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In the list of Caesar’s actions as dictator provided by Suetonius in his Divus Iulius, one item stands out: the requirement that "neve ii, qui pecuariam facerent, minus tertia parte puberum ingenuorum inter pastores haberent" (Suet. Iul. 42). This reference raises far more questions than it answers, from the identities of the people who would be involved to the motives and potential effects of such a policy. The Latin used does not offer much clarity, leaving room for debate around the intended meaning of puberum ingenuorum. Pastores, while typically translated into English as ‘shepherd’, may refer to any kind of herdsman; we face a similar issue with pecuariam, a vague term for animal husbandry. Moreover, the seeming incongruity of Suetonius’ reference to this policy in a list otherwise focused on increasing the population within the city suggests a deeper significance.

At first glance, this requirement for free herdsmen appears to be a measure to reduce urban unemployment while discouraging unrest in the form of rebellion by predominantly enslaved rural laborers – indeed, this is Brunt’s interpretation and the one that has prevailed in what little scholarship addresses this line. The shadow of the Third Servile War still loomed large, and – outside of idyllic pastoral poetry and art – herdsmen had a violent reputation. There is little reason to believe that this measure would be effective at accomplishing this goal. Herding is not considered a particularly profitable source of employment and would be unlikely to appeal to the urban populace, even if they had the skills necessary to perform the work. As for those able to make the transition to herding, the Third Servile War itself demonstrates that the rural free population may sympathize with the enslaved people they worked alongside, making them an ineffective check on their enslaved fellow herdsmen.

With this reference as my focus, I look at how Caesar and his contemporaries grappled with the conflicting economic and social requirements of maintaining a labor force – free(d) and enslaved – in urban and rural settings. I situate this policy within the larger history of so-called popular and agrarian reform to better understand both the motives and effects of such a policy, as well as how it intersected with ongoing tensions between Romans and Italians. This requirement was impractical, unnecessary, and ineffective, but it sent a potent message to landowners and laborers alike throughout Italy: even the people furthest from the urbanity of Rome, tending livestock on land only recently called Roman, were under the watchful eye of Rome’s leaders. I argue that, like many attempts at mandating economic behavior, this policy primarily served the ideological purposes of elites, rather than resolving the tensions that would lead to continued unrest.