PREFACE

The abstracts in this volume appear in the form submitted by their authors without editorial intervention. They are arranged in the same order as the Annual Meeting Program. An index by name at the end of the volume is provided. This is the thirty first volume of Abstracts published by the Association in as many years, and suggestions of improvements in future years are welcome.

Again this year, the Program Committee has invited affiliated groups holding sessions at the Annual Meeting to submit abstracts for publication in this volume. The following groups have published abstracts this year.

AFFILIATED GROUPS

American Association for Neo-Latin Studies
American Classical League
American Society of Greek and Latin Epigraphy
American Society of Papyrologists
Eta Sigma Phi
Friends of Numismatics
International Plutarch Society
International Society for Neoplatonic Studies
Lambda Classical Caucus
Medieval Latin Studies Group
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Society for Ancient Medicine and Pharmacy
Society for Ancient Mediterranean Religions
Society for Late Antiquity
Women’s Classical Caucus

The Program Committee thanks the authors of these abstracts for their cooperation in making the timely production of this volume possible.

2012 ANNUAL MEETING
PROGRAM COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Joseph Farrell, Chair
Christopher A. Faraone
Kirk Freudenburg
Maud Gleason
Corinne O. Pache
Adam D. Blistein (ex officio)
Heather H. Gasda (ex officio)
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ......................................................... iii
Affiliated Groups ............................................. iii
2012 Annual Meeting Program Committee Members ................................................. iii

## FIRST SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Myth and History in Early Imperial Latin Poetry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ideology, Dramaturgy, and Textuality in Greek Tragedy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Thematics and Narratology of Greek Historiography</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Problems in Greek and Roman Economic History</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>New Adventures in Greek Pedagogy</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Islamic and Arabic Receptions of Classical Literature (organized by the APA Committee on Classical Tradition and Reception)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Going Green: The Emergence of Bucolic in Augustan Rome</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Culture and Society in Greek, Roman, and Early Byzantine Egypt (organized by the American Society of Papyrologists)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The Cultural Dynamics of Ancient Empires (Seminar)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## SECOND SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Seneca, Thyestes: Ethics, Theatricality, and the Passions</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Classical Presences in Modern and Contemporary Music, Cinema, and Poetry</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rhetoric in Cicero and the Ciceronian Tradition</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Technologies of Time and Memory</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Appearance and Reality in the Ancient Novelistic Discourse</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Themes of Roman Historiography</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Literary Theory in Graduate and Undergraduate Classics Curricula (organized by the APA Education Committee)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>The Discourse of Marriage in Hellenistic and Imperial Literature (organized by the International Plutarch Society)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Current Research in Neo-Latin Studies (organized by the American Association for Neo-Latin Studies)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 21: Technical and Symbolic Language in Ancient Philosophy</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 22: Pindar’s Thoughtworld</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 23: Canon Formation and Intellectual History</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 24: Problems in Greek Legal History</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 25: Eros and Generic Enrichment</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Session 26: Bodies in Motion: Contemporary Approaches to Choral Performance  
  (organized by the APA Committee on Ancient and Modern Performance) | 104  |
| Session 28: Campanian Cultures: Poetics, Location, and Identity | 114  |
| Session 29: Letters in Late Antiquity (organized by the Society for Late Antiquity) | 120  |
| Session 30: Historiography, Poetry, and the Intertext (Seminar) | 124  |
| **PRESIDENTIAL PANEL**                                   |      |
| Comic Dimensions of Greek Myth                           | 128  |
| **FOURTH SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS**             |      |
| Session 31: Stagecraft and Dramaturgy of Greek Tragedy    | 131  |
| Session 32: Language and Memory in Greek History and Historiography | 136  |
| Session 33: Unruly Satire from Horace to Spenser         | 142  |
| Session 34: Myth and Mythography in Roman Poetry         | 147  |
| Session 35: Attica beyond Athens: The Athenian Countryside in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods (Joint APA/AIA Panel) | 153  |
| Session 36: Classical Tradition in Brazil: Translation, Rewriting, and Reception | 157  |
| Session 37: Re(imagining) Caesar (organized by the American Classical League). | 161  |
| Session 38: Transgressive Spaces in Classical Antiquity (organized by the Lambda Classical Caucus). | 165  |
| Session 39: Ancient Greek Philosophy (organized by the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy) | 171  |
| Session 40: Religion and Violence in Late Roman North Africa (Seminar) | 172  |
**FIFTH SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Some Late Antique Vergils</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Gender and Civic Identity</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Alexander and the Hellenistic World</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Claiming Troy: Receptions of Homer in Imperial Greek Literature</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Truth Value and the Value of Truth in Roman Historiography</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>From Temple Banks to Patron Gods: Religion, Economy, and the Investigation of Ancient Mediterranean Ritual (organized by the Society for Ancient Mediterranean Religions)</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIXTH SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Triumviral and Imperial Roman History</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Horatian Metapoetics</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Paratragedy, Paracomedy, Tragicomedy</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Sport and Spectacle in the Ancient World (organized by the APA Outreach Committee)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Poetry on Stone: Verse Inscriptions in the Greco-Roman World (organized by the American Society of Greek and Latin Epigraphy)</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Intellectual Culture in the Third Century CE: Philosophy, Religion, and Rhetoric between the Second and Third Sophistic (Seminar)</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SEVENTH SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Late Antique Literary Culture: Rome, Byzantium, and Beyond</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Problems of Flavian Poetics</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Greek Myth, Ritual, and Religion</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Teaching History and Classics with Inscriptions (organized by the APA Ancient History Committee)</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Teaching Classical Reception Studies (Workshop)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Sexual Labor in the Ancient World (organized by the Women’s Classical Caucus)</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>The Next Generation: Papers by Undergraduate Classics Students (organized by Eta Sigma Phi)</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Medical Humors and Classical Culture: Blood (organized by the Society for Ancient Medicine and Pharmacy)</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Coins and History (organized by the Friends of Numismatics)</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### EIGHTH SESSION FOR THE READING OF PAPERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Metaphor from Homer to Seneca</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Selected Exostructures of Hellenistic Epigram</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Catullan Identities, Ancient and Modern</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Political Maneuvering in Republican Roman History</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Language and Meter</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>(Dis)Continuities in the Texts of Lucian</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The Literary and Philosophical Dimensions of Allegory in Neoplatonic Discourse (organized by the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies)</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Author Index                                                                                           | 297  |
In an attempt to rouse his troops to march on Rome in Book 1 of Lucan’s *Bellum Civile*, Caesar condemns Pompey’s connection to Rome’s most recent violent dictator, Sulla. In a strikingly vivid epic simile, Caesar compares his rival, Pompey, to wild tigers, following their mother through the Hyrcanian jungle and feeding deeply on the gore of slain herds. Emotional, graphic, and poetic, this is not the Caesar we know from the *Commentarii* or his extant speeches (Fantham, 60). Indeed, in describing the horrors of Rome’s recent past, this Caesar has more in common with Lucan himself, well-known for his use of violent imagery and epic similes in his account of the disastrous civil war. I argue that the tiger simile of Book 1 constitutes a moment of poetic competition between Lucan and Caesar over how Rome’s past should be remembered, a competition in which the poet undermines his character’s re-imagining of historical memory through his own appeal to the reader’s literary memory.

From an oratorical perspective, Caesar’s tiger simile has a number of features that might have effectively persuaded his troops. Caesar encourages the soldiers to recall the Sullan civil war, an event many of his men likely experienced in their own lifetimes. He then tendentiously re-imagines those events in the wild, foreign setting of the Hyrcanian jungle, a move which not only transforms his enemy into a bloodthirsty beast, but also obscures Pompey’s Roman identity. The comparison to the tiger cubs succeeds in infantilizing Pompey, who must follow his “mother,” Sulla, to be fed. Furthermore, the animalistic elements proper to the tiger portion of the simile contaminate the description of Pompey, as, cat-like, he “licks the Sullan sword” (*Sullanum...lambere ferrum*, 330). Not only is the Sullan protégé infantilized and dehumanized, but he is implicitly “de-Romanized” through the transfer of the scene from the Roman forum to wilds of the Hyrcanian jungle. Caesar’s characterization of Pompey’s earlier career would encourage his military audience to view their enemy as a childish, literally bloodthirsty, uncivilized animal.

The very same words, however, would inspire an entirely different memory in Lucan’s readerly audience. As Roche observes in his commentary: “[Hyrcania is] the only place for an epic tiger to be since Verg. *A.4.367,*” where the scorned Dido famously rages at Aeneas “Hyrcanian tigresses gave you their teats.” In well-engineered moment of dramatic irony, Lucan has his Caesar unknowingly align himself with the heart-broken Carthaginian queen, railing against his own noble ancestor, Aeneas. The very words that Caesar hoped would impugn the memory of Pompey serve to condemn his own. Although the allusion to the Hyrcanian tiger would be the initial trigger for the reader to connect Caesar’s speech to Dido’s diatribe, additional similarities
subsequently emerge. Caesar’s somewhat incongruous apostrophe to Pompey in the midst of a speech to his troops matches Dido’s direct indictment of Aeneas. Both characters launch a series of stinging rhetorical questions (BC.1.333-4; A.4.368-371). Perhaps most tellingly, both Caesar and Dido call their respective foes “faithless,” improbe (BC.1.334; A.4.386). Lucan’s appeal to his reader’s literary memory transforms Caesar’s seemingly patriotic cause into a private domestic dispute and his poetic language into the rantings of a wronged woman. His primary audience, the army, is forgotten, as the embittered leader harangues his father-in-law for his treachery. This is not the only moment in the poem in which Caesar demonstrates a comical ignorance of his own family’s epic, the Aeneid (see Tesoriero), but it may be the most pointedly ironic.

Scholars have long observed a rivalry between Lucan and his character, Caesar, in the realms of history and memory (see especially Masters and Rossi). Here, the Roman general attempts to co-opt the language of the poet in an evocative simile, only to find his own words used against him through a particularly crafty allusion engineered by Lucan. In such a poetic showdown, it is only right that the author himself should have the last laugh.

The concordia discors of Lucan's Cato: Myth, History, and the Will to Believe
Christopher L. Caterine

Whether Lucan has depicted Cato the Younger in a positive or negative light in Bellum Civile 9 has been a point of scholarly contention for over a century. In this paper I shall try to resolve this interpretive crux. I will argue first that Lucan’s characterization of Cato is intentionally contradictory. The narrator repeatedly praises him in glowing terms as a Stoic sage and Republican hero, while pervasive negative undercurrents in the narrative itself invite us to question this rosy evaluation. Despite countless efforts, critics have not succeeded in resolving this tension, and a recent revival in the debate suggests that they are unlikely to do so any time soon. To this end, this paper will demonstrate that the contradictory depiction of Cato is deeply rooted in the poem, and propose that it is therefore likely to be an intentional feature of it. My second and more crucial point is that Lucan alerts his reader to this interpretive issue through his treatment of myth, history, and science. Digressions on these topics make up a full quarter of Bellum Civile 9, yet each of them is repeatedly challenged as a useful means of understanding the world as Lucan portrays it. This paper will propose that these passages work in tandem to draw the readers’ attention to the issue of judging the events and actors of the civil war; at the same time, however, they undermine the bases on which those very judgments might be formed. The result is a concordia discors that precludes evaluative certainty: whether one chooses to praise Cato as a hero or condemn him as a would-be autocrat, the narrative ensures that doubts will linger.

The most obvious positive statements about Cato are a series of editorial interjections, occurring at regular intervals throughout Bellum Civile 9, in which the narrator offers explicit praise of his character (9.19-35, 188-9, 215-7, 255, 292-3, 406-10, 599-10, 564-5, 587-604, 617-8, 881-9). As D’Alessandro Behr (2007) has argued, this powerful voice prompts us to interpret Cato’s actions favorably, and in particular to see Cato as an ideological challenger to Caesar and to the monarchy established in his name. On the other hand, there are a series of scenes that utilize
intratextual allusion and a manipulation of the historical record to suggest profound similarities between Cato and Caesar (5.237-373, 7.45-150, 9.215-94; 9.498-86, 961-99). Drawing on the work of Matthew Roller (2001) and Yanick Maes (2009), I shall argue that the result of Cato’s leadership for the men who follow him is virtually identical to the absolute loyalty demanded by Caesar. Since both optimistic and pessimistic readings are so deeply rooted in the text, it is impossible to dismiss either one.

The interpretive difficulty that results from this seeming contradiction is reinforced through a series of digressions in which the narrator pauses to explain geographical disputes or relate aetiological myths (9.303-18, 348-67, 411-44, 619-99). When introducing these passages, however, he claims that his mythical tales cannot be trusted and asserts the impossibility of deciding between the available scientific theories. This suggests that both poetic and practical knowledge are equally uncertain. Indeed, the narrator then insists through a series of second-person apostrophes that his audience must decide for itself what to believe (9.411-3). This subjectivity is ultimately brought to bear on Cato. During an editorial sequence praising his leadership, the narrator claims that Cato’s difficult march across Libya proved him worthy of a great reputation (*magna...fama*, 9.593-4). In a book that presents Cato in contradictory terms and underscores the unreliability of *fama*, however, it seems likely that in this, too, individual readers must make their own judgments. Although the poet has presented us with two, equally valid portrayals, he emphatically refuses to help us decide between them.

**Fear of Falling: Phaethon Figurations in Early Imperial Poetry**

Virginia M. Closs

This paper explores aspects of the various ideological, aesthetic, and philosophical ends that the figure of Phaethon served in Roman literature for authors starting in the late first century BCE through the early second century CE. Allegorized as early as Plato (*Tim*. 22c), the Phaethon myth’s potential as a vehicle for dramatizing early imperial anxieties about inadequately prepared, or even recklessly destructive leaders comes into focus in the late triumviral and early Julio-Claudian crises of succession. Nero and “his” fire, along with the doomed emperor’s pronounced interest in solar imagery and chariot racing, added a striking confirmation of, and further provocation to, such interpretations.

The Augustan period produced a range of texts linking overly ambitious or unstable leaders with the fiery destruction of their homes, from Vergil’s Dido to Livy’s Hannibal. The latter, as Clauss (1997) has shown, is itself constructed as an allusive echo of Sallust's Catiline, suggesting the ways in which the authors of the period enliven and complicate well-worn mythic and historical narratives by calling to mind more recent events and protagonists. Ovid’s Phaethon narrative in *Metamorphoses* 1.747-2.400 has an especially strong set of associations with the Augustan Principate; Fratantuono (2011) offers a reading of the episode highlighting its potential as a metaphor for jeopardized succession within the imperial family, echoing the suggestions of Gale (2000, 34-38) on the hints of Lucretius' Phaethon imminent in the charioteer simile with which Vergil closes *Georgics* 1. The contrast that emerges from these texts is more complex than simply claiming affiliation with one faction or another in a specific political dispute. Rather, we see the Roman imagination struggling to confront the paradoxical notion that a society's
collective deliverer and its scorched-earth destroyer could be found within a single family, or indeed embodied within a single individual.

Extending the concepts outlined above into the later Julio-Claudian and post-Neronian period, I examine the dividends they pay for authors reworking the Phaethon motif under the influence of later emperors and new sets of concerns. The images of Phaethon and universal conflagration as united in Manilius (1.755-804, 5.734-45) invite attention for the ways in which they weave together political, philosophical, and cosmological concerns (Gale 2011). Manilius, selecting from an endless array of available narratives, uses Phaethon to shape representations suited to addressing pressing contemporary questions, explicitly linking Phaethon's destruction with civil war and political crisis. Likewise, we have the alarming quip Suetonius (Caligula 11) assigns to Tiberius: that he was raising Gaius as "a Phaethon for the whole world."

Seneca and Lucan, both keen readers of Manilius, also connect scenes of cosmic dissolution and social discord with images and narratives invoking the Phaethon myth. Specific texts meriting exploration include Seneca's citations of Ovid's Phaethon narrative at de Providentia 5.10-11, de Vita Beata 20.5 and Medea 598 ff, and affinities between Nero and Phaethon identifiable in the Natural Questions (cf. Champlin 2003, 134-5). Lucan's address to Nero in the proem of the Bellum Civile (1.45-66) invokes Phaethon in a famously problematic fashion, initiating a lengthy engagement with Phaethon throughout the epic (cf. the Eridanus at 2.408-424, place names catalogued at 3.169-297, and the Libyan desert in Book 9).

Finally, much of the above became eerily prescient, if perhaps slightly overdetermined, in the wake of 64 and Nero's catastrophic end. The proleptically incendiary figurations of Nero in the historical drama Octavia (808-809, cf. Ferri ad loc.), as well as the apparent popularity of Phaethon imagery in Flavian literature, further suggest the new ideological stakes of these motifs. Thus, Phaethon's trajectory through the literature of the early principate illustrates the intertwining of myth and history in Rome's literary imagination, adding dimension to the ongoing discussion of the relationship between literary allusion and cultural memory.

**Quisquis is est: The “Ibis” in Ibis**
Joy E. Reeber

Ovid's caginess with the identity of his enemy in the Ibis is one of the most notorious aspects of the poem (Casali, Williams): the figure entirely lacks a real name and does not even receive a pseudonym until lines 55ff., when Ovid identifies Callimachus as his major influence and borrows his predecessor's choice of the name 'Ibis' for his own enemy. Despite the emphasis on Greek precedent seen in the characterization of his enemy, however, I argue that Ovid's Ibis has been carefully crafted to engage with the generic tendencies of Roman satire, especially as seen in Horace's own conceptualization of the "walking muse." By writing a poem like the Ibis, which claims its primary influence from Greek literature even as it ostentatiously avoids the Roman genre with the closest ties to invective, Ovid is using the literature to reflect the social estrangement forced upon him by his exile and absence from Rome. He might have imagined a scene or meeting as a means of expressing his frustration with his anonymous enemy, as he had done elsewhere in the exilic corpus. Instead, he chose to echo the marginalization of his relegation with a poem that is kept apart from satire generically, despite the thematic similarity of a poetic persona railing against a particular person. Satire was a genre inextricably bound to
not only the city but to the action of living there, the social connections that came of being a 
Roman citizen surrounded by Roman citizens (Freudenburg 2005). Ovid's deliberate avoidance 
of contemporary urban aspects in the Ibis, with its long and recondite catalogue of 
mythologically-based curses, therefore emphasizes the sense of displacement inherent in exile 
(Edwards, Favro) - just as his enemy's uncertain identity recalls the later satirists' refusal - or 
inability - to name names.

The anonymity of "Ibis" remains consistent throughout the poem, but the most emphasis on the 
issue comes early on in the poem, leading up to the authorial assignment of his enemy's 
pseudonym in line 62. Earlier in the poem, Ovid even seems to be encouraging confusion on his 
audience's part: in particular, a sudden and jarring shift in lines 22-3 between ipse ("Ibis") and 
ille (Augustus) leaves his audience scrambling to identify two people rather than one (Casali). 
This confusion only grows with the eventual appearance of the pseudonym: although "Ibis" is 
everywhere in the text, emphasized by a triple polyptoton (Ibin, 55; Ibide, 59; Ibidis, 62) across 
the passage, he is also nowhere, since each use of the name refers specifically to Callimachus' 
enemy. The target of Ovid's poem remains hidden in second-person pronouns (teque tuosque, 56; 
tu, 62): despite the presence of the name in the oblique cases, Ibis itself (the nominative and 
vocative form) is nowhere to be found. In the end, Ovid is carefully managing his audience's 
expectations of addressee and genre with his treatment of his enemy's name in both the 
introductory section and the excursus on Callimachus' Ibis. The poet's refusal to give a straight 
answer has become a clever means of sidestepping Horace's “Lucilius problem” (Freudenburg 
2001) - that of writing in a genre whose pinnacle had already been reached, a specifically 
Republican genre which had become too dangerous to use without retreating from the use of 
actual names to the safety of anonymity. By trumpeting a Greek poem as his primary influence, 
and one written by an author who had himself struggled with the purpose of poetic composition 
in an ostensibly inferior age, Ovid is therefore acknowledging his own belatedness even as he 
asserts his desire - his need - to keep writing.

The Triumph Motif in Ovid’s Exile Poetry: Reclaiming 
Imperial Subjection on the Margins of Empire 
Nandini B. Pandey

Ovid’s depictions of imperial triumphs in Tristia 3.12 and 4.2 and Ex Ponto 2.1 and 3.4 
ostensibly advance his self-portrayal as a ‘model imperial subject’ after his relegatio to Tomis in 
8 CE. However, by highlighting the difficulty of information transmission between Rome’s 
center and periphery, these poems also make a radical assertion: that provincial subjects play an 
important imaginative role in constructing imperial power abroad.

Habinek has argued that Ovid’s exile poems present ‘dependency and subjection … as the 
necessary condition for enjoyment of the benefits of the imperial system.’ Davis counters that 
they instead dramatize the difficulty of sustaining Romanitas on the frontier, and Hinds and 
Hardie explore the poet’s anxiety to render himself ‘present’ to Rome despite his absence in 
Tomis. Building on these, I argue that Ovid uses the motif of the triumph to reapply these 
problems to the emperor himself, who faces the converse challenge of constructing his presence 
in the provinces.
The triumphal ceremony by definition represents the transfer of power and information from Rome’s periphery to its center. Moreover, as Beard notes, an imperator wishing to extend his triumph beyond its ritual time and space needed to re-present it, in turn, to audiences outside the urbs. This need grew more pressing after Augustus’ ascendancy, as triumphs became less frequent and Rome’s population more far-flung.

Ovid’s longing for report of a triumph in Tristia 3.12.25-48 raises some associated problems. It suggests that Roman identity stems from participation in such communal rituals, but that citizens in the provinces are regrettably excluded. It also illustrates the unreliability and slowness of information travel across empire – a problem that not only threatens Ovid’s ability to send epistles to Rome, but also the emperor’s ability to send news, victories, and his own authority to the provinces.

Ovid presents a solution in Tristia 4.2 when, in the absence of news from Rome, he creates and experiences an anticipated triumph in his imagination. In fact, when news of Tiberius’ Pannonian triumph of 13 CE finally arrives, Ovid’s resultant poem (Ex Ponto 2.1) ostentatiously falls short of Tristia 4.2 in enargeia and inspiration. In Ex Ponto 3.4.1-60, Ovid blames the shortcomings of Ex Ponto 2.1 on the belatedness and poor quality of the news reports that find their way to Tomis from Rome. Taken together, these poems suggest that poetry can play a vital role in helping subjects on the frontier to participate imaginatively in the rituals that underpin Roman identity.

The substitution of imaginative for actual experience, however, raises problems of its own. Tristia 4.2 appears to rescind Ovid’s flippant treatment of the triumph in Ars Amatoria 1.217-228, where he advises would-be lovers to invent names for the cities and rivers on parade. However, the fictive triumph of Tristia 4.2 makes a similarly subversive suggestion: representations of imperial power need bear no relationship to reality so long as they inspire loyalty in their viewers.

Ovid embraces this idea in Ex Ponto 3.4.89-114 with a bold prophecy of future triumph that effectively eliminates the need for a real victory. The poem itself renders this increasingly inaccessible ritual into a vivid imaginative experience that can be shared by readers across time and space. However, it also treats the emperor as a public symbol that is constructed and authorized by the mental gaze of his subjects (cf. Ex Ponto 2.1.1-18). Moreover, Ovid represents the triumph as part of a process of change that applies not only to Rome’s enemies but also to Rome herself. The barbarian peoples now paraded in triumph will someday, like the Getes, be incorporated into empire and become part of the emperor’s validating audience. Ovid’s exilic representations of triumph assist in this process by sharing a quintessentially Roman experience with peoples on the periphery of empire. They also suggest that imperial power exists in part through the imaginative participation of its subjects.
When Clytemnestra, murdered in the second play of the Oresteia, appears in the third as a speaking character (Eu. 94-116) she draws attention to her state as an image: ὄναρ γὰρ ὕμας νῦν Κλυταιμήστρα καλῶ, “for I, a dream, Clytemnestra, now invoke you!” (Eu. 116). In this paper I argue that the Ghost’s appearance in a dream, its relation to living Clytemnestra, and its story about the underworld allow further insight into the problems of image and reality that the Oresteia continually raises.

Characters in the Agamemnon and Choephori have already subjected dreams and images to suspicion, criticism, and interpretation (cf. Goldhill 1984). The Chorus and Clytemnestra in dialogue equate the “phantoms of dreams” (ὄνείρων φάσματ’ Ag. 274) to divine deception (δολόσαντος θεοῦ Ag. 273), to “the (vain) belief…of a slumbering mind” (δόξαν…βριζούσης φρενώς Ag. 275), and to “un-winged rumor” (ἀπτερος φάτις Ag. 276). The Chorus connects “dream-appearances” (ὄνειρόφαντοι Ag. 420) to “(vain) beliefs” (δόξαι Ag. 421) and Clytemnestra herself opposes dreams to the truth (εἴτ’ οὖν ἐληθέξει εἴτ’ ὀνειρίσατον δίκην Ag. 491). Dreams, the uncertainty of their interpretation, and the underworld are bound together in the Choephori when Clytemnestra’s portentous nightmare seems sent straight from Agamemnon in Hades (Ch. 32-41). However, with the appearance of Clytemnestra’s Ghost, dream and image become reified in a character with both stage-presence and speech. Moreover, the Ghost demands to be treated as a self even after death, using first-person verbs to tell the story of her shame in the underworld (e.g. ἐγώ Eu. 94; “and I wander shamefully” αἰσχρῶς δ’ ἄλωμαι 99).

Therefore I argue that in naming herself Clytemnestra and calling for vengeance the Ghost demonstrates a continuation of selfhood that defies simple categorization under rubrics such as “insubstantiality of images” or “deceptive uses of language.”

Several major readings (e.g., Winnington-Ingram 1983, McClure 1999, Foley 2001, cf. Thalmann 1985 and Zeitlin 1990) have demonstrated how Clytemnestra’s living character manipulates speech in ways that transgress political and social norms. Yet far less attention has been paid to the Ghost, who tends to be absent altogether from these discussions. In fact, the Ghost both extends and transforms Clytemnestra’s previous uses of image and the underworld. The living Clytemnestra, like Odysseus (cf. especially Pucci 1987 and Bowie 1993), fashions fictions and imagined situations both to deceive and to justify herself. For example, as part of her explanation for the murder of Agamemnon, Clytemnestra envisions an ironic scene in Hades: Iphigeneia, the daughter Agamemnon sacrificed, welcomes him with embraces and kisses (Ag. 1555-9, cf. 1525-9). The Ghost’s later depiction of those she killed (which includes Agamemnon) relentlessly pursuing her in Hades reverses that imagined scene (Eu. 95-100). Yet the resultant connection with living Clytemnestra’s tendentious language also casts suspicion on the Ghost’s own description, since she is using the account of her shame in the underworld to spur the Furies to avenge her. In other words, the Ghost, though closely connected to the afterlife, manipulates the language of that other realm in similar ways to the living Clytemnestra.
The Ghost of Clytemnestra is thus a nexus point for the appeal to another realm (Hades) as ethical justification and the *Oresteia*’s concern with problems of language.

It has been argued that the language of phantoms, dreams, image, and unreality reflects Greek tragedy’s theatrical illusion, which stages characters who are both visible and patently artificial (Vernant 1990, cf. Zeitlin 2010). As a speaking dream the Ghost not only continues the living Clytemnestra’s language of image and the “elsewhere” of the underworld, but also highlights the illusory aspect of dramatic characters. In addressing these related issues, this analysis of the Ghost scene offers a step towards additional understandings of Clytemnestra’s language as a whole, ethical considerations of the afterlife as “elsewhere,” and the *Oresteia*’s approach to its own imaginative workings.

**The Gendering of Truth in Two Aeschylean Passages**

*Arum Park*

This paper examines the nonverbal signals of coming events in Aeschylean tragedy, the accuracy of such signals, and the treatment of characters who rely on them. Aeschylus delimits nonverbal and verbal indicators of truth by using ἔτυμος and ἀληθής to describe the former and the latter, respectively. I will argue that this distinction parallels a “gendering” of truth, as it is female characters who put faith in nonverbal messages, only to be ridiculed by their male interlocutors for doing so. Ultimately, the female characters are vindicated when their interpretations of such signals are proved to be accurate.

Tragedy itself highlights gender difference, which has been a well-mined area for scholarship (e.g., Foley 2001; Zeitlin 1990, 1996), and it has been argued that male and female characters even have different modes of speech (McClure 1999; Mossman 2001). Furthermore, numerous studies of terms for truth have been conducted (e.g., Cole 1983; Italie 1964; Krischer 1965; Luther 1935; Snell 1975), but none of these has identified gender difference as a parallel for, and possible indicator of, the distinction between ἔτυμος and ἀληθής.

This paper will briefly summarize Aeschylus’ use of ἔτυμος and ἀληθής: the former more frequently designates the accuracy of nonverbal signs while the latter describes verbal messages and the dispositions of those who communicate them. I will then compare the Chorus of Theban Women in *Seven Against Thebes* and Clytemnestra from *Agamemnon* in light of these two terms. The specific sections I will discuss are Sept. 78-286 and Ag. 264-500, where the Chorus of *Seven* reacts to a foreboding dust-cloud and Clytemnestra interprets the beacon-fires. Both the cloud and the fires are nonverbal signals of events about to occur and are described as ἔτυμος or ἐτήτυμος (*Ag. 477; Sept. 82*). Furthermore, the receptions of the Chorus and of Clytemnestra are marked by hostility, skepticism or impatience, and by numerous references to their femaleness. By contrast, messenger-figures, who are invariably male, are never questioned about the accuracy of their messages, nor is their maleness a point of emphasis or contention. The Herald of *Agamemnon* provides the most illustrative example of this contrast, but messenger-figures from the other extant tragedies also confirm it. Not only are these messenger-figures believed by the recipients of their messages, they are also welcomed wholeheartedly and expected to communicate accurate words. The contrast between the belief in the messenger-figure and the
doubt or hostility toward Clytemnestra and the Chorus of *Seven* is further marked by the use of ἀληθῆς rather than ἔτυμος to describe the words of the messengers (e.g., *Ag.* 491).

Not only do these contrasting uses of ἀληθῆς and ἔτυμος demonstrate a certain semantic distinction in which ἀληθῆς is reserved for verbal communications, whereas ἔτυμος can mark signs of a nonverbal nature; it is also the contrasting contexts that point up further differences. The disdain experienced by the female communicators of nonverbal messages and the mannered use of ἔτυμος to describe their messages demonstrates a distinction between the credibility they are assigned and the credibility they ought to enjoy. Both the Chorus of *Seven* and Clytemnestra, despite the negative reactions they experience from their interlocutors, turn out to be right: the dust-cloud indeed signals the imminent threat to Thebes while the beacon-fires likewise accurately communicate the fall of Troy and the imminent return of Agamemnon. This interplay of doubt and vindication suggests that, for Aeschylus, the truth may be found in less than obvious places, which the female characters are more likely to detect.

**Dramatic Means and Ideological Ends in Euripides’ *Ion***

*Victoria Wohl*

Tragic plots, wrote Aristotle, should have a beginning, middle, and end (*Poetics* §7). Euripidean drama puts surprising pressure on this seemingly obvious claim. In Euripides, as in all tragedy, the story’s end is known in advance. But the means by which it is reached are so indirect and adventitious that for much of the play we are uncertain where we are headed and whether we will actually get there. This non-alignment of means and ends produces dramatic suspense, of course, but I argue that it also has ideological effects: the “open structure” (as Mastronarde terms it) of Euripidean plotting induces a longing for closure and a commitment to the ideological entailments of the play’s resolution.

These entailments are particularly clear in Euripides’ *Ion*, for here the end is nothing less than the foundation of Athens’ civic and imperial identity. The play stages Ion’s assumption of his role as forebear of Athens’ autochthonous lineage and Ionian hegemony. This telos is heavily overdetermined, both dramatically (Hermes announces it in the prologue) and ideologically. But that telos is reached through sheer tukhê: a circuitous tale of abandoned babies, mistaken identities, and failed murder plots. The play’s tension between dramatic means and ideological ends reveals the contingency of Athens’ civic and imperial ideology, as numerous scholars have argued, exposing Athens’ national saga as a tale of violence and deception and its imperial power a matter of chance, not divine necessity.

Such a reading of *Ion* tells only half the story, however, for it fails to consider how the play works to create a psychic attachment to the very ideologies it critiques. It does this by yoking these political ideologies to the emotionally charged plot line of separation and reunion between a bereft mother and her long-lost son. This intimate anagnôrisis is the narrative engine of the play and Euripides deploys all of tragedy’s resources to heighten the pathos. Ion’s cries for the mother he never knew (563-65) and Kreousa’s lyric lamentations for her lost infant (859-922, 961-63) are reinforced by the play’s uncommon plot structure. Usually in Euripides’ plays of recognition and intrigue the recognition precedes the intrigue (compare, e.g., *Helen*), but in *Ion* the recognition is delayed and comes only after Kreousa and Ion, in their ignorance, have
reached a murderous pitch of hostility. This delay turns the *anagnôrisis* into the play’s *telos*, not a means toward the end but the end itself, and the longer it is deferred the more we come to fear that we may, in fact, never reach it. This plot structure transforms Athens’ autochthonous and imperial identity from a point of certainty, which lets us enjoy the ironies of the early scenes in complacent anticipation of a happy ending, into an object of anxiety and desire, as the play’s endless deferrals make us long for a resolution that, when it finally comes, seems both miraculous and inevitable.

In this way the play leads its audience to accept as a happy necessity a *telos* that it has itself shown to be purely contingent. If, as Slavoj Zizek has argued, this paradox is at the heart of ideological belief, then the *Ion* is ideological not only in its content, but in its very structure: its skillful manipulation of the relation between beginning, middle, and end makes a contested political ideology seem as simple as a mother’s love and as longed-for as a happy ending.

**Electra in Crisis: Performing Sophocles’ Tragedy on the Contemporary London Stage (2011)**

Anastasia Bakogianni

In Nick Payne’s reception of Sophocles’ *Electra* the eponymous ancient tragic heroine is portrayed as a woman in a state of constant crisis. The young British playwright’s version was performed by the Young Vic theatre company at the Gate Theatre in London in the spring of 2011. In Payne’s creative adaptation Electra is deeply traumatized by her father’s murder which she witnessed as a child. Her grief knows no end and she is near collapse from lack of sleep. One of the most disturbing moments in the production was the scene when Electra hears the false news of her brother’s death and suffers a breakdown. She frantically rips up the floor of the stage and starts digging her own grave. She descends into it in a desperate attempt to reestablish her connection to her dead father. For the modern playwright the ancient tragic heroine is a woman trapped in state of crisis that allows for no respite and no escape.

To use the terminology of classical reception studies established by Lorna Hardwick in her seminal 2003 book *Reception Studies* Payne’s reception is not a translation of the ancient Greek dramatic text, but rather an ‘adaptation’ defined as ‘a version of the source developed for a different purpose or insufficiently close to count as translation’ (Hardwick, 2003: 9). Another applicable term is ‘version’: ‘a refuguration of a source (usually literary or dramatic) which is too free and selective to rank as a translation’ (Hardwick, 2003: 10). Payne’s intention was not to produce a close English translation of the original Greek, but to: ‘find a spoken language that might sound both contemporary and otherworldly, intimate yet epic’ (Payne, Foreword). Payne’s approach coupled with the additional elements added by the director of the Gate Theatre production, Carrie Cracknell, privilege the modern aspects of the dialogue between past and present. This *Electra* is designed to appeal to a non-knowledgeable contemporary audience. In the words of Fiona Mountford, a reviewer for the Evening Standard, the production was ‘a twenty-first-century modern-dress Greek tragedy’ (Mountford, 2011).

Payne narrows the focus of Sophocles’ tragedy down to the interactions within the family. There is no chorus to bear witness to the action on the stage and to establish a sense of the wider community. Cracknell used instead a younger version of Electra and the six actors themselves as
an internal chorus. This strategy is coupled by an intensification of the remaining elements of the drama. Payne’s protagonists see what should not be seen. In this creative adaptation Agamemnon dies in his daughter’s arms and Orestes sees his dead body. Even the audience is made complicit in this ‘seeing’ of the off-stage space of Greek Tragedy. The spectators of this production acted as witnesses to the commission of the matricide on stage. The theatre was plunged into darkness, but flashes of light, the physical sounds of struggle and Clytemnestra’s screams rebounded of the walls of the intimate setting of the Gate Theatre. Payne and Cracknell thus implicate the audience in the matricide that in their version becomes the climax of the play. We never see Aegisthus. Orestes mentions his intention to kill him upon his arrival, but it is Clytemnestra’s corpse that is the focus of the last scenes of Payne’s play.

The series of catastrophes that befall the House of Atreus thus become symbolic of the state of the world at large. This modern version of Sophocles’ tragedy is designed to appeal to contemporary audiences by showcasing extreme emotional states and by recasting the action of the ancient play as a modern psychological thriller. This is an *Electra* for our troubled times.

**The Colometry of Finglass and Sophocles' Manuscript L**

E. Christian Kopff

This talk will compare the line divisions of the choral lyrics of Sophocles’ *Electra* as found in an important medieval manuscript and a representative modern edition. In his critical edition with commentary on Sophocles’ *Electra* (2007) 16, P. J. Finglass discusses the limits of his reliance on the play’s medieval manuscripts. “Two subjects over which manuscripts enjoy relatively little authority are metrical colometry and orthography. My metrical analyses ignore the transmitted colometries, which provide no evidence for the colometry of Sophocles’ text (cf. L. P. E. Parker (2001)).” Finglass provides a useful test case for evaluating the manuscript colometry because, unlike his dealings with orthography, where he compares and weighs the value of the variants found in medieval manuscripts and ancient papyri, inscriptions and grammarians, he did not look at the manuscript colometry at all. This paper will compare Finglass’s colometry with that found in manuscript L of Sophocles for the *Electra’s* parodos, kommos and first and second stasima.

Finglass’s colometry for the parodos (three sets of strophe and antistrophe with final epode) presents generally the same line divisions as L. The first set of strophe and antistrophe (121-152) has the same colometry as Finglass’s edition at 121-125,127-131,132-137,138-141,142-146,147-151 and 135-6. The seventeen lines in strophe and antistrophe of L’s line divisions end with the same word as Finglass’s line divisions fourteen times. The second strophic pair (153-192) is divided into 20 cola in L. Finglass divides the same words into 18 lines, of which 16 have the same word end as L (155-156, 165-172, 175-176, 179-184,186-192). The differences between Finglass and L are due mainly to slips in either strophe or antistrophe, not to a fundamentally different colometry. The third pair (193-232) has the same line divisions in L and Finglass, except for a slip in the strophe at 230-231, which is easily corrigible from the antistrophe. In the epode (233-250), L and Finglass have the same line divisions at 233-246, but differ at 246-250. The first fourteen cola of the epode are the same in Finglass and L. L’s last four cola respond to Finglass’s last five, with one colon the same.

In the first stasimon, strophe and antistrophe differ substantially, although not completely, in Finglass and L. For the epode (504-515) L and Finglass present the same colometry. In the first
strophic pair of the kommos (823-848) L and Finglass differ significantly. In the second pair (849-870) L and Finglass agree except for the intrusive gloss at 855.

The first strophic pair of the second stasimon presents a situation where modern editors differ over colometries. Finglass prints a consistently ionic interpretation, which is found also in Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) and Dale (1968, 122. n.2), while Dawe (1975) prints an iambochoriambic analysis, found also in Dale (1936 = 1969). Both colometries have metrical or linguistic difficulties. Finglass’s thorough discussion rejects Zuntz’s (1984) appeal to the manuscript colometry, which Finglass mistakenly believes to be the same as Dawe’s. The colometry found in L has none of the serious problems found in modern editions. The second strophic pair (1082-1097) is confused by textual problems, but even so L and Finglass agree in four out of eight cola.

In conclusion, the line divisions found in the manuscript L of Sophocles are often the same as the recent editor’s. Differences in colometry are often due to slips and misprints in L, which are not infrequently limited to either strophe or antistrophe. In other cases, the variant colometries are both legitimate and in the first strophic pair of the second stasimon L’s colometry is superior to the modern alternatives. The talk (with handouts for all the play’s choruses) will discuss possible reasons for the quality of the ancient colometry and question a methodology that discusses modern editors, but ignores our Alexandrian colleagues.

**Session 4: Thematics and Narratology of Greek Historiography**

**Croesus' Offerings and the Value of the Past in Herodotus' Histories**

Karen Bassi

This paper investigates the role of visual and material phenomena in constituting the value of the historical past in Herodotus' Histories. In more general terms, it explores how ephemeral objects come to signify the historical past as a receding visual field and how this affects our understanding of the epistemological foundations of Greek history writing. The argument is framed by Frank Ankersmit's distinction between "looking at" and "looking through" the historical text and Alois Riegl's distinction between the "age-value" and the "historical value" of artifacts and monuments.

Herodotus famously begins the Histories with his stated purpose: "so that the past deeds of men may not fade with time" (tw'/ crov'v/ ejxivthla, Histories 1.1). In this programmatic statement, the metaphor of "fading with time" implicitly equates ta genomena, i.e., past events, with visible evidence and establishes the corrosive effect of time upon that evidence. The force of this metaphor within the Histories will be examined in two related narrative features: 1) the lists of Croesus' offerings in the Lydian Logos and, 2) the historian's references to objects or architectural features that exist up to his own time (ejp j ejmevo, mevcri ejmeu', etc.). The
question raised here is not what Croesus accomplished in making the offerings, but what
Herodotus accomplishes in listing and describing them. As I will show, the principal variable in
the presentation of the offerings is time, including how the objects themselves are affected by
time and their anachronistic placement within the narrative of events. If the implied promise of
oracles in the Histories is that the future is knowable, then the implied promise of objects is that
the past is knowable. And Croesus' offerings stand as proof that both promises, as the effects of
writing and reading history, are elusive.

If a general statement can be made about Croesus' offerings at Delphi, it is that they have
undergone some change between the time they were dedicated and the time Herodotus describes
them. The large gold and silver bowls have been moved due to the burning of the Temple. The
dedication inscribed on the golden sprinkling vessel has been falsified. The maker of the mixing
bowl is left to an uncertain oral tradition (fasi;, 1.51.3), as is the identification of the eidolon
(levgousi, 1.51.5). The golden lion has been substantially reduced in size, again due to the
burning of the Temple (1.50.3). As a unique subset of Croesus' offerings, the golden shield and
spear dedicated to Amphiaraurus (1.52.1) exist, says Herodotus, 'up to my time.' Like the
offerings at Delphi, Croesus believed that this oracle too had given him the right answer to his
"test" question, i.e., "What is Croesus doing?" (1.49.1). But they differ from the Delphic
offerings by virtue of the qualifying phrase. As a way of bringing the first account of Croesus'
offerings to a close, the phrase es eme functions both as an acknowledgement of and a defense
against the mutability of material objects as historical data. The overall effect of quantifying and
qualifying Croesus' offerings is therefore not to verify their historicity or, by extension, to verify
the authority of the histor. Rather, they verify the contingencies, notably if ironically that of time
itself, that beset such notions as historical veracity and authority. The offerings also take on the
metonymic function of negating Croesus' hubristic faith in the permanence of his wealth and his
empire just as their preemptive potential (proveron katriwvsas", 1.92.3) is denied by their
retrospective placement in the Logos. Thus, the temporal and spatial contingencies that affect the
disposition of the Delphic dedications are also a key to assessing the value of the past as a source
of moral exempla.

Religious Discourses in Herodotus Histories
Anthony Ellis

It is fundamental to current understandings of Greek religion that there existed multiple,
overlapping religious discourses. Variation in context—including locality, cult, and genre—
seems to have elicited quite different ways of talking about the gods (Parker 1997; Feeney 2008:
24-5; Versnel 2011: 83, 143-4). Although Herodotus engages with numerous writing styles and
genres, the great variety of Herodotus’ statements about the gods is mostly attributed to his
intellectual shortcomings or lack of interest in theology per se: it is analyzed in terms of “slips”
(Parker 2005: 47), “inconsistencies” (Harrison 2000: passim, Versnel 2011: passim), and the
uncomprehending deployment of “maxims” derived from other authors (e.g. Lang 1984: 61-2,
Gould 1989: 79-80). Herodotus’ contradictory statements are viewed as a window onto the
mechanisms by which the Greeks sustained their belief in non-existent divinities—namely by
tolerating inconsistencies (Harrison 2000: 16)—an approach pioneered by early anthropological
studies of religion (compare Harrison (2007: 375-80) with Evans-Pritchard (1937: 475-80)). In
this paper I argue that this is an unsatisfactory paradigm for understanding the Histories: much
variety in Herodotus’ religious expression seems to be intentional, and most of it serves no
conceivable role in preserving belief. I suggest that Herodotus’ use of incompatible religious ideas resembles an intentional engagement with diverse theological paradigms, elicited by his engagements with different literary and cultic sources.

