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The Physical Deformity of the Fetus and the Intelligence of the Soul in the Hippocratic writers and Aristotle

In Plato's *Timaeus*, stupidity is described as a disease of the soul (88b). Such a soul lacks reason and is thus classified as the lower type of soul that is subject to the appetite, to hunger. *Regimen I* from the Hippocratic corpus explains a lack of intelligence in the soul as a disease and, more specifically, as a disease of the body. The level of intelligence that the soul has is connected to the constitution of the body. By analyzing the description of the development of the fetus and of the soul in the Hippocratic writers and in Aristotle's *Generation of Animals*, I will consider whether the development of the fetus is concurrent with the development of the soul in antiquity. I will seek to answer such questions as: to what extent is the level of intelligence the soul can attain connected to its physical constitution and to its form? to what extent are the development of the soul and the form of the fetus coextensive?

I will first consider explanations for the physical deformity of the fetus and the intelligence of the soul in the Hippocratic corpus. "On the Seed" attributes physical deformity in a child either to an external cause (the mother is struck in the region of her womb) or to an internal one (the embryo is constricted in the womb and some body part does not develop normally). I will relate the Hippocratic writer's explanations of the causes of physical deformity to the development of the soul's intelligence in *Regimen I* and to Aristotle's view on the embryo and the soul in the *Generation of Animals*. In *Regimen I.xxv*, the intelligence of the soul (*phronesios psyche*) as well as the lack of intelligence (*aphrosynes*), is determined by the balance of the humors and, specifically, of fire and water. The soul with the greatest intelligence (*phronimotath*), with the best memory (*mnemonikotate*), is the result of fire at its moistest and water at its driest. Cognitive difference results from an imbalance; similarly in "On the Seed," the deformed fetus inhabits a womb that is out of proportion for it and so constricts its development.

The connection between the body of the fetus and the *phronesis* of the soul will be further examined by relating Aristotle's views on embryology and the soul to consider to what extent the form of the fetus is connected to its the form of its soul. In the *Generation of Animals* Aristotle describes the embryo as having a soul (B3, 736a33-736b16). Indeed, the embryo has all forms of the soul as described in *On the Soul*—nutritive, perceptive, and rational—in potentiality but not yet in actuality. The question is, if the fetus is deformed—in particular, if it is deformed in its intellect or *noesis* and is cognitively disabled—does it still possess the potentiality for the three aspects of the soul? When the fetus is physically deformed, is this the result of a deformity of the soul, of a lack of intelligence and cognition? Does physical deformity presuppose a lack of *phronesis* and of *noesis*, of intelligence and intellect, and can it then be described as a deformed soul?

In closing, I will again refer to the *Timaeus* in noting how the language used to describe the development of the fetus in the Hippocratic writers parallels that used to describe the growth of the soul into its "lordliest" (*kyriotatos*) form in Plato's dialogue.