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It is generally accepted that the epistemological views advocated by Lucullus in Cicero’s Academica belong to a Stoic framework. In this paper I argue that, though this is true, there are also elements that do not belong within the epistemology of the Stoa, or at very least the Stoa of Chrysippus, and are best understood as innovations on the part of Antiochus of Ascalon, who broke from the Academy’s sceptical epistemology in favour of the Stoa but nevertheless, it seems to me, retained some features of the Academic approach (cf. Polito 2012). Lucullus’ position is expressly that of Antiochus (cf. Glucker 1978: 406–14). And so, if there are commitments on Lucullus’ part that make better sense in light of Academic arguments than those of Chrysippus, they are probably Antiochus’. At very least, this should serve in many cases as a caution against relying too heavily on the content of this dialogue in reconstructing the epistemology of the Old Stoa.  

            After going over the grounds for taking Lucullus’ and Antiochus’ epistemology as generally that of the Stoa (see Barnes 1989: 83–5 and Brittain 2012), I propose that in the testimonia regarding the criterion of truth we find some distinctly Antiochene features. For Carneades, the criterion depends on the psychological affection (πάθος) of clarity (ἐνάργεια) (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.160), and there was an emphasis in the Philonian Academy on the clarity (ἐνάργεια) of representations (Luc. 34). The use of psychological, seemingly subjectively accessible, factors in sorting representations seems to have been taken over by Antiochus (Fladerer 1996: 55–88). We find light used as a metaphor to describe representations and the criterion of truth in Chrysippus (Aët. Plac. 4.12.1 = 2.54 SVF) and Carneades (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.164); I examine Carneades’ use of Chrysippus’ metaphor in order to draw out Academic innovations in dealing with Stoic ideas. Antiochus’ apparent explication of the metaphor (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.162) suggests an Antiochene approach distinct from Chrysippus’.

            In the second part of the paper, I argue that we can find Academic-influenced features in the epistemology advocated by Lucullus, which are likely to be Antiochene (cf. Striker 1997). Metaphors involving light are also important here (Luc. 26, 46, and 61). Lucullus’ insistence that there must be a “special mark” (proprium, Luc. 34) of secure representations that is subjectively accessible lies at the heart of Antiochene epistemology (cf. Luc. 57). This cuts against more internalist readings of the Old Stoa that rely on Cicero (Perin 2005; Nawar 2014) to argue against the externalist reading (Frede 1983).  I conclude that, since the Academica is mainly concerned when it comes to Stoic epistemology with the Antiochene approach, this should impose severe constraints on the use of Cicero as a source for the epistemology of the Old Stoa.