I begin with three significant theological contradictions in the Histories: First, the notion of Fate as immutable and independent of the gods, as proclaimed by the Pythian oracle at 1.91 but found nowhere else in the Histories (and often clearly contradicted). Second, the question of human descent from the gods and heroes, which Herodotus denies on numerous occasions, but strangely accepts in his catalog of the Persian army. Third, the generalized terms for “the divine” used in metaphysical or theological discourse, alongside his discussion of individual divinities elsewhere. From these examples I argue that these different narrative contexts offer systematically different perspectives on whether there exists a fate that is independent of the gods, whether the divine is unified or divided, the possibility of divine-mortal sexual union, and the religious beliefs of non-Greek peoples.

Having noted these divergent visions of the nature of divinity, I place these observations in the context of three statements made by the narrator in Book II, namely Herodotus’ theory that the Greek names for the gods come from Egypt (2.50.1), his theory that genealogies and other attributes were “created” (ποιεῖν) by Homer and Hesiod (2.53.2-3), and his statement that “all people know the same amount about the gods” (2.3.2). In the light of these passages, I argue that Herodotus’ unreserved engagement with the traditional religious discourses of earlier literature in catalogs and oracles, is self-conscious and derives from what we might call “literary” motives, rather than (as is traditionally claimed) being the result of his intellectual shortcomings, a lack of interest in theology, or a general Greek ability to tolerate contradictory ideas without recognizing them as such.

I conclude by discussing the question of what Herodotus “believes”, for numerous indications make it clear that the narrator considers the cults of individual divinities to have genuine power (e.g. 8.129.3, 9.65.2), and the distinctions between divinities to be important (e.g. the investigation into the nature of Heracles, 2.43-5). This opens up the wider question of what notion of belief can be used to analyze a self-consciously “literary” text, a question that may require different answers in ancient and modern literature.

Greek Local Historiography and its Audiences
Daniel Tober

The parochialism and patriotism evident in many fragments of Greek local historiography suggest that local historians considered one of their principal audiences to have been the focal community itself. This is the underlying contention of Jacoby (1949), who saw Atthidography as a means by which members of the Athenian elite legitimized for their peers their own political beliefs, and a similar claim can be made about the peculiar form of Spartan local historiography (the Politeiai). Comparative, non-fragmentary, evidence (Livy, as well as local histories of e.g. Quattrocento Florence and Stuart England) confirms the primary role given by local historians to the local audience. The enthusiasm with which Greek communities honored their local historians (Chaniotis 1988), moreover, indicates that these texts were indeed consumed by the local communities (ultimate readership, of course, is a different matter: see Momigliano 1978, Malitz 1990, and Clarke 2008 for general remarks). It is striking, then, that many of our fragments of
Greek local historiography imply a non-local audience. I argue that the construction of an external narrative audience, in particular by native local historians, is central to the task of local historiography. By focusing on this narrative strategy, I contend, we can better understand the origins of local historiography in Greece and the important influence of ethnography.

In the first part of this paper, I examine a selection of verbatim fragments that contain static descriptions of the local community. I consider both topographical and religious material, drawing on passages from the *Atthides* of Kleidemos (*FGrHist* 323 F1) and Philokhoros (*FGrHist* 328 F67), the *Argolika* of Deinias (*FGrHist* 306 F3), and the *Deliaka* of Semos (*FGrHist* 396 FF4-5). In all of these fragments, a native historian imparts information presumably well known to the focal community, and he does so from the perspective of an outsider. I then outline other ways in which local historians characterize their audience as external (*e.g.* the synchronization of epichoric with unmarked systems of dating and the avoidance of local dialect). In this context, I address a seemingly anomalous text: the *Argolika* of Derkylos, which employs aspects of the Doric dialect (*FGrHist* 305 T2 and F4; see Cassio 1989).

In the second part of my paper, I emphasize that a narrator could very well communicate facts about his own community directly to his peers. In the *epitaphios logos*, for example, an Athenian orator transmitted historical and cultural *topoi* expressly to his countrymen; and several Platonic dialogues (the *Republic*, *Symposium*, and *Lysis*) open with topographical excursus aimed at an audience familiar with the terrain. Despite this narrative option, however, it was the habit of Greek historians to convey information, even about their native communities, from the perspective of an outsider (Fowler 2001). A good example is Thucydides’ treatment of Athenian topography (*e.g.* 2.15 and 8.67.2) and practice (*e.g.* 1.126.6 and 6.27), for which see Pearson 1942, Bearzot 2001, and Goldhill 2010. In orientation, then, local texts aligned themselves with historiography, not with other modes of remembering, like the funeral oration (*contra* Porciani 2001). The impetus for such a stance, I argue by way of Herodotus and Hellanikos, was the ethnological impulse. A community may very well tell stories about itself to help articulate its identity, just as it constructs a narrative of its past with present conditions in mind (see Gehrke 2001 on *intentionale Geschichte*). But local historiography is not the mere assemblage of local tradition; Greek local historiography adopted, in a Herodotean gesture, the ethnological approach that was itself at the root of the historiographical enterprise. The posture of the native local historian therefore implies an audience that extends beyond, and in fact excludes, his own community; and this in turn designates the focal community as an object of interest and import to the greater Greek world.

**Narrative complexity in Diodorus Siculus: Eunus’ Narrative in the First Sicilian Slave War**

*Peter Morton*

Diodorus Siculus’ account of the First Sicilian Slave War in books 34/5 of his *Bibliotheke* is dominated by the larger-than-life figure of Eunus, the wonder-working king of the rebels. Modern discussions of this colourful character have either taken the description of Eunus in this narrative to be a faithful, historical representation (Green 1961; Vogt 1965: 29-30; Manganaro 1967: 205-22; Bradley 1989: 116-20), or sought to reinterpret Diodorus’ hostile account in a
positive historical context (Toynbee 1965: 405; Finley 1968: 140; Urbainczyk 2008: 52). An underappreciated element of Diodorus’ narrative is the important role of the narrator in defining how Eunus’ character is perceived, through careful verbal links within the narrative, and signposting of Eunus’ qualities through significant vocabulary choices. The aim of this paper is to highlight two elements in this construction in order to demonstrate that Diodorus’ narrative must be read with a full appreciation of its literary complexity.

In the first part of the paper, the description of Eunus’ acclamation as taking place οὐτε δι’ ἀνδρείαν οὐτε διὰ στρατηγίαν will be discussed, demonstrating the importance of this phrase, and the specific terms within it, to how Diodorus conceptualised the correct role a Hellenistic king should play in relation to his subjects. By implying that Eunus himself lacked the qualities of ἀνδρεία and στρατηγία, Diodorus connected him in a negative fashion to a wider ideal of Hellenistic kingship, and in turn undermined any subsequent actions undertaken by Eunus in his role as the royal leader of the rebellion. Furthermore, the implication that Eunus was, in fact, a coward, will be shown to influence the reading of Eunus’ death in the narrative, in which each of his actions leading up to his capture are defined by their cowardly inspiration, a trait in Eunus earlier implied by the narrator.

In the second part of the paper, the literary plays engaged in by the text will be demonstrated further by reference to the use of the verb ψυχαγωγέω to describe one of Eunus’ final four companions’ actions at drinking bouts. By describing this companion as τετάρτου τοῦ παρὰ τούς πότους εἰσοθότος ψυχαγωγεῖν [Εὐνου], the narrator connected Eunus, through interlinking verbal play, to his erstwhile master. Earlier in the narrative, Eunus’ master is depicted as ψυχαγωγούμενος by Eunus’ knowledge of wonders, and this in turn caused him to invite Eunus to become his banquet entertainer. By this verbal link, therefore, Diodorus’ narrative sought to create a circle in Eunus’ personal narrative: from being the beguiler of a foolish master Eunus, in turn, was beguiled himself, assuming the role of the master he had earlier put to death during the revolt.

Through these examples, I will argue that Diodorus’ narrative was capable of demonstrating considerable literary skill, and that the text’s interactions with Eunus demonstrate the need to treat with care a narrative that has, in the past, been used primarily as a source of uncomplicated information regarding the history of slavery in Hellenistic Sicily.
Session 5: Problems in Greek and Roman Economic History

Medias the Risk Manager: The Trierarchy and Consortial Finance
Andrew Foster

In the Against Meidias Demosthenes accuses trierarchs like Meidias of fraud:

λειτουργεῖν ἱρχετο, τινιχαῦτα δὲ τοῦ πράγματος ἤπαι, ὅτε πρῶτον μὲν διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους πεποίηκατε συντελεῖς ύμεῖς, παρ’ ὑπνετρατόμενοι τάλαντον ταλάντου μισθοῦσι τας τριμαρχίας οὔτοι. . . ὡστ’ αὐτὸν ἐνίοις τῇ ἀλήθεια τὸ μηδὲν ἁναλώσαι καὶ δοκεῖν λελειτουργηκέναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λειτουργίων ἄτελές γεγενήσθαι περίεστιν.

He has only began to serve as a [naval] liturgist at a time when you have made 1200 men contributors (συντελεῖς), from whom these men collect a talent and then hire out their trierarchy at a talent. . . so that some of them actually spend nothing while seeming to have done their duty and so they also have become exempt from other liturgies. (Dem. 21.155)

Demosthenes claims that trierarchs abuse their advantageous position as intermediaries between the contributors (synteleis) and the sub-contractor. The trierarch negotiates a private contract with a professional seaman, the terms of which he conceals from the consortium. He then collects the total contract price from the unwitting synteleis. By exploiting his private knowledge of the true cost, the trierarch “pays nothing” since the synteleis cover his own liability and “does nothing” as the sub-contractor performs the service.

Scholars have accepted Demosthenes’ perspective on sub-contracting trierarchs (e.g. Boeckh 1851, 4.13: 726-7, Jordan 78-80, MacDowell 1990, 373). I will show that far from gaming the liturgical system, the trierarch effectively serves both his own and the synteleis’ financial interests by hedging the financial risks associated with the trierarchy.

Demosthenes exaggerates the trierarchs’ power to abuse the system. In particular, Demosthenes distorts a) the trierarch’s ability to accumulate infinitely superior private knowledge; and b) the lack of shared interests between the synteleis and the lead financing trierarch. The costs of discharging a trierarchy did fluctuate (e.g. Lysias 19.29, 42; 21.12; 32.26; [Dem] 50 passim, [Dem] 51.5-6, Isaeus 6.60). Therefore, a trierarch could accumulate private knowledge of the particular costs of a specific trierarchy. Yet, many contributors participated repeatedly in financing trieremes. The Athenian elites enrolled in the trierarchic syndicates, or “symmories,” were drawn from a relatively stable group (Davies 1971, xvii-xxx; Gabrielsen 1994, 66-7). They would have a reasonable expectation that their costs would fall within a certain range based upon their practical experience and shared knowledge: the trierarch does not possess infinitely superior private knowledge that he can leverage.

Yet, the cost variance also exposes each individual syntelēs to financial risk. The trierarch and the contributors are similarly motivated to limit their exposure to cost variability. Both would
find contracting out the liturgy at a set price an attractive hedge against the open-ended risks of
the trierarch actually performing the liturgy. A contributor therefore would be inclined to pay a
fixed sum that includes a “risk premium.”

The trierarch might pass his own initial costs off through a mark-up on each syntelēs’
contribution, but since the trierarch functions as a financial intermediary and as a risk manager
for his consortial partners, he is providing valuable financial services. He, however, remains
exposed to the counter-party risk inherent in sub-contracting his command since that contract is
not enforceable. The trierarch always is ultimately responsible for discharging the duty
regardless of the sub-contractor’s reliability ([Dem] 51.8-9). The trierarch thus remains exposed
to other forms of risk that do not encumber the contributors.

Trierarchs like Meidias are not “doing nothing and paying nothing.” They are actively managing
risk. However repugnant Demosthenes may have found sub-contracting, it remained widespread
because it best served the trierarch’s and synteleis’ shared financial interests. More broadly, the
practice illustrates that Athenian elites used their practical experience to manage risk in a rational
manner.

**From Farmers into Sailors: Athenian Triremes, Kean and Traditional Greek Agriculture**

Ephraim Lytle

*IG II² 1128 (=Rhodes-Osborne GHI 40) poses a long-standing riddle. This fourth-century BC
Athenian inscription records parts of decrees passed by three Kean poleis requiring that these
communities export μίλτος (ruddle or red ochre) exclusively to Athens and in designated ships.
Penalties and enforcement mechanisms are severe. Ancient sources suggest that Kean μίλτος was
of unusually high quality (Theophr. De lapidibus 52), a fact confirmed by modern investigation
(Photos-Jones et al. 1997). Relying on scattered literary references to ships painted with μίλτος,
Hasebroek (1933: 141) and a host of subsequent scholars argued that Athens’ interest in Kean
μίλτος reflected its importance in naval applications. That theory has recently been discredited
(Osborne 2000; Lawrence 2004; Rhodes-Osborne GHI 40). Although Herodotus suggests that
there was once a time when all ships were painted with μίλτος (3.58), it is pitch that made
ancient wooden hulls watertight and there is no evidence to suggest that μίλτος served any
necessary function in preserving the hulls of Athenian triremes. From that point of view Athens’
actions cannot but seem capricious and “extremely high-handed” (Rhodes-Osborne, p. 209), an
interpretation that in turn holds important implications for our understanding of the nature of
Athens' renewed maritime confederation.

I argue that while Kean μίλτος may in actual fact have served no necessary strategic purpose the
Athenians nevertheless believed that it played a vital role in the maintenance of their fleet and
this belief ultimately had its origins in the relatively timeless practices of Greek agriculture.
Crucial evidence suggests that Greek farmers attempted to protect against woodboring larvae
(σκόληκες and θρίπες) by applying μίλτος —sometimes mixed specifically with pitch—to the
roots or trunks of vines and trees. Admittedly much of this evidence is preserved only in the
Geoponika, a Byzantine farming manual. But this underutilized anthology incorporates material
evidence is attested in passages attributed to no fewer than four different agricultural writers—Leontinos (10.50), Paxamos (13.10), Didymos (10.45) and Florentinus (10.90), while additional evidence can be gleaned from a range of authors both Greek and Latin, suggesting a traditional Greek (or wider Mediterranean) agricultural practice.

The nexus between agricultural and maritime practice is the τερηδών, or shipworm, “the principal enemy of wooden-hulled ships in Mediterranean waters” (Morrison, Coates and Rankov 2000: 186). Although the shipworm is actually a marine mollusk, Greek and Latin sources suggest that marine and terrestrial woodborers were commonly associated. Theophrastus discusses shipworms together with σκόληκες and θρίπες (Historia plantarum 5.4.4-5), while a range of medical and other texts use τερηδών not to describe shipworm but various terrestrial larvae and parasitic worms. Latin authors such as Columella likewise use teredo in agricultural contexts as a term for terrestrial woodborers (De re rustica 4.24.6).

The implication is clear: the archaic Greek farmers whom Hesiod imagines trading their agricultural surpluses by sea (WD 641-694) would have applied to the problem of ship maintenance whatever limited experience they had available. In the case of shipworm that traditional knowledge proved largely ineffectual and by the fourth century BC Greek merchant ships were regularly sheathed in lead (Casson 1986: 214-6). But that option was unavailable for triremes, which relied on dry, light hulls for speed and maneuverability. For these triremes shipworm posed an inexorable threat, a fact well known to the audience of Aristophanes, one of whose triremes in Knights imagines herself being “devoured by shipworms” (ὑπὸ τερηδόνων σαπεῖσσ’, 1308). Indeed estimates suggest that a modest infestation would have increased by at least a factor of nine the rate at which ancient triremes became waterlogged (Steinmayer and Turfa 1996). In the fourth century, memory of the Sicilian disaster—precipitated in part by the crippling effects of a waterlogged fleet (Thuc. 7.12)—offered a vivid lesson. For some Athenians interested in maintaining a renewed maritime confederation their monopoly on the very best μίλτος from Keos still seemed of vital strategic importance.

Aphanes Wealth: A Barrier to Long-term Economic Development in Ancient Greece?
Michael S. Leese

Recent scholarship has demonstrated the significance of liturgy and eisphora avoidance within the Athenian economy (Gabrielsen, 1986; Cohen, 1992; Christ, 1990, 2006). Hiding wealth in aphanes form was an important private financial strategy practiced by a large sector of the Athenian population (de Ste. Croix, 1953), and became so widespread in the Classical period that it fuelled the rapidly growing nonagricultural spheres of the Athenian economy and the expansion of commerce in the Mediterranean overall (Engen, 2011). Despite the temptations to hide one’s wealth and avoid burdensome taxation by the state, I argue that this strategy was ultimately short-sighted since such wealth was deprived of state protection, and consequently was subject to embezzlement by corrupt guardians and business partners. As a result, the strategy of hiding one’s real wealth paradoxically depleted family wealth and prevented the long-term accumulation of capital that is characteristic of the modern economy.

Allowing wealth to accumulate unimpeded by government obligations was one of the most
effective means by which savvy businessmen and estate managers were able to maximize the money-making potential of their property, and many of the fastest-growing fortunes known from ancient Greece were largely composed of aphanes wealth. Without national property records, individuals were able to obscure the full extent of their wealth by investing in aphanes ousia: non-agricultural assets which were difficult or impossible to track including money-lending, manufacturing, mining, and trade (Gabrielsen, 1986). However, even after one generation, it was extremely difficult to maintain an aphanes fortune, for the very fact that it was hidden from the state and therefore lacked the government protection of property rights which governed visible assets. Without government protection, guardians of a deceased businessman’s estate were free to embezzle the property either borrowing from the estate for their own money-making activities, or plundering it outright, as happened to the property of Demosthenes’ father (Dem. 27-31). He seems to have hidden his wealth during his lifetime (Davies, 1971, 128-9), and on his death he refused to allow his estate’s value to be revealed by being leased publicly (Dem. 28.7); instead he entrusted it to guardians to hide it from the state (Dem. 28.2), exposing it to predation. Similarly, the money-lender Nausicrates died with a large aphanes fortune of at least eighty talents (Dem. 38.20), mostly in loans (Dem. 38.7). After his death, his brother/partner also declined to reveal its full value by leasing it publicly (Dem. 38.23), and also exposed it to embezzlement by guardians. Finally, the trader Diodotos left his aphanes fortune in the hands of his brother/partner Diogeiton, who likewise refused to disclose its full extent to its heirs, and pilfered much of the inheritance (Lysias 32).

Even when it was not hidden for the purpose of liturgy avoidance, wealth in aphanes form was still difficult to recover without effective government enforcement for overseas loans and invisible assets. Apollodorus, for example, experienced huge difficulties in tracking down the loans made by his father Pasion which were still outstanding at the time of his death (e.g. Dem. 49). Moreover, though a useful form of hiding wealth (Cohen, 1992), bank deposits were equally difficult to protect (Dem. 52; Gabrielsen, 1986, 102-3), and disputes over the property rights of bank funds could arise even when the depositor was still alive (Isocrates 17).

In conclusion, the attraction of aphanes wealth was only short-term, and it was difficult to maintain large accumulations of hidden capital for multiple generations. Though investment in non-agricultural spheres was increased, it seems to have been on an ephemeral and limited basis, especially in the fields of commerce and finance, whose funds were particularly subject to dissolution. Therefore, while an effective short-term profit-increasing strategy, hiding wealth may have been a barrier to the development of the types of large-scale financial and commercial fortunes which were instrumental for the emergence of the modern economy. Thus, short-term economically rational behavior ironically may have impeded long-term economic growth.

Caesar’s War Business
Thomas N. Winter

The procedure that led to this paper was to make a sourcebook of passages dealing with the interplay of business and war from Polybius, Livy, and Caesar, and then to use it to uncover the economic side of Caesar's War Commentaries. The typical economic studies, e.g. Bowman and Wilson, omit the business of war; Ernst Badian deals with Caesar's relationship with the publicani, but not the dealings in wartime; Shatzman and Ferrill both deal with Caesar's private wealth; but none have attempted to uncover the means of its acquisition in the actual War
Commentaries. Caesar seems interested in directing our focus away from business matters, but parallel instances from Polybius and Livy often help us understand what is going on.

Ancient warfare, burgeoning field, mostly goes to strategy, heroism, war games, and chess on real battlefields. The ancient historians are not interested in "merchants and baggage" (calones, impedimenta). Brief instances where the calones appear in action have to be plucked out with tweezers. They trail an army on the march, ready to buy the captives en bloc and then sell them elsewhere. Caesar shows them to us mostly when they are a stratagem, when he uses their numbers to make his force seem larger than it is. In all Latin literature we only see one calo: In Plautus' Captives [98-100], we see a father engaging in the buying and selling of captives. This text defines the trade, a questus inhumestus.

The questus inhumestus makes clear why Caesar minimizes any reference to it. But Plutarch's two paragraphs about Caesar's one year in Spain shows that Caesar knew how to make war in a wild province pay. Caesar into Spain: 860 talents in debt; Caesar out: A wealthy man [Plutarch, Caesar, 11, 12). (Verres' problem was he had provinces at peace!)

Scipio in Spain and Africa had 400 transport ships at his disposal, and in Livy 29, we see them running a shuttle service: in with supplies, out with captives and plunder. Plunder and 8,000 captives were loaded on to his transports and shipped to Sicily. Their return was just in time to take off the plunder from the town of Salaeca, the very day. Here Livy himself offers comment: "It almost looked like second sight, as if they had come on purpose to pick up a fresh cargo of spoils." [Livy 29.35] With that for lens, we see an even larger scale of syndication and transporters marketing in Caesar's wake: disgusted with the false surrender and counter-attack of the Aduatuci, he sold them all. The merchants are only in a relative clause. "From those who had bought them (ab eis qui emerant), their number was reported as 53,000." [B. G 2.33] Their false surrender is an apologia for selling them wholesale; Caesar's apparent motivation for datum is to blazon the scope of his military achievement.

However, from both Hannibal at Saguntum, and Scipio in Africa, we see that managing the questus inhumestus was standard procedure after a victory. Hannibal or Scipio, it makes no difference. Procedure is Win, Sell, Plan the next thing. We have Livy 21.21 for Hannibal, Polybius 14.9 for Scipio, and a nameless subordinate clause for Caesar.

And finally, who are ei qui emunt? Who are their security personnel? We probably have the answer in Book Seven, where the allied German cavalry have unsuitable horses, and Caesar commandeers good horses from (a) military tribunes, Roman knights, and veterans. [B.G 7.65]: Eorum adventu, quod minus idoneis equis utebantur, a tribunis militum reliquisque equitibus Romanis atque evocatis equos sumit Germanisque distribuit.

At this point we can realize what the equites and evocati are doing there, and we are equipped to see a priceless irony: the cavalry, equitatus, is German allies while the Roman cavalrymen, equites, are the buyers! And their transport security force? That would be the veterans.
Imperial Economic Policy as History in the Historia Augusta, from Septimius Severus to Severus Alexander

Caroline Wazer

Evaluations of the threads of peculiarity that run through the Historia Augusta (HA) have focused primarily on personal details of the emperor’s life and on court politics (e.g., the commonalities of all HA vitae listed in White). These are far from being the only aspects of imperial history covered by the HA. Especially overlooked—and ripe for study—is how the HA, taken as a whole, treats imperial economic action. As a test case for a larger study, I focus on the four major Lives that form the pivot of the HA’s turn from mostly credible to mostly fictional: the Lives of Septimius Severus (r. 193 - 211), Caracalla (r. 198 - 217), Elagabalus (r. 218 - 222) and Severus Alexander (r. 222 - 235). These four Lives allow for two different comparative groupings: one by self-proclaimed author (the first two are signed by Aelius Spartianus, the others by Aelius Lampridius), and one by source (the first three, but not the fourth, are believed to derive faithfully from a lost collection of biographies by Marius Maximus). The factuality of the HA’s economic history is not on trial here; rather, I attempt to address whether the HA’s treatment of economic policy, like that of emperors’ personal habits, should be considered a useful point of analysis when discussing the HA's value as a historical source.

In order to compare the selected lives, I first identify the areas of imperial economic activity that appear throughout the HA: (1) maintenance of the food supply, (2) the pay and provisioning of the military, (3) the construction and maintenance of public works, (4) the state of the imperial treasury, (5) public donatives, (6) taxes. I do not examine the personal expenditures of each emperor; rather, I look only at those activities that directly affected the Roman public.

Each Life reveals its own quirks. The Life of Septimius Severus includes vague mentions of Septimius’s concern for domestic economic conditions, but few specifics are given. Caracalla’s Life contains very little of an economic nature beyond the physical legacy he left behind with his Baths. Elagabalus’s Life contains more specifics than either of the previous two, but even the most mundane of economic actions is explicitly treated as a manifestation of Elagabalus’s moral and sexual perversions. The Life of Severus Alexander, however, is unique both in the positive portrayal of the emperor’s economic activity and in the sheer amount of discussion of real policy regarding the common people as active agents in the economy. Nowhere else do we get a sense of the imperial budget at work.

What we see in the Life of Severus Alexander is unlikely to be the result of Alexander’s government being dramatically more economically sophisticated than those of his predecessors in actuality. Instead, the new economic information in Alexander’s vita represents a change in the kinds of historical questions asked and answered by his biographer. Whereas the older Lives fall neatly into the category of traditional Roman history inasmuch as they maintain a deliberate aristocratic remove from the vulgar reality of finance, the Life of Alexander contains new aspects—social and economic ones—that represent a changing historiography, at least for one ancient historian. Because the most marked difference in the Lives coincides with the death of the biographer Marius Maximus, I conclude that the removed and vague attitude toward economic activity represented in the Lives of Septimius and Caracalla must directly echo Maximus’s. The economic vitality in the Life of Severus Alexander is a reflection of the freedom
allowed by the absence of an authoritative preexisting source, while the mixed character of the Elagabalus vita may reveal that the HA author’s personal interest in imperial economic policy occasionally bled through even in the overshadowing presence of Maximus’s narrative.

Session 6: New Adventures in Greek Pedagogy

The 2012 College Greek Exam
Albert Watanabe

This paper reports on the fourth annual College Greek Exam (CGE) administered in March 2012. It begins with a brief history of the exam and its origins. The exam began as a parallel to the National Greek Exam but specifically for college-level students in their first year. Armed with a basic format, syllabus and vocabulary, a pilot exam was given in 2008 and the first regular annual exam in 2009. The report then goes on to describe developments in the 2012 exam and enumerates the high scores and averages. The results of the exam are then analyzed according to grammatical categories. Where the same or similar questions have been asked on previous exams, there is a comparison of how the students did on both exams. The report includes some general comments on how the exam and the results mesh with certain issues in teaching first year Greek at the college level, both pedagogical (textbooks, etc.) and administrative (the need for external assessment tools, etc.). Finally, the report provides updates on some changes to the exam’s syllabus and the ongoing efforts to administer the exam online.

A Better Way to Teach Greek Accents
Wilfreid E. Major

Accents in Greek routinely become a source of frustration for both students and teachers. Some teachers abandon them entirely, while others are left on the defensive against the charge that the benefits of mastering accents do not merit the effort required. Dodging accents, however, deprives students of valuable information when the accent is critical to identifying a word and in general promotes the counterproductive perception of Greek as maddeningly complex and arbitrary. The impasse is ironic, insofar as the purpose of writing the accents in the first place was not to confuse readers but to assist them (in contrast to writing systems without a written marker for the accent, where speakers have to process rules or memorize patterns in order to say the accent correctly).

This paper offers a fresh way to present accents in Greek. Most of this overview can and should be taught when students are first learning Greek words and can serve as continual reference to refresh and review principles as necessary. It begins with the simple observation that Greek has one type accent (not three, as textbooks routinely present them, confusing the single accent with the three accent marks used to designate it in different environments). It eschews the technical vocabulary that names words according to the accent mark and its placement (oxytone, etc.):
• Most words in Greek have a single accent, a raised tone on a single, short vowel sound.
• The **acute** accent marks the **single short vowel** sound with the accent.
  o The acute accent on a long vowel sound means the accent is spoken on the **second half (mora)** of the long sound: ὠ = ὠό
• If the accent falls on the **first half (mora)** of a **long vowel sound**, then the second half has a falling tone. The combination is designated with the “circumflex” (“~”): ὁ = ὠ, ὢ = ὠرعاية
• When the acute accent at the end of a word is diminished or negated by the next word, the mark is inverted to the **grave** accent: τὸ = τῷ τῶρον
• Placing the accent:
  o On most Greek words, the “recessive” rule determines the placement of the accent:
    ▪ If the **last syllable** contains a **single short vowel**, the accent “recedes” **two** syllables: δίδοτε. It recedes only to the last mora of this syllable, so the accent appears as an acute (“/”): δόδεκα ὠ δόδεκα
    ▪ But if the word has **only two syllables** and the last syllable of the word contains a single short vowel, the accent can recede to the first mora of a long vowel sound: δῶρον ὠ δῶρον
    ▪ If the **last syllable** contains a **long vowel sound**, the accent “recedes” only **one** syllable: διδότω. It can recede only to the second mora of this syllable, so the accent always appears as an acute (“/”): παραδόσω ὠ παραδόσω
  o Some nouns, adjectives and pronouns accent case endings or the final mora of their stem.
  o Conjunctions and prepositions normally accent their final syllables: ἀλλά, περί.
  o Proclitics act like prefixes and so rarely bear an accent. Enclitics act like suffixes and generate an accent only if too many unaccented syllables would result otherwise: ἄνθρωπος-ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπων-τινῶν

Construed in this way, the majority of words in a typical passage of Greek follow the rule of recessive accent, and the most common exceptions (conjunctions and prepositions) have an even simpler rule. Most nouns and adjectives effectively follow a “recessive” pattern, and exceptions are easier to explain than the rule of “persistence,” which has little explanatory power in general and none at all for many shifts in accent placement (e.g., μήτηρ, μητρός, μητρί, μητέρα). Where students need to acquire more precise rules, they will have a clearer, more logical structure within which to process details, a principle which makes for a better pedagogy of Greek overall.
Sequence and Structure in Beginning Greek
Byron Stayskal

This paper analyzes structural underpinnings and assumptions in beginning Greek textbooks that work to disadvantage of students learning from them. Specifically, the standard ordering of verb and noun forms has the effect of backloading material for students who would benefit from more exposure to “difficult” or “irregular” forms but instead receive less. Two simple proposals, with far-reaching implications, can reverse this counterproductive pattern.

As different as first-year books may appear, most are structured around the same patterns and assumptions. First or second declension nouns, for example, are introduced first and only later students are finally introduced to the third declension. Verbs too, have a typical order. The present tense of regular -ω verbs is introduced first and is usually followed by the future and imperfect tenses. Only later is the -ω verb aorist treated systematically, and -μι verbs are usually relegated to later, or even to the very end of the beginning sequence. For both nouns and verbs, the assumption seems to be that it is better to teach “easier” forms first and only later introduce forms that involve stem changes or “unusual” patterns of endings.

The consequence of this attempt to help students by emphasizing “easy” forms at the beginning of their Greek experience is that such an order of topics actually makes learning Greek considerably harder and postpones the ability to read ancient texts. The prolonged exposure to the “easier” forms makes more “difficult” forms seem irregular and also reduces the students’ exposure to forms that simply need more practice. The typical order of topics in elementary Greek also tends to create habits that have to be unlearned later. For example, when the imperfect tense is presented before the aorist, despite what an instructor says, students simply gain the habit of assuming that the secondary -ω verb endings used to show the imperfect tense are imperfect endings. They then have to unlearn that habit when they learn second aorist forms.

There is, however, an order of topics that not only avoids current pitfalls but also has positive benefits for learning the language. For nouns, the third declension should be introduced and assimilated first, and then nouns of the first and second declensions can easily follow. Several critical benefits accrue to this order. From the very beginning, students learn the importance of knowing a noun’s stem and gender. They also learn the principle of agreement, especially the point that an adjective ending (like the article with its third-declension noun) may look quite different from that of the noun and yet still agree in number, gender, and case. In regard to verbs, -μι and -ω verbs should be learned together from the time verbs are first introduced. Students will learn in this way that -μι verbs are not irregular but simply belong to a different but consistent family of forms. The logical starting point for learning different tenses is the present, but the next tense should be the aorist. Students can begin practicing with strong aorist stems, become acquainted with augmentation (given in the third principal part), and ingrain the notion of primary and secondary tenses. The patterns of present and aorist endings, once thoroughly learned, not only equip the students for the two most common tenses but also provide a clear basis for all other tenses to be learned.

Such radical rearrangement of first-year topics would, of course, require new textbooks, exercises, and readings. A prototype has already been put into use with positive outcomes though there is much left to be done. There is also likely to be a certain amount of discomfort stepping...
out of the order in which almost all Greek teachers have been trained. The extra effort, however, is certainly worthwhile if our goal in Greek pedagogy is to continue to reach new students and give them the best possible experience as they learn the language.

A Little Greek Reader: Teaching Grammar and Syntax with Authentic Greek
Georgia L. Irby and Mary English

We want our students to read as much authentic Greek as possible from the first day of Greek 101. The benefits of drawing widely from the corpus of Greek literature and epigraphy are immeasurable. Whereas some beginning textbooks and readers are author driven, and thus ease students into the style of Plato or Homer only, students who read widely from Greek literature can better navigate between different authors, styles, vocabulary sets, and genres. The transition from grammar instruction to literature classes becomes smoother because such students have been reading literature all along. Students see, from day one, that the endless charts and lists we ask them to memorize have very real, practical, and immediate applications. They learn firsthand, from the Greeks themselves, about cultural institutions, practices, and values. Much of Homer, Herodotus, Euripides, and Plato is written in Greek that is accessible to students at any level. Our students enroll in Greek to learn to read literature, history, and philosophy. Why should we reserve these riches as a reward for those who have successfully completed the grammar exercises when we can utilize them as a carrot to encourage students to continue studying the language?

We are in the process of compiling a Greek Reader to address these very concerns. The selections in our book will be arranged to emphasize the points of Greek grammar and syntax that the individual texts highlight. Such an arrangement allows for the greatest flexibility in the classroom, as the collection will easily supplement and harmonize with any curriculum: a single selection can provide additional practice in syntax and translation during the first or last few minutes of a class session; a series of selections can provide the foundation of an entire class meeting; selections can be used for practice and/or testing in translating at sight; or the entire reader can be used as the core text of a comprehensive review of Greek grammar.

In general terms, the passages unfold in order of increasing difficulty; we present sentences that emphasize first and second declension nouns long before ones that feature –μι verbs and clauses with the optative. That said, we do believe that students should be challenged to confront the realities of “authentic Greek” early in their study of the language, and they should be encouraged to tackle unadapted Greek passages even before they have met every form or vocabulary word as part of their formal instruction. We provide brief contextualizing introductions for all the passages as well as extensive running vocabulary notes so that students can read the entries without needing to look up unfamiliar words in a dictionary.

In this presentation, we will discuss the authors from whom we have chosen our texts (from Aristotle to Xenophon); our criteria for selecting texts that best illustrate grammar, syntax, and Greek history or culture; our process of annotation and arrangement of the selected texts; and our suggestions for using such materials in the elementary Greek classroom to ensure that students derive the greatest benefit without further taxing overburdened instructors and overstuffed
syllabi. The materials will be drawn broadly from the standard corpus and lesser known authors to provide the students with the fullest possible experience of Greek literature, history, and culture while rigorously covering all the salient points of grammar and syntax that are presented in all the standard beginning Greek textbooks. We hope to inspire other instructors to incorporate as much authentic Greek as possible into even the first days of Beginning Greek.

**Greek Core Vocabulary Acquisition: A Sight Reading Approach**

Christopher Francese

This paper describes how a core ancient Greek vocabulary list can be used in the context of a pedagogy that emphasizes sight reading. Major, Rachel Clark, and others have argued for the usefulness of core lists of high frequency vocabulary in ancient Greek instruction at the beginning and intermediate level. But the focus in pedagogical discussions so far has been on selecting which words to emphasize in a particular introductory textbook, and which to add when the textbook falls short.

At the intermediate level, a sight reading regime something like the following can leverage the high frequency core list to improve student motivation to acquire vocabulary. Lists are created for the text to be read in class; those lists are separated into high frequency (HF) and non-HF groups. Students are asked to learn ahead the HF words, and quizzed on them (orally or in writing), with equal credit given for definition(s) and full dictionary form. These quizzes are cumulative, working toward a gradual mastery of the whole core list. Larger tests include sight passages (all new and non-HF words glossed) with comprehension questions and grammatical analysis, with limited translation tasks (e.g., the finding and translating of participial phrases, syntactically related pairs of words, or identifying and translating subjunctives); a HF vocabulary section; and the reproduction of memorized Greek passages.

In class, non-HF lemmas are provided as glosses. Sight reading develops the skill of syntactical analysis and identifying word groupings. Since students are not preparing passages ahead, out-of-class time is freed up for whatever the instructor desires: grammatical reviews, easy Greek reading with comprehension questions and grammatical analysis (to accustom the students to the test format), or cultural readings. Class begins with a quick review of the previous day’s material, then moves to the fresh text. Such a routine minimizes student use of the dictionary, cultivates the skill of sight reading for comprehension, and shifts the learning goals toward vocabulary acquisition, notoriously the weakest part of intermediate Greek and Latin courses. But it also emphasizes grammatical concepts, especially syntax and morphology. Faced with a sight passage some of whose words are unknown and cannot be looked up, students are thrown back on the information available in endings, and any grammatical weaknesses are highlighted, rather than camouflaged as they often are by prepared translations.

Students see every day the benefits of mastering declensions, conjugations, and syntactical constructions, and focus more on patterns than on individual words. The notion of HF vocabulary makes sense to students as a way to prioritize the bewildering profusion of lemmas; the empirical “grammar-you-can-use” approach also helps students and instructors prioritize
grammatical review. Intensive study at test time takes the form of vocabulary acquisition, rather than the memorizing of prepared passages in English.

Session 7: Islamic and Arabic Receptions of Classical Literature (Organized By the APA Committee on Classical Tradition and Reception)

Homer Christianus: From Egypt to the 'Abbāsid Court
Paul Dilley

This talk explores the comparison between the poetry of Homer and the Qurʾān made by Qusā ibn Lūqā (ca. 820-912 CE), a translator and author of medical and scientific texts, in the context of Homeric reception across the early medieval Near East. Ibn Lūqā wrote a defense of Christianity, responding to various claims made by his Muslim acquaintance Ibn Munaḡǧim, including the inimitability of the Qurʾān (Samir and Nwyia, 1981). In a remarkable passage, he juxtaposes the collection of the Qurʾān, which remained fragmented and dispersed until it was assembled by the caliph ʿUthmān, according to numerous and varied ʿaḥādīṯ (Burton); and the collection of the Homeric corpus under Peisistratus (Wyrick, 2004). Ibn Lūqā notes that ʿUthmān required two independent witnesses to include a verse in the Qurʾān, whereas Peisistratus’s experts could discern authentic and forged Homeric verses based on their language alone.

Ibn Lūqā used his status as an authoritative mediator of Greek tradition to make this unique comparison (Szigorich, 2010). Yet his appeal to Homer, in whom the ‘Abbāsid translators showed little interest as compared to philosophy and science, and whose reception among Christians was mixed, demands closer examination. Indeed, Robert Hoyland has recently emphasized how religion was only one among many factors in social relations, alongside “culture, ethnicity, history, language” (Hoyland, 2011). Accordingly, in this paper I examine the role of these factors in the reception of Homer across the Early Medieval Near East, in order to place in relief the circumstances of Ibn Lūqā’s comparison between epic poetry and the Qurʾān.

In Egypt, where an indigenous reception of epic traditions about the Trojan War had developed among the priesthood in the Greco-Roman period (Quack, 2005), Late Antique Christians were largely hostile to Homer. Although epic hexameters evidently played a role in education at some monasteries, the latest references, at around the time of the Arab conquest, condemn the poetry as idolatrous (Fournet, 2011). A very different situation existed in Syria and Mesopotamia, where the association between Homer and polytheism was less pronounced. The astrologer and polymath Theophilus of Edessa (695-785 CE), who was active at the court of the ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Mahdī, translated the Iliad and the Odyssey into Syriac, and also apparently included a retelling of the Trojan War in his Chronicle. This narrative sympathizes with the Trojans, implying connections between their defeat by the Greeks and the subjugated Christians of the Near East (Conrad, 2005).
Ibn Lūqā, a native speaker of Syriac, was probably familiar with this positive attitude toward Homer. Like his contemporary, the Christian Hunayn ibn Ishāq, he traveled in the Byzantine Empire (probably Constantinople), where he would have learned epic poetry in Greek, along with the Peisistratus legend and the allegorical interpretation of Homer, a Neoplatonic strategy (Lamberton, 1989) that gained broad Christian support by the sixth century (Browning). Ibn Ishāq radicalized allegorical interpretation for his Muslim readers, divesting Homeric citations in the works of Galen of all allusions to the gods, for instance identifying Apollo as a mortal doctor, and even a “prophet” (Stromaier, 1980). I argue that this strategy, pursued by the head of the Bayt al-Ḥikma under caliph al-Ma’mūn, clarifies the comparison of the Qur’ān to Homer by Ibn Lūqā, who identifies both as sources of rhetorical and scientific knowledge, if not divine inspiration. In particular, it explains Ibn Lūqā’s extremely daring comparison between the prophet Muhammad and a polytheist poet, which breaks the normal monotheistic decorum of Christian-Jewish-Muslim debates. In fact, in ‘Abbāsid Baghdad Homer was known not as a pagan poet, but as a wise man who inspired philosophers.

Rewriting the Demiurge: Galen's Synopsis of Timaeus and Ex Nihilo Creation
Aileen Das

Plato's Timaeus had a profound influence on the philosophical and medical discourses of medieval Islam. The dialogue's speculations on the creation of the cosmos and the human body have shaped the cosmologies and pathologies of writers such as ar-Rāzī (d. c.925) and Mūsā ibn Maymūn (d. 1204). While there is some suggestion from 11th century bio-bibliographic sources that Plato's Timaeus was translated into Arabic, very strong arguments have been put forward recently that the text was only available in Arabic through the exegetical treatments of Galen, Proclus and Plotinus (Arnzen forthcoming). This paper will emphasize one aspect of this transmission, that is Galen's synopsis of Plato's Timaeus. Galen synopsis of the Timaeus does not survive in Greek, but is preserved in a tenth-century Arabic translation produced by the Nestorian Christian Ḥunaynibn ’ Ishāq and his associates (Kraus and Walzer 1951; Ullmann 1970). The synopsis covers the entire dialogue, from the Atlantis myth (17a–27b) to the creation of woman and animals (91a–92c). The narrative structure of this work, however, differs considerably from the Platonic original, for Galen omits Timaeus' narrative breaks (34a–b; 45b–47e; 51e–52d; 69a–d; 72d–73a) and thus presents his discourse as a continuous, linear account.

In this paper, I suggest that Galen's presentation of Timaeus' narrative facilitates the Arabic translator's adaptation of the dialogue into his own religious milieu. My argument demonstrates that Galen's narrative does not elaborate on the pre-cosmic period, and therefore gives the impression that all of creation seems to stem from the Demiurge. The synopsis portrays the Demiurge as a creator ex nihilo, which corresponds with the representation of God in the traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Although Galen firmly rejects the principle of creation ex nihilo (UP11.14), I will argue here that the interpretation of the Demiurge in his synopsis of Timaeus appears compatible with Christian and Muslim belief. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a work that had significant influence in transmitting the theories of the Timaeus into Arabic, and to show that its presentation of the divine ensured its successful reception.
The Image of Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism in the Greco-Arabic and Arabic Histories of Philosophy
Anna Izdebska

The aim of this paper is to show how a narrative about Pythagoras and his philosophy developed as the Greek histories of philosophy were received by the Arabs. Thus, I approach the transmission of the Pythagorean tradition not as if it consisted just of translating the Greek sources into Arabic, but rather as a complex process including both the uninterrupted persistence and modification of this tradition. There were various stages in this process: the translations of the Greek biographies and doxographies into Arabic, Arabic compilations and forgeries, and finally the Arabic intellectuals’ own histories of philosophy, created on the basis of Greek as well as Arabic sources. In the paper, I present examples of those elements of the Pythagorean tradition which were selected for transmission, those elements omitted, and those added by the Arabs. As a result, I show how the Pythagorean tradition was transformed by its transmission.

The paper is based on a broad range of sources, which can be defined generally as histories of Greek philosophy in Arabic. Only some of the Greek biographical and doxographical texts were known to the Arabs, moreover, most of what was known to them had already undergone various modifications. Therefore, Aetius’s (Pseudo-Plutarch) Placita philosophorum was relatively faithfully translated. There is also a kind of translation of the first book of Porphyry’s History of philosophy, the Vita Pythagorae. However, Hippolytus’s Refutatio omnium haeresium was used only as the basis for the doxography of Pseudo-Ammonius, who treated his material in a very unconstrained manner.

