“A Condemnation of Nature”: The Reception of Propatheia in Late Antiquity

While the origins of the Stoic principle of προπάθεια (propatheia) remain mysterious, the concept was much more popular in certain philosophical and religious debates of late antiquity. προπάθεια essentially softened the almost impossible ideal of the Stoic sage who does not feel passions by conceding that the initial impression of a passion is not a willful action, and therefore does not vitiate the individual. The most prolific user of the concept was not a Stoic philosopher at all, but rather Didymus the Blind (313–398), the patristic commentator and instructor. After an overview of προπάθεια, especially as it is represented by earlier writers such as Plutarch, Seneca, and Aulus Gellius, my paper analyzes one of the primary applications of προπάθεια in Didymus’ commentaries, especially his Commentary on the Psalms (Comm.Ps.), which appears primarily in connection with Jesus’ fear in the Garden of Gethsemane in the Gospel of Mark. I continue by evaluating the various interpretative threads that come together for Didymus’ justification of Mark’s narrative to work, which however forces Didymus to undermine the traditional Stoic understanding of προπάθεια. I approach Didymus’ writing not to evaluate primarily his theology or the religious implications of his usage of προπάθεια, but rather to explicate the reception of this concept in late antiquity.

While scholarship (e.g. Layton 2000) has focused on a heated exchange between Didymus and a student on the nature of προπάθεια, Didymus also runs into trouble when he tries to analyze Jesus’ experience in the Garden of Gethsemane in Mark 14:33 (“And he brought along Peter and James and John with him, and he began to terrified and afraid”; καὶ παραλαμβάνει τὸν Πέτρον καὶ [τὸν] Ἰάκωβον καὶ [τὸν] Ἰωάννην μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἤρξαντο ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν). While Origen acquits Jesus of sin by categorizing this as an instance of προπάθεια, this simple explanation does not satisfy Didymus, who realizes that passions classified as προπάθειαι (e.g. lust) are condemned elsewhere in the Gospels. If lust is a sin, then surely being terrified is also a sin from a Stoic perspective; indeed, προπάθεια must then represent a “reproach of nature” (Comm.Ps. 43.20–25; φύσεως…ἔλεγχός).

Didymus approaches this problem creatively, by suggesting that only Jesus’ soul (ψυχή) began to be terrified. As a result, Didymus claims that Jesus’ soul is separate from the Trinity, and that this προπάθεια does not reach his mind (νοῦς), which is divine. By so doing, Didymus acquits Jesus’ spiritual and physical parts (νοῦς and σῶμα) of any sin, though his human mind is in some way tainted by προπάθεια. The upshot of Didymus’ interpretation of these various passages is that he is forced to attribute some blame to προπάθεια, however minor, in contrast to his Stoic predecessors: “the entirely clean man, therefore, even considers the little (sin) in thought as a great sin” (Comm.Ps. 76.12–13; ὁ ὁλοκάθαρος οὖν ἀνὴρ καὶ τὸ βραχὺ ἐν λογισμῷ μεγάλην ἁμαρτίαν ἡγεῖται).