Timothy F Clark (University of Chicago)
From Parthica Capta to Rex Parthiis Datus: Crisis and Flexibility in Trajanic Imperial Ideology
A widely debated issue among Roman historians is the ideological construction of the emperor: how did Roman officials or subjects view the emperor? How did such conceptions impact wider conversations about the scope and purpose of Rome’s broader imperial project? Ando (2000), Richardson (2008), Hekster (2015), and others have approached these questions in various ways, from examining the language of empire to the importance of familial lineage to the emperor’s identity. An overlooked area of evidence, however, concerns Roman relations with and representations of Parthia. Parthia marked one of Rome’s most frustrating enemies, a foe that was never overcome over three centuries of conflict. Roman-Parthian relations elucidate how Roman conceptions of the emperor’s power—especially the types of authority he wielded over foreign foes—were challenged by this lack of conclusive victory and how they were changed in response. Research on Roman-Parthian affairs often dismisses these wars as desperate, and ultimately fruitless, bids at gloria by particular emperors (Sheldon 2010; Campbell 1993; Isaac 1992). Less attention has been paid to how the Roman-Parthian conflict was implicated in larger questions of ideology (Schlude 2020; Schneider 1998, 2007).
My paper addresses these questions by explaining how ceremonial and numismatic depictions of Parthia under Trajan reflected flexible conceptions of the means by which the emperor could assert Roman dominance over foreign powers. After Trajan’s forces took the capital of Ctesiphon in 116 CE, Roman imperial coins triumphantly claimed that Parthia had been fully defeated. Above the legend Parthica Capta, gold aureii (RIC II Trajan 324-5) and silver denarii (RIC II Trajan 324, denarius) showed two Parthians sitting in mourning beneath a large trophy and arms.
However, following rebellions against Roman rule later in 116, Trajan had to change tactics. In a diplomatic ceremony outside the Parthian capital, narrated by Cassius Dio (68.30.3) and represented in a bronze sestertius (RIC II Trajan 668), a Parthian noble, Parthamaspates, performed proskynesis before Trajan, who proclaimed Parthamaspates the new client king of Parthia. The reverse legend declared Rex Parthiis Datus. The ceremony and coin substituted the emperor’s ability to defeat his enemies militarily with his power to crown new client kings and assert ritual dominance over them.
This shift testifies to how Roman imperial ideology was altered during a moment of crisis. Trajan hoped that the story of his Parthian campaign would end with his first issue of coins, clear evidence of military victory. But the Mesopotamian revolts forced Trajan and his advisors to adjust their representation of imperial authority—how Trajan was shown to dominate Parthia—to emphasize a new form of Roman power. This real-time adjustment of Roman ideology shows that Trajan was not just attacking Parthia in a blind bid for personal glory—he and his advisors recognized the impact events in Mesopotamia would have on larger perceptions of imperial dominance. Future research can show to what degree such flexibility was replicated at other moments of ideological crisis in the rest of the empire.