This author, as Ulrich Rudolph (Rudolph 2007) noticed, used the Pre-Socratics (and among them Pythagoras) for describing his own metaphysical and theological ideas: not only Neoplatonism, but also the Mu’tazilite viewpoint in the controversy about the God’s possession of the Ideas in his mind before the creation of the world.

Apart from translations of the Greek histories of philosophy, Arabic intellectuals were also composing their own histories, which combined information taken from various sources. Among the authors who treated extensively the biography and opinions of Pythagoras, one may find al-Sijistānī, Ibn Hindū, al-Shahrastānī, al-Mubashshir ibn- Fātik, Ibn Abī Uṣaybi’a. Each composed his narrative about Pythagoras in a slightly different manner and emphasized different elements. Furthermore, in each of these narratives one can recognise the sources which the author used (the tradition about Pythagoras attested in many Greek sources), but there are also many new elements, while some traditional components of the Pythagorean narrative completely disappear.

One may find a very good example of this phenomenon in al-Shahrastānī’s large work Kitāb al–Milal wa al-Nihal, which contains a separate chapter on Pythagoras’s doctrine. There are several statements which can be traced back to the Greek texts, such as the number as arche and the doctrine of tetraktys; man as microcosm; the notion of harmony in metaphysics and psychology. However, these elements are inserted into a purely Neoplatonic, or even Avicennan, discourse. Although this perspective does not contradict the image of Pythagoras’s doctrine we find in the Greek sources, it does go beyond this doctrine and substantially develops several of
its elements. Thus, in his presentation of Pythagoras, al-Shahrastānī defines the key ideas – such as the highest God, the Intellect, the Soul, the Nature, the celestial spheres and their intelligences – in the perspective of the Platonist-Aristotelian-Arabic tradition. Finally, it is also interesting that there suddenly appears a “magic of numbers and letters”, which is a much more properly Arabic idea than the notions mentioned above. On one hand, the Pythagoreanism was associated with numerology and theology of numbers already in the Greek tradition, but the Greeks did not know this type of magic and did not attribute it to Pythagoras.

**The Sunna of the Philosophers in the Works of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī**

Kevin van Bladel

AbūBakr al-Rāzī (d. 925 or 935), the celebrated physician, philosopher, and heretic from Ray in northern Iran, was at pains to defend himself against the charge of disloyalty to the Greek philosophical tradition he claimed as his own. In fact both the charges against him and the defenses he deployed were derived from ancient Greek tradition.

In his book *Doubts about Galen* (*al-Shukūk ʿalā Jālinūs*), he criticizes the great ancient master of medicine but insists, against anticipated fault-finders, that this is loyalty not ingratitude. He uses examples from the works of Galen, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Themistius to demonstrate that the proper attitude of the philosopher is to subject the works of their antecedents to close and honest scrutiny, and to improve them where necessary. Rather it is those who blindly accept (taqlīd) the doctrine of their teacher who have abandoned the customary practice of the philosophers (sunnat al-falāsifā). Similarly in *The Philosopher’s Way of Life* (*al-Sīra al-Falsafiya*), the short work in which he defends his self-identification as a philosopher against charges of hypocrisy, he refutes those who mock the inconsistencies between his conduct and those of the ancient philosophers, in particular his imām (leader) and model Socrates. He says they neither understand philosophy nor the biography of Socrates. To defend himself in both works, al-Rāzī is deliberately using Arabic terms loaded with connotations from Muslim sectarian debate, in which the tension between the authority of revelation and the power of interpretation is pervasive.

His country man Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī wrote a thorough going refutation of his views based on their face-to-face debates, extant as *The Proofs of Prophecy* (*Kitāb Aʿlā l-nubūwa*), serving also as a demonstration of the Ismaili doctrine of which he was a missionary. The book shows us what Abū Bakr was fighting against. In his arguments, Abū Ḥātim makes heavy use of an Arabic doxography called today that of Pseudo-Ammonius to show that the philosophers disagreed wildly with each other. The inconsistency of the philosophers, from Thales onward, is a proof of their invalidity. Truth depends rather on divine revelation, needing the divinely appointed Ismaili imām for its interpretation. Philosophy, for Abū Ḥātim, is at best derivative of revelation and brings only a variety of opinions. Here again the argument is an ancient one. For the doxography of Pseudo-Ammonius, which he employs so extensively, depends through unknown intermediaries on *The Refutation of All Heresies* by Hippolytus of Rome, in which the purpose of relating the views of the philosophers was just to demonstrate their mutual inconsistency. Hippolytus in turn depends on even more ancient criticisms of the philosophers (cf. Diodorus Siculus 2.29).
It is true that Abū Bakr al-Rāzī is a peculiar case as one of the very few Arabic authors effectively to deny religion directly. Most of his peer philosophers working in the Greek tradition in Arabic translation were Muslims, Christians, and Jews who made their religion and philosophy fit together one way or another. Few of them were so bold as to criticize their masters so directly. But by his placing himself in line with the ancient philosophers and against prophetic religion, al-Rāzī becomes vulnerable to attacks developed long before by the fathers of the Church against pagan philosophers and their followers. In the end, what appears to be a conflict between reason and revelation is a contest over sources of authority, but both approaches find it necessary to appropriate ancient Greek tradition.

Session 9: Going Green: The Emergence of Bucolic in Augustan Rome

Eclogue 5 and the New Bucolic Tradition
Deanna Wesolowski

Theocritus and Virgil both establish trees that are symbolic of their approaches to the bucolic tradition. Theocritus’ pine and Virgil’s beech stand in programmatic passages where each writer creates and reshapes the bucolic landscape as a symbol for the bucolic genre. In the opening of Theocritus’ Idylls, a goatherd’s piping is favorably compared with the sound of wind through the pine (pītus). This passage establishes the pine as a symbolic marker for Theocritus’ bucolic world. The pine, however, also marks passages where the placid bucolic landscape is punctuated by the frustration of unfulfilled personal desires (Idylls 1.134, 3.38, 5.49). These moments of tension, attached to the tree as a symbol of both the landscape and the genre, are adopted and adapted to resonate with in Virgil’s Eclogues.

Virgil shows his adherence to the bucolic tradition in the opening of Eclogue 1, where Meliboeus comments that Tityrus lies beneath a beech tree (fagus), piping to the woodland Muse. Although the reader may assume that the beech is simply Virgil’s version of the Theocritean pine, the beginning of the fourth line makes it clear that this bucolic world is not only inhabited by unrequited personal desire, but external upheaval and frustration: “nos patriam fugimus.” The inclusion of external strife in two key passages in the Eclogues associated with the beech tree (3.12 and 9.9) reveals that the beech tree in the Virgilian landscape highlights the poet’s break from the Theocritean tradition.

This new tradition is particularly highlighted in Eclogue 5, wherein Menalcas sings with a younger counterpart, Mopsus. Mopsus announces that he will not sing of the traditional topics but will instead sing a song he recently wrote on beech bark (fagus). By using his programmatic tree, the beech, in a novel way—as a writing surface—Virgil marks this “new” song as his own. The topic of Mopsus’ song, however, the death of Daphnis, nevertheless alludes back to the Theocritean and Hellenistic literary tradition. This paper argues that in this cordial Eclogue, Virgil casts himself in the dual roles of the shepherds: he is both Mopsus, a younger poet creating something new from what came before, and Menalcas, a singer of the traditionally
bucolic Eclogues 2 and 3 (5.85-87). By assuming the double role of Menalcas and Mopsus, Virgil simultaneously breaks from the Theocritean tradition with the emphasis on the “new” and also recognizes the importance of the tradition itself. By doing this, Virgil establishes the mutability of the genre, which is further adapted by later bucolic and bucolic writers.

**Urbanus es, Corydon: Ecocriticizing Town and Country in Vergil Eclogue 2**

Ricardo Apostol

Traditional criticism of bucolic (and this includes traditional ecocriticism) has long assumed the dichotomy Town/Country as one of the genre’s fundamental elements. This dichotomy is particularly evident as the guiding principle of much of the scholarly reception of Vergil’s second Eclogue, which makes Iollas and Alexis representative *urbani* to Corydon’s *rusticus*, and interprets this as a major reason for both the hopelessness of Corydon’s passion and the comic incongruity of his situation. A major trend in ecocriticism (the school of literary theory concerned with nature and the environment), however, challenges such easy distinctions and instead conceives of the human and natural as inextricably intertwined and social formations such as town and country as mutually implicated on a continuum. This paper applies ecocriticism’s insights to Eclogue 2 to show that the central drama of the poem is a result precisely of this porousness of the categories “town” and “country”; that Corydon is therefore not as rustic as his passionate outbursts assert; and that, insofar as Corydon finds himself hopelessly excluded from the imaginative community to which he aspires to belong (which is not that of the supposedly *urbanus* Alexis, but rather that of his imaginary counterpart, the rustic character “Corydon”), the tone of the poem is not so much comic/ironic as it is tragic/pathetic. That this collapse of supposedly fundamental landscape categories occurs in the very text commonly thought to set the generic boundaries of bucolic certainly does much to highlight the remarkable fluidity of the genre.

Vergil’s choice of monody rather than dialogue in Eclogue 2 makes the poem uniquely suited for psychological exposition. Except potentially for the first 5 lines, the poem is entirely Corydon’s poetic fiction. The form naturally invites a reading that suggests that the contradictions with which the poem is concerned are conceptual, as the text is palpably a depiction of the character’s mental state. The addressees of the poem are also obviously imaginary constructs: it is not actually Alexis whom Corydon addresses, since he is alone, nor yet is the Corydon whom he calls upon precisely coextensive with his entire “self.”

It is furthermore not at all self-evident that Alexis has said any of the things Corydon ascribes to him, and even if he has, they are here internalized within Corydon’s monologue. Therefore it is most directly Corydon, the singer, who does not care for his (own) song, who is pitiless and disdains the shepherd, his flocks and gifts, and repeatedly uses forms like *sordidus* and *rusticus* to characterize his lifestyle. The precondition for Corydon’s composition is his “contamination”, his penetration, if you will, by an outsider perspective. And this is not surprising – although previous scholarship has often chosen to obscure the fact, Iollas and Alexis, too, must be touched, and deeply, by the Italian countryside.
We thus have two Corydens – the singer, who lives in a real world of complex landscapes and interactions between town and country, and the idealized rustic “Corydon” he constructs in his song along with his imaginary milieu, and whom he simultaneously looks down upon and aspires to be. On this reading, Corydon’s song becomes an attempt to reconcile the incongruities between an idealized vision of rusticity and its complex actuality, and the poem accords with Northrop Frye’s definition of low mimetic tragedy, whose “tradition of sophisticated pathos is the study of the isolated mind, the story of how someone recognizably like ourselves is broken by a conflict between the inner and outer world, between imaginative reality and the sort of reality…established by social consensus.” Furthermore, “the type of character involved here we may call by the Greek word alazon, which means impostor, someone who pretends or tries to be something more than he is” (Frye 2006), and thus Corydon is exposed for the fake that he (tragically) becomes as he insists on his pure rustic identity.

The Bucolic Symposium: Issues of Place and Genre in Horace’s Odes 1:17
Kristen Ehrhardt

In Odes 1.17, Horace combines the locus amoenus of bucolic poetry with a sympotic aesthetic, presenting a rural setting as an ideal location for drinks, song, and possible erotic play within the confines of a lyric poem. The double nature of the setting—bucolic and sympotic—mirrors the poet’s combination of genres, and in the end, highlights the duplicitous nature of the poet and locale. The mixed site, it seems, must be approached with a mixed mind.

As poet and host, Horace creates an illusory place for a tryst—a sanitized bucolic landscape—emphasizing safety while simultaneously undermining these efforts. The poem begins with a recreation of rural tranquility that recalls the innocence of a golden age, as Horace’s lambs are left to frolic blithely with wolves in sunny fields. The safety of this locale is highlighted throughout the first four stanzas: defendit 3, impune and tutum 5, tuentur 13, and benigno 15. Faunus and other gods have everything under control, allowing the poet to let his livestock wander into the wilds unscathed. Tyndaris is invited to share in the rustic bounty, with the assumption that the same safety afforded to the livestock will apply equally to her.

This beginning might give us pause, since Horace’s conventional locus amoenus seems suspiciously out of place: what is bucolic doing in a lyric ode? Horace’s solution connects the bucolic setting with a symposium, described complete with usual sympotic tokens of wine and poetry (pocula Lesbii, 21 and fide Teia, 18). Even the landscape takes part in the symposium as the countryside itself reclines, Usticae cubantis (11), another guest at this event. Horace’s central placement of the description in the middle stanza highlights the mixed locale of sympotic and bucolic space as the very crux of the poem.

Of course, any poetic heroine versed in literary tradition ought to know not to linger in such a place, but as usual, the lush, bucolic locus compels and deceives. The innocentis at the beginning of the sixth stanza (21) verbally injects a hint of nocens into the picnic setting, still hidden within its own negation. Here, the possibility of harm, cloaked within the language itself, begins to reveal the cracks in the façade of Horace’s safe countryside party. Multiple fissures, illuminated by prolepsis, ultimately lead to a detailed, albeit negated, threat against Tyndaris’ safety.
Recent scholarship has tended to side against worrywarts, reading 1.17 as light-hearted and playful, rather than examining the combination of landscapes and genres as sites of danger (cf. Pucci 1975: 259-60; Davis 1991: 200-4; Oliensis 1998: 121-4; Spencer 2006: 267). Yet the double nature of the poem calls for a suspicious reading. The subtlety of description in the final stanza, proleptically outlining in vivid detail what could happen if the rival Cyrus were to appear, leaves the reader to wonder whether such an outing is safe for Tyndaris after all. Despite the description of the safety that will follow the girl if she comes to his farm for an outdoor symposium, *Odes* 1.17 hints at the possibility of sexual danger and violence, including the very things Horace sought to exclude through vehement negation.

**Speech and Song in Vergilian Bucolic**

*Raymond Kania*

It is a commonplace that in bucolic poetry context permits distinctions between performative song and conversational speech. Typically, readers of Theocritus (e.g., Wilamowitz, Gow, Rosenmeyer, Payne) presume that hexameter misrepresents the herdsmen’s songs, which by rights should be imagined in different, more melic forms; what is taken as given for Theocritus is readily, if tacitly, applied to Virgil as well. I propose an alternative: in the *Eclogues* especially, characters freely blend speech and song. Thus Virgil’s reception of bucolic interrogates some of the genre’s fundamental conceits.

Formal elements do little if anything to corroborate the speech/song distinction, since bucolic employs consistent hexameter verse throughout. It is a dubious assumption that hexameter is prosaic, more suited to representing speech than singing. According to ancient critics, it is too elevated to accurately represent prosaic discourse (e.g., Arist. *Poet.* 1449a20-35). In addition to the grandeur of epic, it also evokes humbler, Hesiodic strands within the *epos* tradition (see Halperin). The hexameter of bucolic occupies a delicate, middle register (cf. Hor. *Serm.* 1.10.43-45), which is perhaps more suited to narrative than are lyric meters but not therefore ordinary or unmusical.

Nor do lexical indications distinguish performance from conversation. Theocritus occasionally signals a putative change from talking to singing: e.g., an “aside” in *Id.* 3: “My right eye is twitching—will I see her? I will move over by the pine here and sing (ἀσσεῖμαι)” (37-38). Thereafter the goatherd performs in a heightened stylistic register (Hunter). In Virgil such shifts are inconspicuous. Generally, the verbs *cano* and *dico* in Latin indicate authoritative or ritualized discourse, while unmarked verbs like *loquor* and *narro* denote mere talk (Habinek). Such a scheme does not map well on to the *Eclogues*. In Virgil, *cano* denotes performance and programmatic discourse, and *dico* is frequently used in the same way; *loquor*, however, appears only four times, and twice it indicates not speech but quasi-musical sounds made by non-human agents (5.28 & 8.22; *laλάκω* is used similarly at *Id.* 5.34, 7.139, 20.29, 27.58 & [Mosch.] 3.47). *Ecl.* 6 poses a difficult case when the poem’s speaker stops relating what Silenus sang and speaks again in his own voice: “Why should I mention (loquar) either Scylla ...” (74). The verb calls our attention to the change from the reported song to direct speech. However, the speaker uses *narro* to allude to another part of the song he did not provide: “how [Silenus] told (narraverit) of the changed limbs of Tereus ...” (78). So the supposedly more prosaic verbs are used for what is not to be sung but could be, and then for something that had already been sung.
To show how slight the line between speech and song is in the *Eclogues*, I will consider two poems. *Eclogue* 1 excludes performance because it is essentially a conversation between herdsmen. Yet critics (e.g., Alpers) have noted that the speakers are not very responsive to each other. Performative elements intrude into their speech, especially Meliboeus’ lengthy “set piece” (46-58), including ephrasis and onomatopoeic alliteration: *sape levi somnum suadebit inire susurro* (55). The poem cannot be satisfactorily described as either a dialogue or matched performances. *Eclogue* 5 is premised on an exchange of songs, one of which Moeris composed and wrote down earlier. After he performs it, Menalcas expresses his appreciation in conspicuously poetic fashion, with an elaborate simile (*tale ... quale ... quale*, 45-6) and a line that mimics the sound and action of its “leaping stream” (*saliente rivo*, 47) stream. Menalcas may be consciously one-upping his companion or unknowingly slipping into a poetic register. While communication and performance can still be differentiated, the distinction means little within the poem. However salient the difference between speech and song may be, there is no cause to foist it in an absolute form upon this poetry and thus unduly constrain readers’ imaginative responses to bucolic fictions.

**Decline and Nostalgia in the Augustan Age**

Tara Welch

In a recent article in the *New York Review*, Mary Beard addressed the growing discourse in modern times about the Classics as an endangered species with a new and bold understanding of the Classics that goes beyond the study of the ancient Greco-Roman world. Classics is that world, plus our decline from it, plus our nostalgia for it: “The study of the classics is the study of what happens in the gap between antiquity and ourselves. It is not only the dialogue that we have with the culture of the classical world; it is also the dialogue that we have with those who have gone before us who were themselves in dialogue with the classical world (whether Dante, Raphael, William Shakespeare, Edward Gibbon, Pablo Picasso, Eugene O’Neill, or Terence Rattigan)” (Beard 2012).

Beard showed that the Classics are thus always – and have always been, from Nestor onward – losing ground and prestige because loss is at the heart of the Classics’ identity. The one moment, perhaps, in which the ancients expressed the belief that they were living in the best possible age, at the apex of a tradition, was Rome’s Augustan age. Vergil, Horace, and Propertius all claimed to have revived, even refined, Greece’s great literary forms, histories saw Rome as the *telos* of the whole world’s past, and Augustus claimed to have reintroduced the golden age. In this grand culmination, what space is there for Beard’s formulation of Classics as content-plus-decline-plus-nostalgia?

In this paper I read pastoral echoes in Rome’s elegiac poetry as just such a discourse of “Classics.” Whereas Vergil’s bucolic poetry presents the tension between pastoral and urban from within the green pastoral world, which was even then losing ground to the city and its morals, Propertius, Tibullus, and Ovid write from an urban perspective about the pastoral specter that haunts the golden city in which they live and love. After opening remarks on pastoral moments in these three elegists, I focus on how Propertius 1.18 uses a pastoral landscape to probe the themes of decline and nostalgia. In this short elegy, the poet has sought out a pastoral landscape in order to lament and recover from Cynthia’s disdain. Scholars have found strong traces in this poem of the pastoral of Gallus, Vergil, and even Theocritus (Ross, Zetzel, J. King,
Richardson, Gow, Cairns). Rather than establish a tension between pastoral and elegiac verse, I read this poem as a testament to their interdependence and, beyond that, a testament to the interdependence of the “then” and the “now” in Beard’s concept of the Classics.

Propertius seeks out a solitary landscape as balm and audience for his own pain (1-4, 19-20). The pastoral landscape here takes the place of Cynthia, the poet’s lost lover, and his song of lament strives to bridge the gap between his current sorrow and his past joy. Propertius, though, knows this attempt is futile and that the pastoral world is never quite fully his to grasp. He doubts the grove’s ability to keep promises, and wonders if the nearby trees even have love affairs (or love poems, amores). With Cynthia gone, the glory and culmination of the Augustan age are out of his reach. Nonetheless he seeks the lost ideal and acknowledges, through his intertextual nods to Vergil, Gallus, and Theocritus, that others in the past have sought it too. The gap has always been there; pastoral has always been irrecoverable, just like Beard’s “Classics.” Pastoral is, on this understanding, content-plus-decline-plus-nostalgia.

The essential remoteness of pastoral is confirmed by the poem’s close (31-2):

\[ \text{sed qualiscumque's, resonent mihi 'Cynthia' silvae, nec deserta tuo nomine saxa vacent.} \]

The poet longs to hear the name of his beloved, but knows only an echo may come back to him – an echo that can be revived and have meaning only by re-touching the source – like pastoral, like the Classics.
principal goals are: (1) to refine and implement a consensus algorithm, adapted from those used in the study of DNA sequencing, that collates multiple transcriptions, producing a variety of meaningful statistical data and digitally searchable transcriptions that will be accessible to scholars through a unique graphical user interface (GUI); (2) based on the extant strings of Greek characters, to implement algorithmic meaning extraction to assist in the contextualization and identification of unknown literary works through an automated projection of possible linguistic/word scenarios. We are also aiming at computationally repairing gaps/holes in papyri through an automated projection of characters that are not only dimensionally suitable but also contextually sound through linguistic parallels elicited from the searchable online databases of Greek texts. The purpose of this paper is to report initial project results and to outline in greater detail our methodology for building this computational interface. In sum, we are merging human and machine intelligence – automated algorithmic methods – to increase the accuracy with which Greek texts are edited. We are transforming image data from Oxyrhynchus papyri into meaningful information that scholars can use – information that once took generations to produce.

**Homer and Hesiod in P. Oxy. 4648: Reconstruction and Interpretation**

Michael Haslam

This paper examines the intriguing piece published as P. Oxy. 4648, “Prose on Star-Signs Quoting Homer, Hesiod, and Others,” edited by Dirk Obbink. Published a decade ago, it plainly calls for attention, but has received virtually none. (Glenn Most took over Obbink’s version of the Hesiod section unameliorated in his Loeb Hesiod, as T151.) I attempt to reach a more satisfactory reconstruction of the text, one that yields a better understanding of what is being said both about Homer and about Hesiod, and along the way to elicit something of the significance that the text holds for ancient literary criticism of each poet.

The text is written in a practiced bookhand, probably of the later 3rd century CE, reportedly on the back of a petition; there are remains of 33 lines of just one column, broken at either side. What is under discussion is poets’ practical understanding of the constellations. When our column begins, the author is discussing Homer; he moves on to Hesiod ( appending mention of Aratus as Hesiod’s zelotes); then to Aeschylus and Sophocles; and there the papyrus breaks off. I propose to deal with the sections on Homer and Hesiod, the first 23 lines.

The first tolerably clear (albeit largely restored) statement we meet is that Homer’s veiled meaning (αἵνιττόμενοϲ) is that everything is controlled by the movements of the constellations. I suggest that the author is here addressing a passage in the description of the Shield of Achilles, Il. 18.483-9 (485 ἐν δὲ τὰ τεύχεα πάντα τὰ τ’ οὐρανόϲ ἐκτεφάνωται), and investing it with cosmological import, in line with Crates’ take on the Shield as a mimema tou kosmou. Then, on my understanding of the text (different from Obbink’s), he proceeds to say that Homer conferred his astronomical knowledge on Odysseus. Homer made advance arrangements (προοικονομῶν) for Odysseus’ skill at navigating by the stars in the Odyssey (5.272ff.) by endowing him with the ability to tell the time of night by the stars already in the Iliad (10.252f.), thereby lending plausibility to the Odyssey episode. This implies that Homer wrote the Iliad with the subsequent Odyssey in mind, and tailored the prior poem accordingly, an interesting and unusual view of
Homer’s compositional procedures. I float the suggestion (without arguing the case) that the section on Homer may represent the Homeric criticism of Crates.

Then comes Hesiod. Obbink took the papyrus’ “[X knew] these things likewise” to mean that Homer knew seafaring just as Odysseus did, but I argue that the sense is that Hesiod knew the workings of the constellations just as Homer did, this effecting the transition from the one poet to the other. On this view the author is not differentiating the two according to their respective arenas of seafaring and farming (so Obbink, supplementing accordingly) but uniting them in their shared understanding of star-signs: he’s a lumper not a splitter. (Cf. H.H. Koning, Hesiod: The Other Poet (2010), who unfortunately seems unaware of this text.) It is significant that the poet—Homer for Obbink, Hesiod for me—is introduced as ὅ ἡ δύεπης (suppl. P.J. Parsons ap. Obbink, irresistibly). I note the doubly allusive appositeness of conferring this distinctive epithet on Hesiod. It is the epithet that Hesiod applies to his Muses (Cat. 1.1/Th. 1021, Th. 965); and in the later Greek and Roman tripartite classification of styles Homer’s Νέοτορ ἡ δυεπης (Il. 1.247-9) was the archetype of the “middle” style, the prime exemplar of which was Hesiod (Quint. 12.10.58-64, 10.1.52, cf. Dion.Hal. de comp. 23, Dem. 40). I conclude by restoring coherence to the remainder of the Hesiod section, which defeated Obbink and Most.

Women’s Petitions in Later Roman Egypt: Survey and Case Studies
Graham Claytor

Over 150 petitions from women survive from Roman and Byzantine Egypt. Along with reports of proceedings on papyrus and imperial rescripts from outside Egypt, these constitute the best evidence we have for provincial women’s engagement with the law and help shape our view of the social position of women in the Roman Empire. Taking the terminus of B. Kelly’s recent study as a starting point, I first discuss petitions from women in the “long” fourth century (284-400 CE) as a whole, and then examine the cases in which we can learn a little more about the women involved in litigation, in the context of archives. I close by touching on the larger issues raised by Kelly and others, such as the agency of female petitioners and whether the legal system tended to undermine or reinforce traditional gender roles.

I focus on the “long” fourth century for three reasons. First, Kelly’s study on petitioning and social control ends in 284 CE, the traditional papyrological divide between “Roman” and “Byzantine” Egypt. R.S. Bagnall, however, has shown that the real break was from the late fourth century on, when evidence for female petitioners is much scarcer and largely restricted to wealthy, educated widows (Bagnall, “Women's Petitions in Late Antique Egypt,” in Denis Feissel and Jean Gascou (eds.), La pétition à Byzance [Paris, 2004], 53-60). The fourth century evidence continues to be marked by Kelly’s two “ideal types” of female petitioners: one, the woman isolated from male support through death, divorce, or other circumstances; the other, the woman of relatively high standing whose economic engagements brought her into legal conflict (Kelly, Petitions, Litigation, and Social Control in Roman Egypt [Oxford, 2011], 235ff.). Thus, we can study these petitions in close comparison with the earlier period and in contrast to the later period.
A second reason is the prominence of female petitioners in the period 284-400. From about 15% of total petitioners in the period 30 BCE - 284 CE, the percentage of female petitioners rises to over a quarter in the ‘long’ fourth century, then falls to about 10% after 400. This paper explores the reasons behind this apparent surge, which is paralleled also in imperial rescripts, and argues that it represents a real rise in women’s participation in the legal sphere and independence, at least during the Tetrarchic period.

Third, the archives of this period offer the opportunity to learn more about the family situation and economic engagements of certain female petitioners. I focus on the archives of Isidoros, Sakaon, Aurelia Demetria, and the descendants of Alopex in Panopolis. The first archive presents a pair of sisters, Taesis and Kyrillous, whose engagement with litigation came early in life due to the deaths of both parents: their coming of age is marked by a struggle against their uncle for the control of their inheritance. In the archive of Sakaon from Theadelphia, Artemis the daughter of Paesios and Heros uses the legal system to protect her children’s property after the death of her husband. Finally, the archives of Aurelia Demetria and the descendants of Alopex give us valuable details from urban settings. In Hermopolis, Demetria petitions about a disputed sale of land, and in Panopolis, we meet the oil-seller and landlady Theodora, whose business interests lead her to petition the prefect about a defaulting debtor.

This period offers us unparalleled evidence for women’s engagement in legal processes. Through both a broad survey and a microhistorical approach, I argue that women in the ‘long’ fourth century actively engaged in legal processes to achieve their own goals and that this period of transition witnessed a slight relaxing of traditional gender roles. Both trends were halted by the end of the century and reversed in the centuries to follow.

**Outsourcing Army Duties: Foederati in Late Roman Egypt**

Anna Kaiser

This paper seeks to examine the status of foederati in Late Roman Egypt. One hundred years ago Jean Maspero wrote an essay on 6th century CE foederati and soldiers (“Φοιδεράτοι et Στρατῶται dans l’armée byzantin au VIe siècle,” *BZ* 21 [1912] 97-109). Since then many more papyri have been edited that allow a better view of the Roman military organisation of Egypt in general and the question of foederati in particular.

The main focus of this paper is the status of foederati and their duties in Egypt, one of the more peaceful parts of the Late Roman Empire. Included among these duties might well have been the screening of the road system in the Eastern Desert, formerly a well-known duty of Roman soldiers. The Principate saw Egypt’s Eastern Desert dotted with small Roman outposts guarding the road system and important quarries. By the 3rd century CE there is almost no evidence for them anymore. This may give the impression that the roads through the Eastern Desert were unprotected, although they were seriously threatened by the Blemmyes, Egypt’s neighbours in the desert. The continuing trade with Berenike and Myos Hormos should have mattered enough to maintain the military road screening system (cf. *O.Claud. I-IV; O.Krok; O.MyosHormos; S. Sidebotham, Berenike and the Ancient Maritime Spice Route*, Berkeley 2011). Papyrological and literary evidence together seem to suggest that those patrol duties formerly carried out by Roman soldiers were outsourced – to people and tribes living near the Roman borders. These tribes may have even included the Blemmyes, a group that engendered a great deal of fear in the Egyptian
inhabitants during the 5th and 6th centuries CE. But both Eusebius and Abinnaeus, the praefectus alae of the ala V Praelectorum in 4th century Egypt, mention Blemmyan envos in Constantinople, and Procopius refers to the retraction of the Roman frontier in 298 CE and gold delivered to the Blemmyes. Some tribes of the Blemmyes therefore seem to have been Roman foederati (Eusebius, Vita Constantini 4, 7; P.Abin. 1; Procopius, De bellis I 19, 27-37.) Another tribe appears to have formed the 6th century CE numerus of Pharanitae, which was stationed at Bau, a famous monastery, in the Thebaid. The soldiers of this unit were first recruited in the Sinai peninsula, from a tribe living near the city of Pharan, not far from the famous Monastery of St. Catherine (Ph. Mayerson, “Pharanitai in Sinai and in Egypt,” BASP 47 [2010] 225-29). The Latin word numerus, or its Greek equivalent ἀριθμός, was used for any kind of troop in Late Roman Egypt; the term does not distinguish between Roman soldiers or federates. The Pharanitae may therefore provide another example of foederati in Late Antique Egypt – an example worth examining in more detail.

Session 11: The Cultural Dynamics of Ancient Empires (Seminar)

The Ecumenical Rhetoric of the Early Roman Principate
Myles Lavan

This paper explores how provincial elites were invited to conceptualize their place within the Roman world order by pronouncements of the Roman state. It argues that, from the very beginning of the Principate, Roman emperors and provincial governors endorsed and reproduced a Greek discourse which represented the emperor as the benefactor of ‘all men’ or ‘the whole human race’. By eliding potential distinctions between citizens and non-citizens and Italians and provincials, this ecumenical rhetoric invited provincials to see themselves as a unified community of subjects.

Augustus is normally credited with insisting on the significance of the division between citizens and non-citizens within the population of the empire (Ando 2000, esp 296-300). Dio writes that one of the documents which he left to be read together with his will advised Tiberius and the public ‘that they should not enrol large numbers as citizens, in order that there should be a marked difference between themselves and the subjects’ (Dio 56.33.3). According to Clifford Ando, not until Hadrian did pronouncements of the Roman state begin to address the inhabitants of the empire as a community equal in their subjection to the emperor (Ando 2000, esp. 330).

This paper aims to complicate this narrative through a systematic study of the corpus of letters and edicts issued by emperors and governors to provincial communities. We have the text of some 300 imperial letters, 30 imperial edicts, 90 praebidal edicts and dozens of praebidal letters. Although these texts have been studied extensively for their insights into Roman law, administrative structures and the social and economic history of the empire, they have not received sufficient attention as a discourse which structured the provincial experience of Roman power. There is far more at stake in them than the simple mechanics of petition and response.
Their production, their dispatch over vast distances, their reception, display and sometimes monumentalization in provincial cities, the multiplication of this process across all the cities of the empire and over time – all this represents a massive investment in symbolic production on the part of both emperors and cities. Yet nobody has yet done for the rhetoric of Roman emperors and governors what Jean-Marie Bertrand and John Ma have done for the rhetoric of the Hellenistic kings in their brilliant analyses of the language of royal letters and city decrees in the Hellenistic period (Bertrand 1990, Ma 2002; Kokkinia 2004 is a promising start) or what Carlos Noreña has recently done for Roman imperial coinage and honorific inscriptions (Noreña 2011). Instead, work has focused on formal and stylistic aspects (Oliver 1989, Benner 1975) and the idiosyncrasies of particular emperors (Williams 1976 and 1979, Alexander 1938).

This paper will show that these texts employ an ecumenical rhetoric from the very beginning of the Principate. For example, Augustus professes his reverence ‘for all men’ (Jos. AJ. 16.165) and Tiberius tells the citizens of Gythium that it is proper for ‘all men’ to give divine honours to the late Augustus on account of his benefactions ‘to the whole world’ (Oliver 1989 no. 15, ii, 17-19). Similar language is employed by provincial governors. As early as 10 BCE, Paullus Fabius Maximus, governor of Asia, styles Augustus ‘the common good fortune of all men’ (Sherk 1969 no. 65, 8-9). His son Paullus Fabius Persicus, himself governor of Asia under Claudius, writes that the emperor ‘has taken the whole human race under his particular care’ (Smallwood 1967 no. 380, 13-14).

The paper will argue that this ecumenical rhetoric originates in the civic decrees of the cities of the East and is first endorsed and then reproduced in Roman pronouncements. It has its antecedents in the ‘generalizing idiom’ of Hellenistic kingship (Ma 2002) and particularly in the cosmocratic language of the Ptolemies. Whatever its origins, the ecumenical tropes of these imperial and praesidial pronouncements encouraged provincial audiences to see themselves as part of a community of subjects.

**Virtue, Cosmopolitanism and the Self-Understandings of the Late Roman Aristocracy**

*John Weisweiler*

In the first three centuries AD, the governing élite of the Roman Empire was a small group of office-holders, living in one city. There were around six hundred senators, and all of them were legally required to establish their residence in Rome. But since the 320s, emperors conferred senatorial rank on ever-larger groups of imperial office-holders. Around the year 400, total membership in the senate had increased almost sevenfold, to more than four thousand. Most of the new senators did not come from Rome, nor did they relocate there after their acquisition of senatorial rank. The governing élite of the Roman Empire transformed from a face-to-face society, based in Rome, to a trans-regional aristocracy, whose members were dispersed throughout the Mediterranean World.

Several recent studies have greatly advanced our understanding of the set of administrative, fiscal and institutional reforms which made possible the formation of a new empire-wide ruling class (Heather 1994, Kelly 2004, Banaji 2007). By contrast, as yet, we have precious little sense of the set of ideas which motivated and legitimized this transformation of the imperial
élite. This paper maps the shape of the cultural language on which emperors and senators drew to make sense of, and justify, the formation of an empire-wide ruling class in the fourth century.

In order to understand the ideological foundations of this change, it is necessary to appreciate the culturally specific ways in which the Roman imperial élite conceived of its pre-eminence. Unlike the feudal aristocracies of later European history, senators saw themselves not as an aristocracy of birth, whose membership was reproduced by blood inheritance, but as an aristocracy of civic virtue, which included the ‘best’ citizens of the Roman state, whatever their social origin (Hölkeskamp 1987, Badel 2004).

The power of late-antique senators continued to be rooted in these long-standing conceptions of the senate as a meritocracy. In official correspondence, public inscriptions and literary texts, they insisted that they owed their elevated rank neither to their high birth nor to their wealth, but solely to their supreme moral capacity. New and old senators alike found that the republican conception of the senate an aristocracy of virtue, open to the ‘best’ of outsiders, still offered an exceptionally useful language to naturalize their dominance and to regulate social mobility.

But late-antique texts not simply replicate republican ideas of the senate as an aristocracy of virtue. They also testify to the development of new modes of legitimation. Senatorial writers of Republic and Early Empire had insisted on the nature of the senate as a specifically Roman élite, whose ethnicity distinguished them from the provincial subjects over which they ruled. By contrast, in Late Antiquity, the senate is frequently extolled as a trans-regional governing class, which united ‘the flower of all the provinces’ (Pan.Lat. 4.35.1-2) or even ‘best part of the human species’ (Symmachus, Epistula 1.64). Remarkably, this new idea of the senate as an empire-wide élite was adopted not only by new members of the imperial élite, but also by scions of the Roman nobilitas. Late Roman senators saw themselves as a global aristocracy of virtue, whose dominance was based not on descent or ethnic origin, but on superior moral capacity.

An Empire of Dynasties: Imagining Aristocratic Power in an Iranian Imperial Order
Richard Payne

From 226 to 636 CE, the Iranian Empire integrated the elites of geographically, socially, and culturally diverse territories from Northern Arabia to Bactria into a network of impressive extent and endurance. This paper will examine the instruments through which the ruling Sasanian dynasty consolidated relations with the aristocracies both provincial and trans-regional that mobilized men and material in the service of the empire. Recent accounts of late antique Iran present the empire in a state of ineluctable instability and decline because of its dependence on aristocratic sources of military and fiscal power (Pourshariati, 2009; Rubin, 2004). And yet the aristocratic houses - even the Parthian families the Sasanians had displaced - reliably supported the development of Iranian imperial institutions across four centuries (Gyselen, 2007). In place of studies that assume centralization and bureaucratization as the sole routes to lasting empire, the case of Iran demands consideration of the ways in which an imperial dynasty could rule through, not over, landed elites.
How, in short, did the Sasanian dynasty persuade the aristocracies of the Iranian world to collaborate in the erection and extension of their structures of rule? This paper will suggest that the production of myth-histories at court played crucial roles in the construction of aristocratic consensus, particularly in the fifth and sixth centuries. Best known from the *Shahnameh* of Firdawsī, courtly literary specialists produced extensive royal histories - the Book of Kings - in the late Sasanian period that traced the sacred-historical lineage of the Sasanian kings of kings back to the primordial kings of the earth (Yarshater, 1983). What has gone unnoticed in these histories is the way in which their authors subtly included great aristocratic families, including Parthians, as the reliable partners of the kings of kings, whose military prowess frequently safeguarded the imperial project against outside, "barbarian" invasion. When the Sasanians imagined their imperial order, the sharing of power and the cultivation of aristocratic consent were the distinguishing marks of effective rulership. These myth-histories, moreover, documented the genealogies of the greatest aristocratic houses alongside the royal lineage. Some aristocratic lines were as ancient and as vaunted as the Sasanian dynasty itself. This was not an empire of a single dynasty but rather of multiple dynasties that imagined themselves in a collaborative relationship forged at the primordial origins of political power.

This new imperial imaginary emerged just as the Iranian Empire was developing fiscal and military structures of unprecedented scope. Kawad and Khosro I revamped the fiscal system, which resulted in the burgeoning administration, dizzying revenues, and military expansionism characteristic of the Iranian Empire in the sixth and early seventh centuries. In revisiting the political history of the period in light of recent sigillographic and numismatic studies, we will show how mythical-historical models for imperial-aristocratic cooperation well account for the success of the dynasty at expanding its power not at the expense of, but to the benefit of, landed elites. At the same time, we will show how these literary ventures of the court and the great aristocratic houses spurred their provincial inferiors - the middling local aristocracies of Northern Mesopotamia, Iberia, and Armenia - to produce mythical histories of their own in the sixth century.
The Act of Viewing Within and Without Seneca’s *Thyestes*
Laury A. Ward

The characterization of Atreus within Seneca’s *Thyestes* presents a problem for those who seek to unite the works of Seneca the philosopher with those of Seneca the poet. In the tragedy, Atreus successfully avenges himself on his brother Thyestes for Thyestes’ previous attempts to subvert Atreus’ rule. Through careful plotting, Atreus convinces Thyestes to return home, secretly slaughters Thyestes’ sons, and feeds the children to their father in a disguised feast. Unlike his brother Thyestes, whom Atreus describes as *nec satis menti imperat* (*Thy*.919), Atreus is able to emerge victorious in the play through suspiciously scrutinizing the actions of those around him, and constantly reasserting his purpose to himself (e.g., *Thy*. 192-196). For Schiesaro (2003), Atreus symbolizes the power of poetry and serves as “the incarnation of a victory against the constraints of moral repression” (48). Although Schiesaro does not argue that Seneca’s tragedies are fundamentally incompatible with his prose works (as does Dingel 1974), he nonetheless finds that the *Thyestes*’ sympathetic portrait of a bloodthirsty tyrant presents a problem for those interpreters who wish to read the tragedy as designed to educate its audience in Stoic principles. Star (2006) problematizes Atreus further by focusing on Atreus’ language of self-command. Star describes Seneca’s tragic heroes as an expansion of his philosophical ideas: “Stoic self-control and *constantia* do not vary between Seneca’s philosophy and tragedy” but “Seneca’s characters also create a deadly new category that links vice with *constantia*” (241). Yet Star’s analysis largely avoids mention of the actual contents of Atreus’ vengeance, and he leaves open the question of how the viewer is meant to reconcile Atreus, executor of *nefas*, with Atreus, Stoic exemplar. By exploring Seneca’s focus on the activity of viewing both within the *Thyestes* and within his prose works (in particular *De Ira* and *De Clementia*), I propose that the character of Atreus is meant illustrate the dangers of pursuing those activities, such as spectating, without natural limits (cf. *Ep*. 16).

I begin my discussion by highlighting the theme of visual consumption within the *Thyestes*. For Atreus it is not enough that he should know such a punishment was inflicted upon Thyestes; rather, he repeatedly expresses his desire to see the gruesome banquet for himself. Even before the crime occurs, for Atreus *totaiam ante oculos meos / imago caedis errat, ingesta orbitas / in orapatris* (282-283). The need for autopsy extends to Thyestes as well, whose very first words in the tragedy are an expression of satisfaction that he finally can see his homeland (404-410). References to the act of seeing mark other key moments of the *Thyestes*, such as the initial prodding of Tantalus by the Fury (63-66), the first meeting between the brothers (508, 517), the choral response to this meeting (546-549), and the entrance of the messenger who conveys the news of the implementation of Atreus’ plan (623-625). Further exploration of these passages
shows that, *contra* Davis (2003: 66), neither Atreus nor any of the other figures in the *Thyestes* are viable candidates for the being a “Stoic sage”, for none of them understand the proper role of the visual within a philosophical life. Just like the audience members themselves, these characters fail to understand the psychic impact of the visual consumption of forbidden or unlawful acts, and mistakingly believe the pleasures of such sights will make them happy. Not only is this reading of Seneca’s *Thyestes* consistent with the views put forward in Seneca’s prose works about the dangers of viewing spectacle (e.g., *Ep. 7*), but it also illustrates the psychagogic force of the play on its audience through its inversion of the traditionally positive role of exempla in philosophical texts.

The Incarnation of the Stoic Passions in Seneca’s *Thyestes*

Ursula M. Poole

The relationship between Seneca’s theatre of cruelty and his allegiance to Stoicism has been the subject of intense scholarly controversy. At the center of this debate is the “most unpleasantly sanguinary” of Seneca’s tragedies, the *Thyestes*. Certain scholars insist on an ideological connection between the play and its author’s philosophical persuasions. Tarrant, for instance, maintains that the tragedies are “unmistakably the work of a writer imbued with Seneca’s particular philosophical outlook” (23). Others maintain that Seneca’s roles as philosopher and dramatist are distinct and in tension. Poe argues that the play channels a non-Stoic morality, while in Wray’s estimation, Senecan tragedy “confounds and refutes” the Stoic tradition (241). Schiesaro’s influential book maintains that Seneca, though interested in the Stoic passions, had little interest in touting Stoic doctrine. This schism in scholarly thought suggests that further work must be done to reconcile the Stoic elements in Senecan drama with their elliptical and sometimes problematic representation.

