Ümit Öztürk (Stanford University)
The proliferation of new institutionalist approaches to the making of ancient economies has been shaping our understanding of the interplay between societies and economies over the last two decades (Bresson; Lewis et al.; Ober). As part of these theoretical frameworks, the fundamental questions of economic history have been treated mainly from the perspective of legally compliant economic behavior. The large scope of narratives, theoretical necessity to do away with anomalous behavior, and data scarcity could be held responsible for this focus. While the limited evidence concerning aberrant economic behaviors remains an acute problem, its scale should not be overstated: as the recent histories of socially illicit behavior (Christ) and law enforcement (Bauschatz) illustrated, the opportunities to develop alternative queries are copious once we extend our fields of vision. A similar call was more recently made by Hartnett and Dawdy for an archaeology of illegal and illicit economies, and the explorations in piracy and prostitution already shed light on multiple facets of such economic activities (e.g. De Souza; Lewis; Glazebrook and Henry; Cohen). Nevertheless, smuggling has been the missing link in the study of illegal and illicit economies as incidental references relegated to the footnotes have so far denied an attempt for a systematic historical analysis.
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the available evidence and ascertain the workings of smuggling in the eastern Mediterranean between the fifth-second centuries BCE. To do so, the paper has three sections. The first part offers a brief overview of the institutional context by examining the legal terminology pertaining to contraband trade. For this, I focus on epigraphic and papyrological sources such as “Revenue Laws” papyrus (P.Rev. Laws) and the Customs Laws of Asia (Lex Port.), which will help reconstruct how the lawmakers historically conceptualized smuggling. The second part presents case studies and explores the sort of goods circulated, the identity of actors, and the organization of contraband trade. To make a better sense of the limited historical data, I organize my discussion under three broad categories: illegal trade under usual regulations, trade restrictions, and state monopolies. The final section illustrates observable trends and offers explanations for illegal trade. In particular, this paper highlights the role of two principal elements in accounting for smuggling: a cost-benefit analysis based on a precarious balance between various factors such as profit-seeking, absence of legally binding contracts, risk minimization, trust, and expert knowledge; and misalignments or decoupling between formal institutions and social and cultural norms and expectations. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of such economic strategies available to individuals and communities in response to state regulations for the larger social and economic history.