In this paper, I hope to offer fresh perspective on this dichotomy in Classical scholarship. I posit a connection between the author’s aesthetic choices in constructing the world of the play and his Stoic worldview. I argue that Atreus and Thyestes embody the psychological processes which Stoicism investigates as they are reified through the narrative events of the play. Atreus’ rage is presented in concrete terms: it is a festering *tumor*, and transforms him into a panorama of savage beasts that give fuller expression to his anger. Likewise, through Thyestes’ literal embodiment of his own children, he is transformed into the figurative embodiment of his Stoic vice: ravenous desire. Such externalizations and reifications go beyond mere sensationalism: they are revelations of the internal through the external, they enact a Stoic psychology that is inseparable from Stoic morality, and they betray the monstrosity of boundless passion and its contravention of the natural. Interpreting the central characters as incarnates of their excessive passions thus conceptually integrates Seneca’s dramatic works into the corpus of his explicitly philosophical ones.

First, I consider Atreus’ succumbing to—and becoming—his own anger. His rage is an entity beyond the limits of nature, one that cannot be conceived in the terms of normative emotion. It takes on a grotesque corporeal form: it is a cancerous tumor, one that swells (*tumet*), fills him (*impleri*), and presses against his insides (*instat*). This is consistent with the Stoic picture of anger that we see in *De Ira*, where is it deemed a “swelling” and “pestilent excess” (1.20.1). As Atreus is overcome by his unfettered passion, he is transformed through figurative device into a hungry tigress (707-13), and a furious lion (732-37). Not only are these beasts emblems of
unbridled emotion, but their appetites seem to exceed natural bounds. Atreus has thus not only achieved a state of *feritas*, he has come to embody it. So too the adulterous Thyestes comes to substantiate his own Stoic vice: *cupiditas*. Tumescent with the flesh of his own progeny, Thyestes becomes a symbol of self-consumption (*suos artus edat*, 278). Seneca’s representation of his characters’ emotion reduces them to something monstrous and inhuman. In the eyes of a Stoic, this is what being overtaken by emotion is: an alienation from what is natural and proper to a human being, and so a vice.

The reading of the *Thyestes* that I offer has significant implications for our understanding of the Senecan corpus as underlined by a common purpose. The violence and unwieldy emotion depicted in the *Thyestes* are not contrary to Stoicism or gratuitous. Rather, they invite us to explore what a human being is and how he becomes monstrous: both salient concerns of Stoic doctrine. Seneca’s drama and philosophy, rather than being at odds, are mutually reinforcing and illuminating. It is through Stoic psychology that we come to a greater understanding of the *Thyestes*, but it is through the dramatic phenomena in the *Thyestes* that we become more astute and disciplined students of Stoicism.

**The contagio of Ethical Agency in Seneca’s *Thyestes***

Eric Dodson-Robinson

A prominent and growing body of scholarship claims that Senecan tragedies dramatize, in diverse forms, the internal struggle between passion and reason: the psychomachy of a divided self (e.g., Gill, 2009; Littlewood, 2004; Schiesaro, 2003; Fitch and McElduff, 2002; Gill, 1997, 1987; Foley, 1989; Segal, 1986). Charles Segal, for example, argues, “In Seneca the tragic element operates in a struggle that is almost entirely inward, in a battle against the passions” (1983: 174). Segal’s interpretations build on those of earlier scholars who insist upon the inwardness of the drama (e.g., Staley, 1981; Shelton, 1977; Shelton, 1975; Regenbogen, 1927-1928). Such interpretations, although frequently at odds with the language and action of the tragedies, now predominate. In contrast, this paper argues that *Thyestes* dramatizes the breakdown between inner and outer world: a socio-psychic breakdown between the ostensibly autarchic self and others. Through explication of two key passages of *Thyestes* with reference to Seneca’s *De Ira* and to recent scholarship in Stoic philosophy, I demonstrate that external psyches infiltrate Atreus’ ethical agency. My essay, which examines *Thyestes* through a Stoic, rather than a Freudian aperture, explicitly challenges Alessandro Schiesaro’s contention that the tragedy portrays a struggle between “passion” and “repression” (2003: 2, 42). In doing so, my reading illuminates flaws in the predominant view that Seneca’s tragedies are in general allegories for internal conflict.

Seneca deploys the metaphor of a besieged city in *De Ira* to demonstrate that the soul must keep anger completely outside and separate from itself in order to retain reason (1.8.1-2). My argument begins with contextualization and close reading of this passage. For the Stoics, all that exists, whether mind, cause, soul, or event, is corporeal (Boeri, 2001; Rosenmeyer, 1989). *Contagio*, the interconnection and interpenetration of all being, entails that when one body moves, it acts on others with inevitable consequences. Because the mind is material, it, too, is subject to external movements or infection (Graver, 2007). In *De Ira*, Seneca describes the mechanisms by which external impressions act on the mind: when a stimulus acts, one may make a rational judgment to resist. Should one accede, however, there is no possibility of internal
struggle, as the resulting passions overwhelm, transform, and rule the soul (1.7-8; 1.16.7; 2.4; 2.5.8; cf. Ep. 18.15).

With reference to the vocabulary of contagio and furor in De Ira, I show that in Thyestes, Atreus does not wage an internal struggle against passion within a divided psyche. Instead, he consents or gives in to an external impulse. Tantalus invades Atreus’ agency, I argue, by initiating an impression, or pre-emotion (ictus), that leads to furor and violence. When Furia commands Tantalus, “concute insane ferum pectus tumultu” (84-5), the tumultus that agitates Atreus’ breast is an impression that penetrates from without. Tantalus infects Atreus with furor, such that a resulting tumultus shakes Atreus: “tumultus pectora attonitus quatit / penitusque volvit” (260-1). Atreus’ chiastic echo of Furia’s words indicates Tantalus’ ethical contagio, or infection, of Atreus. The furor of Tantalus invades and overwhelms Atreus’ agency, and Atreus assents to its impetus: “fiant hoc, fiant nefas” (265), he proclaims. For Atreus, atrocity (nefas) will determine his identity, as he makes explicit during his dialogue with the Satelles (176-335) and in other key passages (887; 1098-9; 326-9). The contagio of ethical agency ironizes autarchic self-construction and dramatizes that what is at stake in acceding to the impetus of external passion is one’s very identity.

I conclude by very briefly suggesting the applicability of my argument about Thyestes to other tragedies in the Senecan corpus, particularly Hercules. While my reading challenges psychoanalytic interpretations that read Senecan drama in terms of self-constructed identity and exclusively internal conflict (especially Schiesaro, 2003; Fitch and McElduf, 2002; Segal, 1986; Shelton, 1977), it also resonates more broadly with recent scholarship and controversies pertaining to Senecan perspectives of agency and ethical selfhood (Bartsch and Wray, 2009).

Session 13: Classical Presences in Modern and Contemporary Music, Cinema, and Poetry

Russian Tityrus: Joseph Brodsky in Arcadia

Zara M. Torlone

My talk focuses on Joseph Brodsky’s reception of Vergil, specifically on his “rewriting” of Vergil’s pastoral landscape. While Brodsky’s reception of classical myth is a subject of many critical studies, his allusions to Vergil, especially the Eclogues, received little attention (Spence 2001; Torlone 2009).

Brodsky’s eclogues, written as separate poems rather than a poetic corpus, evoke Vergilian pastoral as an idyllic space of poetic creativity and contemplation. The poems also follow some of the previous Russian discourses on rural retreats and their idealization (Tolstoy, Turgenev), which then unexpectedly escalate into contemplation of exile, alienation, and devastation.

Especially noteworthy in Brodsky’s eclogues is the treatment of the pastoral space. Vergilian Arcadia based on Theocritus’s Sicily, despite the occasional intrusions from the outside world,
offers an idyllic summer locus amoenus, the place of poetic inspiration. While Meliboeus is exiled from his land and Gallus is suffering from unrequited love, and even as Tityrus’s carefree existence becomes conditioned by the power of the city, Arcadian landscape remains a magic place of suspended existence where the exiles seek respite from the city and its anxieties.

Brodsky’s earliest “Field Eclogue” is full of references to a generalized Russian rural landscape, which is eerily uninhabited, abandoned. It is most certainly not a picturesque landscape of Tityrus’s leisurely existence. But it is that of Meliboeus, the exile, misplaced and lost. The theme of exile becomes in fact dominant in the poem. The “Field Eclogue” is a string of memory shots of Russian countryside as if the protagonist is on the move, wandering from one place to the next. That narrative finally culminates in the contemplation of what constitutes a true exile.

In his much later (1980) “Fourth” or “Winter Eclogue” Brodsky returns to the theme of exile again. The number of the eclogue does not signify its place in any previous succession of Brodsky’s eclogues but is in fact a clear allusion to Vergil’s “messianic” eclogue as the epigraph to the poem makes it clear: Ultima Cumaei venit iam carminis aetas. However, “Winter Eclogue” is not a poem about future, or awaiting Golden Age, political or spiritual. The idea of the “winter” in the space of the eclogue is an oxymoron. Brodsky undoubtedly was aware that the countryside of Vergil’s shepherds was full of gifts of bountiful nature. In this eclogue, however, the traditional summer landscape of Arcadia changes into an uncharacteristic winter terrain, providing for the poem written in Cyrillic a setting and a theme appropriate for its form. Like Vergil’s characters, Brodsky seeks his refuge in this new pastoral landscape, his moment for poetic creativity, fraught, however, with angst and anticipation of banishment and hardship.

The poem offers a strangely soothing description of the comforts of Russian winter which stands in stark juxtaposition to Brodsky’s attempt to describe the traditional pastoral landscape in yet another eclogue which he pens one year later, in 1981: “Eclogue 5th (Summer)”. “I hear you again, mosquito’s song of summer,” starts the poem, and then it languishes in hazy description of the Russian short summers. The summer landscape for the poet represents the uneasily suspended life, unwelcome languor that results in apathy rather than creativity (Reynolds 2005). The idealized landscape of ancient pastoral is no longer the mid-summer day of idleness that inspires poetic contests. Russian wintery countryside full of blizzards and frost becomes the metapoetic “spiritual” space where a Russian exile seeks his consolation and his hope.

Reinventing the Arena: A Neronian Presence in The Hunger Games
Katharine E. Piller

The recent film The Hunger Games shows that the imagery established by the history and literature of the Neronian principate maintains a strong presence in modern cinema. I will demonstrate that the cinematic adaptation of The Hunger Games draws on the spectacular imagery of Neronian Rome as interpreted by directors Cecil B. DeMille in The Sign of the Cross (1932) and Mervyn LeRoy in Quo Vadis (1951). In addition, the use of the name Seneca for the adviser to the President of the dystopian world in which The Hunger Games is set, as well as screenwriter Gary Ross’ decision to portray the two engaging in conversations on leadership
throughout the film, displays an indebtedness to the argument on kingship between Seneca and Nero in the *Octavia*.

*The Hunger Games* is ostensibly a version of the Theseus myth set in a dystopian world called Panem. Every year, each district of Panem is required to send one teenage boy and one teenage girl to fight to the death in an elaborate arena, which all of the citizens of Panem are required to watch. The spectacle itself, called The Hunger Games, is intended to remind the citizens of the power of the government, the Capitol, and act as an deterrent against revolt. The concept of punishment as spectacle is distinctly Roman, and Nero has become a major dramaturge of Roman brutality. Edward Champlin discusses how Nero’s punishments of the Christians present the viewer with ironic versions of the victims' crimes, cloaked in mythological imagery (Champlin 2003). The Hunger Games, which the Capitol established as revenge for a bloody revolt of the districts, are representative of a history that has achieved mythical status in the context of Panem. The arena becomes a means of punishment in the guise of entertainment for the masses. The cinematic version of *The Hunger Games* exploits this connection between spectacle and punishment by using imagery of a futuristic Roman arena with clear nods to *The Sign of the Cross* and *Quo Vadis*. Rome at its most extravagant is implicit in architecture throughout the Capitol, as well as the outrageous dress and eating habits of the citizens.

As Maria Wyke has demonstrated, various versions of *Quo Vadis* in the early-to-mid 20th century have used the figure of Nero and the imagery that surrounds him to send a moral message, presenting Nero as representative of sources of anxiety during a particular age. As a result, he has come to exemplify fears contemporary to the era of any version of *Quo Vadis*, such as the threat of foreign domination during World War II or the shadow of McCarthyism during the Cold War (Wyke 1997). Continuing this tradition, Nero becomes the overwhelming fear of government manipulation with advanced technology in *The Hunger Games*. This is explicit in the conversations between President Snow, the autocrat of Panem, and his adviser Seneca Crane, responsible for the production of The Hunger Games. In these conversations, President Snow explains his method of government, a combination of fear and manipulation, strikingly similar to the methods described by Nero in the *Octavia*. Seneca Crane’s position is reminiscent of the Seneca presented in the *Octavia*, a figure who can express misgivings but is ultimately powerless in the face of a leader who sees tyranny as the proper way to rule. The connection between Seneca Crane and his Roman namesake becomes telling at the end of the film, where Seneca Crane is forced by Snow to commit suicide.

*The Hunger Games* continues the tradition of Neronian spectacle in modern film by using imagery established in the early 20th century to portray a decadent and dystopian government. This imagery evokes our own contemporary suspicion of a government made more intrusive by technology, as well as the age-old fear of a tyrannical leader with absolute power over people he cares little about.

**Oedipus Rex and Memento Meet the Sophists Halfway**

Hardy C. Fredricksmeyer

“You don’t know who you are … maybe it’s time you started investigating yourself,” says Teddy to Leonard in the critically acclaimed neo-noir film *Memento* (Nolan, 2000). As a result of anterograde amnesia, Leonard does not know that he himself is the very culprit he seeks to
punish for killing his wife. The multiple and seemingly conflicting roles of Leonard as detective, criminal, and avenger correspond to those of Oedipus in Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*. I explicate these and other associations of narrative, and then discuss a deeper correspondence. According to my critique, the prevailing critical assessment of how these works relate to sophism is misinformed. In both cases, this view is monolithic: *Oedipus Rex* rejects sophism and *Memento* embraces it. I believe that the relation of these works to sophism is more nuanced and instead lies somewhere between the extremes of rejection and embrace. *Oedipus Rex* is more appreciative of sophism than previously understood, and *Memento* less so, and in the process they meet somewhere in the middle. Both works, I believe, acknowledge the problematic nature of how language reflects reality without denying its ability to do so.

The narrative correspondences between *Oedipus Rex* and *Memento* are manifest and abundant: both Oedipus and Leonard commit crimes unintentionally and in response to information they misinterpret; investigate crimes of homicide and sexual violation; conduct their investigations in a veritable wasteland of death and dysfunctional relationships; overestimate their own cognitive skills because of past successes; ignore the warnings and advice of others; ultimately discover their true identity and simultaneously their own culpability.

I will now turn to how each work relates to sophism. Knox (142), de Romilly (16), and most others understand *Oedipus Rex* categorically to reject the sophists. These sophists included Gorgias, who published his treatise *On the Nonexistent* in the 440s BCE, taught in Athens in the 430s, and settled there in 427, all before the premiere of *Oedipus Rex* probably in 425 (according to the most recent and thorough dating of the play by Mitchell-Boyask, 55-66). In the third section of *On the Nonexistent* (DK 82 B3), Gorgias argues that accurate verbal communication is impossible. It relies on word (*logos*), which exists only within the realm of human speech and thought, and is different from the external reality (*to pragma*) to which it refers.

Previous critics are undoubtedly correct that *Oedipus Rex* rejects Gorgias’ view of language as incapable of reflecting reality. Nevertheless, as I argue, the play responds appreciatively to Gorgias by underscoring the problematic relation of language to reality. Numerous examples include verse 1250 with its chiasmic juxtaposition of normally conflicting terms: “from a husband a husband and children from her child she [Jocasta] bore” (*ex andros andra kai tekn’ ek teknôn tekoi*). Also notable are the plays pervasive disjunctions between words and reality, as when Oedipus contrasts his name (see ô *onomazeto*, 1021), “son of Polybus,” with his body, the biological offspring of Laius.

*Memento* is widely interpreted categorically to embrace Derrida and his (neo-)sophistic understanding of language as “unable to summon forth meaning” (see Smith 34, and his bibliography; Derrida 1963 and 1967). In my view, however, the film mirrors the dualistic relation of *Oedipus Rex* to sophism. On the one hand, in accord with previous interpretations (that I will summarize) and my own analysis of the so-called FACTS tattooed on Leonard, *Memento* recognizes the problematic relation of language to reality and thus responds positively to Derrida. On the other hand, in contrast with previous understandings, I argue that *Memento* ultimately rejects Derrida’s linguistic indeterminacy. Teddy’s concluding revelation of Leonard’s history provides a yardstick by which to measure the truth-value of every aspect of Leonard’s (re)construction of his past. Indeed, it is this last measurement on which hinges *Memento’s* final,
twisted impact. Thus, the film duplicates *Oedipus Rex* in recognizing the real-life clash between linguistic and epistemological uncertainties and brute reality.

The Strange Case of the Latin Libretto to Stravinsky's *Oedipus Rex*

Susanna Braund

This paper proposes a rehabilitation of the Latin libretto by Jean Daniélou commissioned by Igor Stravinsky for his 1927 opera *Oedipus Rex*. After a brief discussion of Stravinsky's aims in commissioning the libretto in a language inaccessible to most of his audience, I oppose the generally dismissive attitude of scholars by arguing that the libretto is closely aligned with Stravinsky's intention to produce a monumental opera and that Daniélou was not (as has been assumed) attempting to reproduce the effects of Sophocles' Greek, but was influenced and inspired by the Latin of Seneca's tragedies to provide a verbal complement to the stark, monolithic monumentality of the music. My argument will be conducted by close analysis of select passages from the libretto and will be illustrated by a short audio-visual excerpt from a 1992 production which likewise responds to the stark monumentality of the music.

Igor Stravinsky's 1927 opera *Oedipus Rex* is an international curiosity both in its creation and in its reception. The Russian composer, who lived in Russia, France, Switzerland, and the US, had the idea to 'compose an opera in Latin based on a universally known tragedy of the ancient world' (quoted at Stephen Walsh, *Stravinsky: Oedipus Rex*. Cambridge Music Handbooks (Cambridge, 1993) 6). He decided on Sophocles' *Oedipus The King* and he asked the French novelist, playwright and filmmaker Jean Cocteau to abridge it, as he had done with *Antigone* in 1922. Stravinsky didn't like the result and sent it back for revisions a couple of times. Finally the stripped-down libretto was translated into Latin by the young Jean Daniélou, who later became an eminent Jesuit priest. (On this process see Paul Bauschatz 'Oedipus, Stravinsky and Cocteau Recompose Sophocles' *Comparative Literature* 43 (1991) 150-70.) Add to this internationalism that the most notable modern production was staged in Japan in 1992 by Julie Taymor, the extraordinary American stage, opera and movie director, designer and writer, who combined Japanese dramatic forms with western singers including Jessye Norman and Bryn Terfel.

As background, I start by explaining that Stravinsky's central aim was to present monumental music: a static opera-oratorio, with minimum distractions from the music. He called his *Oedipus Rex* a 'still life'. The word 'monumental' is taken directly from Stravinsky himself; it is also used at the very start by the narrator figure. This aim of monumentality explains his choice of Latin, which was designed to be hieratic–statuesque, but obscure. This aim also explains his prescription that the singers wear masks—he wanted their individuality as performers obliterated—and remain seated throughout, immobilized like statues.

I now move to focus upon the libretto and glance briefly at scholars' dismissal of Daniélou's Latin. For example, McDonald (Marianne McDonald 'The Dramatic Legacy of Myth: Oedipus in Opera, Radio, Television and Film' in *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Theatre*, eds Marianne McDonald and Michael J. Walton (Cambridge, 2007) 306): 'his Latin hardly equaled the rich Greek of Sophocles, or even the richly poetic Latin of Virgil, but was an etiolated Church Latin, and even contained errors. In short it was almost a parody of the original
I argue that this is a misunderstanding: I explain how the Latin libretto matches Stravinsky's aims and, through examination of several excerpts, I demonstrate how linguistic monumentality is achieved by Daniélou. Then I argue that Daniélou turned to Seneca's Latin tragedy *Oedipus* for inspiration and deployed vocabulary and effects taken from the Latin play. No one has suspected or seen this before. A few telling examples clinch the argument. In conclusion, an audio-visual illustration from the 1992 Taymor production provides a fully realized demonstration of the starkness and austerity of libretto and music alike.

Session 14: Rhetoric in Cicero and the Ciceronian Tradition

Cicero’s *First Verrine* and the Role of Shame in the Roman Courts

Joseph A. DiLuzio

This paper will show how, in the first *actio* of the Verrines, Cicero references the crowd as part of an effort to shame the jury into convicting the defendant. Like all trials, the prosecution of Verres took place amid the din of the Forum, where crowds would gather in a circle (*corona*) to watch the proceedings. This provided a ready platform for the ambitious advocate-politician, whose concerns could be many and varied. Ann Vasaly has recently argued that, while attempting to persuade the jury of Verres’ guilt, Cicero’s defense speech was also “a bold attempt on his part to use the forensic occasion for political self-representation before a mass audience” (*CA* 28.1 [2009] 120). The trial afforded a similar opportunity for the courts as an institution, which at the time suffered from a reputation for corruption.

At the beginning of the speech, Cicero reminds his audience of the courts’ disrepute (*infamia*), which has made the Senate an object of popular indignation (*invidia*), and he suggests that a conviction has the potential to restore their good standing in the eyes of the People (*Verr.* 1.1). Additionally, he refers to the *corona* as the *populus Romanus* at several points in the speech – a phenomenon that Robert Morstein-Marx identifies as “interpellation” (e.g. *Verr.* 1.34-5, 48, 50; cf. 1.10, 17, 41. *Mass Oratory and Political Power* 2004: 14-5, 41-2 w. L. Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* 1971: 170-7; cf. J. –M. David. *Le Patronat Judiciaire* 1992: 472-4). With charges of corruption swirling about the courts and the guilt of the defendant supposedly well-established, Cicero uses the crowd to put pressure on the jury to convict: “Now, however, men are on watch; they are observing to what extent each one of you will maintain your self-restraint and uphold the laws in your conduct” (*Nunc autem homines in speculis; observant quem ad modum sese unus quisque vestrum gerat in retinenda religione conservandis legibus; Verr.* 1.46). And later: "This is a trial in which, just as the you will judge the defendant, so the Roman People will judge you" (*hoc est iudicium in quo vos de reo, populus Romanus de vobis iudicabit; Verr.* 1.47).
With this, Cicero appeals to republican ideology, specifically the People’s expectation that individuals invested with authority should exercise that authority in the interests of the community. In any society, a failure to meet such moral obligations occasions shame (*pudor*), and sanctions inevitably follow. The element of sight is critical to the construction of shame as it entails being seen to have acted inappropriately (R. Kaster. *Emotion, Restraint, and Community* 2005: 28-45). It implies an audience – in this case, the *corona* – and ultimately depends on perception more than fact. Cicero's rhetorical strategy in the first *actio* of the Verrines demonstrates how the *corona* could play an important role in enforcing judicial norms. Andrew Riggsby has argued that while politics, bribery, and rhetorical performance might deflect them from their appointed task, jurors were nonetheless expected to “establish whether defendants had or had not committed certain reasonably well-defined crimes” (*Rhetorica* 15.3 [1997] 237; cf. *Crime and Community* 1999: 9, 158-9). While the evidence from the first *actio* of the Verrines suggests that shame based on public perception could provide a mechanism for enforcing norms, it also suggests that the opposite was possible: the prospect of “shame” based on public misperception (e.g. believing an innocent man to be guilty) might just as well distract the jury from rendering a “true” verdict.

**Inventing Sacrilege: The Misrepresentation of Religion in Cicero's Verrine Orations**

*John N. Dillon*

It is well known that Cicero exploits religious sentiment to lend force to his accusation of C. Verres: Verres should be condemned for embezzlement a fortiori because he is guilty of sacrilege. Cicero's rhetorical manipulation of religion, however, has been analyzed only generically (Cancik, Lhomme, Zimmer, Miles, Vasaly). A careful reading of the Verrines, especially Book IV (de signis), reveals that Cicero pervasively assimilates eastern and Sicilian Greek cults to Roman norms, creating the illusion that Verres had committed sacrilege not merely against a variety of Greek gods, but against the gods and cults of the Roman people.

In this paper I examine Cicero's representation of religion in the Verrine orations according to the norms of the official religion of the Roman state. Cicero does not merely frame Greek gods, sanctuaries, and cults in the categories of the official Roman religion; he intentionally misleads his audience into accepting as Roman, gods and cults that were irrelevant to the public religion of the Roman Republic, particularly with respect to the public categories of sacred and profane applied by the Roman pontiffs. Cicero's general strategy is to beg the question of the Romanness of Greek cult by representing it consistently in the terminology of Roman sacral law.

The paper considers four aspects: nomenclature, topographical terminology, syncretistic precedents, and ritual. First, nomenclature: It is obvious that Cicero uses only Roman names for nearly all the injured deities (Lhomme). What is not obvious is that he creatively extends this nomenclature to misrepresent local Greek gods as identical to gods of the city of Rome itself, for example the gods of the Capitoline Triad. Secondly, Jordan noted that when Cicero discusses non-Roman sanctuaries, he prefers the word *fanum* to other terms that have connotations in pontifical and augural law. This is true generally, but Cicero's usage also shows that when he reasonably can get away with it, he deliberately uses precisely the same topographical terminology applied to civic Roman temples. Thus Verres’ depredations in Syracuse occur in
virtually a Roman setting. Thirdly, in order to magnify Verres' wrongdoing, Cicero judges Verres against several *exempla* from Rome's past, such as a delegation of the Xviri to the sanctuary of Demeter in Enna. This and the other examples are, under scrutiny, highly unusual events in Roman religious history and far more complex than Cicero allows (cf. Cancik). The final section is dedicated to the representation of religious ritual in the Verrines. Cicero carefully creates scenes that evoke both Roman domestic and public religious ceremonies. The latter category is the most spectacular: Cicero represents a Syrian king performing a Roman *dedicatio* that is, technically speaking, wrong in every possible way.

Thus throughout the Verrines Cicero cleverly and carefully misappropriates Roman religious terminology to elevate Verres' crimes beyond theft (*furtum*: Frazel), and to transform them into sacrilege against the gods and cults with which a Roman readership would have identified most: their own.

**Quintilian the Unteacher**

Timothy J. Phin

This paper provides a reading of Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* as a deconstructive work, or ‘unteaching,’ associated with Flavian aristocratic reassessment. The *Institutio* has received intermittent scholarly attention: earliest as a repository of data on Roman education (Marrou, Gwynn); later, reassessed as political philosophy (Morgan). Recently, W. Martin Bloomer used the *Institutio* to suggest the origins of liberal education (Bloomer 2011). I frame Quintilian’s pedagogical practice in its Flavian political context, demonstrating that the *Institutio* ‘unteaches’ by moving from traditional aristocratic competition to communal interaction and sentimental reinforcement.

I begin with an examination of the semantic possibilities of the Latin verb, *dedocere*. *Dedocere* is rare in Classical Latin, and it is usually used as a modification to the traditional teaching verb, *docere*. Cicero uses it multiple times (*De or.* 2.72.12, *Fin.* 1.20.10 and 1.51.13, *Tusc.* 2.60.5). Quintilian, Horace, the elder Seneca, and Statius each use the verb once (*Inst.* 2.3.3.1, *Carm.* 2.2.20, *Controv.* 2.2.8.18, and *Theb.* 2.409). In several of these instances, particularly in the *Carmina* and *Thebais*, *dedocere*’s meaning is one of ‘teaching the opposite.’ In Horace’s second ode, for example, *Virtus* teaches the people not to use false words (…*Virtus populumque falsis dedocet uti vocibus*…). For Cicero and Quintilian, however, *dedocere* is usually paired with a second verb of teaching or instructing and has the meaning of ‘unteaching’ or ‘re-teaching’ a person or concept. This pairing focuses our attention on the difference between teaching in its original sense and a type of new teaching, or ‘unteaching.’

Situated in the tumultuous Flavian period, Quintilian’s subtle deconstructions, or ‘unteachings,’ take on new meaning. Supported by ranking equestrians like Quintilian, the Flavians distanced themselves from their predecessors. Quintilian’s work, as argued by Morgan, is a Flavian text even though it often pretends not to be (Morgan). It responds to the Julio-Claudian period with a mixture of detachment and distaste, continuously citing republican examples and *exempla* in an effort to remove itself from any contact with an imperial regime. Aristocrats of the imperial period, unable to pursue traditional paths to power, chose alternative methods to express their aristocratic values (Talbert, Roller). Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* is a guide to the education of a generation with reassessed values. As such it operates to deconstruct
republican political and aristocratic ideals while promoting a new, imperial aristocracy bound
together in bureaucratic, civic service to the emperor and empire.

I conclude with three examples from within the *Institutio Oratoria* illustrating
Quintilian’s subtle ‘unteachings’: moments of *dedocere* that shift assumptions and call into question cultural habits. First, Quintilian redefines the mentor-student relationship as paternal, individual, and yet, communal (esp. *Inst. 1.2.1*-5). Second, he flagrantly insists on education happening out in the open, or ‘public’ education. Third, he displays a sentimental concern for children’s safety. In each of these examples, Quintilian illustrates the concept of *dedocere*, taking what had been habitual and converting it toward the ends of a new aristocracy. These examples undermine the individualistic conflicts Cicero (and most modern historians) blamed for the collapse of the republic, focusing classical education on the promotion of a bureaucratic aristocracy capable of supporting itself and the empire. For Quintilian, the proper application of education can lead anyone of even small talent to a successful aristocratic career. In this way, the *Institutio Oratoria* ‘unteaches’ the essence of the aristocracy as a closed body of birth, and promotes public education as a path to prestige.

---

**Session 15: Technologies of Time and Memory**

**The Antikythera Mechanism and the Corinthian Family of Calendars**

Paul A. Iversen

In 1901, Greek sponge divers recovered from a shipwreck of *circa* 70-50 BCE a remarkable bronze device with gears now known to the world as the Antikythera Mechanism. Recently, a group of researchers known as the Antikythera Mechanism Research Project has examined this badly corroded and brittle device with modern technologies that have revealed finely engraved inscriptions on the Mechanism’s inner surfaces that have not been seen in over 2,000 years (see T. Freeth *et alii*, *Nature* 444, November 2006, pp. 587-591 and Supplementary Information pp. 1-27; *Nature* 454, July 2008, pp. 614-617 and Supplementary Information, pp. 1-44; and *ISAW Papers* 4, Preprint February 2012, located online at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/17002562/isaw-papers-4-preprint/isaw-papers-4.html). Through these new technologies it is now known that the back of the device housed a Saros Eclipse-prediction Dial, a Games Dial (that listed several athletic games in a four-year cycle that was similar to, but not identical to, an Olympiad, including the Isthmia, Olympia, Pythia, Nemea, Naa, and one other set of games in Year 4 that they could not identify but which I have now deciphered), and a specific Greek lunisolar calendar that was regulated according to the 235 months of the Metonic cycle and probably also the 76 years of the Callippic cycle. The names and orders of the months of this calendar are: Phoinikaios, Kraneios, Lanotropios, Machaneus, Dodekateus, Eukleios, Artemisios, Psydreus, Gameilos, Agrianios, Panamos and Apellaios. The authors who published these results (see especially T. Freeth, A. Jones *et al.*, *Nature* 454, 2008, pp. 614-617 and Supplementary Information, pp. 1-44), argued that this lunisolar calendar belonged to Corinth or one of its colonies, including Syracuse the home of Archimedes (who is known to have made celestial
orreries), or to a city of Epirus, and that this lunisolar calendar commenced one month after the
autumnal equinox, or roughly October.

This talk will demonstrate that the calendar is indeed that of Corinth, or of one of Corinth’s
colonies in NW Greece, or of a member of the Epirote League. In particular, I will reject the
argument recently put forward by P. Cabanes, Tekmeria 10, 2010, pp. 249-260 that the calendar
of the Mechanism and that of Epirus were different. Instead, I will argue that the Epirote League
adopted this calendar mostly unchanged from one of Corinth’s colonies in Epirus, possibly from
Ambrakia in the time of Perseus. I will also offer some new explanations for the names of some
of the months (particularly Kraneios and Lanotropios), I will reject the existence of other alleged
month names in the calendars of Corinthian colonies and the cities of Epirus (especially
Haliotropios and possibly Datyios), and I will demonstrate that Syracuse’s calendar, while
related, was not the same as that on the Mechanism. In addition, with the help of my collaborator
John D. Morgan’s work, I will argue that the start date of the calendar on the Mechanism must be
backed up one or two months to begin in late summer and I will have general comments about
using the comparative method to reconstruct ancient calendars that will modify Pritchett’s
argument (AJA 50, 1946, pp. 358-360) that the calendar of one Doric city cannot be used to
reconstruct the calendar of another. Finally, I will also reveal the heretofore-unidentified game in
year 4 on the Games Dial.

All these new findings will have a significant impact on our understanding of what I call the
Corinthian Family of Calendars (and thus Corinthian history and religion), ancient calendars in
general, the provenance of the Mechanism (which does not have to be the same as the calendar),
as well as calibrating the starting time of the world’s oldest known analogue computer

**Divine birthdays and family obligations in Roman Egypt**

Kevin Funderburk

Holidays implied certain obligations between friends and family in Roman Egypt, of which some
found expression in contracts and letters preserved on papyrus. This evidence shows how people
actually negotiated duties, affection and authority among themselves and thereby gave concrete
form to moral expectations in an ancient context. This paper examines how the Amesysia, a
combined New Year’s and birthday celebration of the goddess Isis held for four or five days in
late August (the epagomenal days and Thoth 1st) could be employed within families of different
social status to define and claim obligations owed to one another. Such festivals held a general
expectation for generous gifts of wine and meats from parents to children, but the relational
function of these gifts and the festival itself changed depending on family’s social status and
distance between its members. I argue that the Amesysia served as a marker of intimacy and
distinction for professional and artisan families, while wealthier parents used this feast instead to
reestablish authority over distant children who had left home for educational pursuits.

Fourteen papyri dating from 6 BC to the latter third century AD mention this feast and most are
from either the Arsinoite or Oxyrhynchus except three that are unprovenanced and one from the
Memphite nome. They include nursing contracts (C.Pap.Gr. 1.28, 31), a leasing contract for an
oil-press (P.Fay. 95), business letters (P.Flor. 2.131, SB 20.14197, SB16.12518), private letters
(P.Iand. 6.95, P.Oxy. 14.1666, SB 14.12182) a list of expenditures (P.Lond. 3.1171r), a
mummy’s identification tag from near Memphis (SB 1.3462), as well as two apprenticeship
contracts (P.Oxy. 41.2971, SB 20.15162), one of which specially reserved the Amesysia from the work year. Examination of the letters and contracts reveals certain expenditures and contractual expectations relevant to this celebration and portrays a moment where different families negotiated duties and affection within this provincial context. This paper therefore analyzes certain real costs and effects of cult, how it offered constraints on behavior and how different families could use it to change the shape and character of their relationships and negotiate conflict when their interests clashed.

Epitaphs Recording the Hour of Death as Horoscopes of the Afterlife
Simeon D. Ehrlich

Roman epitaphs recording times of death served as horoscopes for the deceased. Though long regarded as a curiosity, there is indeed substance to the c.900 surviving inscriptions of this type. Prior scholarship (Armini 1916, Sandys 1919, Calabi Limentani-Degrassi 1968, Almar 1990, Kajanto 1963, Rutgers 1995, McLean 2002) has acknowledged such inscriptions but has made little effort to interpret them. Bilfinger 1888 marks the most substantial inquiry into references to hours in Roman antiquity, yet his concern is more for how time was measured than why it was recorded.

Through analysis of the recording of precise times by the Romans in reference to major lifecycle events, I am able to highlight the contexts in which Romans recorded hours. The significance ascribed to recording such information is discerned from astrological (Solinus, Polyhistor I.18; Cassius Dio 37.18.1-37.19.3; Manilius, Astronomica 2.453-465; CILVI 2305-2306) and patristic texts (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 18.153.19-18.154.3; Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto 25.2; Asterius, Homilies on the Psalms, XI.2.14; St. Ambrose, Exp. Luc. VII.222; Augustine, Ex. Ps. 55.5; Zeno of Verona, Tract. II.45=I.33.4; Methodius of Olympus, De Sanguisuga XI.3; Hippolytus, Den Moyxes – Patrologia Orientalis 27.171). This primary material is considered in light of Beck 2007 on astrological practice, Hegedus 2007 on Christian attitudes to astrology, Galvao-Sobrinho 1995 on Christian epigraphic and sepulchral practice in late antiquity, and Danéliou 1963 on Christianization. These primary and secondary materials show that the hours represent, variously, the signs of the Zodiac, the gods of the Pantheon, and the Apostles.

Dating from the first through sixth centuries CE and coming from Rome, Italy, North Africa, and parts of Europe, these inscriptions include either references to the time of death or, more commonly, measures of hours as a quantity in the lifespan of the deceased. As the figure of hours in a duration merely records the last fraction of a day lived (as measured from sunrise), this number also functions as the time of death.

First, I establish that there was no official context in which times were recorded in reference to lifecycle events, despite their use in other official contexts (e.g. Suet. Aug. 50.1; Caes. B.G.1.26.2). Rather, hours were recorded by the masses almost exclusively for the casting of horoscopes. The most common form of astrological practice in the Rome was the genethliatical horoscope, based upon the genethlios, the hour of birth.
Next, I situate the practice of recording hours in the intellectual climate of Rome as it expands into the Greek east. I contend that new ideas of time measurement and astrological thought imported from Hellenistic Greece, Egypt, and Babylon, in conjunction with the rise of the epigraphic habit around the turn of the millennium spurred the development of these epitaphs. Astrological models present systems of assignations whereby the twelve sings of the Zodiac are mapped onto other systems of twelve, such as the limbs of the body or the components of one’s life. More common, however, were models correlating units of time to the heavens, whether to the stars or the gods. As well, there were systems in which units of time and, hence, the events occurring within them, were governed by tutelary deities. In all cases, the intention is to reconcile the divine and mortal realms.

Subsequently, I argue that even as Christianity came to prominence these pagan astrological ideas retained their currency, albeit in an adapted, Christianized form. Whereas in the pagan astrological texts there are no direct connections drawn between time and death and tutelary divinities, in early Christian writings such links are explicit.

Ultimately, I propose that in these epitaphs, as the hour of death represents the moment of birth into the afterlife, the hour recorded functions as the sign under which the deceased is reborn. Thus, the hour of death is both the moment from which a new horoscope is to be reckoned and a means of denoting the tutelar who guides the deceased.

Aurelia Philematium and Maria Auxesis: Kept Women or Wives?
Alison Jeppesen-Wigelsworth

Aurelia Philematium’s epitaph, in which she embodies the ideal of the chaste coniunx, is one of the best known spousal inscriptions to survive from Rome. Less well known is the stele of Maria Auxesis, an amica who died c.98-117 C.E. By terminology alone these two women should represent opposite ends of the spectrum: one was a respectable coniunx and the other was an amica, a girlfriend or mistress at best. Yet, as this paper illustrates, a comparison of their epitaphs to each other and to a wider range of inscriptions demonstrates that both inscriptions challenge long-held assumptions about what it meant to be either a wife or an amica.

Select readings of the literary and epigraphic sources have provided a rather narrow portrayal of the Roman wife over a broad period of time. Roman wives are often depicted as chaste and loving with Lattimore’s summation as the benchmark: “we are presented with the ideal of a woman as housewife...pia, which sums up such qualities, is much in evidence; and we hear much of chastity” (Lattimore 295-6). This view of Roman wives and Roman marriage is easy to find on large scale inscriptions such as Aurelia Philematum’s (Treggiari; D’Ambra; Koortbojian). Such inscriptions are taken as emblematic of spousal ideals on epitaphs throughout the Roman period. But were they?

Amicae are often even more problematic and more narrowly portrayed. Identified as girlfriends, mistresses, and prostitutes, the neutral application of this term is often overlooked, particularly when applied by a man to a woman, (Rawson 287; Adams 348-350; Konstan 90-91). This is, however, largely based on a gendered reading of the literary evidence (e.g. Catull. 41, 43, 72;
Prop. 1.6.10; Juv. 4.20), which also seems to illustrate a lack of amicitia between men and women (Konstan 146). Yet an examination of amicae inscriptions, centered on Maria Auxesis’s example, reveals a discrepancy. The literary portrayal of amicae does not correspond to the depiction found in the epitaphs.

This paper focuses on the commemorations of Aurelia Philematium and Maria Auxesis in order to challenge the traditional understanding of Roman wives and so-called sexual partners. By comparing them to each other and to a wider sample of over 2,500 inscriptions commemorating women, it becomes quite clear that the portrayal of Roman women in epitaphs was influenced by numerous factors. The term of relation (coniunx, uxor, amica), the place of burial, and the status of those involved could intrinsically affect how the deceased woman was described. More importantly, this description changed significantly over time. The result is that when amicae and wives are compared and analysed statistically, as they have been for this paper, startling patterns emerge.

Maria Auxesis appears, at first, to be an example of a very unusual amica while Aurelia Philematium has been held up to be an example of a very typical coniunx. What this paper effectively demonstrates is that the opposite is true. Maria Auxesis was a typical Roman woman commemorated as a friend by a friend. Aurelia Philematium was a very odd example of a Roman wife and one that most Roman women would not have seen when they looked in the mirror.

Session 16: Appearance and Reality in the Ancient Novelistic Discourse

Aspasia and Callirhoe: Greek Women in the East
Steven D. Smith

In this paper I establish an intertextual relationship between Chariton’s Callirhoe and Aelian’s story of Aspasia (VH12.1) that highlights their contrasting representations of Greek identity. Aspasia is different from romantic heroines in important ways (Pervo), but further comparison of Aelian’s Aspasia with Chariton’s Callirhoe is justified.

Aspasia of Phokaia (not to be confused with the famous companion of Perikles) was born into poverty and became a beautiful woman after being cured of a facial disfigurement by the goddess Aphrodite. Captured by Persians, she is forced to become the concubine of the satrap Cyrus, whom she grows to love; Aspasia eventually passes to Cyrus’ brother Artaxerxes, to whom she also develops a strong emotional attachment. Aspasia of Phokaia is discussed by Xenophon, Plutarch, and Athenaeus, but Aelian’s is the most elaborate account.

Chariton and Aelian are both interested in self-fashioning, but they differ in the representation of their versatile heroines’ Greek identity. Though flexible in enduring her life’s misfortunes, Callirhoe never lets go of the belief that she is Greek to the core and that her superiority over Persian slavery is based on essential differences between Greek and barbarian. Aspasia’s story,
by contrast, is marked by metamorphosis and her versatility is shown to be not just a strategy for survival but the undoing of Greek identity; in the story of Aspasia, Aelian shows that the essentialism of Greek identity, the belief that one has a Greek nature, is illusory.

Aspasia and Callirhoe are contemporaries in the historical fictions that Aelian and Chariton construct. The Artaxerxes with whom Aspasia ends up in Aelian’s story is the same Persian King whose passion Callirhoe ignites. There are other hints that Aelian has Chariton’s heroine in mind. Aelian says that “she had an abundance of charms (χαρίτων),” thereby writing the romancer’s name into Aspasia’s physical description and signaling her literary genealogy. Aelian also notes that the remarkable necklace Cyrus tries to present to Aspasia was brought from Sicily, a superfluous detail that evokes Chariton’s description of Callirhoe as the ἀγαλμα τῆς ὅλης Σικελίας (1.1.1). Aspasia’s adaptability to her role as concubine and her gradual love for Cyrus recall Callirhoe’s own adaptability: Callirhoe marries, has a sexual life with, and even develops an affection for Dionysius (cf. her love-at-first-sight romance with Chaereas).

The women’s Greek identity is tested by their respective confrontations with eunuchs at the court of Artaxerxes. After the eunuch Artaxates propositions her for the king, Callirhoe’s first impulse is to gouge out his eyes; instead she dissembles, remembering that she is educated and prudent (6.7.8). In their subsequent meeting, when the eunuch insults Chaereas as a slave, Callirhoe finally lashes out, invoking the memory of Marathon and Salamis to remind the eunuch of Greek superiority (6.7.9-10).

Aspasia’s encounter with a eunuch reveals a different attitude toward Greek identity. Early on Aspasia rejects the gaudy dress of a courtesan as an admission of slavery. But Aspasia gradually welcomes Persian luxury: though politely declining the ornate necklace, she happily sends wealth to her father, modulating her style as appropriate to both Greek and Persian standards. The story’s climactic final scene nevertheless astonishes, as Aspasia consoles Artaxerxes for the death of his beloved eunuch by voluntarily dressing herself in the eunuch’s cloak. Gone are the scruples about her supposed Greek identity; Aspasia fully admits her status as the slave of the Persian king.

Aelian frequently explores different ways of understanding Greek identity, and reading Chariton’s Callirhoe alongside the story of Aspasia reveals an interesting variation on one of Aelian’s favorite themes. Aphrodite’s early intervention to remove Aspasia’s disfiguring growth (φυμα, from φύσις) teaches her about the metamorphic power of ἔρως. Freed from the constraints of an essentialist Greek nature such as abides in Callirhoe, Aspasia transforms herself into the perfect Persian woman.

Transgression in Longus’s Daphnis and Chloe
Bruce D. MacQueen

Longus’s Daphnis and Chloe differs from the earlier Greek novels in many obvious ways, one of which is an almost Aristotelian unity of place. While the fictional young lovers of Chariton, Xenophon, and Achilles Tatius are flung from one exotic location to another, nearly all the action in Daphnis and Chloe takes place within the confines of a country estate on Lesbos, a self-contained and largely self-sufficient pastoral world-within-a-world. And yet, every important event in this novel happens because someone appears who does not really belong in this idyll (to
use the word rather literally). The proposed paper will explore how Longus uses transgression, i.e. the crossing of the boundaries between worlds, to transform a speciously silly story into a genuine novel, which Goethe called “ein Meisterstück, ...wogegen der gute Virgil freilich ein wenig zurücktritt” (Eckermann, 9 March 1831).

Some of these “transgressors” are patently dangerous (a she-wolf, hunters, pirates, an enemy army), while others seem quite innocent - such as the author himself, who informs us in the Prologue that he was hunting on Lesbos when he saw a picture that inspired him to write a novel (ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ). His protagonists, then, are two exposed infants, i.e. not born to the world in which they have been raised and which they believe to be their home. Only their parents (and we, the readers) know this, but until the fourth and final book only the astute reader will occasionally notice a reference to this fact, as when Chloe’s unbelievable erotic naivete is explained at I.14 with the remark that she is νέα κόρη καὶ ἐν ἀγροικίᾳ τεθραμμένη. As many scholars have noted (Goldhill, MacQueen, Morgan, Wouters, Reardon, Zeitlin), the task of teaching Chloe about Eros is protracted and complicated, and requires the intervention of several “teachers,” including especially Philetas and Lykainion. The latter (whose name links her thematically to the real she-wolf in Book I, while ironically identifying her as a retired prostitute) is a transgressor in several senses, but she performs an essential task: it is from her that Daphnis finally learns what Eros is all about. By the end of Book III, all is tending towards an expected and fully satisfying conclusion: the marriage of Daphnis and Chloe, to which both “fathers” have given their consent. In Book IV, however, the owner of the estate appears, Dionysophanes, a wealthy man from Mytilene, and in his entourage is a pederastic parasite named Gnathon, whose attempts to seduce Daphnis lead directly to the revelation of Daphnis’ true identity as his erstwhile master’s son. In the meantime, a brutish local shepherd abducts Chloe, but then she is found and rescued by none other than Gnathon, who returns Chloe to his would-be-catamite-turned-young-master and regains his former position of trust. Once it is revealed that Chloe is also of suitable birth and the two “real” fathers consent, the marriage finally takes place, and is duly consummated in the last sentence of the novel. Daphnis and Chloe will be restored to the world of their birth only briefly, however: we are informed in the penultimate paragraph that they will leave Mytilene and live out their days in the country.

The contrast between the worlds of country and city thus turns out to be highly complex and deeply ironic: the vices and inadequacies of both are ruthlessly exposed, while Eros leads Daphnis and Chloe to an almost Hegelian Aufhebung, that is, not a compromise or synthesis, but transcendence of a destructive and insoluble antithesis, moving to a plane where the issues are no longer of any importance. The various planes of antithesis that permeate this novel from the first sentence to the last (male and female, nature and art, hunter and prey etc.) are thus transgressed and thereby rendered harmless. Goethe’s admiration was not, after all, misplaced.

The Boy Who Cried Wolf: Longos, Mimesis, and the Pastoral Tradition

Robert L. Cioffi

This paper examines the figure of the wolf in Longos’ Daphnis and Khloe. I argue that the wolf – always depicted as absent – is a complex and multi-dimension figure within the novel’s pastoral world: as an “absent presence,” it offers an ideal locus to problematize the act of
mimesis. Specifically, I suggest that each of the three wolf episodes (1.11-12, 1.20-2, 3.15-19) illustrates a different kind of mimesis (plastic arts, dramatic performance, and literature). By portraying the successes and failures of these lupine mimeseis, Longos reflects on his own project of representing the natural world, while also positioning his landscape within the tradition of pastoral. The lesson of the wolf is the lesson of the novel: successful mimesis requires the fusion of nature and culture.

Previous discussions of wolves in Daphnis and Khloe have focused on their role as (sexual) predators, injecting violence or realism into an idyllic pastoral world (Winkler 1990; Pandiri 1985) or on their narrative function as catalysts for Daphnis’ and Khloe’s sexual development (Epstein 1995). More generally, scholarship on the natural world in Longos has focused on the accuracy of his description (inaccurate: Naber 1877, Reardon 1971, 201; accurate: Arnott 1994) or on the possible sources for his descriptions with an emphasis on the pastoral tradition (Cresci 1999, Effe 1999, Mason 2003, Morgan 2004).

In contrast, this paper argues that the wolf and by extension the natural world also serves a meta-narrative function. Longos uses the wolf to reflect on the way in which different kinds of art can represent the natural world. I begin with the observation that although wolves are mentioned some 31 times in Daphnis and Khloe, they are always depicted as absent. In fact, zooarchaeological research suggests that wolves were not on Lesbos in antiquity (Yannouli 2003). Rather, Longos’ wolf takes its cue from the pastoral tradition of the absent threatening wolf, but goes well beyond its predecessors.

In the first wolf episode (1.11-12), villagers try to trap a she-wolf by digging pits and covering them with sticks in order to “make an imitation (μεμίμητο) of earth” (1.11.2). The trap does not catch the wolf – for she can perceive “false earth (γῆ σεσοφισμένη)” – but it does ensnare Daphnis and his goat. I argue that this episode illustrates that the natural world alone is an insufficient model for mimesis.

The next episode (1.20-2) moves from mimesis in the plastic arts to performance. Dorkon, the lovelorn cowherd, dresses as a wolf and tries to snatch Khloe. Dorkon’s efforts at dramatic mimesis, reminiscent of Dolon’s in [Euripides’] Rhesos and Homer, Il. 10, flop. His disguise is too realistic. Khloe’s dogs mistake him for a real wolf and remove his costume (1.21.3). In contrast to the villagers, Dorkon’s mimesis failed to consider the realities of the natural world or the lessons of his literary models.

My final wolf, Lykainion (“little wolf”), the wife of Daphnis’ neighbor Khromis (3.15-20), explores mimesis in narrative. Like other “wolves,” Lykainion is an outsider, but she comes from the city, not from the wild, and she pursues Daphnis rather than Khloe. She engages in literary mimesis (μιμησάμενη) when she modifies Penelope’s dream in Odyssey 19.535-58 and pretends that an eagle has snatched one of her geese (3.16.2-4). Similarly, her sexual instruction (3.18) teaches Daphnis what he could not learn by imitating nature (3.14). Lykanion’s successful mimeseis combine both natural and literary models.

I conclude by suggesting that the wolf is one instance of a broader pattern in which the natural world creates meaning in the novel. Like Longos’ description of art, gardens, and humans imitating animals (cf. Hunter 1983, Zeitlin 1990, 1994), the wolf allows Longos to problematize...
the act of *mimesis* and the relationship between his work and the pastoral tradition. The figure of the wolf reminds readers to pay attention to Longos’ own construction of the natural.

**Does Clothing Make the Man or Does It Make the Man an Impostor?: Costume and Identity in Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses, Florida, and Apology***

Ashli J.E. Baker

In the final book of Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*, a crowd of Isis worshippers is on parade, costumed in unexpected ways: from a man in the garb of a hunter to a bear pretending to be a *matrona*. This parade can be read as a montage of the novel, demonstrating that physical appearance is mutable and may not reflect the underlying truth: men can dress as women, animals can become human, and anyone can costume as a Roman magistrate or philosopher. The preoccupation with deceptive appearances apparent in Apuleius’ *Met.*, most notable in Lucius’ asinine transformation, is also present in his rhetorical works, the *Florida* and *Apology*. Starting with Sebesta and Bonfante (1994), who established a foundation for understanding the signification of Roman clothing, scholars have focused on clothing as a way of asserting and policing social identity in the Roman Empire (e.g. Edmondson and Keith 2008). Costuming and falsification of identity in literature and how this relates to the larger political context has also been explored (Gleason 2011 on Cassius Dio). Incorporating the work of Bradley (2008) on the centrality of physical appearance in the rhetoric of Apuleius’ *Apol.*, this study moves beyond previous scholarship in two ways: first, it reads Apuleius’ literary and rhetorical oeuvre in a tightly integrated way, relatively unusual in Apuleian studies; second, it offers a sustained discourse on Apuleius’ treatment of physical appearance and deception, arguing that he uses the clothed body to explore the mutability of identity in his fictional and lived worlds.

Apuleius’ *Met.* depicts the inadequacy of appearance as a tool to interpret the identity of others and to represent oneself. In addition to the parade of Isis worshippers, the novel shows characters intentionally and unintentionally misrepresenting themselves through alterations to their ‘costume’. Lucius’ identity is somewhat accidentally concealed beneath the hide of an ass, thrusting him into a life far below his birth, while many characters use dress to deceive others about their identities (e.g. Milo as a poor man – 1.21; Thrasyleon, a bear– 4.15; Plotina, a man – 7.6; Haemus, a woman – 7.8). In the novel, the connection between physical appearance and identity is portrayed as tenuous at best, a notion explored more fully in Lucius’ bizarre encounter with his childhood friend Pythias, a man described as having attendants, rods, and *habitus prorsus magistratu congruentem* (1.24). Pythias’ costume suggests that he has become a Roman magistrate and yet he wields power out of proportion to his station, raising questions about whether his new *habitus* conveys or conceals the truth of his identity.

Similar anxieties about deceptive appearances are evident in the *Flor.*, where Apuleius decries the loss of integrity of the philosopher’s *pallium* and clothing is shown to obscure rather than reveal the truth. On several occasions in his collected speeches, Apuleius offers a negative judgment of those who falsely wear the *pallium*: in *Flor.* 9, he distinguishes himself, a true philosopher, from *qaedam…palliata mendicabula obambulant*; likewise, in *Flor.* 7, after praising Alexander’s edict forbidding any but the best artists from reproducing his image, Apuleius expresses a desire of similar protections for philosophy to prevent men from donning the *pallium*.
and seeming to be philosophers (7.9). Finally, in Flor. 4, Apuleius bemoans the confusion of identity caused by duplication of costume, connecting his own distaste for the fact that, in the Rome of his day, people with radically different statuses are indistinguishable to the laments of the Greek aulete, Antigenidas, who disliked that the name of his high-status profession was shared by funeral pipers. This final example reveals that, for Apuleius, the ambiguity of identity created by dress may also be present in the lack of fixity of language itself.

In a world without objective means of decisively establishing or refuting social identity, costume becomes critically important in identifying individuals. By demonstrating the changeability of appearance and the mismatch between appearance and reality, Apuleius offers a biting social critique.

**Session 17: Themes of Roman Historiography**

**Wisdom expressions (gnomai) in Dio Cassius**  
Andriy Fomin

Prevailing opinion holds that wisdom expressions (gnomai) in Dio Cassius are stylistic derivatives from Thucydides (Lintott 1997). This paper will argue that gnomai in Dio’s Roman History had an explanatory function and that understanding their role illuminates his conception of historical causation.

Gnomai are one of the particularly salient features of the composition of Dio’s work. A typical example is the following: “So, no doubt, it is ordered by Nature that whatever is human shall not submit to be ruled by that which is like it and familiar to it, partly through jealousy, partly through contempt of it” (DC Fr. 5.12).

I start with observations derived from the comparative analysis of Dio and of some of his possible sources (Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus), and also by juxtaposing evidence from material of the Second Sophistic: (1) Gnomai in Dio appear to be a part of his own input. They are not present in the parallel passages in Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, unlike, for example, popular etymologies, which Dio includes only when his sources etymologize. (2) The overwhelming majority of Thucydidean gnomai are used within speeches, while most maxims in Dio are employed in the narrative; thus they represent a part of Dio’s explanatory system. (3) Gnomai are widely used for the purpose of strengthening the argument in Second Sophistic literature, a phenomenon apparent in Philostratus. Dio may have adopted such diction in his history through his immersion in rhetorical devices of the Second Sophistic. (4) Gnomai in Dio become less frequent in the narrative of the imperial period and virtually disappear starting with the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Markov (2009, cf. Hose 2007) suggested that this evolution revealed the progression of explanatory paradigm in Dio: the Thucydidean model used by Dio for regal and republican periods was not fitting for his exposition of imperial Roman history. However, Dio favored personal observation and interrogation of witnesses as the most trustworthy approach and thereby underscored the continuity between his own and Thucydidean methodology (Simons 2009). Therefore, Markov’s explanation becomes problematic once one
poses a critical question: why would Dio use the Thucydidean model, which was devised by the Athenian historian for processing current events, in order to narrate regal and republican periods, while subsequently abandoning this model for the very period during which eye-witness accounts might be already available to him?

In counter-distinction, I shall provide a new definition of gnomai and explain why previous classifications have been too broad (Hidber 2004, together with all gar-clauses) or too narrow (Markov 2009 and Reinhold 2002, only maxims containing the word *anthropeion vel sim.*).

In order to show that gnomai in Dio are not simply the stylistic borrowings from Thucydides, I shall analyze a number of parallel examples and define their functionality in both narratives. It will become clear that *gnomai* in Dio serve different purposes in comparable contexts. Next, I shall give a short overview how *gnomai* are used in Philostratus and Ps.-Longinus and also how Second Sophistic rhetorical treatises identify their function (Apsines, Hermogenes, Ps.-Aristides, Anon. Seguerianus, and Ps.-Demetrius).

Finally, I will demonstrate that gnomai were employed by Dio in the process of integrating source material within the narrative, in an attempt to rationalize the less reliable or less coherent (from Dio’s perspective) information. It would be improbable to believe that gnomai (especially the *anthropeion-maxims*) form any consistent conception of human nature shown to be capable of driving historical events. The use of maxims diminishes with Dio’s turn to the sources he deems more trustworthy. Therefore, maxims in Dio are a popular in contemporary discourse tool that was adapted by him from the store of rhetorical devices suitable for the “artistic” proof, in an *enthymeme*. They were employed especially when the nature of Dio’s sources rendered other explanatory strategies inapplicable, while adding the illusion of authority to Dio’s authorial comments (as suggested by the rhetorical treatises analyzed here).

**No Mercy for Tiberius? Clementia in Velleius Paterculus’ *Historiae*  
Jaime Volker**

Tiberius is often considered the teleological end point of Velleius’ history (Gowing (2007), Schmitzer (2011)). Though he is characterized as the ultimate Republican leading the new republic, of all the virtues he is assigned, *clementia* is, surprisingly, not one of them. This omission is even more poignant considering that Tiberius advertised his *clementia* during his reign (see Levick (1975), 131-33). To explain this omission, Claudia Kuntze (1985) suggests that Velleius is criticizing Tiberius *ex silentio*; Tiberius is not assigned *clementia* because, in Velleius’ opinion, he is not particularly clement.

Kuntze’s suggestion, though tempting, contradicts Velleius’ overall program of making Tiberius the *sine qua non* among leaders and Republican figures. My paper offers an alternate suggestion, namely that Velleius does not assign *clementia* to Tiberius because in his *Historiae* he associates the virtue *clementia* with conflict, primarily civil conflict.

In the first part of my paper, I briefly discuss which figures are assigned a clement nature, particularly Scipio Africanus, Julius Caesar, and Augustus. Through this examination of when
clementia is mentioned, I contend that Velleius links clementia to a past age of Rome’s history, particularly the period of decline and discord spanning the destruction of Carthage through the civil wars of the late Republic. For example, the highest concentration of uses of clementia and synonymous terms, such as mitis, occur in Velleius’ narrative of Caesar and Augustus, but only in the period of the civil wars. Similarly, Velleius’ assignment of clemency to Scipio Africanus, while not occurring in the context of civil war, comes to contrast his mercy toward the Carthaginians with his descendant’s destruction of Carthage, an act which is the catalyst for Rome’s decline. Clementia in Velleius is, in short, a virtue of times of war for Rome.

From here I show how Velleius chooses to portray the time after the civil war as a period of peace (pax). Velleius emphasizes the peace of empire at several points, particularly in his catalogue of the blessings Rome now enjoys under Tiberius’ reign (2.126.2-4). Once Rome enters this new phase of its history, punctuated by domestic peace, clementia is no longer necessary. In fact, Velleius finds it more useful that Tiberius exercise severitas against those who attempt to disrupt this Pax Tiberiana. Thus, Velleius passes over assigning clemency to Tiberius not in an attempt to criticize the emperor but because, as an emperor of a pacified Rome, Tiberius does not need clementia so much as vigilantia.

Laetitia and Libertas in Livy's First Pentad

Peter L. Blandino

One trend in Livian scholarship, starting with Burck’s landmark work, Die Erzählungskunst des T. Livius (1934), has focused on the author's narrative sophistication. My approach builds on his and more recent findings in this vein, but I focus less on thematic patterns, and more on lexical markers that, I argue, signpost coherent narrative strands that serve to organize the text and convey meaning.

I focus on words expressing joy in Livy’s first pentad, such as laetitia and gaudium, that, as I show, contribute to a conceptual substructure on which Livy situates his discourse on Roman libertas, its gestation, birth and its subsequent struggle to survive and thrive. The doublet of happiness and liberty first takes root approximately midway through Book One with the arrival of Tarquinius Priscus and Tanaquil at Rome, receives direct articulation in the preface to Book Two, and then recurs in a significant pattern throughout the remaining books of the pentad.

My essay explores how Livy weaves this nexus of key words and concepts into his narrative, and how form and content combine to channel meaning from the author to his readers. Specific episodes that I use to confirm this new way of reading Livy's text include the first struggle between plebs and patricians after the founding of the republic (2.21ff.), the extended Verginia narrative at the center of Book Three, and the disputes and resolutions over year-round military service, intermarriage, and the plebeian right to hold consular office that conclude Book Four and initiate Book Five.

I show, first and foremost, that joy is strongly linked with libertas, and serves as perhaps the single greatest theme organizing Livy’s presentation of Rome’s early history. This conceptual link is marked by the consistent collocation of some combination of the words libertas, laetitia, and gaudium, whether in these or related verbal forms. Second, the narrative presents joy as experienced by individuals, groups, the city as a whole or some vague intimation of divine will.
By dividing the *laetitia/libertas* concept onto these different planes, Livy can explore the social dynamics of a society oriented towards a specific telos, the creation and preservation of liberty. Third, by consistently coupling *libertas* with joy, an inherently voluble emotion (with the exception of divine joy), Livy demonstrates the volatility of freedom, presenting it as a process of continued conflict and negotiation rather than a stable product. Since Livy’s history analyzes this process in successive iterations, expressions of joy occurring repeatedly in recognizable patterns serve the narrative simultaneously in structural and theoretical capacities. In this way form and content merge artfully so as to become almost indistinguishable. Furthermore, the pattern of political process does not simply replicate itself, but shows development and increasing sophistication. In Books Four and Five, where the tribunate is operative, patricians show greater acumen in deliberation and the plebs prove quite able to resist the tribunes and look towards the common good. This progress is expressed and emphasized by the most inclusive and emotionally intense instances of joy in the pentad. I conclude by discussing how the frequency with which these passages recall the language from the two prefaces speaks to their importance in the overall scheme of the pentad. The prefaces, which claim a didactic and teleological purpose for the history, act as a sounding board by amplifying the *laetitia/libertas* concept, thus calling attention to its value in interpreting the narrative.

**Historiographical Advocacy: Cicero’s *opus oratorium maxime* Revisited**

John Marincola

The phrase *opus oratorium maxime* has been discussed at great length by many scholars, and indeed one must not underestimate its importance, given that it is one of the few generalizing remarks we possess from the ancient world about the nature of history. Many scholars have emphasized the rhetorical aspect of this phrase, the suggestion that history is not much different from, or is at the very least strongly dependent upon, rhetoric, which is here made to seem the *sine qua non* of historiographical narrative.

Two points must be noted. First, the Latin term *orator* can indeed mean ‘speaker’ but its root meaning, of course, is ‘pleader’, one who advocates, such that the phrase *opus oratorium maxime* can be translated as ‘a task more than any other suitable for an advocate’ or (perhaps even more provocatively) ‘a task more than any other suitable for a lawyer’. Once put it in these terms, the nature of historiographical contestation becomes immediately evident: the historian is the one who will build a case, argue an interpretation, persuade the jury (of readers? of the future?) that his account is true. Second, it is essential to keep in mind that Cicero’s discussions of historiographical activity, unlike those of Dionysius, Plutarch, or Lucian, for example, occur in dialogues, in which several sides of an issue are aired and discussed. The point, in fact, is not to come to any conclusion, but to show the various ways in which history had been and could be used, and, secondarily, to show how contestation is built into the historiographical project by its very nature.

As a man interested in history and as a politician who often ‘used’ history, Cicero was aware of the often competing claims made on the past. In the *de Legibus* Atticus relentlessly pursues Marcus and Quintus about the exact nature of the tree in Cicero’s *Marius* but is kept at bay by the brothers who posit different rules for poetry and history, while in the *Brutus* Atticus playfully
allows Cicero to keep ‘his’ version of Themistocles’ suicide, cognizant, as he is, that history and oratory approach the past in different ways. Much depends on circumstances and context.

The way in which writers fought over history is a testament to how valuable the past was in these societies. Cicero comes across as a man who knows what should be done in the realm of history but can’t help himself, and he embodies many of the contradictions that the ancients displayed towards that past. On the one hand, they knew very well that one could make true and false statements about the past. But there was also the past and its allure. To persuade the people, to motivate them, to move them, to win renown for oneself – well, if that required the speaker ementiri in historiis, that might be a small price to pay, because the past could materially influence the present. A good story could be put towards ‘useful’ ends: that was the value of using history and also the danger.

Session 18: Literary Theory in Graduate and Undergraduate Classics Curricula (Organized By the APA Education Committee)

Literary Theory Survey Classes for Classics Undergraduates
Nigel Nicholson

This paper seeks to open a discussion about how to teach a literary theory survey class as part of an undergraduate classics curriculum. With reference to a syllabus that in some form has been taught for two decades, it will explore the justifications and benefits of such a class, as well as the problems it must overcome, under four headings:

1. Why teach a full unit on theory? The goal of the class is to help students develop the facility with the language, concepts and even syntax of literary theory that they need to engage with theoretically informed Classical scholarship on its own terms, and not feel like outsiders looking in. Developing such a competence requires concentrated study of the larger field, this paper will argue, and cannot be achieved by addressing models as and when they surface in literature classes.

2. How can such a class be made accessible to students who lack a background in theory? Four strategies have proved helpful. First, starting with American New Criticism. This is an approach most students recognize in some form, though they have rarely encountered its theorization; engaging with the complex body of scholarship behind the theory both gives the approach substance and reveals the relevance of theory. Second, mixing together readings from ‘high’ and ‘low’ theory, Classicists and non-Classicists, pure and applied theory. Third, testing the theories must be central to their critical appraisal; students should consider theories especially in terms of their deployment, in articles or practical exercises. Fourth, stressing that theory is not a pawn in an academic game, but making a personal decision about how the world works and what is important.
3. How can such a class be fitted into the curriculum? Students must be enabled by the syllabus and encouraged by the faculty to bring what they have studied into other classes, but the theory can also be matched to the curriculum. The syllabus can focus on the more dominant theories in Classical scholarship; how different movements treat language provides an obvious point of contact and interest to Classicists. In fact, the study of theory brings new dimensions to the study of syntax and word choice, so that it can help bridge the often awkward gap between language and literature classes.

4. Finally, why make theory a central part of an undergraduate curriculum at all? Theory is part of Classics, and undergraduates make excellent theory students—engaged, energetic, eager to work together. Further, such seminars enable Classics students to join, or even shape the larger conversation with their humanities peers. Most of all, however, theory makes students more reflective about their Classics work and the larger shape of their studies, and such self-consciousness is surely central to a liberal arts training.

Using Team-Teaching to Make Theory Central to the Undergraduate Curriculum

Christopher van den Berg

This paper discusses team-taught courses as one venue in which to introduce theory to students. I draw from experiences in a recent undergraduate course on “Political Rhetoric” to address the role that theory has in the curriculum. The aims of the paper are twofold: first, to outline the ways in which team-teaching across fields makes it necessary to address the theoretical assumptions which foster and constrain the disciplines (cf. Heath (2003) and Garber (2001)); second, to make the case that Classics, because of its unique historical and cultural perspectives, must be part of larger conversations about contemporary theory.

“Political Rhetoric” enrolled about 50 undergraduates at different stages in their tuition, and was taught in conjunction with a colleague in Political Science. Readings included prize rhetorical texts of Greco-Roman antiquity, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Tacitus, etc., as well as the reception and re-conceptualization of these authors by modern thinkers such as Hume, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Dewey. The course closely examined how the modern era’s emphasis on verifiable truth values influenced political agency. The philosophical underpinnings of this doctrine arise from the belief that certain descriptions can thoroughly capture human nature, “man’s glassy essence”, as Rorty (1979) put it. The ancient rhetoricians competing—but not necessarily incompatible—obligations to truth and to plausibility provided a way to think around the modern preference for truth over pragmatic results as categories of evaluation.

The course yielded two interrelated insights. First, while the historical specificity of rhetorical culture in Greco-Roman society invaluably illuminates the modern dilemma, it was not because Classics simply “provides a background” for the recent developments. Instead, what emerged in explaining the differences is how a genealogical framework, outlined by Nietzsche and developed by Foucault, still figures among the most powerful reasons for the necessity of Classics as a field both within modern curricula and across the liberal arts (cf. Foucault (2001) for its application to rhetoric rather than sexuality; Pollock (2009) on “future philology”). The assimilative tendency in Classics—the belief that we ought to smooth out the differences in order
to maintain our relevance to the pressures of the present—should give way to a recognition that the irresolvable differences are productive (cf. recently Greenblatt (2011)).

Second, while theory is an essential and inevitable part of our curriculum, this need not mean that theory itself should be tacked on like an appendage to traditional historical or genre-based surveys and emphases. “Applied Theory” has justifiably attracted criticism. The existence of literary theory outside of texts is predicated upon appeals to verifiable external criteria. That model is ultimately reflected in, though not necessarily endorsed by, the modern handbooks (e.g. Culler (1975), de Jong and Sullivan (1994), Schmitz (2007)). Nearly three decades ago Michaels and Knapp challenged the totalizing explanatory bent of “Theory with a capital T” (in Mitchell (1985)). The result is an observation made by different critics across time and discipline: theory works best when it is “the beginning of criticism, not the end” (Feeney (2008); cf. Cavell (1969)). The opportunities and no less the limitations of the theoretical enterprise require us to find new avenues, such as team-teaching, in which to combine our theories and our texts.

A Dedicated Theory Class for Graduate Students
Leslie Kurke

A required literary-theory class for Classics graduate students was introduced at my institution in the late 1980s, as a proseminar alternating every other year with the required proseminar in textual criticism. Initially, the course encountered some resistance from some students, but for at least the last twenty years, students seem grateful and eager to have such an introductory theory course.

The general framing or position of the course is that we are not requiring students to become theorists in general, or theorists of any particular stripe. We are simply exposing them to another “language of scholarship”—just as we require of them that they learn German, French, and Italian to be able to read scholarship in those languages, the theory proseminar is intended as a basic introduction to the common discourse of scholars throughout the Humanities and many of the Social Sciences. In order to be able to converse intelligently with colleagues from other disciplines and read and benefit from their work, Classics students require a foundation in structuralist and post-structuralist theoretical approaches. This is especially true because very few Classics undergraduates have much exposure to theory—or even if they do, it is rarely taught to them systematically as a coherent intellectual tradition unto itself.

In our experience, the theory proseminar has become more and more for our students just the first step in a more in-depth and rigorous course of study in different theoretical approaches, as they go off and take other more advanced and specialized theory courses (mainly outside the Classics Department), and learn to make full and effective use of theory for their seminar papers and dissertation projects.

So how do we get beginning graduate students “from zero to 60” (or at least to 30) in a one-semester theory proseminar? The course is taught regularly by several different faculty who have different approaches, and even different notions of the subject matter to be covered in the course (along a spectrum from literary theory narrowly defined to more of a cultural studies approach). This talk will consider the content, structure, pacing, and pedagogical strategies of such a course, including sample syllabi and different writing and in-class projects. In particular, I will consider
how such a course can be effectively integrated with the students’ other Classics coursework, and how students can be motivated to regard the theory proseminar as just the first step in their ongoing education in theory.

Teaching “Theory” in Topical Graduate Seminars
Matthew Roller

This presentation discusses a model for introducing theory into graduate and undergraduate seminars on an “as needed” basis. In this model, a seminar or course is constituted around an explicitly Classical topic, and introduces particular theoretical approaches in a focused way as they pertain to that topic. This model thus presents theory in a bottom-up way, rather than top-down as one finds in a dedicated “survey of theory” seminar. The focus is on developing fine-grained techniques for working with particular approaches in relation to specific problems, rather than presenting a god’s eye overview, Eagleton-style, of the emergence and eclipse of major trends or schools. It may also instantiate a fundamentally different view of what “theory” is, and its place in Classical pedagogy, than is presupposed by a dedicated theory survey course.

I present two examples drawn from my department’s recent graduate offerings. First, a graduate seminar entitled “How to persuade an emperor.” This seminar was organized around a reading (in Latin) of Seneca’s *De Clementia* and Pliny’s *Panegyricus*, with thematic units on the following topics: speaking to power; metaphors for imperial authority; virtue language; and courts/courtly society. There exists a significant scholarly apparatus, developed by sociologists and anthropologists, around the matter of how subalterns speak to or about those who dominate them, and on the social dynamics of “courts,” i.e., the people close to a monarchic ruler. Representative readings from this material, most of which does not directly address antiquity, were assigned on a weekly basis along with “regular” Classical scholarship. The seminar’s focus was thus firmly on a Roman problem as framed by Latin texts, but that problem was illuminated via engagement with a small and focused selection of social theory.

The second example involves a seminar entitled “Roman landscapes in context,” conducted once at the graduate and once at the advanced undergraduate level. This seminar examined Roman landscape paintings together with a variety of Latin literary texts dealing with the countryside, thus juxtaposing literary and visual modes of representation. Particular theoretical perspectives informed the examination of these paintings and texts. A body of art historical theory has developed around landscape, which has been a staple of Western painting from antiquity to modernity. Paul Zanker’s *Power of Images* disseminated a semiotic-cum-political approach to looking at Roman art in general. These two approaches provided alternative lenses for viewing Roman paintings and for considering a range of Latin literature from a “visual” angle.

A reflection on terms seems useful. What do we mean by “theory?” Is it an object of inquiry in and of itself, to be taught and learned as such? My impression is that, when Classicists speak of “theory,” they often mean something along the lines of “a set of ambitiously generalizing interpretive frameworks, with claims to broad applicability, developed by scholars working in fields outside of Classics, some of which we may (or may not) find pertinent to our own work.” If this is a fair description, then “theory” has no unity or coherence as such: but there are as many “theories” as there are ambitious intellectual frameworks generated in other fields. To say that a Classicist uses “theory,” then, is to say nothing other than that s/he works in an interdisciplinary
way, engaging and appropriating ideas generated in other fields. And if the real pedagogical issue is how teach students to work in interdisciplinary ways, then perhaps we are, indeed, ultimately dealing with a set of fine-grained practices that are best developed from the ground up.

Session 19: The Discourse of Marriage in Hellenistic and Imperial Literature (Organized By the International Plutarch Society)

Plutarch’s Coniugalia Praecepta and the Tradition of the Poetic Epithalamium
Paolo Di Meo

The treatise Advice to the Bride and Groom consists of 48 moral precepts addressed to the couple of young spouses in the form of short similes (ὁμοιότητες). Although it is a philosophical essay, Plutarch tends to connect his discourse from the beginning to the sphere of music and song, thus presenting it as a sort of homage of a poetic kind. This can be seen from the abundant use of musical terminology, which we find particularly in the prologue (Defradas- Hani-Klaerr 1985, 313), but emerges even more clearly at the end of the work, when the author cites some lines from Sappho, making it clear that he wants his essay to be understood to some extent as a counterpart of marriage songs. However, the relationship between the Advice and the poetic tradition of the epithalamium does not seem to have been examined with the due attention, so that we find nothing more than hints in the bibliography. It is the aim of my paper to attempt to fill this gap.

The tradition of the poetic epithalamium (Keydell 1962 and Wheeler 1930) begins with the poetry of Sappho, the insuperable model of the genre. Thereafter, although samples of marriage songs have been preserved within tragedies and comedies, it is only in hellenistic times that we first find a complete independent epithalamium, i.e. the famous wedding song for Helen and Menelaus in Theocritus’ Idyll XvIII. As an “imported product”, this genre found its way into Latin literature too, and some centuries later learned poets produced elegant songs of this kind (the only ones remaining being Catullus' Poems 61 and 62). This long and consistent tradition tends to disappear in the imperial period. Of course epithalamia continued to be written, but their form and purpose changed considerably, as can be shown by Statius' wedding poem in his Silvae I 2, which can be better considered a laudatory poem. While the custom of singing marriage songs decreases, rhetoric takes over their characteristics and the wedding speech (of which Himerius' Oration IX provides us with an example), modelled on rhetorical prescriptions such as those of Menander Rhetor, replaced or flanked songs performed at wedding ceremonies (Russell 1979).

It is only within this literary tradition, I believe, that some aspects of Plutarch's essay can be fully appreciated. Some examples should suffice to prove this. Limiting our attention to the prologue,
the mention of Demeter in the very first lines may seem a bit puzzling, since Plutarch does not mention her among the deities responsible for the protection of the spouses (cf. Aet. Rom. 264 B). But if we look at the poetic tradition, we find that the presence of Demeter was an almost stable feature of the epithalamia, as testified by a fragment of L. Calvus (fr. 6 Blänsdorf, FPL p. 214). Some lines later, Plutarch refers to the νόμος ἱππόθορος, a music capable of arousing desire in horses, as a term of comparison for the λόγος γαμήλιος. From a similar reference to music accompanying wild love between horses in Himerius' Oration IX 5, in a passage strewn with quotations from marriage songs, we may infer that this detail too was one of the stock motifs of the epithalamia. More generally, the positive view of marital love, the stress on harmony between spouses and the unusual regard for the female figure in the treatise (Foucault 1986, Patterson 1992 and the essays of Foxhall, McNamara, Patterson and Pomeroy in Pomeroy 1999) are not only to be explained by the changing moral climate of Plutarch's time or by the author's personal attitude, but are also a legacy of the literary tradition of the epithalamium which Plutarch is explicitly recalling here.

**Father Knows Best: Plutarch and Ben Sira on Marriage**

Lisa Feldkamp

I propose to show that, when read together, Plutarch's *Conjugalia Praecepta* and Ben Sira's *Wisdom* (Sirach, Ecclesiasticus) reveal that during the late Hellenistic Period and early Roman Empire a wide range of philosophers were participating in a shared ethical discourse. Both texts are treatises on appropriate social behavior and are addressed in a paternal voice to a younger generation, nominally a child or student of the author. Despite differences in period and culture, these two authors provide similar advice on appropriate marital behavior. Recent scholarship on each author has shown an interest in their sources and influences (Hawley 1999, Schwartz 2009). Some have shown a particular interest in the way that these authors participate in philosophical dialogue with the earlier Greek Stoics (Wicke-Reuter 2001, Casevitz and Babut 2002) or Xenophon, especially with reference to their views on marriage (Kieweler 1992, Pomeroy 1999). Others have set a precedent for arguing that each author's work can be better understood as part of a continuing, multi-cultural dialogue in the Mediterranean (Sanders 1983, Kieweler 1992, Demarais 2005). Modern scholarship has also examined the views of each author on the role of women in marriage (Stadter 1999, Forti 2007). As of yet, however, there have been no comparative studies of Plutarch and Ben Sira.

This paper will fill that gap by looking at the texts together and drawing on scholarship concerning each text to strengthen arguments that the authors were participating in a larger Mediterranean dialogue and to reveal analogies between their works. I will argue that Plutarch and Ben Sira are both contributing to a larger philosophical dialogue in the Mediterranean about appropriate social behavior in response to earlier writers of ethical advice, such as Xenophon. Ben Sira wrote his text in Hebrew during the early 2nd century BCE as part of the Biblical tradition of proverbial advice. His grandson translated the text into Greek in the late 2nd century BCE. As Schwartz has shown, Ben Sira was acutely aware of conflicts between the societal values of traditional Judaism and Hellenistic Greece and attempted to address these in Wisdom. Plutarch lived from 45-120 CE and his work shows great familiarity with the Greek philosophical tradition, but there is no evidence to suggest that Plutarch had read the work of Ben Sira directly. Wisdom covers a wide range of topics, as does the whole of Plutarch's *Moralia*, but for the purposes of this presentation I will focus on their marriage advice as an
example of how these works can profitably be read together. Examples from each text reveal that Plutarch and Ben Sira shared views on the importance of marriage and appropriate behavior for husband and wife within that relationship that go beyond what one might expect from two patriarchal societies. For instance, both authors mention that a wife should be intelligent (Sir 25:8; Mor. 145b-f). Both speak about the relationship between virtue and appearance; Plutarch says that virtue will be the adornment of the plain woman (Mor. 141d) and Ben Sira that vice will make even a beautiful woman appear ugly (Sir 25:17-8). As expected, they both believe that a man should take the lead role in his marriage. Nevertheless, they describe the ideal marriage as one where husband and wife are in harmony (Sir 25:1; Mor. 138c, 139d). These and other examples that I will discuss from Plutarch's Coniugalia Praecepta and Ben Sira's Wisdom make a strong case for reading these works together as a part of the moral dialogue on marriage of which Xenophon's Oeconomicus is an early and influential example.

A Union of Hearts? Ritual and Plutarch's Coniugalia Praecepta
Karen Klaiber Hersch

In his groundbreaking article "Plutarch's Manly Women," J. McInerney remarks that in the Mulierum Virtutes, "the tension between the rather trite praise of women's virtues and the actual details of the exemplum almost makes a mockery of the central proposition that women possess the same virtue as men." A similar tension, provoking a similar uneasiness in the modern reader, may be found in Plutarch's Coniugalia Praecepta. In this work, Plutarch asserts that marriage is meant to be a harmonious union of like minds, but just as often he makes clear that this harmonious union is possible only as long as the mind of the wife is trained firmly, at all times, on the desires of her husband. This paper reevaluates evidence concerning the rites of the Roman wedding against the backdrop of Plutarch's Coniugalia Praecepta.

For we may also observe in the rituals of the Roman wedding that the harmony of marriage was in the hands of, or rather at the expense of, the bride. The many ritual events of the Roman wedding ceremony focused on the subjugation of the bride may have communicated to participants and viewers that the future marital happiness of the couple was not in fact a joint venture. The public display of the misery of the bride seems to have been of paramount importance and tied inextricably to future marital good fortune; moreover evidence from Roman sources suggests connections between religion and violence against the bride, violence that was deemed a necessary beginning to a successful marriage. The frequency of the image of the weeping bride who must be forced to wed in Roman literature (e.g. Festus, s.v. caelibari hasta, rapi simulatur; Plutarch, QR 87, Romulus 15; Catullus 61, 62) suggests a belief that the only Roman bride of value was a virgin who was stolen from her family during the ceremony, and who appears to have suffered rape thereafter. While many cultures, ancient and modern, included a simulated capture of the bride in their wedding ceremonies (Van Gennep 1909), the Romans elevated the bride's unwillingness to wed to mythic proportions in the tale of the Sabine women and commemorated this abduction in their marriage ritual (Livy 1.9.11; Plutarch, QR 31; Servius, Aen. 1.651). Many Romans may have also considered actual physical violence against the bride a necessity. For example Macrobius (Sat. 1.15.21-22) noted that at weddings "violence seems to be done to a maiden." Indeed the bride may have been compelled to make her suffering known: Suetonius (Nero 29) described with disgust the fact that Nero, after his wedding to
Sporus, imitated the cries of "maidens suffering violence," while Servius (Ecl. 8.29) asserted that nuts were thrown at weddings to "drown out the cry of the girl losing her virginity." If the evidence from Roman sources is correct, then the rituals of the Roman wedding showcasing public and private subjugation of the bride may be viewed as the oral and visual equivalents to Plutarch's Praecepta. That is, concordia may have been a union of hearts, but to only one of these hearts did the gods grant the role of primus inter pares.

The Husband-Loving Kingfisher: Plutarch on Marriage, Marital Virtues, and Animals
Katarzyna Jazdzewska

In my presentation I propose to search for the "discourse of marriage" in texts rarely considered by scholars examining ancient views on marital relationships, namely Plutarch's texts on animals. I focus on Plutarch's account of the kingfisher (ἀλκυών) in De sollertia animalium (982f-3e), in which the bird is compared to a married woman (γυνὴ γαμετή) and praised for being, among other, φιλανδρος and φιλότεκνος. I examine earlier traditions concerning the kingfisher to which Plutarch is indebted and which he (or his source) skilfully combines in order to represent the kingfisher as a manifestation of uxorial virtues.

In the second part of the paper, I discuss Plutarch's application of marriage terminology to the world of animals in De amore prolis, its implications, and the distinction between the natural and human in his treatment of marriage. The kingfisher is the most elaborate example of animal marital virtues in Plutarch's texts. The discussion of the bird in De sollertia animalium (coming from a youth Phaedimus) combines separate earlier traditions: we can distinguish a 'zoological' one, which focuses on bird's exceptional love for its offspring and its marvelous nest (Aristotle); a 'mythical' one, which narrates a transformation of a woman into a kingfisher and her love for husband (Ps. Plato, Halycon); and a 'paradoxographical' one, which narrates the female bird's care for her elderly mate (Antigonus of Carystus). Plutarch, or his source, fuses elements of these traditions and creates the model of a perfect wife, i.e. wife that excels in three areas: the love for husband, the protective affection for offspring, and the care for household. I discuss Plutarch's presentation of the kingfisher and compare his choice of adjectives (such as φιλόμουσος, φιλανδρος, φιλότεκνος, φιλόπονος, φιλότεχνος) with the vocabulary used in reference to women in his other texts. In the second part of the paper I examine Plutarch's employment of marriage terminology in (unfortunately corrupt) De amore prolis, in which Plutarch discusses animal marriages (γάμοι, 493e) in order to identify the natural basis (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν) of human marital relationships. The employment of the term 'marriage' in reference to animals is a noteworthy phenomenon, one that cannot be found in the zoological writings of the sober Aristotle nor in Aesop's fables (except for the rare cases of animals marrying people); interestingly, it will become a staple in Aelian. I argue that Plutarch's usage of marriage vocabulary in reference to animals is closely tied to the moralizing nature of his texts and is indicative of the fact that marriage becomes for Plutarch a legitimate theme of moral reflection: animals are here "both modelled on humans and in their turn used as models for humans" (Gilhus). I examine Plutarch's employment of the concept of nature in the context of the discussion of marital relationships and broader implications of Plutarch's decision to reflect on the concept of marriage by putting it against the backdrop of animal lore.
Discovering the Peak: A Philological Approach to Thomas Hobbes’s *De mirabilibus pecci*

Johanna Luggin

In the following paper I intend to introduce a Neo-Latin text which has so far not received the scholarly attention it deserves. Around the year 1627 a Latin poem of about 500 verses entitled *De mirabilibus Pecci. Carmen* was presented to William Cavendish, Second Earl of Devonshire, by his employee, the later philosopher Thomas Hobbes (Aubrey 360). It describes a trip through the Peak District and praises its ‘Seven Wonders’: *Aedes, Mons, Barathrum, binus Fons, Antraque bina* (vs. 79). The poem was printed around 1636, reprinted in 1666, 1675 and – with an English translation – in 1678 (Macdonald / Hargreaves 4–7) and was one of the three works by Thomas Hobbes in John Locke’s library and the only one in Isaac Newton’s (Skinner 241). It inspired Charles Cotton’s poem *The Wonders of the Peake* (London 1681; Hartle 420) and H.A.’s *Mirabile Pecci* (London 1669). Despite this obvious popularity in the 17th and 18th century, scarcely any academic research has been done on the text. Partly, this seems to be due to the language barrier; the few philosophical-historical studies on the subject mostly refer to the English translation of 1678. The poem even lacks a modern edition and translation, which I will provide. If scholars mention the text at all (not mentioned e.g. in Sorell 1996), they compare it with Hobbes’s later oeuvre and find it disappointing (Skinner 245; ‘aesthetically unsatisfactory’: Martinich 76).

In my paper, I intend to oppose this view and introduce a philological approach to the poem to reveal its extraordinary characteristic as a humanist, but also modern text: Praising his patron and Chatsworth, Hobbes joins contemporary English writers of estate poems in emulating classical examples such as Horace and Virgil (Rogers / Sorell 2000, 58–59; Rogow 68–72; Springborg 677). Hobbes’s description of the Peak District’s Seven Wonders reflects the motif of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, but transfers it from man-made constructions to natural phenomena – even the praise for Chatsworth is based on the site’s natural advantages (vs. 1–64). Hobbes furthermore uses numerous classical traditions and motifs in his praise of the Peak District: The gardens around Chatsworth are compared with Virgilian landscape (vs. 16, 31), the chasm Eldon Hole reaches Pluto’s realm (vs. 245–347) etc.

Despite the classical references I argue that this is not the ‘most striking feature’ of the poem (Skinner 240). Instead, I propose that its modernity is. The work refers to several discourses of Hobbes’s time and connects them in an original way: (a) the poem represents an early touristic literary work. It recounts a journey through the Peak District, made by Hobbes and a few companions, describing both the difficulties and pleasures that a trip through such a remote region can bring. The examples of the arduous ascent to the Peak (vs. 90–101), the mention of a hired guide at Peak cavern (vs. 205–206), the cheerful swimming in the *balnea* at St. Anne’s well (vs. 442–471) speak of early tourism in the area. (b) At the same time, *De mirabilibus Pecci*
describes a journey of scientific discovery. Hobbes and his comrades are constantly searching for the causes of the *mirabilia* (vs. 83), exploring the wonders using empirical investigation (cf. especially the experiments at Eldon Hole: vs. 245–347). (c) Finally, Hobbes’s poem also testifies to the rise of patriotism during the 17th century by describing a trip through a small local region instead of a transnational ‘Grand Tour’ (which Hobbes had already made around 1614; cf. Denis de S. Boissieu’s poem *Septem Miracula Delphinatus*, describing the ‘Seven Wonders of the Dauphiné’, Grenoble 1656).

With this new philological approach to *De mirabilibus Pecci* I hope to give a new perspective towards a better understanding of Hobbes’s early writings.

**The Pope, the Pole, and the Bison: Nicolaus Hussovianus’ *De statura, feritate ac venatione bisontis Carmen***

Frederick J. Booth

We usually do not associate bison with the Old World, let alone with Latin literature, yet in *De statura, feritate ac venatione bisontis carmen*, (“A poem concerning the size, ferocity and hunting of the bison”) published in Krakow in 1523, Nicolaus Hussovianus offers a vivid description of the now-rare Lithuanian bison, its habitat, the customs of the local people, and their methods of hunting. I have just completed the first English translation of Hussovianus’ poem, along with an annotated text and my paper will explain the circumstances of the poem’s composition and then examine several short passages which typify its diverse styles and topics.

Little is known of Hussovianus’ life, and while Poland, Lithuania and Belarus all claim him as a native son, Hussovianus tells us: *Polonus eo*. He arrived in Rome around 1518 as an aide to the Polish ambassador to the Vatican. In 1521, the ambassador promised Pope Leo X, son of Lorenzo the Magnificent and an avid hunter, the gift of a bison hide to be displayed in Rome, and he then commissioned Hussovianus to write an accompanying poem. But before Hussovianus could complete his work, the plague struck, killing Pope Leo, the ambassador, and the man supplying the bison, so Hussovianus returned home to Krakow, where he came under the patronage of Poland’s Queen Bona, a Sforza from Milan, to whom he dedicated his book.

The 1,082 lines of elegiac couplets are written in straightforward Latin, free from mythological ornamentation but with many echoes of Classical authors, especially Vergil and Ovid. The style ranges from the informal to epic, the mood from humility to outrage. That a Northerner could attain such scholarly sophistication and find himself in the daunting intellectual circle of a Medici pope is a testament to the mobility possible for educated men in the Latinate culture of Renaissance Europe.

*Carmen de bisontis* is a work of natural history and ethnography. Hussovianus’ pride in the Polish-Lithuanian wilderness is evident in his accounts of the flora and fauna and of the customs and occupations of the people. While, for the most part, the poem offers scientifically accurate descriptions of the bison and the northern woods, Hussovianus’ mistakes or his lapses into superstition are entertaining and give him an endearing naiveté that contrasts with his Renaissance learning. The poem reaches its dramatic high point when the royal spectators barely escape death as stampeding bison charge into their observation platform. The poem concludes
with a prayer to the Virgin Mary to end internecine warfare in Europe, thus making possible a unified front against the Turks and Tartars.

But *Carmen de bisontis* is not merely an engaging poem about wildlife and folklore. It is also a pointed work of propaganda. Hussovianus was part of a national campaign to strengthen and spread the influence of Poland, and his poem was meant to influence Pope Leo to favor the tough, bison-hunting Poles over the Teutonic Knights, their long-time bitter enemies.

**A Polish poet in Ovidian exile: Janicki’s *Tristium Liber* 1 and Ovid’s *Tristia* 1**

*Gabriel L. Fuchs*

Despite the fact that the Polish Latin elegist Klemens Janicki (1516-1543) was the first native Pole to attain the laurel crown for his Latin poetry and is considered the pinnacle of Polish achievement in Latin letters, the major studies, editions, and commentaries exist only in Polish (e. g. Ćwikliński, Mosdorf, and Krókowski), rendering this inspired and highly original Neo-Latin poet unknown to wider audiences. There is only one significant piece of scholarship on Janicki in English (Segel, whose interest is much more historical than philological), and the entirety of his work remains without an English translation.

One of the key pieces in Janicki’s literary oeuvre is his *Tristium Liber* (published 1542, Kraków), a book of ten highly subjective and personal elegies inspired by the *Tristia* and *Epitulae ex Ponto* of Ovid. While Mosdorf and Lewandowski have outlined general formal and stylistic similarities between the two, there has been no concerted attempt to elaborate the literary process by which his adaptation of Ovid functions. This paper presents a literary analysis of the first poem of Janicki’s *Tristium Liber* and its interaction with the first poem of Ovid’s *Tristia*. It will focus on how Janicki—who was never a political exile—assumes the Ovidian exilic persona and adapts it to his own ethical and political purposes. Janicki seeks to rehabilitate the Ovidian exilic voice, which is characterized by the rhetoric of silence and non-response (see Claassen), by reintroducing its ideas concerning literary cultivation (*cultus*) and *amicitia* into an ongoing discourse, thereby restoring it to efficacy in the moral and political spheres.

The two poems are both constructed as *propemptika* for their respective literary works, in which they advise and admonish their books as they venture out into the world. Upon analysis, their similar inspirations give way to divergent aims, as Janicki takes the trappings of Ovidian exile in a direction which fits their new humanist context. Janicki begins his poem with the verse *I liber, I tandem, frustra obluctamur amicis* (“Go my book, go at last, in vain do we resist our friends”). This is a programmatic indication that Janicki is performing a reversal: the exilic Ovid presents his poetic work as his only means of communication with deserted and deserting *amicis*, and characterizes himself as the sole participant in a one-sided conversation, whereas Janicki establishes his poetry as the respondent’s side of a dialogue initiated by his circle of learned friends. Even the appearance of their personified works can be set at odds. As Ovid’s book is sent forth (*Tr.* 1.1.4-14), it is admonished to make sure it clothes itself in the dark and obscuring appearance which befits an exile. Janicki, however, sends his book (though also dressed in black—a sign of his assumption of the exilic mode) out of the darkness (*tenebris progrediare*...
tuīs, v. 2) and makes it bright (*in lucem*, v.2). Such examples, of which these are but two, suggest that Janicki has a much more publicly engaged role in mind for Ovid’s exilic persona.

The Jesuit Seminary and Japanese Latinists in the 16th to 17th Century
Akihiko Watanabe

This presentation examines Latin documents authored by Japanese Christians in the late 16th to early 17th century together with the Jesuit seminary where they were trained. While classicism in the Jesuit curricula and the diffusion of Neo-Latin in non-Western contexts have both been studied to some extent, my research sheds light on an area where both coincide and yet has only received scant attention.

The first recorded piece of Latin composition by a Japanese author is Hara Martinho’s encomiastic speech, which was delivered in 1587 and survives in a printed edition of 1587. An ornate and mannered oration which conscientiously follows the classical rhetorical tradition, it has sometimes been attributed to a European tutor rather than a Japanese teenager. Close textual analysis however reveals minor grammatical and stylistic flaws which suggest that a relative novice may have had a hand in its composition. Hara is followed by several of his compatriots whose authorship of Latin is less in doubt. Among them are Miguel Goto, whose elegant and correct Ovidian couplets appeared in print in 1621, Diego Yuki, Miguel Minoes and Kibu Cassui, all Jesuits whose autograph reports to their superiors survive in ARSI (*Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu*), and Thomas Araki, another Jesuit alumnus who penned a Latin letter in Japan as late as 1632 even though he had apostatized more than a decade earlier.

Examination of these documents provide sample proof that certain Jesuit-educated Japanese of the late 16th to early 17th century developed sufficient fluency in Latin to produce extensive, correct and often elegant compositions on their own, an achievement that was noted by contemporary Europeans but is passed over in Ijsewijn’s survey. The Jesuit seminary in Japan, as recent research has shown, placed extraordinary emphasis on developing linguistic competence in Latin and was staffed by dedicated teachers who were both classically trained and sensitive to local culture. The seminary deserves greater attention as a community where Latin found a home outside the traditional West, even though its life proved short due to historical circumstances beyond its control.
The shifting sense of “self-sufficiency” in Aristotle’s account of happiness
Kirk R. Sanders

In this paper, I examine a family of arguments employed by Aristotle in his efforts to specify in what happiness (eudaimonia) consists. I focus in particular on the distinct, and potentially incompatible, senses of self-sufficiency (autarkeia) at play in those arguments.

In NE 1.7, Aristotle introduces two formal criteria that any candidate for the chief good must satisfy. The first of these is completeness. According to Aristotle, an end may be complete either relatively or simpliciter: “Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” (NE 1.7, 1097a30-4; trans. Ross, rev. Urmson). The second criterion Aristotle introduces is that of self-sufficiency, for which his definition is as follows: “the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” (NE 1.7, 1097b14-16). Both criteria figure importantly into Aristotle’s claims throughout NE 1 regarding the nature of happiness.

When Aristotle returns to the subject of the nature of happiness in NE 10, however, he makes the following claim in support of his identification of the highest form of happiness with contemplation: “And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity. For while a wise man, as well as a just man and the rest, needs the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly … but the wise man, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better is he has fellow workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient” (NE 10.7, 1177a27–34).

I maintain that Aristotle’s arguments concerning happiness in NE Books 1 and 10 conflate two distinct senses of “self-sufficiency”: that of an end itself, and that of an agent with respect to some end. Aristotle’s definition of “self-sufficiency” from NE 1.7, cited above, concerns the former. An end is self-sufficient in this sense if it “lacks nothing” and by itself makes life desirable. But Aristotle’s remarks on happiness in NE 10.7 appeal to an agent-centered notion of self-sufficiency. According to this sense of “self-sufficiency,” the less need a person has for anything beyond his own resources to attain a specified end, the more self-sufficient he is with respect to that particular end.
Unfortunately, there is no antecedent reason for supposing that these two kinds of self-sufficiency will coincide in such a way that agents will be (entirely, or even mostly) self-sufficient in the relevant sense with respect to ends that are themselves self-sufficient in their relevant sense. (More formally, if we designate the agent-centered notion of self-sufficiency as found in NE 10.7 by the term “self-sufficiency$_a$” and the end-centered notion given in NE 1.7 by “self-sufficiency$_e$,” then we might say that a high level of “self-sufficiency$_a$” with respect to some end, $x$, does not entail that $x$ itself will satisfy the standards of “self–sufficiency$_e$.”) Indeed, in light of comments on human nature that Aristotle himself makes both elsewhere in NE and in Pol., I wish to suggest further that any plausible formulation of a self-sufficient end — i.e., one that makes a human life desirable — would not afford agents the level of self-sufficiency that is central to Aristotle’s argument in NE 10.7. This conclusion highlights what I contend is an irreconcilable tension between the conception of happiness in Books 1 and 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

**Reading Atomic Intertextuality in Lucretius**

Matthew P. Vieron

This paper offers an interpretation of a possible allusion to Homer in Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura*: after demonstrating that the passage (Lucr. 1.271-6) is in fact an allusion to Homer (Od. 5.291-4), I consider it in light of the poem’s own atomic principles, arguing that the letters that compose the (inter)text behave just like the atoms that make up Lucretius’ physical world. In conclusion I argue that Lucretius’ philosophical analogy between the nature of language and the movement of atoms is instructive for how we should understand his strategy of using Homeric intertextuality as a way to create philosophical problems for the reader to consider in the context of didactic poetry.

The argument that Epicurean physics can be applied to intertextuality is based on the often repeated analogy which presents atoms and their compounds as equivalent to words and their letters (e.g. Lucr. 1.820-7); this analogy has led many scholars to find parallels between the *DRN*’s philosophical content and its literary form. For example, Schrijvers connects the Epicurean philosophy of vision with Lucretius’ use of rhetorical analogies. Kennedy discusses how the Epicurean explanation of an infinite universe is provided through the medium of a finite text. Most notably, Schiesaro connects the theory of *palingenesis* (the repeated destruction and reconstitution of atoms throughout time) with the excessive repetition throughout the poem. These scholars work under the assumption that Lucretius structured his literary work according to the atomic principles of his own philosophy. The current paper, working under the same assumption and taking the next plausible step, draws a similar connection between content and form with respect to Epicurean principles of atomic movement throughout time and intertextuality between two texts.

The argument is as follows: since Lucretius invites us to analyze textual processes in terms of Epicurean atomic physics, I apply this concept to the poem’s own intertextuality by analyzing an instance of Homeric storm imagery within the *DRN* (Lucr.1.271-6) and interpreting it in light of Lucretius’ explanation of atomic movement (Lucr. 2.62-332 and 5.110-234). First, I suggest that the way in which a text interacts with and is built upon other texts is equivalent to the way in which atoms interact with and are built upon other atoms, so that the literary mirrors the philosophy, and the form reflects the content. I then argue that the functionality of the form
Homeric intertextuality also mirrors the content (atomic principles). The evidence for this argument indicates that the language used by Lucretius to describe atomic origins and movement is identical with the literary language of intertextuality: a “pattern” for production (exemplum gignundis), the “idea” for humanity (notities hominum), and a “model” for creation (specimen...creandi) (5.181-6). Interpreting exemplum, notities, and specimen in literary terms makes Lucretius’ final conclusion about atomic motion patently metapoetic: “the particular arrangements [of atoms] by which the totality of the present work (haec rerum... nunc summa) has been produced (geritur), is forever in the process of innovation (novando)” (5.194).

The approach and conclusion of this analysis contributes to our understanding of intertextuality in Lucretius and is suggestive for other didactic poets. The connections made by intertextuality are not meant to have one specific purpose guided by divine/authorial intent; instead, the reader should negotiate each instance of intertextual connection as the result of random movements of texts interacting with one another over time. For example, in Lucretius it is the force of wind that hits the ocean, scatters the clouds apart, and mixes land and sea (Lucr. 1.271-6). In Homer it is Poseidon himself that disturbs the ocean, brings the clouds together, and distorts both land and sea (Od. 5.291-4). The function of Homeric intertextuality in the DRN is thus to create a situation for the Epicurean learner to consider independently, i.e. not to look for specific intentional meaning from an authoritative source but to account for themselves the philosophical juxtaposition that it creates.

The Stoics and anatomical language

Thomas M. Cirillo

Early Stoic philosophy concerned itself to a great extent with physical science. Much of the Stoics’ interest in this general topic originated from their theories about the interconnectivity and materiality of all things (see Sambursky 1959). The Stoics, however, never developed a systematic approach to human biology and anatomy or an account of the human body akin to, for example, the one we find in Plato’s Timaeus. This comes as a surprise, especially given that Stoicism’s founder, Zeno (334-262 B.C.), was a near exact contemporary of the physician Herophilus of Chalcedon (330-260 B.C.), who, while working at the Ptolemaic court in Alexandria, was making great advances in anatomical methods and using them to investigate bodily systems (Solmsen 1961; von Staden 1989; Hankinson 2003). The Stoics’ lack of engagement with anatomy as a physical science may lie in their ideas about total mixture and continuum. The Stoics declined to see a body as an entity composed of strictly defined and separable parts and instead championed the notion that “man does not consist of more parts than his finger, nor the world than man... [we should] think of each body as consisting neither of certain parts nor of some number of them, either infinite or finite” (Plut..de comm. not.1079a10-1079c6 = Long & Sedley 50C). Developments in anatomical science did, however, have an impact on Stoic thought. Explorations into the human body by the Alexandrian anatomists necessitated the creation of special terms and figurative language to describe their findings (von Staden 1989). Herophilean anatomical descriptions of the circulatory and nervous systems and of sensory perception, in particular, provided to the Stoics a new vocabulary that was readily applicable to ideas about mixture, continuum, and interconnectivity.

Herophilus, for example, used a spider web as an analogy for the sensory membranes of both the eye and the skin (von Staden T 74, 88) and supplemented this figurative language with empirical
analysis of the biological infrastructure associated with each organ. The Stoics used the spider’s web as an image which represented the total connectivity of the world, originating with an organism’s central *hegemonikon* and extending to external stimuli by means of *pneuma* (Calcid. Ad Timaeum cp.220 = SVF 2.879.31-37).

The Stoics viewed the entire material world, animal bodies included, as a “co-flowing” and “co-breathing” organism. Yet, the Stoics could not ignore the findings of Alexandrian anatomists like Herophilus who had successfully investigated the body as a composite substance comprised of isolatable parts and systems. Through a consideration of the Stoic appropriation of anatomical language a clearer picture emerges of the relationship between medicine and philosophy in the early Hellenistic period. Furthermore, we find that such a relationship extends across epistemological boundaries through its dual engagement with biological empiricism and language.

**Ulpian’s definition of justice and the philosophical tradition**

Matthijs H. Wibier

In the opening of his book of *Regulae*, the Roman jurist Ulpian states that ‘justice is the constant and enduring will to distribute to each his right’ (*iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi*, Ulp. in Just. Dig. 1.1.10). As justice is a relatively abstract concept at some remove from the very practical focus of juristic discussions, scholars have often used this line to investigate Ulpian’s philosophical allegiance. The *communis opinio* seems to be that he took this definition from the Stoic Chrysippus (most emphatically Winkel 1988, who is elevated to common knowledge by Johnston 2000). But as Ulpian also seems to espouse ‘fundamentally un-Stoic’ elements at other places, it has even been argued that Ulpian is an ‘eclectic’ (Johnston 2000:621, digesting a lot of scholarship). In this paper, I will argue—against this reductive view—that Ulpian’s definition is not derivable from any particular source, but should be seen in terms of a ubiquitous philosophical maxim. This argument will be made in two steps.

First, the second part of the definition, *suum cuique tribuendi* (generally without *ius*), is widely attested (in all kinds of variants) in Greek and Latin literature in explicit reference to the concept of justice (e.g. [Plato], Aristotle, [Aristotle], Diogenes of Babylon, Andronicus Rhodius, Cicero, Arius Didymus, Livy, Lucian, Galen, [Galen], the scholia on Aristotle, Tryphoninus, Diogenes Laertius, but NOT in Chrysippus (notwithstanding SVF’s listing of 13 fragments)). Interestingly enough, it is found in many so-called doxographical texts across the philosophical spectrum (e.g. the [Platonic] *Definitiones*, the Peripatetic *De Virtutibus et Vitiis*, Arius Didymus’ *Stoic Doxography*), and Cicero also presents the definition several times in the context of different philosophical sects (e.g. *Fin*. V.65, *Leg*. I.19, *Rep*. III.24). This suggests that it has no distinct philosophical flavour.

Secondly, the element *constans et perpetua voluntas* is a hapax, and it is unclear to what concept in the philosophical definitions (of the texts listed above) it is supposed to refer (*epistêmê, phronësis, hesis, dynamis, adoptio, prudentia*). In any case, a connection with Stoic doctrine seems problematic, as *voluntas* is at odds with virtues’ (including justice) being purely intellectual (e.g. Galen *Plac.Pl.Hipp.* VII.2). It may be transforming a Stoic notion (*hexis, boulësis*) without carrying Stoic baggage. As, however, it may similarly have been inspired by [Platonic] and/or Peripatetic *hesis*, the point is not so much about tracing Ulpian’s source as it is
about Ulpian taking up and twisting a popular catchphrase to open his *Regulae* with. And as these are works containing brief statements of law without arguments (Stein 1966), this would be the kind of prefatory *topos* we would expect.

At the end of the day, this poses questions about the way we think about Roman jurists (e.g. the philosophical texts they read), ancient philosophy (e.g. notions such as ‘the’ Stoics and ‘eclecticism’; the focus on canonical authors), and their relationship (e.g. the question as to what we mean by philosophical influence; the apparent wish of modern scholars to see jurisprudence in terms of legal philosophy).

---

**Session 22: Pindar's Thoughtworld**

**Nestor, Sarpedon, and Counterfactual Narrative in Pindar’s *Pythian* 3**

Kathryn A. Morgan

This paper presents a new explanation for the appearance of Nestor and Sarpedon at the end of Pindar’s third *Pythian* ode, where they are cited as exemplars of the principle that our knowledge of heroic achievement is mediated by poetry. I argue that Pindar’s use of Nestor and Sarpedon is best understood by fitting it into broader structures of counterfactual narrative within the ode: just as Pindar starts the poem by expressing the unattainable wish that Hieron of Syracuse be restored to health, so he ends it by evoking the characters associated in the narrative of the *Iliad* with counterfactual moments where the epic toys with the idea that a lost youth might be restored or the fate of death averted.

At *P.* 3. 112-114, Pindar observes that we know Nestor and Sarpedon, “the talk of men,” through the words that experts have composed. There has long been puzzlement over Pindar’s reasons for choosing these two characters to express this theme. Speculation has covered a range of options, from the suggestion that the names are chosen almost at random (Young: 62), to the notion that they are types of wisdom and courage respectively, to the proposal that they are types of longevity (Miller). Sider has usefully remarked that both heroes exemplify what he calls the *non omnis moriar* theme: in the *Iliad* each is aware that they are regarded with particular honor by their countrymen and companions. This evocation of an Iliadic context can be taken further. Homer deploys the heroes in the *Iliad* to underline the inexorability of death and the relentless advance of old age. Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, is fated to die at the hands of Patroklos. In a famous episode, Zeus laments his forthcoming death to Hera and wonders whether to rescue him from his fate. Hera protests that it would be almost unthinkable to save a mortal who has long ago been doomed to die (*Il.* 16.440-442). Instead of contemplating such an act, Zeus should allow Sarpedon to die and be given honorable burial. This episode acts as a commentary on the issues foregrounded in *Pythian* 3, where Pindar wishes that he could have come to Syracuse with Chiron and cured Hieron of his illness. Zeus himself wished to save a beloved mortal from death, but did not do so. If Zeus will not even save his son, how much less possibility is there for Hieron to escape the fate of mortals. Like Sarpedon, he will be honored after death, both by physical monuments and by the song exemplified by Homeric epic.
The case of Nestor brings us back to the role played by the unattainable wish in *Pythian* 3. Pelliccia has already noted that the poem belongs to an established type where a wish is followed by narrative insertion: the (unattainable) wish that Cheiron were alive is followed by the stories of Koronis and Asklepios. He supplies several Homeric comparanda, including, significantly, Nestor’s lengthy narrative interventions, which typically begin with Nestor’s wish that he were as young and mighty as he was when he defeated a certain enemy in battle, a desire that cannot, unfortunately, be fulfilled (e.g. *Il.* 4.318-323). Nestor’s wish to turn back the clock is closely comparable to Pindar’s wish that Cheiron were still alive.

Both Homer’s Sarpedon, then, and his Nestor are evoked in *Pythian* 3 because they introduce counterfactual possibilities into Homeric narrative, moments when a character wishes that the current world order could be over-ridden but when the possibility is dismissed because it runs counter to standard divine practice. They resonate strongly with Hieron because fate or weakness or some combination of both has prevented them from achieving all that they might. Just as their counterfactuals prefigure his, so does their fame.

**Pindar on the Sources of the Nile: A Neglected Pindaric Fragment and its Cultural and Religious Contexts**

Ian C. Rutherford

In a lost song (fr.282 Maehler) Pindar referred to colossal figure which controlled the flow of the Nile river, apparently by moving its feet, so as to make it proportionate (*summetros*) to the seasons. The aims of this paper are to establish what can be known about this little studied fragment (the only recent treatment is Lavecchia. 1999, which deals with a different aspect), and to situate it in its cultural and religious contexts.

Three sources survive for Pindar's Nile-controller. First, Flavius Philostratus (*VA* 6.27) talks of: “. . . stories . . . which Pindar in his wisdom puts into verse about the *daemon* whom he sets over these springs to preserve the due proportions of the Nile”. This *daemon* is also mentioned by Philostratus Major in his *Imagines* (1.5.2). The third source is a scholion on Aratus, *Phainomena* 283 which refers to a “hundred fathom statue” (ἐκποντορόγυιον ἄνδριάντα), "from the movement of whose feet the Nile floods". Finally, the neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry considered Pindar's account of the Nile significant enough that he wrote a treatise about it, "On the Sources of the Nile in Pindar" (fr.421 Smith).

Whether it was a colossal divine being (*daemon*) or an animated statue, Pindar's Nile-controller should probably be thought of as having been created by the gods by an act of providence, to ensure that the river flooded at the right time and to the correct extent. Pindar tells stories of divine providence elsewhere, e.g. the rooting down of the floating island of Delos (fr.33d Maehler), or the creation of the Third Temple at Delphi complete with singing Keledones (Paean 8, 65-8), and somewhere he invoked Zeus as "of surpassing skill" (*aristotekhna*, fr.59). At the same time, the idea of a statue controlling the Nile flow perhaps reflects knowledge of real monumental statues on the Nile, such as those at Abu Simbel, where Greek mercenaries left graffiti in the 6th century BC (cf. Bowra. 1964, 372). It is even possible the role attributed to the statue's feet has been influenced by Egyptian sources which talk of the Nile flowing under the feet of statues, as was suggested by Danielle Bonneau in her important study of ancient theories
about the Nile-flood (1964, 229-30; for possible echoes of Egyptian religion in another Pindaric fragment [fr.201 Maehler], see Derchain.1999).

Pindar's mythopoetic treatment of the Nile in fr.282 Maehler stands in complete contrast to the rational speculations attributed to early Greek intellectuals about the causes of the seasonal flooding of the Nile and the location of its sources (see Bonneau. 1964, 135-214). The historian Herodotus (Hist. 1.19-34; Lloyd. 1975-88, 2, 91-146) already looks back on a rich body of theory, starting with Thales of Miletus, who explained the flood as a result of the Etesian Winds. The attitudes of Greek intellectuals can be contrasted with views found in Egyptian sources, which attribute the river's flow to the agency of certain gods, among them the Nile-deity Hapi, the creator god Khnum, or Osiris. Later Greek writers, among them Plutarch, report authentically Egyptian ideas, e.g. that Nile flood is an "efflux of Osiris" (Plutarch, DIO36, 365b; 38, 366a). Pindar's explanation of the Nile-flow as divinely-engineered is thus closer to the traditional Egyptian way of looking at the Nile than the contemporary Greek one.

Whatever the date of Pindar's song, it is likely that it postdates the earliest Ionian philosophers, offering a supernatural explanation for a phenomenon which they were already trying to explain in rational terms. It may thus be suggested that Pindar is composing with knowledge of Ionian science and, as it were, reasserting a religious view of the world in reaction to it. So too, while rational explanations for solar eclipses had been around since the early 6th century (e.g. Thales, ap. Herodotus, Hist.1.74), Pindar's response to the eclipse at Thebes in Paean 9 reasserts a strikingly religious mentality.

**Praise of the Victor and his Maternal Relatives in Pindar's Nemean 5**

Monessa F. Cummins

The catalogue of familial victories that concludes Nemean 5, a poem for the young Aiginetan victor Pytheas, is one of the most difficult passages to interpret in Pindar’s corpus. Scholars have contested in particular the meaning of almost every line in the victory-catalogue of Pytheas’ uncle, Euthymenes (41–6). I endorse both Christopher Carey’s analysis of this passage (1989, 290–5) and David Fearn’s recent defense of Carey (2007, 342–50) against the counter-arguments of Ilya Pfeijffer (1999, 159–72): Euthymenes, Pytheas’ maternal uncle (43; I.6.62), has won twice at the Isthmos (41–2; cf. I.6.60–2), and, in descending order of prestige, at Nemea (43–44), Aigina (44–5) and Megara (46).

Carey’s argument for the conventional structure of Euthymenes’ victory-catalogue does not account for peculiar features of the catalogue that have vexed scholars: the allusive treatment of Euthymenes’ Isthmian victories (41–2), shifts between second-personal addresses (41–2, 43) and third-personal description (44–6), and a double reference to victory on Aigina within a μέν . . . δέ construction (44–5). These features of the catalogue are, I argue, part of a larger strategy of praise by which Pindar situates the first victory of a young victor within the context of the victories of his maternal uncle and grandfather. Pindar wishes to praise three successive generations of victory, but there are two difficulties: the number and prestige of Euthymenes’ wins could overshadow the single achievement of the laudandus, and the victories of prior generations derive from the maternal side of the victor’s family.
I argue that Pindar shapes the praise of Euthymenes to reflect glory on Pytheas, the *laudandus*. First, though Pindar introduces Euthymenes with an emphatic second-personal address (41–2), he manages to mention and simultaneously to de-emphasize Isthmian victories that are superior in number and prestige to the Nemean victory of the *laudandus*. Second, Pindar notes, in an apostrophe to Pytheas, that his uncle’s Nemean victory follows upon that of Pytheas himself (43), a reversal of the more usual situation in which the victor, often a boy, “follows in the tracks” of the prior athletic success of an older relative (*P*.8.35–8, 10.11–14; *N*.6.15–16). Pindar playfully notes that Pytheas, though a younger and inexperienced athlete, anticipates Euthymenes’ victory at Nemea with his own victory, possibly because his competition was scheduled ahead of Euthymenes’ event (Von der Mühll 1964, 96–7; Fearn 2007, 346). Finally, a μέν . . . δέ construction distinguishes Euthymenes’ Nemean and Aiginetan victories as an adult (44) from his Aiginetan and Megarian victories as a boy or youth (45–6). The double reference to Aiginetan games makes explicit the fact that Euthymenes’ victories as a boy or youth, while more numerous than Pytheas’ lone victory, are at locations less prestigious than Nemea. Thus the catalogue of Euthymenes’ victories, while laudatory because of its extensiveness, is also subtly comparative: Euthymenes can be proud of his Panhellenic and local victories, but Pytheas debuts as a young victor at a Panhellenic venue, while anticipating his uncle’s victory at Nemea. Thus Pindar skillfully exploits this extensive catalogue of Euthymenes’ victories to define the quality of Pytheas’ first athletic victory.

By means of a sharp shift in subject to Themistios, the father of Euthymenes and maternal grandfather of Pytheas, Pindar then adds more victories to the familial total: two at Epidauros, one each in boxing and the pankration (50–4). Euthymenes, by contrast, has multiple victories at Megara and Aigina as a boy or youth, as well as local and Panhellenic victories as an adult. Thus, by the poem’s end Pindar has articulated an escalation in prestige over three generations of athletic victory: athletic victory may originate on the victor’s maternal side, but it culminates in the victor’s paternal *oikos* with the *laudandus’* victory as a young athlete at a Panhellenic venue.
Comedy's official introduction to the Athenian City Dionysia in 486 BCE resulted in the decline of various modes of humorous performance (Rusten 2006; 2011). As comic poets incorporated elements from comedy's precursors, these pre-comic performances became obsolete. In this paper, I will argue that satyr drama suffered the same fate, but that the process was largely set in motion by Euripides' satyr-less "satyr play," the Alcestis. Throughout this production Euripides establishes satyr drama as comedic komos-song, a connection that inspired a significant artistic discussion of comic-satyric relations: comic poets began staging more comedies with satyr choruses and vase painters created a number of vases with satyrs named Komos. These interactions revealed that comedy could "do" anything that satyr drama did, and as a result satyr drama began to decline just as pre-comic performances had declined in the first quarter of the fifth century.

At the City Dionysia of 438, Euripides concluded his tetralogy not with a traditional satyr play, but with his satyr-less Alcestis, a production closer to tragedy than to satyr drama. Marshall (2000) has convincingly argued that the play was a response to the recent enactment of the Athenian law known as the "Decree of Morychides," which prohibited "making comedy" (μὴ κωμωδεῖν). Although the intent of the decree was almost certainly to prevent personal abuse in the genre of komoidia, the wording (since it lacked the term ὀνομαστὶ) could be interpreted as outlawing κῶμος songs altogether: the verb κωμωδεῖν is made up of two parts etymologically, κῶμος (revelry, merry-making) and φωνή/ἀοιή (song) or ἀείδειν (tosing). For Euripides, satyr drama was an integral part of the tragic experience, but with its chorus of Dionysian komastic satyrs, it was also a komos-song, a komoidia. Euripides ensures this reading by repeatedly using κῶμος and its related verbal forms throughout the Alcestis.

Slater (2005) has shown how jarring the experience of viewing a satyr-less satyr play must have been to the Athenian audience, and Storey (2005) has compellingly suggested that comic poets of the 430s were responding to this experience when they began to employ more satyr choruses in their comedies (cf. Callias' Satyroi, which was staged just one year after Euripides' Alcestis). The 430s also saw a spike in Attic artists producing high-classical vases with satyrs named Komos. The relative closeness of a) the Decree of Morychides, b) Euripides' satyr-less Alcestis, c) comedy's interest in satyrs, and d) an increase in satyr-komos vases indicates a flurry of interest in satyrs and the comic-satyric (or komos-satyric) relationship during this period. Comedy and satyr drama were generically connected, and comic poets showed that it could even "be" satyr drama. In this way, comedy consumed satyr play just as it had consumed its precursors. The two genres continued to become less differentiated until finally, during the fourth century, satyr drama was removed from the competition and relegated to an opening act.
Against the historical validity of the so-called list of Alexandrian librarians in \textit{P.Oxy.} X 1241

Jackie Murray

This paper challenges the historical value of \textit{P.Oxy.} X.1241, part of which is the list of Alexandrian Librarians. It questions the basic assumption that the list at col. i.5 - ii.30 is in fact a list of the heads of the Alexandrian library. It calls attention to the fact that every single chronological statement needed to be emended and shows the fallacious reasoning behind the editors' influential conclusion that the papyrus is the most trustworthy of all sources pertaining to the history of the library.

In 1914, B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt published an anonymous 2\textsuperscript{nd} cent. CE papyrus containing lists of famous artists, grammarians and historical/mythological inventors of weapons of practices of warfare. They observed its similarity to Hellenistic and Imperial mythographical catalogues and concluded: “Though the name of the compiler is unknown, the class to which this treatise is to be referred is thus clear; it is a characteristic product of Alexandrian erudition.” They, therefore, assessed the papyrus to be the most historically accurate source about the Alexandrian library. Their view has been accepted almost universally.

The papyrus is 6 columns with the list in question occupying col.i.17-ii.30. After a break of about 8 lines, the text picks up in the midst of a catalogue of grammarians, \textit{γραμματικοί}, with a reference to “Philadelphus.” It is unclear who the grammarians in the first column were, but at the beginning of col.ii the text resumes with Apollonius of Rhodes, Eratosthenes, Aristarchus of Byzantium, Aristarchus, Apollonius the Eidographer, Aristarchus of Samothrace, Cydas the Spear-bearer, Ammonius, Zenodotus, Diocles and Apollodorus.

The first observation is that the library or of the position of librarian is not mentioned. The position that is explicit in the papyrus, however, is royal tutor (\textit{διδάσκαλος} to royal children), and only two grammarians in the list are singled out as having held it: Apollonius of Rhodes and Aristarchus of Samothrace. Thus, it is only an inference of the editors that the list refers to “head librarians,” an inference that is apparently based on a supposition that royal tutor = head Librarian. Yet, the link between these positions is merely one of correlation, and the main basis for this correlation is \textit{P.Oxy.} X.1241 itself. Rather than following this circular logic with the editors who assert that the list is “an account of the Alexandrian librarians,” it is submitted here that the list is as it appears, a catalogue of grammarians connected to the Ptolemies, some of whom were known to be heads of the library.

Additionally, the unemended list is full of chronological errors. Indeed, the editors found it necessary to emend every single chronological reference in the papyrus in order to make it consistent with other sources. Particularly egregious is the case of Apollonius Rhodius. The unemended text says that Apollonius was the teacher of the first king, \textit{διδάσκαλος τοῦ πρ[ό] του βασιλέως}, Ptolemy I Soter (304 — 283 BCE). This is \textit{prima facie} false. The editors, prompted by this error, emended the text to say \textit{τρίτου βασιλέως}, “the third king,” which reflects the chronology of \textit{Suda} and MS H of the \textit{Vita} A of Apollonius. Hence, \textit{Suda} and \textit{Vita} A are the basis of the papyrus’ corrected chronology. Nevertheless, the papyrus’ singular report that Eratosthenes succeeded Apollonius is preferred to the \textit{Suda’s} report that he was Apollonius’
The ancient evaluations of the plays of Old Comedy typically focused not only on their aesthetic virtues but also their ethical implications, and Old Comedy's abusive outspokenness was generally taken to be enabled by and used in defense of the demos. Already in the 5th century, however, the nature of and motives for its outspokenness were questioned, and a body of criticism arose that attacked its effects on society and its role in the democracy. Under the Empire especially, the democratic values associated with these texts became problematic, and, for example, Dio Chrysostom (Or. 33.9-10; cf. Plebe 1952 and di Florio 2001), Aelius Aristides (Or. 29; cf. Plebe 1952), and Plutarch (Mor. 67F-68C, 711F-712A, 853A-854D; cf. Hunter 2009) criticized the efficacy of its outspokenness and its use as a model for appropriate behavior. In this paper, I argue that this polemic about free speech and democratic values was a central influence on the construction of narratives about Old Comedy's origins and development.

According to one type of narrative, Old Comedy's origins are to be found in a kind of folk justice: wronged farmers would disguise themselves, gather outside the house of a more powerful wrong-doer, and mock him in order to shame him into changing his behavior; Athens later institutionalized this practice in the form of Old Comedy, and Old Comedy's abusive and corrective outspokenness was a symbol of the demos' power and a tool for maintaining it (e.g., the anonymous treatises on comedy XIb or XVIIa Koster). But a second type of narrative discounts the benefits of such outspokenness and connects comedy's origins to unwarranted abuse and even violence. Plutarch describes the demos under the democracy in Archaic Megara - where, according to some sources, comedy was invented - as violent and insolent towards the powerful, with mobs attacking ambassadors and assaulting the rich (Mor. 295D and 304EF). As Forsdyke 2005 argues, there was probably no such democracy in Archaic Megara; these accounts may describe festivals of license, and the conception of a violent, radical democracy may be a product of an anti-democratic agenda. In fact, I will suggest that these two types of account manifest the same functionalist analytical strategy, with their differences contingent on their valuation of unrestrained speech and the democracy.

I will show that the same kind of analysis underlies narratives about the development of comedy, according to which it evolved (or devolved) because of its engagement with politics: according to the standard narrative, in the beginning comedy abused wrong-doers, but as the democracy lost power legislation was passed that increasingly curtailed its license for mockery. However, a second, rather anti-democratic type of narrative asserts that, on the contrary, such legislation was passed because the type of corrective abuse associated with Old Comedy degenerated into unwarranted abuse, and it had to be curtailed for the good of the state (e.g., Evanthius De fab. 2.5). Here, too, the same pattern emerges, with histories of comedy based around positive or
negative valuations of democratic values, and in particular the abusive outspokenness so frequently associated with Old Comedy.

**Reopening the Closure of ‘Canon’: Tracing the Classical and Early Judeo-Christian Conceptual Polysystem**

Christopher M. Kuipers

The wide conceptual field of the Greek term *kanôn* (Oppel 1930) seems to have only tangentially to do with that troublesome modern literary term, “the canon” (Guillory 1993). For instance, “the canon” as represented by today’s classroom literature anthologies, which metamorphose each generation according to new critical paradigms (Csicsila 2004), has little to do with the original sense of *kanôn* as a stable legal standard. As Jules Pfeiffer has noted, the secular emergence of “canon” also seems extremely late—in David Ruhnken (1723-98), whose Latin edition on the orator Publius Rutilius Lupus (Ruhnkenius 1768) contains the first application of the word “canon” to lists of chosen secular authors and works, that is, to what is regularly meant today by “the canon” as a choice of “the best” of literature (Pfeiffer 1968: 207; Harris 1991: 110). However, it is obvious that the classical era did have “canons” in all four key literary senses (criteria, corpuses, selections, lists)—but it is also clear that an inconsistent variety of terms were being used for them (e.g., *pinax*, *ordo*; see Pfeiffer 1968: 203-08; Rutherford 1998: 3n4). As a short but revisionary *Begriffsgeschichte* of literary canonicity, this paper will argue that, long before the terminological watershed of Ruhnken, the concept of “canon” was well in formation, and can only be understood in the classical era as a *polysystem*, or a rich, dynamic conceptual realm where fluctuating, interlinked factors and forces, working on multiple scales, have played out historically (Even-Zohar 1990). The key finding is that the classical and Judeo-Christian lines of concept-formation are not separate, but are much more closely interlinked than previously credited. Obviously, enormous effort has been spent in both biblical and classical studies on understanding how the particular groups of texts of most interest to these fields have been disseminated, but disciplinary boundaries have masked how similarly such canon-dissemination has occurred. This paper will synthesize recent studies by biblical scholars that isolate key steps in the formation of both the concepts and the realities of scriptural canons (among others, Dungan 2007; Toorn 2007; Van Seters 2006), for which the wider cultural contexts of the ancient and classical worlds are indispensable.

Because the paper will undoubtedly seem ambitious, at this point I would like to reassure the program committee that this is not a “prospectus” but indeed an “abstract,” one based on material composed for my book on *The Canon*, forthcoming in The New Critical Idiom Series of Routledge Press. There are five points that should be made about the early formation of the canon-concept. First, it is messy, and at times illogical, especially since it is hard to trace the terminology that the canon-concept is employing in different eras and languages. Second, where there is canon-terminology to be traced, the polysystem often is marked by upheaval rather than continuity. A good example of this is the word *haeresis*, originally associated with “(books of a chosen) philosophical school,” but later in Christian theology transformed to “(books of a dangerous) sect.” Third, the ancient cultural-linguistic polysystem often resulted in canonical re-(not to say mis-) translation, as when the Greek plural *biblia* “book rolls” could be reread (e.g., in Augustine) as a Latin singular codex (“*the* Holy Bible”). Fourth, the necessary precondition for the concept of an exclusive canon is the related concept that books can have relative levels of
authority. Such were the graded levels of authority accorded to the proto-Tanakh, or Torah (“the law,” most authoritative); the Nevi’im (“the prophets,” less authoritative); and Khetuvim (“the writings,” an obviously miscellaneous set). Fifth, and perhaps most important, there was a classical idea from the Alexandrian library—one that was in fact anti-scriptural, since “scriptures” imply endless religious writing: it was the idea that an authoritative text could be complete and counted on as such. In short, the canon of scripture is inconceivable without the text of Homer, in 24 alphabetic books—from the alpha to the omega.

The Musical Culture of Roman Egypt
Rebecca A. Sears

In this paper, I challenge the long-standing scholarly assumption that the musical culture of Roman Egypt was centered primarily in Alexandria, and in particular, the supposition that the musical papyri must have originated in that metropolis (e.g., Gammacurta 2006: 203). Instead, I advocate a re-evaluation of the evidence for Greek musical culture in the Nile valley, especially in the Fayum, that combines papyrological and archaeological sources in order to provide a more balanced hypothesis which acknowledges the centrality of music within Greek culture. I propose that the evidence provided by these sources suggests that, in fact, communities outside of Alexandria were capable of a higher-level of musical production than has been previously theorized, and therefore, that at least some of the musical papyri were likely written by and for professional musicians within these more rural communities.

In contrast to previous studies of the musical papyri (e.g., West 1992, Pöhlman and West 2001, Prauscello 2006), which avoid discussing these documents in terms of the specific cultural milieu of Roman Egypt, I emphasize the necessity of considering the context for which they were written and in which they were used. Even though most of the musical papyri do not have specific archaeological provenances, this does not exclude utilizing other evidence for musical practices in rural Egypt to elucidate important comparative information about the musical papyri. Such evidence includes the archaeological remains of musical instruments, where they have been found, and the documentary papyri and ostraka that refer to the activities of musicians. These sources suggest that musical professionalism was not restricted to elite contexts in Alexandria and perhaps a few of the major metropoleis, but was, in fact, an important aspect of the social and religious lives of Greek speaking Egyptians.

In order to demonstrate the type of approach to the musical papyri which I advocate in this paper, I will briefly examine two case studies: a wood-lined bronze flute from Karanis (accession number 27-C59A-N1) and P. Col. VIII 226 (P. Col. inv. 441), a late second-century-C.E. contract for musical entertainment in the village of Alabastrine. The Karanis instrument is most likely a Greek aulos or monaulos in form, although it may have been influenced by Egyptian flutes in the spacing of the finger-holes, while the contract provides specific information about the nature of musical professionalism in rural Egypt. I discuss how these two examples specifically relate to the musical papyrus P. Mich. inv. 2958, the primary topic of my dissertation, in terms of the musical resources necessary for the performance of Greek tragedy in an Egyptian setting. In this light, I suggest several hypothetical scenarios which could account for the existence of a musical document in Karanis outside of its exclusive importation from Alexandria due to the used-papyrus trade. While this paper can only present a small fraction of the evidence of the musical
Session 24: Problems in Greek Legal History

The Drerian Law on kosmoi (ML 2): Cui bono?

Jason Hawke

Confronting the law from Dreros regulating the iteration of kosmoi (mid-seventh century BCE), commentators have of late ignored the fundamental question: cui bono? This law stipulated that anyone who had been kosmos, the chief political and judicial magistrate, was debarred from holding the office subsequently for ten years. Furthermore, any former kosmos who privately exercised judicial power was liable to a fine double the amount of any judgments rendered and faced political and civil liabilities, perhaps including the loss of citizenship. However, much recent scholarly attention to this law has centered on the enactment clause (“it seemed good to the polis”) and the list of oath takers to the agreement (“damioi,” “the twenty of the polis”); this focus has led to arguments that the law represents an assertion of community identity and influence to limit and regulate elite power at Dreros. In my view, this focus on the “inclusiveness” of the enactment clause clouds interpretation of the statute. Rather, three fundamental questions appertain: first, whether the enactment reflects the concerns of the content; second, why and to whom ensuring the rotation and powers of this office will have mattered; and third, whether the terms used in the enactment clause and the list of oath-swearers are to be taken at face value. Once those questions have been addressed, it becomes possible to apply the principle of cui bono to ascertain whose interests the law best served.

The content of the law concerns the restriction/clarification of eligibility for holding Dreros’ most important magistracy, and lays down penalties for those who disrespect rules on iteration and/or exercise unofficially the duties of the office. Superficially, this problem appears to have been of interest to the wider citizen community. Some scholars have argued that the law responded to a crisis wherein some individual had arrogated alarming power to himself, while others have argued that no crisis need be present: the law manifests the polis’ new-found capacity to discipline and manage elite power sharing, and that the law represents a modification of older rules that could have been remembered by those to whom it applied. I disagree, and maintain that this law speaks directly to the problems of elite power sharing in an archaic polis: while it is true that the larger community may have balked at unrestrained elite competition for power, such competition must have existed for them to wish to regulate it. Further, the law suggests that sufficient demand existed for the private decisions of former kosmoi to create the perception of a problem. Such a demand vitiates the assumption that no such problem existed -- as some experts have held -- and begs the question of why the citizen community would prohibit private judgments from a preferred individual: one presumes that a former kosmos could only act unofficially if citizens sought his adjudication over that of his successors. Finally, we cannot assume the office had existed long enough for understood rules about iteration to have emerged; the seventh-century Athenian archonship would seem to militate against such a development, to take one example. Finally, archaic politeiai generally and Cretan ones specifically often
employed more inclusive labels as cover for aristocratic regimes. We cannot therefore assume
that the various authorities and witnesses to this law were as inclusive as their names suggest.

If we apply the principle *cui bono*, the most sensible interpretation is that the Drerian law on
*kosmoi* sought to establish a new rule where no clear norm previously existed, and to prevent the
domination of the office or its powers by one aristocrat or a clique of aligned elites. While the
wider community may have secondarily benefited from such a law, the primary beneficiaries of
the law will have been the elites who wished to ensure the rotation of the office and its powers
among themselves.

**Athenian methods of statutory interpretation**

*Domingo Avilés*

While Athenian statutes were not very encompassing and thus left much room for uncertainty,
their wording was held in high esteem and could not easily be argued against.

It is often debated whether or not Athenian law courts followed the “rule of law”. While it was
clearly part of Athenian political ideology, it is doubtful whether it was truly practiced. It is often
argued that following the statutes was rather optional for Athenian juries in reaching their
verdicts. The opposite view states that Athenian judges were, on the contrary, committed to
following the written laws, as was required by the dikastic oath.

The problem with this debate is that it is not clear what exactly obedience to the law and
subservience to its “rule” is supposed to mean. Statutes do not generally tell their readers how to
interpret them, so their construction is inevitably based on criteria external to them, which are
themselves open to debate. Scholars tend to accept only literal interpretations of statutes as
correct, and although Johnstone (*Disputes and Democracy*, 1999, p. 26) has pointed out that this
view amounts merely to asserting the superiority of one interpretive protocol over others, few
seem to have paid him attention. Moreover, literalism is only apparently a viable solution: truly
literal interpretation is impossible, if only because the superficial meanings of different statutory
norms contradict each other; besides, in some cases literal-minded interpretation is bound to lead
to unfair or absurd results. Therefore, any legal system needs (as Johnstone calls it) interpretive
protocols to make sense of its statutes.

To find out what interpretive protocols the Athenians followed we have no other way than to
look at the arguments found in actual forensic speeches. I argue that, according to this evidence,
in fourth-century Athens statutes were generally cited to reconstruct the intent of the fictitious
“lawgiver” (sometimes given a concrete name such as Solon or Draco) who had supposedly
devised the whole legal system and in whose "will" one could find the solution to any juridical
problem; only in a few cases were statutory norms applied directly. In these few cases, however,
the authority of statute law was absolute and even the slightest departure from the letter of the
law had to be argued for very carefully. In fact, the only non-literal interpretive protocol that
juries are ever asked to apply is the narrowing of the scope of statutory norms to fewer cases than
their wording itself suggests. The view that Athenian juries ignored statutes at whim is not borne
out by the evidence and overlooks the difficulties orators faced when the letter of the law was
against them. The rarity of "proper" legal argumentation is due to the nature of the Athenian
statutes themselves.
I first provide statistics of the frequency of the two kinds of legal arguments; then I analyze two passages in which the speaker argues for narrowing the scope of application of a statutory norm, showing under what circumstances this was possible.

In the famous dispute between Aeschines and Demosthenes over the crown, while Aeschines 1.35-48 claims it is illegal to crown anyone who is still subject to audit for any term of office (which is what the statute, according to the most plausible reconstruction, literally says), Demosthenes 19.120-21 maintains that the norm only applies when the crown is awarded for a term of office not yet audited, which was not the case with the crown Ctesiphon had proposed for him. Demosthenes’ narrowing of the scope of the norm seems to be in accordance with general Athenian practice.

Hypereides 3.13-22 combines the two main interpretive methods: the norm that declares all agreements to be valid must be limited to just contracts because this is the lawgiver’s intention as appears from his other laws. Although this would seem fair enough, most scholars accuse Hypereides of sophistry. I intend to challenge this view.

**Athenian eugeneia and Matrilineal Transmission of gentilitas**

Alex K. Schiller

In recent years two scholars (J. H. Blok and S. D. Lambert, “The Appointment of Priests in Attic Gene,” *ZPE* 169[2009] 95-121), have argued that at times an Athenian genos allowed gentile membership to be transmitted along the matriline, so that the genos could maintain some continuity among its members and priesthoods. The basis of their argument is the system of ankhisteia, whereby the male next-of-kin was supposed to marry the epikleros, the female who has no living immediate relatives, for the purpose of keeping property within the extended family. In rare cases where no male kin was alive the property was transmitted to the surviving woman’s family, either to her husband’s family or her sons. This is an example of matrilineal transmission of property. Likewise Blok and Lambert think that gentilitial priesthods were transmitted along the patriline, but in rare cases matrilineal transmission of the priesthood was permitted. The problem with this hypothesis is that the evidence shows patterns of succession to priesthood, not transmission of membership. Presumably the succeeding priestess, e.g., was already affiliated with a genos ether as a member or the daughter of a gennetes. Matrilineal transmission of gentile membership (gentilitas) may be found from the late second century B.C. on. The admission of matrilineal transmission of gentilitas enabled Athenians to be members of more than one genos. It has been argued that multiple gentile affiliations were in part the results of a response to the economic boon from the Roman gift of Delos to the Athenians and Roman preferences to deal with aristocracies (A. K. Schiller, “Multiple Gentile Affiliations and the Athenian Response to Roman Domination,” *Historia* 55.3 [2006] 264-266).

The reason for the acceptance of matrilineal transmission of gentilitas may be related to the social devaluation of citizenship and the promotion of eugeneia. Eugeneia referred to one’s freeborn status and for Athenians also Attic origins. Whereas citizenship was defined by the father and transmitted patrilineally, eugeneia helped define either an Athenian man or woman and could be transmitted along the matriline. Eugeneia was extremely important to gennetai,
because they were considered synonymous with the ideology of autochthony. In the face of intrusion of foreigners who gained citizenship through participation in the *ephebeia*, the Athenian elite sought means to prove social superiority. *Eugeneia* became that means. In turn, as the Romans equated aristocracy with the *gene*, so the proof of *eugeneia* became paramount. *Gennetai* had the best chances of acquiring the top political offices (Geagan, Clinton).

The paper will focus on a few families. Matrilineal transmission of *gentilitas* occurred at the end of the second century, when Philippe II Medeiou became priestess of Athena Polias. Her father was *exegetes* of the Eumolpidai, her brother priest of Poseidon Erekhtheus, and she was named after her paternal grandmother, Philippe Kharmidous. This Philippe (I) was able to transmit her Eteoboutad *gentilitas* to Me Dios. Nikostrate, a granddaughter of Philippe II Medeiou (Plut. *Moralia* 843), traced her Eteoboutad gentile affiliation through the matriline back to the family of Kallias and Habron Batethen. Philtera, a priestess of Athena Polias (*IG* II² 3474), paradoxically traced her Eteoboutad lineage from fellow Eteoboutad Lykourgos Boutades, the orator, and a Macedonian. The second to last known *hierophantes*, a son of Xenagoras (IV) Hegiou Phalereus, whose *tabulagenealogica* is found on an early fourth century A.D. herm (*IG* II² 2342), traced his Eumolpid and Keryx lineages through his paternal grandmothers’ ancestors (Kapetanopoulos, *BCH*, 1968). But the allowance for matrilineal transmission of *gentilitas* entailed perhaps a serious societal objection. According to Sarah Pomeroy (*Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* [Oxford 1997] 127 and Pomeroy, 1995) no Athenian child, son or daughter, would want to be socially compromised by being identified for eternity with the female. In Roman Athens freeborn Athenian women served as spare confirmation of one’s true Athenian origins and that explains why we find recorded claims of matrilineal transmission of *gentilitas*.

**Matricide as Mistrial: Legal Procedure in Euripides' *Electra***

Zachary R. Herz

My paper examines flaws in legal procedure in Euripides’ *Electra*. By viewing the play as a parable about procedural, rather than substantive, justice I hope to resolve some of the ambiguities that have troubled previous readers of the text. Instead of asking whether Clytemnestra should be killed—a question Euripides pointedly declines to answer—it is more fruitful to consider the procedural flaws in Electra’s ‘trial’ of Clytemnestra, and the conflict between the two women’s *agon* and Clytemnestra’s execution. Viewed in this light, the play’s coda becomes less problematic, and more concordant with the opposition between law and feud that has underlain this narrative since the *Oresteia*.

This analysis owes a great deal to the rise of law-and-literature analysis in legal scholarship. In recent years, scholars have increasingly used legal systems and reasoning to approach ethical problems in literature (White 1994, Ward 1995, Posner 2009). The Orestes/Electra myth is particularly well-suited to such analysis, given the explicit role of law in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* and the general connection between tragedy and legal rhetoric described by (among others) Mastronarde 2010. However, scholars such as Wohl 2010 and Nussbaum 1994 have used literature to examine law, my paper reverses this hermeneutic by considering law's power to inform literary tropes.
Many current readings of the Electra attempt to either justify or condemn Electra’s behavior, despite Euripides’ explicit moral ambiguity. When Burnett 1998 argues that Electra’s behavior is justified, or Ianov 2012 that she is an irrational murderess, I submit that they neglect a necessary element of the myth; the murder of Clytemnestra, pitting filial duty against matricide taboos, is by definition an unsolvable ethical problem. Electra’s jury splits their votes (1265-6), and Apollo himself can only offer ἄσοφοι ἐνοπαί on the topic (1302). If the substantive issue—whether Electra should kill Clytemnestra—could actually be determined with certainty, the play would be either shockingly anti-religious (with Apollo being unable to solve a simple moral problem) or portraying human justice as inferior to divine (thus running counter to previous treatments of the myth). By contrast, upon considering procedural issues in the play—whether Electra uses the right process in determining Clytemnestra’s guilt—it becomes clear that Electra, in refusing to seek community sanction for her vengeance, is acting outside the law.

These procedural defects are clearest in the agon between Electra and Clytemnestra; this contest bears a striking similarity to the Athenian jury trial, suggesting a legal resolution to the dispute, which is then aborted by Clytemnestra’s murder. The agon begins in a notably juridical fashion, with discrete, polished speeches delivered before a large audience, before degenerating into squabbling and violence. At the moment when an audience familiar with jury service would expect to deliberate and vote, Clytemnestra is instead brutally murdered. By showing how the conflict could have been properly resolved (a jury trial, ending with execution or acquittal), Euripides demonstrates the impropriety of Electra’s vengeance and justifies her eventual punishment.

This reading has several advantages; firstly, it makes the Electra’s explicit theme of epistemic difficulty (passim, but especially 367-90) central to the play’s outcome, as Electra does not know how to evaluate the rightness of her actions. Furthermore, focusing on procedure reveals the meaning of the δίκαια paradox on 1244. Clytemnestra must die, but process still matters—by relying on oracles rather than trials, Electra rejects her community’s adjudicative methods and is thus exiled from those whose laws she has ignored. This reading also accords with the themes of mythical vs. modern behavior that appear in Euripides’ Orestes as well as the Eumenides. Whether or not Electra’s actions are appropriate is tangential; what matters are Electra’s antisocial methods of seeking justice, and her disregard for law’s power to subordinate violence into a larger community framework.

Restraint and its Rewards: The Rhetoric of timōria in
Demosthenes’ Against Meidias (Dem. 21)
Robert Nichols

The subject of vengeance in Athenian legal and social discourse has received considerable treatment over the past two decades (see, e.g., Fisher 1992; Hunter 1994; Cohen 1995; Allen 2000; Herman 2006; Scheid-Tissinier 2006; McHardy 2008). Scholars, however, have not fully appreciated how litigants invoke the concept of timōria, commonly translated as “vengeance” or “punishment.” Litigants not only cite the desire for personal vengeance (timōria) as a legitimate motivation for litigation (e.g. Dem. 53.1-2, 58.1-2, 59.12; Lys. 10.3, 14.1-2), but also recommend that jurors, as agents of the community, join them in seeking vengeance (timōria) on wrongdoers to punish them for legal and moral transgressions (e.g. Dem. 50.64; Din. 1.109; Lyc.
1.141; Lys. 12.94, 13.3). The frequency of these claims suggests that Athenian audiences were receptive to them, yet scholars have not given close attention to understanding how and why litigants reconciled personal and collective interests. This paper argues that litigants employed a “rhetoric of timōria” that sought to blur the difference between personal vengeance and collective vengeance/punishment. Demosthenes’ prosecution of Meidias for striking him at the City Dionysia in 348 BCE richly elucidates this thesis.

A critical question posed by this speech is whether personal slights merited physical or legal retaliation. By prosecuting Meidias instead of returning the blow, Demosthenes faced suspicions that the attack was not severe or that he was vindictively escalating a private quarrel. But Demosthenes capitalizes on his restraint by staging a vivid replay of the events following the assault in the theater. Beginning with the probolē or prejudicial vote first brought against Meidias, Demosthenes stresses the public nature of his personal vengeance. Meidias’ attack on him at the festival provided the perfect context to avenge himself legally (26), since other citizens supported him and were hostile to Meidias (2, 215, 226). Demosthenes closely associates timōria with boētheia (help, aid), arguing that those who suffer violent hybris but restrain themselves can look to the jurors and the laws to aid and avenge them (30, 45, 76). Finally, Demosthenes emphasizes that restraint allows the jurors to exact their own timōria from Meidias (28, 40); he gives them personal and public grounds for anger (46, 70, 123, 183, 196) and vengeance (34, 127, 142, 227) in order to convict Meidias on the spot and safeguard themselves from future acts of aggression (220). By encouraging his jurors to exact vengeance from Meidias, Demosthenes casts collective interests in personal terms analogous to his own. Restraint, therefore, offered Demosthenes greater opportunities than immediate retaliation to avenge himself on his enemy.

Demosthenes’ detailed presentation of timōria in Against Meidias suggests that litigants did not suppress vengeance but harnessed it for their own purposes. Indeed, Athenians were highly sympathetic to the pursuit of vengeance when it was carried out collectively in accordance with democratic ideals. If we appreciate how litigants made persuasive arguments using this rhetoric of timōria, we can better understand Athenian attitudes towards vengeance and the role of legal discourse in shaping them.

**Session 25: Eros and Generic Enrichment**

*Crímen, Amor, Vestrum: Elegiac amor and mors in the Metamorphosis of Cycnus (Verg. A. 10.185-193)*

Sarah L. McCallum

In this paper, I explore Vergil’s generic experimentation with elegy in the aetiological myth of Cycnus (A. 10.185-193). A detailed philological analysis of the episode supports my argument that Vergil employs the motifs of both erotic and sepulchral elegy to enunciate the themes of amor and mors in the tale of Cycnus’ love and lament.
Existing scholarship has recognized the generic influence of erotic elegy on Vergil’s depiction of Cycnus. Vergil presents the Ligurian hero as the lover of Phaethon, a decision that reflects the influence of Phanocles’ Ἐρωτες Ἡ Καλοί, an elegiac collection devoted to amatory tales of beautiful youths (Wiseman, 1979; Harrison, 1991; Hollis, 1992; Keith, 1992). In her discussion of swan imagery, Keith (1992) suggests that Vergil affiliates the Cycnus-swan with the elegiac lover-poet, overdetermines the elegiac quality of Cycnus’ song by combining the motifs of love and mourning, and evokes the elegiac Amor in the parenthetical address (crimen, amor, uestrum, A. 10.188). I build upon the pre-existing scholarship by providing additional evidence for the influence of erotic elegy and further proposing that the sepulchral mode of elegy also informs the Vergilian Cycnus. Through a comprehensive study, I aim to broaden our understanding of Vergil’s experimentation with elegy as a funerary, as well as amatory, mode.

Roman elegists frequently articulate the strong thematic connection between amor and mors, a binary pairing that reflects the ancient etymological derivation of the word “elegy” from ἐ ἐλεγείν, a Greek refrain of mourning and lamentation (Luck, 1969; Papanghelis, 1987; Hinds, 1998; James, 2003; Maltby, 2006; Ramsby, 2007; Dinter, 2011; Keith, 2011b; Maltby, 2011). Furthermore, elegists like Propertius and Tibullus weave epitaphic language and funerary epigram into their overarchingly personal and erotic verse (Thomas, 1998; Dinter, 2005; Ramsby, 2007). If the fusion of amor and mors is integral to the thematic and poetic programme of elegiac verse, the question arises as to whether or not Vergil acknowledges this double aspect of elegy in his generic experimentation. As this paper will show, the Ligurian digression provides evidence for Vergil’s reaction to, and experiment with, the erotic and sepulchral aspects of contemporary elegiac verse in his depiction of a war fueled by amor and characterized by mors.

Vergil frames the introductory apostrophe to Cinyrus and Cupavo with self-conscious allusions to sepulchral and erotic poetics. While the phrase non ego te transierim (A. 10.185-186) reinterprets the “passer-by” motif, a convention of Latin funerary inscriptions, the parenthetical reproach of Amor (A. 10.188) evokes the diction and thematic content of erotic elegy. In the central panel itself, Cycnus plays the role of maestus amator, in which the two voices of elegy – lover and mourner – coalesce. Verbal signposts for erotic elegy (amati, A. 10.189; amorem, A. 10.191; molli, A. 10.192) characterize Cycnus as an amator and affiliate him with ‘soft’ elegiac verse. Cycnus is an allusive composite of Phanocles’ elegiac Orpheus (Phanocl. fr. 1.3-4 Powell) and the figure of Gallus from the Bucolics, and thus evokes Vergil’s elegiac predecessors and his own prior experimentation with elegy. The lexical pairing of words denoting grief and love (luctu ... amati, A. 10.189; maestum ... amorem, A. 10.191) connects the Cycnus myth to the genre of elegy as a funerary, as well as amatory, mode (Keith, 1992). Imagery of shade (umbram, A. 10.190) and old age (A. 10.192) allusively associates Cycnus’ metamorphosis with mors. The catasteristic departure of the Cycnus-swan (A. 10.193) evokes the consolatory motifs of astral translation or deification frequently found in epitaphic inscriptions, and is thus an appropriately closural image for the central panel.

Vergil’s depiction of Cycnus provides compelling evidence of his virtuosic experimentation with sepulchral and erotic elegy in the ‘Italian Iliad,’ and demonstrates the value of investigating the elegiac character of significant episodes within his martial maius opus.
Gallan Elegy in the Narrative Frame of Eclogue 10
John H. Henkel

Readers since antiquity have seen the influence, even quotation, of Gallan love elegy in Eclogue 10 (Serv. ad 10.46: hi autem omnes versus Galli sunt; cf. Hollis ad FRP 141). This discussion has centered around the song spoken by Gallus himself, but further Gallan influence can be seen in the poem’s narrative frame, spoken by a character that many have judged to be Vergil (since he refers to the position of Ecl. 10 as last in its collection, extremum laborem, 1). Conte, Harrison, and others have discussed the metapoetic interaction between elegy and pastoral in Gallus’s song, since the elegist Gallus plays the pastoral role of Daphnis (Theoc. 1). The same metapoetic interaction can also be found in the frame, where the pastoral narrator plays elegiac role of poet-lover. Just as the elegist Gallus takes part in pastoral’s foundational conceit of singing shepherds, so too the pastoral narrator of Ecl. 10 participates in the foundational conceit of elegy, singing first-person complaints about his unhappy love and his competition with a rich, gift-giving rival.

While Gallus’s song in Ecl. 10 (31–69) tells of the elegist’s unrequited love for Lycoris, who is herself going north to follow a soldier (46–49), the poem’s narrative frame (1–8, 70–77) can be read as describing the narrator’s unrequited love for Gallus, who is himself in love with Lycoris. Some readers have seen the possibility of homoerotic love in the narrator’s reference to his love for Gallus (Gallo, cuius amor tantum mihi crescit in horas, 73; Coleman). Rather than seeing this as autobiography, we should see Vergil as adopting the conventions of Roman elegy, which pretends to verisimilitude through its first-person narrative, but which uses ostensibly real love affairs to make metapoetic statements about poetry. When Vergil styles Ecl. 10 as a gift “for my Gallus,” though “the sort that Lycoris herself might read” (pauc a meo Gallo sed quae legat ipsa Lycoris, | carmina sunt dicenda; neget quis carmina Gallo? 2–3), his allusion, as always, is literary: “poems such as Lycoris would read” are Gallan elegy, which we know imagined Lycoris as its reader (New Gallus 1). In these lines Vergil’s narrator assumes the elegiac role of exclusus amator, whose wheeling beloved asks for a present (neget quis carmina Gallo? 4), but who instead gives love poetry (Ecl. 10, Vergil’s extremum laborem) and prays for this to count as much or more than the gifts of his rival (Pierides: vos haec facietis maxima Gallo, Ecl 10.72). Later elegists frequently wish to be allowed to offer poems to their mistresses instead of gifts (James), and although this motif is not found in surviving Gallus, it is comparable to that poet’s concern that his verses be “worthy of my mistress” (NG 6–7). There are thus two metaliterary points in Vergil’s narrator's claim that amor Galli grows hourly for him (73, above): as elsewhere in the Eclogues, Vergil uses erotic love as a metaphor for literary influence (cf. Hubbard on Ecl. 2), and since amor and amores can refer to the genre of love poetry (DServ. ad Ecl. 8.23, Harrison 33), he underlines his admiration for Gallan elegy in this most elegiac of the Eclogues. That Gallus himself is in love with Lycoris ensures that the narrator’s love will be unrequited, as always in elegy.

The figure of the poet-lover is well-known from later Roman elegy, but at this early date, Vergil’s allusion must be to the poetry of Gallus himself. The metapoetic interaction between elegy and pastoral in Ecl.10 is thus complex, but balanced: Vergil casts the elegist Gallus into a role drawn from Theocritus, the originator of pastoral, and the pastoral narrator into a role drawn from Gallus, the originator of Roman love elegy. Both characters function equally as vehicles for
Vergil’s meditation on the similarities—and ultimately differences (both characters reject the poem’s initial characterization of them)—between pastoral and elegy.

**Love and Strife in Lucretius and the Elegists**

Donncha O’Rourke

This paper will argue that Lucretian Epicureanism is a persistent subtext in Latin love-elegy, and specifically that Lucretius’ ‘tableau’ of Mars and Venus at the opening of the De rerum natura (DRN 1.29-43) imparts to elegy’s fixation with love and war a quasi-Empedoclean outlook on the creative and destructive forces that regulate the world and human life. In the context of an age that claimed to have begotten peace through war (cf., e.g., Augustus, *Res Gestae* 13), the elegiac opposition of love and war is a political theme with urgent philosophical ramifications.

The prospect of Lucretian ‘subtextuality’ in elegy might seem unlikely given the polarised outlooks of the Epicurean and elegist. While scholarship has recognised that the other Augustan poets, especially Virgil, responded to Lucretian didactic in their explorations of Roman history and politics, and the place therein of civilian, soldier, and leader (cf., e.g., Hardie 1986; Farrell 1991; Gale 2000; Hardie 2009), it has only more recently considered Lucretius as a mediator of the same concerns in elegy (cf., e.g., Fabre-Serris 2005; Caston 2012). However, Tibullus’ and Propertius’ fixation with death and love points to the relevance to elegy of the central books of the *DRN*, and Ovid’s didactic works might be considered Lucretius’ final destination in elegy (Sommariva 1980; Shulman 1981; Steudel 1992; J. F. Miller 1997; Farrell 2008). In view of elegy’s propensity to converse with the Lucretian world-view, then, the implications of Lucretius-reception in Virgil suggest parallel avenues for exploration.

Having established in this way the potential for intertextual ‘traction’ between Lucretian Epicureanism and elegy, this paper will compare and contrast Virgil’s reception of Lucretius’ Mars-Venus ‘tableau’ in the Shield of Aneas (where Lucretian language and Empedoclean subtext have far-reaching politico-philosophical implications) with three elegiac texts which, to varying degrees and with different implications, are in conversation with the same Lucretian passage:

1. Tibullus 1.1, a bucolic reverie in which the lover prays to be delivered from war into his mistress’ embrace, looks to two passages of Lucretius: the poet’s prayer for peace in *DRN* 1, with its symbolic expression in the embrace of Mars and Venus; and the depiction of early man in *DRN* 5, here refracted though Virgil’s *Eclogues*. In bringing together these two sections of the *DRN*, Tibullus (like Virgil) projects the dream of a returning Golden Age onto a Lucretian backdrop. However, the snapshots of domestic violence that darken Tibullus’ vignettes of rustic peace suggest a cyclical interchange of love and strife that resonates, through Virgil, with Lucretius’ Empedoclean intertext.

2. It has been noted that the unorthodox position adopted by the lovers in Propertius 3.4 is paralleled in literature only by Lucretius’ Mars and Venus and by Virgil’s Venus and Vulcan (Edmunds 2002). Further, the presence of Mars and Venus within this elegy, the juxtaposition of war and peace across this elegy and the next, and the *re cusatio* in the latter specifically of Lucretian didactic (Conte 2000), invites philosophical as well as political interpretation of the diptych as a whole.
3. The sexual positions recommended by Ovid at *Ars Amatoria* 3.771-88 echo both the Lucretian tableau and its Virgilian reworking (Gibson 2003), but eschew the political implications of the latter. Rather, Ovid’s agenda as erodidactic *praeeceptor* adheres to a non-allegorical reading of Mars and Venus that further aligns this passage of the *Ars* with Lucretius’ analysis of female sexuality in *DRN* 4. In this context, Ovid’s historical exempla remain subordinate to the elegiac ‘warfare of love’.

The paper will conclude by suggesting that elegy’s manifold juxtapositions of Mars and Venus, peace and war, and even *militia amoris* may be more frequently informed by Lucretio-Empedoclean implications than we are accustomed to think. Elegy’s readings of Lucretius thus encompass a much wider discourse about the cyclic interchange of *arma* and *amor*, in the histories of our nations, as in our private lives.

**Heracles and Erotic Failure in Apollonius' *Argonautica***

**Katherine Lu**

Apollonius' purpose in including Heracles among the Argonauts in his *Argonautica* has long confused interpreters. After all, Heracles is abruptly abandoned by the Argonauts at the end of Book I, and appears only through others' narratives in the rest of the epic. Many scholars have blamed Heracles for not fitting in with the group: Heracles is too primitive and bestial (Lawall 1966); too archaic for a Hellenistic poem (Galinsky 1972); too independent for a collective endeavor (Feeney 1986; Hunter 1988); or simply too big (DeForest 1994). Others claim that Heracles has no place in the narrative at all (Wray 2000). But these unsatisfying arguments do not account for the full range of Heracles' presence in the poem.

I will show instead that Heracles serves a crucial purpose: to model for the youthful Jason both the positive aspects of heroism that he must attain and the dangers of erotic attachment that must be avoided. And Apollonius uses Jason's response to this model to define his character. For Jason, though persuasive and attractive, cannot accomplish his mission and a safe *nostos* through his own heroic prowess. Apollonius emphasizes Jason's fear and dependence (see Carspecken 1952; Lawall 1966), a "problem" that leads some scholars to insist that Jason, in his lack of traditional heroism, represents a new kind of hero, a romantic hero (Beye 1969; Clauss 1993; Zanker 1979).

In contrast, Heracles demonstrates genuine, successful heroism throughout the poem. In his introduction in the Catalogue (I.122-32), Heracles is already an established hero, interrupting his legendary Labor of the Erymanthian Boar to join the Argonauts. When the Argonauts must select a leader, the men unanimously choose Heracles as "the best man"; with great tact and diplomacy, Heracles avoids a narrative crisis by deferring the honor to Jason (I.332-62). Heracles easily conquers the Earthborn Giants who threaten the *Argo* (I.985-1078). Even after Heracles has been separated from the Argonauts, they find heroic success by imitating his civilizing imposition of justice on the lawless (II.774-810) and his strategy to defeat the Stymphalian Birds (II.1047-89).

While Heracles demonstrates the importance of physical strength, skill in battle, and clever strategy for heroism, equally significant is his one spectacular failure in the poem: the loss of his beloved, Hylas. Heracles, a famously lustful philanderer, here in the *Argonautica* remains sexually continent with the Lemnian women and Melanippe; instead, he is excessively devoted
to Hylas. So exaggerated is his erotic attachment to Hylas that, when the boy is abducted by a nymph, Heracles experiences a fully unheroic collapse (I.1207-72). The master hunter conceives no plan for tracking and finding the lost boy, but instead rushes about heedlessly. The message is clear: when Heracles acts as a lover, he experiences heroic failure. The Argonauts' subsequent and implausible abandonment of Heracles is thus marked by Apollonius as a narrative choice responding to Heracles' defeat.

Heracles' singular failure reveals the dangerous effect of Eros on heroism. Jason displays his own susceptibility to erotic attachment by lingering with Hypsipyle on Lemnos, a sojourn that obstructs his heroic development (I.853-78). But in Colchis, instead of denying eroticism, Jason uses his sexual charms to encourage Medea's erotic attachment to him; her magic compensates for his lack of strength, and though they successfully gain the Fleece, Jason fails to become a hero like Heracles. The narrator treats Eros with an increasingly negative tone, culminating in the sacrilegious murder of Apsyrtus in Book IV (IV.421-81). When the cloak of Dionysus and Ariadne suggests the possibility that Jason could abandon Medea, Jason instead binds himself closer to Medea through murder and marriage. Concern for his heroism there after disappears from the poem: Jason absorbs neither "lesson" provided by Heracles. Thus, Heracles' didactic purpose is interwoven into the themes of the entire epic, and Apollonius uses Heracles' successes and failures to shape the very character of Jason himself.

Session 26: Bodies in Motion: Contemporary Approaches to Choral Performance (organized by the APA Committee on Ancient and Modern Performance)

Translating the Greek Chorus: Choral Performance and Poetic Performance
Simon Perris

This paper theorizes the Greek chorus in performance by addressing the relationship between words and movement. Specifically, I argue that the chorus performs a dialectic between text and action by performing two distinct creative personae (viz., poet-playwright and director). This in turn illuminates certain issues fundamental to performance reception studies.

The chorus is the synecdochic crux of Greek drama: choral song and dance is central to reception (Fischer-Lichte 2005: 240-52; Bierl; Goldhill: 45–79); so too is the translated text (Hardwick 2005, 2010; Walton; Ioannidou; Perris). Indeed, it is the formal element least amenable to proscenium-arch naturalism and most amenable to avant-garde techniques. Choral verse, which is difficult and markedly ‘poetic’, also offers the greatest possibilities for translation in (post)modern poetic idioms. In contemporary productions, then, the chorus can, at one and the same moment, represent a director and a poet-dramaturg. Thus, while many scholars prioritize
performance over text (Walton) or separate poetry and movement (Goldhill: 169–78), some consider the fraught interactions between playwright, translator, and director (Hardwick 2005: 217–21; Taplin; Harrop). My paper likewise reconsiders embodied choral poetry within the spectator’s totalizing aesthetic experience.

Using this framework, I address certain issues raised by contemporary reception of the chorus. One such issue is discursive relevance. Do authors and directors use the chorus to construct meaning? How? In The Cure at Troy (1990), Seamus Heaney interpolated original choral poetry into Sophokles’ Philoktetes in service of political commentary, demonstrating the power of choral song—even after the performative turn—to make an enduring literary statement about the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Authenticity is another fundamental concern, which comes in different, sometimes contradictory guises (Gamel). For example, the National Theatre of Scotland’s 2007 Bakkhai subordinated poetry to music and movement for the sake of a certain kind of authenticity. John Tiffany’s ostensibly radical production ultimately assimilated the chorus into a popular musical theatre idiom: Broadway. The result was an inauthentic production and a hyper-authentic, over-determined translation. By contrast, the 1981 Hall/Harrison Oresteia made effective use of the mask (see Hall) as a formal(ist) intermediary between alliterative poetic translation and the phenomenological body of the performer. This suggests different modes of formalism, poetic and dramaturgical, operative in performance reception. Finally, Yael Farber’s Molora (premiere June 2003; no text published) merged the Oresteia with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Xhosa chorus performing their own dances in their own language to an anglophone audience. This chorus asserted its autonomy qua collective performing body. In so doing, it short-circuited the ‘problem’ of text and performance and emphasized the primacy of the body in constructing theatrical meaning.

The singing, dancing, versifying chorus exemplifies Greek drama as multimedia performance art: not quite poem, not quite play, not quite opera. By playing (with) director and poet, the chorus foregrounds, and problematizes, text and body, poetry and physicality. It thus embodies the ever-present, unstable dialectic – that between text and action – at the center of classical reception studies (Griffiths). Thick description of performance reception (à la Fischer-Lichte 1983) must account for a spectator’s experience of the embodied chorus in toto: movement, music, words, et cetera.

From Gardzienice to Athens: Unpacking Staniewski’s Ideology
Dorota Dutsch

I propose to discuss the representation of Greek chorus in Włodzimierz Staniewski’s production of Iphigenia at Aulis (2007). I will begin with a short clip representing Iphigenia’s death and draw attention to the male and the female dancers’ frenetic movements in the background. Still photographs from the performance of the play in Warsaw (2009) will be used to illustrate further the company’s effort to reconstruct the movements of ancient Greek choruses as recorded on vase paintings. Staniewski’s work was recently the subject of Yana Zafiri’s (2010) enthusiastic description. My goal is to open a discussion about the intellectual and ethical implications of Staniewski’s effort. In order to do so, I will first outline the rationale for his strategy, sketching
the history of the company and historicizing Staniewski’s comments on the Greek past and on the actor’s body.

Inspired by Tadeusz Grotowski’s “para-theater” (Allain 1997: 44-60), Staniewski founded a Center of Theatrical Practice in 1978 in Gardzienice, a village located in a culturally diverse part of southeastern Poland. The center’s mission was to create an opportunity for dialogue (in the Bakhtinian sense; cf. 1968) between theater practitioners and rural communities (Filipowicz, 1983, 1987). Actors obtained rigorous training in dance and song and plied their trade during “expeditions” to remote locations and “gatherings,” not only performing, but also learning dance, music, and ritual gestures from their hosts. Soon, “expeditions” meant to enrich the troupe’s bodily erudition went abroad, as far as India and North America, contributing to Gardzienice’s international reputation.

With their staging of Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* (1997), Staniewski and Gardzienice turned the technique that they had used to dialogue with living cultures to the study of ancient Greek theater. In his recent book (2004), Staniewski often evokes “the Greeks” as a source of inspiration. Upon close reading, it turns out that Staniewski’s debt is mostly to Werner Jaeger (1962) and his concept of *paideia* (2004: 47). Two examples will suffice here. To Jaeger, Greek culture was the sublime expression of the universal human spirit, so that “men who realize the deeper values of the human spirit must turn […] to the original forms in which it was first embodied” (1986: XVIII). This is what Staniewski has in mind when he refers to antiquity as “the childhood” of humanity, which artists endeavor to remember (2004: 124-5). Jaeger argues that the Greeks discovered “how to represent the human body […] by learning the universal laws governing its structure, balance and movement” (1986: XX). Staniewski echoes this view when he asserts that, when imitating the figures from Athenian vase paintings, he was able to “retrieve primordial gestures” he and his actors “found that the postures on the vases came from a forgotten line of life” (2004: 128-9). Thanks to this connection, the body becomes a means of transcending one’s culture and connecting to “that which is old, ancient, forgotten, and hidden, which can mean somehow universal” (2004: 97).

Staniewski’s use of dance inspired by Greek vase paintings is thus based on the assumptions that 1) the actor’s body is endowed with a supra-cultural memory of its own; 2) Greek culture represents a universal ideal that can be brought back to life through embodied memory. This position, at once universalist and Hellenocentric, contradicts the original premises of Gardzienice, renouncing the company’s initial awareness of and openness to cultural difference. The aesthetic merits of Staniewski’s work (past and present) notwithstanding, it is important to keep in mind that the corporeal mysticism motivating his use of chorus reveals more about early 20th century ideas of Greece than it does about ancient Greece itself.

**Flipping Greek Tragedy: The Hip Hop Chorus**

Alison Traweek

This paper shows how the relatively recent genre of hip hop theater, with its heavy reliance on elements of music, song, and dance, provides a vibrant and living way of presenting the chorus of Greek tragedy. Taking a hip hop adaptation of an ancient play as its primary example, the argument uses the methodologies of theater reception studies (e.g. Foley, Gamel, Hall, and Hardwick), and builds on scholarship in Classical as well as African-American literary traditions.
(e.g. Banks, Catanese, Cook and Tatum, Hall, Walters, and Wetmore). As a way of briefly summarizing the history and conventions of hip hop theater, the paper begins by outlining the inherent similarities between hip hop theater and Greek tragedy; both are shaped by a heightened consciousness of social justice, for instance, both are competitive performative traditions fundamentally rooted in the reworking of earlier materials, and, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, both feature a singing and dancing collective alongside individual performers.

With this background established, the paper then turns to the case study, Will Power's *The Seven*, a hip hop re-imagining of Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* that was first produced in 2001. Although he broadens the plot of the play to incorporate background information essential to the story but likely unfamiliar to modern audiences, Power's presentation follows the Aeschylean model in its basic story line. At first glance, however, his chorus differs markedly from the traditional Greek chorus. Rather than presenting one constant chorus of unchanging identity, he has divided the chorus into two roles with distinct functions: the first is a group of rappers who adopt and shed identities fluidly as they participate in and are subject to different aspects of the action of the play. The second is a DJ who stands outside the play, comments on it, and controls its boundaries – her action of dropping the needle onto the record is what sets the play in motion, for instance, and the play ends when she packs up her equipment. These two aspects, while physically and dramatically distinct, are nonetheless closely linked; the chorus is identified in the cast description as "[T]he DJ's 'posse'" who "help the DJ by seamlessly becoming whatever she needs [it] to be."

While both of these aspects, the implicated rappers as well as the quasi-omniscient DJ, are innate to the genre of hip hop theater, they map onto the traditional Greek chorus in interesting ways. The hip hop chorus in *The Seven* portrays several different groups over the course of the play, but is consistently cast in relatively powerless roles, able to react to the action of the play but rarely to control it. In this, it recalls the tendency of the Greek chorus to represent lower status figures and to function as the "internal audience." The DJ, on the other hand, is removed from the immediate consequences of the plot; she takes a more expansive perspective, and speaks more to the philosophical implications of the situation than to the specific action itself. Her role is thus reminiscent of the way that the choral odes can pull away from the particulars of their plot to reflect on constants of myth and humanity. Both rappers and DJ, meanwhile, make use of the full range of kinetic and musical features of the hip hop tradition.

Power's *The Seven*, then, not only gives the audience the experience of witnessing a singing and dancing chorus that is organically and generically contextualized within the play, but dramatizes several of the theorized functions of the ancient Greek chorus. Hip hop theater as a genre, I argue, is thus capable of reinvesting the tragic chorus with a vitality and immediacy that few other genres can match.
Imagining and Imaging the Chorus: A Study of the Physicality, Movement, and Composition of the Chorus in A.R.T.’s Ajax
Viviane Sophie Klein

This paper describes and analyzes the staging of the chorus in the American Repertory Theater’s 2011 production of Sophocles’s Ajax. It identifies key points of contact with and innovations upon the ancient form, focusing in particular on the chorus’s physicality, movement and composition. Aside from the chorus leader, who was played by a live actor, the rest of the choral performances were pre-recorded and projected on video screens. This format enabled director Sarah Benson to experiment with the chorus’s liminal nature: they were at once physically present and also ethereal; they could watch the story unfold from afar and actively participate in it; they were made up of actors and non-actors alike, all from the local Boston community. This paper reveals how these dramaturgical decisions not only updated the ancient device for a modern setting, but also actively encouraged the audience to (re)consider the form and function of a traditional chorus.

The first part of the paper explores the chorus’s physicality. Their images were projected on the sloping ceiling of the military mess hall in which the play was set. Each member occupied one of thirty square panels. They were adult men and women of diverse ages and races wearing modern, everyday clothing. Their virtual nature made them seem part human and part otherworldly. Contributing to this impression was the fact that the screens were suspended above the stage in the deus ex machina position. The screens created the illusion of a cyberspace community, a chorus of anonymous voices participating in a shared experience. They introduced yet another layer of theatricality by reflecting the voyeuristic nature of the chorus back onto the audience. This production revitalized the ancient device by reincarnating it in a modern medium.

The second part of the paper investigates the chorus’s movements. A traditional Greek chorus, of course, wore masks that restricted their ability to manipulate facial expression and, consequently, amplified the impact of their body language. This production inverted the traditional model. The video footage presented the chorus members from the shoulders up, directing all the attention to their faces. The limitations on their bodies heightened the effect of their smaller movements; a subtle shift, twitch, or frown became all the more dynamic. The videography enabled the production team to make quick edits and guide the audience’s eye to a particular character or group of characters. In this way, they were able to choreograph a vivid dance, bringing carefully selected combinations into view in a precise rhythm. The chorus members would appear on the screens and speak individually, in rounds, over one another, or in unison as one collective body. They would also simply appear and wordlessly observe the action, speaking volumes with their silence. The overall effect was that of a living, breathing mosaic.

The final part of the paper examines the composition of the chorus. This production was designed in collaboration with Theater of War, which uses ancient plays as a forum for dialogue with modern soldiers about the psychological aftermath of war. As with an ancient chorus, this modern group was composed of people from the local community. In addition to professional actors, it featured real-life veterans as well as their friends and families. This created a meaningful sense of meta-theatricality, especially when these individuals departed from
Sophocles’s script and spoke about their own experiences with and opinions about war. In this way, A.R.T.’s production of the *Ajax* successfully, and poignantly, addressed the challenges of reimagining an ancient Greek chorus for the contemporary stage.

**Dancing Philoctetes in Tehran: The “(Un)Dancing” Chorus in Raúl Valles and Afshin Ghaffarian’s *Lemnos***

*Katie Billotte*

In 2008, the Mexican playwright and director Raúl Valles and the Iranian dancer and choreographer Afshin Ghaffarian collaborated to produce *LEMNOs*, an experimental adaptation of Sophocles’ *Philoctetes*. Using the original Greek text, *LEMNOs* was performed three times as part of the 2008 Fadjr International Theater Festival, Iran’s only annual theater festival. Each year in late June the festival draws theater practitioners from around the world to Tehran for a week of ground-breaking theatrical performances in country where religious authorities exercise extensive control over every aspect of artistic and cultural life. This control can be particularly felt in the performing arts, which have been governed by strict regulations since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The most important restriction to the aims of the purposed paper is a *de facto* ban on public dancing. Iranian law calls for the authorization of any “staged rhythmic movement” by the Ministry of Culture. As one might imagine, authorization for most “staged rhythmic movement” is hard to come by. Thus, most dance performances in Iran over the past thirty-three years have occurred as part of the underground arts scene that thrives throughout the capital.

The Fadjr International Theater Festival could not be more different than the small illicit performances that constitute most of Iran’s contemporary dance culture. And yet, through co-opting the ancient chorus, Valles and Ghaffarian provided an opportunity for Iran’s normally hidden contemporary choreography to find (for a moment) an international stage. In this paper, I will argue that key features in the contemporary reception and perception of the ancient chorus allowed Valles and Ghaffarian to exploit it as a site of subversive performance in plain view of the Iranian authorities. Chief among these features is the extent to which the chorus has been viewed by many modern audiences and scholars as an embarrassingly obsolete feature of Greek theater. This, I will argue, was the view of the chorus taken by the government censors who, as a result of their confidence in the chorus’s old-fashioned character, did not notice the ways in which the chorus’s choreography in *LEMNOs* defied Iranian law concerning public dance performances. I will contend that for this reason in *LEMNOs* we see the possibility to reclaim the chorus as a site for ethical and political contestation within the theatrical experience. I will offer an alternative view of the chorus, not as an anachronistic appendage of the Greek theatrical tradition that must be either reformed or complete amputated, but as a vital and dynamic component of Greek theater that serves as a powerful tool for adaptation and commentary through these plays.

Where are we now? The state of research on ancient magic

Werner Riess

During the past twenty years the study of ancient magic has turned into one of the most productive domains in ancient studies. This surge of interest in how and why Greeks and Romans resorted to magic provides us with invaluable insight into ancient emotional, economic, political, and social conditions. The variety of themes addressed in research is dazzling. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of subjects and trends in the field.

Defining magic in relation to religion is a notorious problem (Versnel 1991b). Within the wide array of curses, Versnel has undertaken attempts at finding different categories (2010; 2009; 1991a). Apart from research into the material evidence such as “voodoo dolls” (Ogden 1999; Faraone 1991b; Wünsch 1902), investigation of magic’s ritual aspects has become a major trend in recent years (Riess 2012, 177–188; Meyer-Mirecki 1995).

Probing into the ritual side of ancient magic also entails examining specific structures of communication prevalent in magical practices. How are we to envision a magician’s interaction with the gods of the underworld, the dead, and the human targets of malign magic (Kropp 2004; Brodersen 2001)? Asking about the participants involved in a magical act and their relation to one another also entails questions about their agency (Ogden 2008; Collins 2003). The way in which magic is situated in the respective social and legal systems is the focus of many studies: magic could be a means of social control (Faraone 1999) as well as revenge (Graf 2007; Wünsch 1902). It is the expression not only of sharp agonistic thinking (Faraone 1991a), especially in the realm of sports (Tremel 2004), but also of the desire to ward off attacks (Faraone 1992; 1991b).

Contextualizing magic within the broader framework of similar practices, such as divination and oracles (Eidinow 2007), makes us wonder whether magical practices were considered legal or criminal in specific communities (Collins 2001; Faraone 1989). Noteworthy also are monographs on ancient magic that have been introducing students to “magical studies” for quite some time and that also pave the way for researchers who intend to delve more deeply into the material (Collins 2008; Graf 1997). There is no shortage of English source readers, although in most cases they showcase only some literary sources (Ogden 2009; Luck 2006). There is only one collection of Greek curse tablets in English translation, namely Gager’s oft-quoted Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World (1992). As useful as all these research endeavors are, they are hampered by a serious gap in ancient studies: the scarcity of reliable editions of ancient, especially Greek curse tablets.

Whereas magical papyri have been edited in an exemplary way (Betz 1992) and the Latin tablets are available in a collection without translation (Kropp 2008), Greek epigraphy lags behind. Wünsch published his grand corpus of Attic curse tablets within the Inscriptiones Graecae
project in 1897, but his edition is dated on account of much new material and new readings. Since then, curse tablets have been edited in disparate journals, often unknown to the non-expert or hard to access. It is this obstacle that has prompted the two new in-progress projects that are the focus of this roundtable: a searchable online database of Greek and Latin curses, and a reading edition of all Attic curse tablets with Greek text and facing English translation.

Legal binding curses from classical Athens
Zinon Papakonstantinou

Binding curses (katadesmoi/defixiones) are intensely personal and direct texts that can provide fascinating glimpses of magical practices and other facets of daily life in the ancient world. Despite their evidentiary value, however, they have until very recently been largely neglected in classical studies, with the exception of certain scholars working on Graeco-Roman magic (e.g., Faraone 1991; Graf 1997; Ogden 1999). Since most binding curses are the products of disputes and antagonism, it is not surprising that a large number of them deal with legal matters and attempt to recruit the assistance of supernatural forces in securing success in legal proceedings. This paper looks at the legal binding curses from classical Athens as a case study that illustrates the way in which judiciary defixiones can contribute to our assessment of legal systems, behaviors, and practices in the ancient world.

In classical Athens, the extensive and complex legal system was considered by many as a cornerstone of the city’s democracy. Structured on the principle of wide citizen participation, legal proceedings and especially the popular courts of classical Athens were the prime means of formal dispute resolution, and were a token of popular power. What happened in the courts had implications for politics, social relationships, and everyday life in general. With so much at stake, it is not surprising that litigants often recruited the support of a network of friends and associates and attempted to influence the outcome of litigation in numerous ways—including magic. Written legal binding curses were produced in Sicily starting in the early fifth century BCE or earlier (Jordan 1985, nos. 95, 99, 100, 108). In Athens, the earliest extant specimens date to the late fifth century, although oral legal binding curses were probably performed much earlier (Faraone 1985).

From the vantage point of social and legal history, judiciary binding curses provide valuable insights into technical procedural aspects of the law as well as into the social dynamics of Athenian litigation during the classical period (Eidinow 2007; Riess 2012). Prosopographical analysis of the targets of legal binding curses reveals that the practice was popular and widespread among Athenians of all social backgrounds (e.g., Wünsch 1897, no. 24; Wünsch 1897, no. 65; Costabile 1999, no. 2, 2 all seemingly refer to upper-class opponents in court, and see further Nisoli 2003; Wünsch 1897, no. 87 and Audollent 1904, no. 49 target tavern-keepers and butchers).

Moreover, the language and requests of the agents of curses are often at odds with the picture of litigant behavior and expectations as depicted in fourth-century Athenian forensic oratory. In the latter, litigants (whether plaintiffs or defendants) are depicted as largely restricted by the need to conform to civic standards of behavior, especially regarding their respect towards the law and their trust in the courts and the justice system in general (Christ 1998; Lanni 2006). By the same
token, opponents are often portrayed as devious, manipulative and subversive towards the courts and the principles of the democracy.

Legal binding curses provide a corrective to the largely schematic portrayal of Athenian litigation depicted in forensic orations and shed further light on Athenians’ perspectives and objectives vis-à-vis their legal system. They suggest a template of Athenian litigation where both expediency and mistrust of civic institutions override the desire, professed by many litigants in court, to reach a fair resolution to disputes. Overall, Athenian legal binding curses suggest a legal system that, besides being an integral part of democratic Athenian society, was at the same time vulnerable to potential manipulation by litigants and other interested persons, who at times had little interest in justice, but sought instead to promote their personal or wider political agendas.

A new electronic infrastructure for research on curse tablets
Kirsten Jahn

This paper presents a detailed overview of an in-progress database of Greek and Latin curse tablets (defixiones). Despite recent advances in the study of Graeco-Roman curse magic, there is still no complete printed corpus or online database of this material. Scholars interested in defixiones are still bound to use the printed editions and their indices. Wünsch (1897), Audollent (1904), Solin (1968), and Jordan (1985; 2000) are the most important collections, but they do not cover recent scholarship. Several source readers (Tomlin 1988; Gager 1992; Luck 2006; Ogden 2009) and works on different aspects of ancient magic (Tremel 2004; Eidinow 2007; Kropp 2008) may provide new materials and alternative readings, but once again coverage is not comprehensive. Complete translations can likewise be difficult to access. Perhaps most problematically, a systematic search for and of the tablets is essentially impossible.

Online searches for curse tablets garner poor results. The Centre for the Study of Ancient Documents at Oxford University hosts a page listing a mere 27 defixiones from Britain (http://curses.csad.ox.ac.uk/index.shtml), while only 115 curse tablets are included in the Epigraphische Datenbank Heidelberg (http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/institute/sonst/adw/edh/). Further material can be found in articles available online, but again, as with print sources, systematic search is impossible. There is an electronic reference work (Kropp 2008) that contains all Latin defixiones. The user must overcome two hurdles in order to make use of the material, however: obtaining a physical copy of the database on CD-ROM and finding and installing an outdated version of the program FileMaker. Without FileMaker, the user is left with a PDF file and, consequently, with limited search options.

In contrast, the new project presented in this paper is an online database with multiple search options, allowing combined searches and text search in Greek, in Latin, and in translation. The database furthermore contains an extended bibliography and a concordance. It is projected to encompass all curse tablets that survive with a fairly comprehensible text—about 1000 tablets in total. Extensive information is provided for each tablet. First, there is the text itself in three versions: a critical text with markup consistent with the Leiden conventions, a more reader-friendly text, and a translation. An image is uploaded, if one of sufficient quality is available. Furthermore, a full list of bibliographical references is included at the end of each entry. Thereby a bibliographical record is provided and different readings or opinions about one defixio can be
presented. Unfortunately, many curse tablets are still not translated, so they are largely inaccessible for non-classicists, although new projects like the bilingual source reader presented in paper #4 can help solve this problem. When completed, this online database will provide a basic translation of all binding curses.

In addition to the text and the physical description of each defixio, the database will offer an analysis of the textual content and assist in answering a great variety of questions. The database possesses search capability for such keywords as the names of persons, gods, goddesses, and demons involved; the type of the curse; and the formulas of the curse itself. Such commentary enables further conclusions concerning the development, spread, and usages of binding curses in the ancient world.

Finally, because it is based on programming in PHP and MySQL, the database is open to technical improvements and its content can easily be updated online. New discoveries of tablets and new scholarly work can, for the first time since Audollent (1904), be included in an all-encompassing collection of defixiones, and the whole genre will be much more easily accessible to both specialists and non-specialists alike.

A new comprehensive bilingual source reader of Attic curse tablets
T. H. M. Gellar-Goad

This paper presents a detailed overview of an in-progress book project that collects, collates published textual variants of, and translates all extant Attic defixiones from all periods, classical through Roman. The project—a collaboration between German, American, and Greek scholars—addresses a major shortcoming in the field. Since Wünsch’s IG III.3 volume (1897), there has been no truly comprehensive edition of Greek curse tablets, with the result that any particular text may be published in many different forms by a number of different scholars. Audollent (1904), the Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (SEG), the Bulletin épigraphique, and Jordan (1985, 2000), and numerous others have edited or surveyed editions of certain collections and corpora of tablets. Gager (1992) and López Jimeno (1999) have offered translations (English and Spanish, respectively) of a large number of tablets, but still not all. Until a new edition of IG III.3 is completed, the project presented in this paper offers a comprehensive solution for scholars, students, and instructors looking to work with Greek-language curses from Athens and its environs.

Targeted at a broad audience, from specialist to casual reader, the project begins with a substantial introduction on the historical, material, and cultural context of the Attic defixiones, and on recent interpretive work in the field of ancient magic. For each tablet, the date and provenance (if known), a Greek text, English translation, and sociohistorical commentary are provided. Given both the wide intended readership and the fact that autopsy of the tablets was not possible (and in some cases the tablets themselves are now lost altogether), textual notes—on emendations, cruxes, and the like—are given in English, rather than a more bulky Latin apparatus criticus. Similarly, to aid accessibility of the Greek to a wider range of students, the texts are corrected to standard classical Greek orthography (e.g., τήν instead of τῇμ or καλῶδ instead of καλὸδ); variant spellings and post-classical orthographic developments are indicated in
After briefly overviewing such editorial considerations, this paper presents a case study of two defixiones, the first a “letter to the underworld” curse tablet from Wünsch’s IG III.3 volume (no. 102, published also at Gager no. 104, Wilhelm pp. 112–113, Versnel p. 65, Bravo pp. 203–204, SEG 37.219, and López Jimeno 2001 no. 102), and the second from the body of publications postdating Wünsch, a curse against bronze-workers found in the Agora (Young p. 223, Burford p. 163, Jordan 1985 no. 20, Camp pp. 140–141, SEG 40.273, Gager no. 71, Curbera-Jordan, López Jimeno 1999 no. 20, and López Jimeno 2001 no. 214). Each tablet is relatively short but has prompted not only numerous editions but also several different readings of the text. The complete components of the book project will be provided for each tablet: date and provenance, text, translation, commentary, textual notes. Examination and audience discussion of the tablets, their presentation in the source reader format, and the progress of the project will highlight both the value and the challenges of studying Greek defixiones.

Session 28: Campanian Cultures: Poetics, Location, and Identity

Lucilius the Campanian Satirist
Ian Goh

Juvenal introduces his poetic predecessor, the inventor of satire Gaius Lucilius, as an Auruncae alumnus (1.20). The scholiast explains the description as a reference to Lucilius’ Campanian hometown of Suessa Aurunca, a fortified Samnite War stronghold. Juvenal uses the word Auruncus only once more, in his next satire, where it appears in a line, stolen in part from Virgil’s Aeneid, denoting a mirror that is Actoris Aurunci spolium (2.100). The conflation of the satiric with an epic model, where being Campanian is concerned, recalls the mock-heroic contest between Sarmentus the scurra and the Oscan Messius Cicerurus in Horace’s Satires 1.5, when the latter is mocked for his obscure ‘Campanian disease’ (S. 1.5.62). Porphyrio’s identification of that poem’s dependence on Lucilius Book 3 makes it probable that Campanian identity played a role in the first satirist’s self-presentation.

From that starting-point I offer in this paper two observations about Campanian culture in the poetry of the satirist Lucilius who was, according to Jerome, given a public funeral in Naples, with multiple caveats: that some speculation is necessary in the light of the fragmentary nature of Lucilius’ remains; that Lucilius’ allusions demand biographical readings, given Horace’s aggressive characterizations of his flaws; and that Campanian origins do not, unfortunately, explain Lucilius’ virtuosic code-switching, mingling Greek words with his Latin, a practice condemned by Horace in Satires 1.10.
Cicero likens his addressee Paetus to Granius, Lucilius, Crassus, and Laelius as an *imaginem antiquae et uernaculae festiuitatis* (*Fam.* 9.15.2). A common denominator for all of these figures is residence in Campania. Unlike Naevius, whose epitaph, according to Gellius, demonstrated that he was *plenum superbiae Campaniae* (*Gell.* 1.24.2), Lucilius was, for Horace, a humble participant in a private game played with Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius while the rustic cabbage cooked (*S.* 2.1.71-4). Since Horace also claims that Lucilius was able to rattle off two hundred verses before and after dinner (*S.* 1.10.60-1), witty poetry may have been part of a Campanian camaraderie. In another letter, Cicero jokes that Paetus was so hungry that he ate or sold his horse and will only have a mule on which to ride back to Rome (*Fam.* 9.18.4). In this light, I analyze a three-line Lucilian fragment, 506-8M=511-3W, preserved by Gellius, which features a ‘Campanian clatterer’ (*Campanus sonipes*) so slow it seems to be going backwards. I argue that Lucilius, an *eques*, here offered a self-deprecatory pose that ironically foreshadows the later satiric focus on horse-riding as a Lucilian hobby – from the contrast of Horace’s gelded mule on which he could ride all the way to Tarentum (*S.* 1.6.104-6) with Lucilius ‘piloting his Satureian steed around the countryside’ (*S.* 1.6.59), to Juvenal’s depiction of Lucilius as he *equos ... flexit* (1.20).

I also suggest that warfare in Campania contributed to assumptions about Lucilius’ values. Two origin stories are relevant: one about how the naming of gladiators ‘Samnites’ may have resulted from the hatred of Campanians for their defeated Samnite enemies (Liv. 9.40.17), and the other regarding the founding of the Temple of Juno Moneta on the Roman Arx, as vowed by Lucius Furius Camillus to the goddess in the midst of battle against the Aurunci in 345 B.C. (Liv. 7.28). The first aetiology could explain the seemingly editorial condemnation of the gladiator Aeserninus at 149-52M=172-5W (*Samnis* at 150M=173W), whose angry opponent, the unique fighter Pacideianus, is a stand-in for the poet. The violence depicted here is often uncritically ascribed to the satirist, but my reading brings cultural influences into play too. Likewise, the reminiscence of a defeat against the natives of Suessa Aurunca may help explain a persistent fixation on money, Juno Moneta’s domain, in the fragments, including a cryptic line about selling the Muses, Moneta’s daughters, to Laverna, the goddess of thieves (549M=564W). These examples flesh out Juvenal’s vignette of Lucilius raging *ense uelut stricto* (1.165), and cause us to question how unequivocally Roman, rather than Campanian, Lucilius was.

**From *otium* to *imperium*: Propertius and Augustus at Baiae**

**Amy Leonard**

This paper proposes a relationship between the poems of Sextus Propertius (specifically 1.11 and 3.18) and the changing identity of the area surrounding Baiae, Rome’s infamous resort spot on the Bay of Naples. The quest for leisure spots in Campania by Roman aristocrats dates to the beginning of the 2nd century B.C. With the influx of wealth from recent conquests in the east and alliances with new Roman colonies around the Bay of Naples, wealthy Romans sought properties to the south in ever greater numbers. An additional attraction of the region were the healing waters of Baiae which were sought by such famous Romans as consul Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus, general and consul Cn. Marius, and M. Claudius Marcellus, nephew and heir of Augustus (D’Arms).

The emperor Augustus was never known to have visited Baiae, an unsurprising detail of the historical record, considering his simple tastes, moral legislation, and grim treatment of his
granddaughter, Julia. Areas surrounding Baiae, however, were highly influenced by Augustan innovations, including the Aqua Augusta, changes to the temple of Apollo at Cumae, the relocation of the imperial fleet to Misenum, and the construction of the portus Iulius on the lacus Lucrinus adjacent to Baiae. It is these last two Augustan modifications that make an appearance in the poems of Propertius who wrote under Augustus in the circle of literary patron Maecenas.

Propertius wrote two elegies featuring Baiae: 1.11, an entreaty to his Cynthia to avoid the temptations of the resort and return to him still a casta puella; and 3.18, the epicedium for Augustus’ heir Marcellus who died near the resort in 23 B.C. Though the subject matter is dramatically different in the two poems, the language used to establish the geographical setting is similar, and accomplishes a link between the legendary origins of the region and the changes made by Augustus in the time period prior to their composition. Following are the opening lines of 1.11:

Ecquid te mediis cessantem, Cynthia, Baiis,
qua iacet Herculeis semita litoribus,
et modo Thesproti mirantem subdita regno
proxima Miseni aequora nobilibus,
nostri cura subit memores adducere noctes?

In these lines, Propertius focuses on two important geographic features of the Baian landscape: the semita that connected Baiae to Puteoli, supposedly the handwork of Hercules, and the connection of lake Avernus (Thesproti...regno) and the waters adjacent to Misenum, an undisputed reference to the construction of the portus Iulius by Agrippa in 37 B.C. which necessitated a system of channels cut between the lakes to provide safe harbor for the fleet (Saylor; Richardson). Thus, Propertius announces that his Cynthia is not visiting and marveling at the Baiae of Republican era, but that of the new Augustan age.

Likewise does Propertius incorporate these same geographic features into poem 3.18 in establishing the context for Marcellus’ wandering spirit. The poem opens:

Clausus ab umbroso qua tundit pontus Averno
fumida Baiarum stagna tepentis aquae,
qua iacet et Troiae tubicen Misenus harena,
et sonat Herculeo structa labore via

References to the enclosed Lake Avernus and the Herculean road in lines 1 and 4 echo those in 1.11 and seem to carry the same references to the military program of Augustus. Additionally, the legendary Trojan origins of the promontory of Misenum are emphasized in the third line. The prominent mention of Misenum in both poems, and especially in this later one, seem to resonate with the renewed, Roman importance of Misenum with the arrival of the classis Misenensis, established by Augustus in 27 B.C. (Webster and Elton).

These examples provide the foundation for my paper, which proposes to examine these poems more closely, as well as other related contemporary sources, for the literary echoes of Augustan changes to the Campanian culture and landscape. In summary, I will attempt to state that what
once belonged to Campania (i.e. Baiae and its culture) now is indelibly Roman and, more particularly, Augustan.

**Ovid in the House of Octavius Quartio**

*Peter Knox*

This paper examines the decorative scheme of the House of Octavius Quartio (II,2,2), also known as the House of Loreius Tiburtinus. It was excavated in three phases, in 1916, 1918, and 1933-35. Although the atrium and some of the rooms off of it were seriously damaged in bombing during the Second World War, the key areas of the house are in a relatively good state of repair and the excavations have been well published. The house has been the object of several excellent studies, including Paul Zanker’s, in which the house is examined as an example of the “urban villa”, a type that Zanker identified among Pompeian homes that adopted some of the trappings of the great country estates of the Roman aristocracy that dotted the coastline of Campania. The last owner of the house, it would thus appear, was keen to demonstrate that his good taste and refinement were on a par with the highly educated elite.

It is therefore particularly noteworthy that in the most prominent areas of the house the owner aimed to exhibit his interests in literature and that in doing so he deployed themes from Greek and Roman poetry according to distinctions of genre. The house has no tablinum, so the largest and presumably most important room is one usually identified as a triclinium. Its walls are decorated with a unique double frieze, depicting epic themes associated with Troy. The large, upper frieze depicts scenes from the life of Hercules, with special emphasis on his role at Troy, freeing Hesione, the daughter of Laomedon, and investing Priam as king. The smaller, lower frieze depicts scenes from the *Iliad*, beginning with Apollo devastating the Greek camp with plague and culminating with the ransom of Hector’s body. The choice of serious mythological—and in this case epic—themes for this room is consistent with practices in other Pompeian homes. What is unique about this home is the deployment of Ovidian themes in the garden on which this room opens. Most prominent among the paintings in the garden area are scenes from the third and fourth books of the *Metamorphoses*: Pyramus and Thisbe, Narcissus, Actaeon. They are set in a woodland context, which is accentuated by the sculptural decorations and the backdrop along the north wall, Orpheus among the beasts, a scene that also evokes the Ovid’s poem.

Inscriptional evidence from Pompeii suggests a rather widespread familiarity with elegiac poetry and Hellenistic narrative. Many homes reflect these interests in their arrangement of wall paintings, but the House of Octavius Quartio appears to have been home to a true fan of Ovid. When considered together with the decorative schemes of other homes in Pompeii and the literary graffiti, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about the reading habits of the last inhabitants.
Campanian Politics and Poetics in Silius Italicus’ *Punica*

Antony Augoustakis

Scholars have recently emphasized the poem’s position within Flavian Rome as the new national epic that looks at the anachronistically challenging heyday of the Roman republic at the end of the Second Punic War (cf. Marks 2005, Bernstein 2008, Augoustakis 2010). As Augoustakis has recently demonstrated (2010), Silius recalibrates the dark moments of Roman republican history with a view to the future in store under the empire, while he points to the deterministic decline of the Roman state, after Hannibal’s defeat. With reference to Campania and its capital, Capua, and the election of two consuls from the region after the Social War, Silius dramatizes the episode of Capua’s defection to the Carthaginians as a direct result of the denial to admit men from the periphery to the consulship in Rome. In this paper, I shall discuss the references to Campania throughout the poem and the prominent role of the region in the *Punica* episode in 11. Silius showcases Campania as a place within Italy where politics and poetic activity intertwine to promote the region as a birthplace of prominent politicians that advance to the highest office in Flavian Rome and as a locus of *otium* for poetic activity. At the same time, however, the synergy between Capua and Rome, foreshadowed by the poet and set at a later age, beyond the scope of the poem, is interrogated by Silius, who questions the myth of an ostensibly seamless Italian unity.

In the course of the *Punica*, Campania is defined as the space where Hannibal settles down, before he sets out to ravage extensively the territory. In 6.651-52, for instance, the region receives Hannibal and significantly slows down his destructive path: *donec pestiferos mitis Campania cursus / tardauit bellumque sinu indefensa recept.* Simultaneously, Campania is the place of Scipio’s estates, as well as of his future exile, and as such it offers a plethora of sites that keep Hannibal entertained during his sojourn there (6.653-716). The seventh book takes place in Campania, and the poet exploits aetiological digressions on the topography of the region, such as the myth of Falernus (7.162-211), to underline the fertility and singularity of Campania for republican as well as for Flavian Italy (Littlewood 2011, 93-94). Most importantly, however, Campania receives prominent mention in the catalogue of Italian forces (8.524-61), as *diues opum ... diues auorum* (8.524): Scipio has trained the Campanians for war and is portrayed as their leader in the catalogue. Silius indulges in many references to the various cities in Campania, but also underscores the otherness of its space as an Oscan territory. Scipio’s association with Campania endows him with the qualities that will later make him a great fighter and politician (8.551-52).

In the eleventh book, Campania becomes once again the ground of political developments in the course of the war, namely it becomes the site of Hannibal’s own decline: by entering Capua, the Carthaginian’s army is given into sloth and *luxuria* and therefore begins to lose its momentum and eventually the war (Fucecchi 1990). Here Silius introduces the significance of Campania for Italian politics, when after the Social War the people of Capua, now citizens, become eligible for the consulship at Rome (11.123-29). Coupled with allusions to Virgil’s fourth *Eclogue* and Lucan’s tomb of Pompey (Augoustakis 2010, 110-12), Capua’s future is anticipated as a *felicior aestas*, which nevertheless must first endure the turmoil of the Punic Wars and survive the notoriety of the city’s defection. In other words, Capua and Campania undergo the same transformation as Rome, from defeat to victory. Whether or not Silius celebrates the election of one of his fellow-countrymen from Campania to the consulship in Flavian Rome (or even alludes...
to Capua as his own patria, cf. Vessey 1984), the Flavian poet memorializes Campania and its capital as the fertile ground for poetic activity and a political fermentation.

In the Land of the Giants: Greek and Roman Discourses on Vesuvius and the Phlegraean Fields
Catherine Connors

This paper investigates the representation of the distinctive geological features of Campania in Greek and Roman mythical, literary, historical, philosophical and geological contexts. Even before the Campanian earthquake in 62 or 63 CE and the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 CE, some remarked on the area’s resemblance to the known dangers of Sicily’s Mount Etna. Vitruvius in his discussion of pozzolana, the volcanic ash that has distinctive properties when used to make cement, attributes its formation to underground fires comparable to those at Etna and says that in ancient times such flames did burn beneath Vesuvius (Vitr. De Arch. 2.6.1-4). Strabo too compares Vesuvius to Etna and suggests that perhaps Vesuvius’ subterranean fires have died down through lack of fuel (Str. 5.4.8; cf. Str. 6.2.3, citing Poseidonius’ discussion of ash near Etna). Book 6 of Seneca’s Natural Questions and the didactic poem Aetna indicate the scientific and philosophical frameworks available for interpreting volcanic landscapes.

The younger Pliny’s description (Ep. 6.16 and 6.20) of the elder Pliny’s death during the eruption has received a great deal of attention. Poets writing after 79 CE react to the catastrophe in a variety of ways. Valerius Flaccus (Arg. 3.209 and 4.509) uses Vesuvius similes as part of a strategy of measuring the Greek myth of Jason’s Argonautica in recognizably Roman terms. Silius Italicus uses the violent potential that lies beneath the Campanian landscape to depict the scale of Hannibal’s battles in Italy (8.654, 17.595-6; cf. 4.275-8); Hannibal himself receives an informative tour of the area’s mythical and geological features while he is at Capua (12.108-157). As noted by Watson and Watson 2003, Martial (4.4) depicts Vesuvius as a victim of capricious gods, rather than as the source of Campanian troubles. For Statius (Silv. 4.4.78-85) the aftermath of the Vesuvian eruption is a demonstration of resilience.

Of particular interest are representations of Vesuvius and the Phlegraean fields that set the mythical gigantomachy in comparison with political strife. When and how was the term Phlegraean fields transferred from Pallene – site of a gigantomachy – in Macedonia to Campania? To what extent do the political overtones associated with gigantomachy as a metaphor for assault on established power become associated with the Campanian landscape? The poem on the Civil War in Petronius’ Satyricon compares Caesar and Pompey’s Civil War to (Campanian) Gigantomachy in a relatively straightforward way. More complex perhaps is Dio’s account of the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE: he says that figures resembling the Giants appeared in the smoke associated with the eruption, and some thought the Giants were rising up in revolt (66.23). In some ways Dio’s gigantomachic narrative of Vesuvius can be understood to set the scene for the death of Titus and coming to power of Domitian. A similar narrative arc is evident in Plutarch’s mention of Vesuvius in his ‘The Divine Vengeance’: in a narrative constructed to resemble Plato’s myth of Er, a certain Thespiesius is shown what happens to souls after death. On the tour he is almost in a position to glimpse the oracle at Delphi, where he hears ‘the Sibyl’ give a prophecy of the eruption of Vesuvius and hears a scrap of verse predicting that a good emperor (presumably Titus) would die of natural causes (Mor. 566 E)
The distinctive and violent landscape of Campania brings into sharp focus powerful questions about human capacities to know and control the forces that shape experience.

Session 29: Letters in Late Antiquity (organized by the Society for Late Antiquity)

Letters versus Orations: A Question of Genre
Raffaella Cribiore

When both letters and orations of a late antique author are extant, it is very important to distinguish the information they convey. In the past scholars have regarded all the production of an author uniformly, assuming that letters were public documents in the same way as speeches were. Not all letters, however, were public texts and it is necessary to consider each time their tone, characteristics, and audience. In the case of Libanius, scholars have accused this sophist of lack of consistency and duplicitous behavior when he praised or addressed in a neutral way some people whom he attacked violently in his speeches. Letters and orations belong in two different genres so that it is useless to request a great deal of consistency. While the speeches reveal a sophist very critical of his students and show Libanius as a traditional exponent of paganism who upheld the Olympic gods, the letters point to his caring attitude toward his pupils, the close relationship he had with some Christians, and the disappearance of the gods, except Zeus, from his late epistolary messages. Ancient letters were vehicles for friendship. A minimum of politeness was written into their initial and concluding expressions, and aggressive comments were generally ruled out. Yet politeness was a straightjacket so that sometimes one can perceive in a letter hostile or cold behavior that might come fully to the light in a speech. Some apparently innocuous letters of Libanius already reveal that he felt threatened by some people whom he abused in his speeches. An interpreter thus must examine carefully the text of a letter trying to go beyond polite, conventional expressions. In this paper I intend to examine a group of letters that concern Heliandus 4, a Christian governor who in 363 married his daughter Prisca to a relative of Libanius, Bassianus 2. Two families were thus happily joined. All the sources regard the governor as a good, pious, and humane administrator. The sophist, however, attacked him violently around 365 in Or. 37. He accused Heliandus of prostituting himself when he was young, of running to Rome at the bidding of a certain senator who was his lover, and of having a concubine while living with his devout wife. These seemingly made up allegations were inspired by the rhetoric of psogos, a violent invective that appealed to a public that regarded speeches as a form of spectacle. But is the sophist's malevolent attitude absent from the correspondence? Veiled polemic and frigid remarks are hidden under politeness. Genre, and not inconsistent behavior, is a fundamental key to understand the different treatment.
Reading Genre in Sulpicius Severus’ Letters
Zachary Yuzwa

Sulpicius Severus' Life of Saint Martin seems to come to the most abrupt of conclusions; the reader is left wanting, the Life unfinished while Martin yet lives. The narrative of Martin's life extends beyond the bounds of Sulpicius' biography into a series of three Letters, which narrate Martin's eventual death. However, this compositional shift from narrative biography to the letter is not one whose motives are immediately self-evident. It is a literary re-packaging which demands explanation. This paper therefore addresses itself to the complex of questions which arise from Sulpicius' decision to take up the letter form in an ostensibly hagiographical context. Jacques Fontaine explains these supplemental texts as essentially apologetic. Clare Stancliffe suggests similar, arguing that they "grew out of the Vita, completing and defending its portrayal of Martin" (Stancliffe 1983, 83). I do not deny this basic interpretation; nevertheless, I would suggest that the problem of Martin in Gaul and the apparently negative reception of Martinian asceticism there are for Sulpicius primarily problems of interpretation, problems occasioned by the inability of his audience to read as Sulpicius would have them do. At their core, these supplementary letters take the act of reading as their primary focus. I argue that the letter form is particularly suited to such an end. For, conceived most simply, what a letter does is introduce a second person – the addressee and primary reader – into the narrative space of the text. "The epistolary form is unique in making the reader . . . almost as important an agent in the narrative as the writer" (Altman 1982, 88). One feature which marks the epistolary genre, therefore, is its formal tendency to foreground the act of reading and the narrative presence of the reader. Whereas in the Life the audience is external to the text, a passive witness to the miraculous deeds of Martin, in the Letters the primary reader is its recipient, directly addressed and explicitly invited to share in Martin's intercession. This is significant for Sulpicius because in the Martinian corpus he attempts to set out a method of reading, granting the reader an essential role in constituting the text's meaning. In particular, he expects his readers to understand Martin in the context of prior exempla, just as he expects his readers to take this text which reproduces Martin's life as an exemplum for their own. The Letters themselves serve as examples of how to read in an exemplary mode and demonstrate, moreover, the salvific benefits which accrue to those who would do so.

Bridging the Cultural Divide? Letters between Civilian and Military Elites in the Fourth Century
Jonathan McLaughlin

Despite the relatively large number of military elites with non-Roman names in the fourth century CE, I argue that a stark cultural divide did not exist between "barbarian" military officials and non-military educated Greek and Roman elites, as witnessed by their communication with educated members of the civilian elite. Letters, ranging from mundane scrawlings on papyri and ostraca to the polished epistles of the manuscript tradition, were an essential component of patronage and friendship not only in civilian society but also in military administration. While military officials of non-Roman backgrounds may not have fully appreciated the artistry of the letters composed by civilian elites, they nevertheless understood the benefits of maintaining relationships through letters because of the cultural and administrative practice of letter-writing in the Roman army. Focusing on the letters of Libanius,
Symmachus, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus, I first argue that educated civilians approached military officials in nearly the same manner as they did civilian administrators. Overall, such letters conform to the traditional understanding of the epistolary genre and have similar purposes, such as demonstrating friendship, offering praise, and recommending clients. For example, in the summer of 390, Libanius wrote twelve letters to influential men in Constantinople on behalf of his student Thalassius (Ep. 922-30, 932, 936-7). One of these men was Ellebichus, the recently retired magister militum and Libanius' long-time friend (Ep. 925). However, although Libanius uses explicit military analogies, neither Ellebichus' military status nor his seemingly barbarian origins mattered at this point; what mattered was his influence at court. Maintaining the semblance of a shared educational background in their letters suggests not only that civilians were concerned about not offending the cultural aspirations of their military correspondents, but also that their military correspondents had these very aspirations. Military officials responded to their civilian correspondents (e.g. Symmachus Ep. 3.55, 64, 71; Libanius Ep. 1059, 1060), although none of these letters survive. While this may have been a somewhat burdensome task, military officials would have recognized the potential benefits of maintaining such relationships, as writing letters, particularly letters of recommendation, was a standard part of military administration. Letters found on papyri and ostraca demonstrate that even soldiers of non-Roman backgrounds were required to write in Latin or Greek. For high military officials, a degree of education in Greek and Latin was necessary, although an appreciation of literary prowess was not. The stylistic and content similarities between the civilian letters sent to civilians and those sent to military officials, combined with the importance of Latin and Greek letter-writing in military administration, suggest that the degree of cultural separation between educated civilian elites and military officials of non-Roman background may not have been as definitive as it appears on the surface. These relationships of friendship and patronage were maintained on the terms of the practice of the exchange of letters, effectively leveling out the differences in culture, education, and power between correspondents.

Enter the Bishop: Late Roman Epistolary Networks and the Effects of Clerical Office
Adam Schor

For centuries before the rise of Constantine, letter writing had played a critical role in Roman social relations. Traditional Greek and Latin-speaking elites relied on letters to communicate shared culture, and to maintain webs of personal bonds. Elite men, such as Pliny the Younger, published letter collections to demonstrate their social reach. Philosophic and religious movements employed letter collections for these purposes, as well as the more focused goals of defining doctrine and community boundaries. Early Christian letter collections differ sharply from traditional elite Roman collections, in their stark moral expressions and demands for solidarity. Second and third century bishops, such as Ignatius of Antioch and Cyprian of Carthage, used letters to represent their community, and to paint themselves as figures of authority. It was late antiquity, however, that brought the collision of traditional elite and clerical epistolary practice, as larger numbers of educated elites embraced Christianity and assumed church office. And letter collections of the fourth and fifth centuries reflect a serious tension, between elite and early clerical social messaging, and the resultant patterns of relations. This paper explores the way epistolary social interactions were affected by holding clerical office, especially the role of bishop. The focus falls on two educated men whose collected letters span...
the times before and after their election as bishop. Basil of Caesarea had long used his letters to maintain friendships, bonds with school mates, and elite connections when he became priest and then bishop (in 370) of a familiar Cappadocian town. Synesius of Cyrene had relied on his letters to bond with fellow former courtiers, relatives, and devotees of philosophy when he was chosen as bishop of Ptolemais (in 410). Numerous biographies and monographs (including studies by Marrou, Bregman, Rousseau, Métivier, and Van Dam) have examined these men, with their divergent interests, circles of associates, and personal itineraries. But these very differences help to reveal the ways in which episcopal office redirected elite late Roman social lives. For this presentation, I explore two sorts of shifts that can be linked to the assumption of bishoprics. First I look at changes in the new bishops' social expressions – the phrases, cultural references, and other cues that signaled meaningful attachments with patrons, clients and friends. Second, I analyze shifts in the new bishops' pattern of social relations, the portion of social networks that can be traced from the epistolary exchange of social cues. This approach affords a fresh view of the two main subjects. Scholars have usually cast Basil as a firm convert, who abandoned his secular interests for asceticism, theology, and clerical duty. They have portrayed Synesius as eager to maintain philosophic and sophistic pursuits, and reluctant to embrace clerical life. But both men found rhetorical advantages and limitations in their new clerical roles. And both found their social worlds transformed, from the open, fluid networks of traditional elite life into the doctrinal camps, jurisdictional paths, and intricate rivalries of church leadership.

Patronage and Networking in Libanius’ Letters
Scott Bradbury

I would like to consider in this paper what Libanius' letter collection tells us about the process of assembling the personal network necessary for gaining high office in the Greek East in the fourth century. Patronage and networking lie at the heart of this vast epistolary corpus, some 1550 letters over a fifteen-year period (355-65 and 388-93), or an average of one letter produced every three days. If Libanius maintained that rate of production during the years for which no letters survive, then we can assume that some 2,000 letters have disappeared. The collection is our most significant witness to the complex patronage networks and the tentacular webs of relations pursued by the Hellenic gentry in their efforts to enhance their social and political fortunes. It reveals the extraordinary lengths to which Libanius went to maintain 'connectivity' with a far-flung network of relations, the largest personal network known from antiquity. Libanius' powers as a patron are quite limited, as he readily concedes, particularly when dealing with very powerful officials. He is better regarded as a broker, a master communicator with an extensive network of connections who puts the right people in touch with one another. The geographical parameters of Libanius' network are well-known, as is much of the prosopography of the network (see Seeck, Die Briefe, Petit, Les Etudiants, PLRE i, Cribiore, The School of Libanius). The letter collection reveals scores of urban notables plying their way among Eastern cities, armed with packets of letters of introduction and recommendation addressed to other notables and imperial officials. This travel -- and these letters suggest a lot of traveling -- insures that enterprising notables can make new contacts, forge new links, and develop new networks of friends in neighboring provinces and at court. But there are practical questions concerning the transport and receipt of letters to which the collection does not provide easy answers, but which should be investigated. For example, when the traveller is received by an official, will it be alone or in a group audience? Will the official actually read the letter right then and there? How will the traveller use the letter to introduce his request? And will Libanius' letter be the only one, or
Session 30: Historiography, Poetry, and the Intertext (Seminar)

Introduction
Christina Kraus

The seminar organizer will introduce the panel as the third in a now three-year series on intertextuality, beginning with the panel on Intertextuality and Historiography in San Antonio, and continuing with one on poetic intertextuality in Philadelphia. The issues to be addressed here arise from those two earlier seminars and explore in tandem the question of the intertextual relationships between poetry and prose, and those between prose and historiography. Do different assumptions, problems, and methodologies still operate in the two fields of prose and poetry? Is historiography really a special case?

Sallust, Kristeva and Intertextual Prosaics
William Batstone

This paper will review the origin and history of the term “intertextuality.” In doing this, I revise some basic misunderstandings about Kristeva, point to a lost potential in the understanding of literature and its value, and suggest how Sallust, and writers like him, can benefit from a return to Bakhtin’s prosaics and Kristeva’s intertextuality.

Intertextuality, by Kristeva, is Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, the polyphonic novel was the locus of independent voices. The art of this novel was “plural, anti-totalitarian and anti-theological. It thus exemplifies permanent contradiction…” [Kristeva 1970, 21]. Even the word was heteroglot, always double voiced it addresses another (dialogism) and carries with it the traces of where it has been (polyphony). The classical unity of epic and lyric imposed the author’s will upon meaning, a form of aesthetic totalitarianism. The “otherness” inhering in the polyphonic novel became the basis upon which Kristeva developed her view of intertextuality. Other voices, forces, drives speak within the text. And they do so as a function of the heterogeneity of language and the fluidity of self: on the one hand, the homonyms, rhymes and the pulse of words (what Frye called “babble”) and, on the other, the slips of the tongue, lies that tell the truth, denial and projection (what Frye called “riddle”). The subject, whether reading or writing, is always split, between the said and the un-said, the communicable meaning and the unassimilable. For Kristeva, intertextuality disrupts the project of clear communication, because there is no point of security and self-presence.
But it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that this potential for disruption and otherness was exploited by writers. This historical dimension to the work of Kristeva and Barthes has generally been overlooked. The death of the author is not a transhistorical fact, but a feature of literary history. After the break that interests Kristeva, the writing-subject no longer claims undisputed authority over the meaning of his texts. She becomes the writing-subject-in-process (always of interest, but not for reasons of authority) presenting the text to a reading-subject-in-process. Being “in process” refers both to “the process of becoming” and “judicial process,” indicating that there is no fixed absolute, but only the ethical, political, and aesthetic dimension of responsibility.

For Kristeva, “intertextuality” conflated with allusion only revives the representational world of the transcendental ego. So, how did intertextuality become what it is in Latin studies? The Hellenistic art of reference contributes, and so does Kristeva’s emphasis on “poetic language” – a modification of Bakhtin to reflect her interest in rhythm, pulse, and sound. But, there is something else going on: our desire for a transcendent authorial voice. One may cite Hinds’ talk of limits, extremity and impoverishment, all terms from the social world of symbolic illusion. It seems that we enjoy our poets circulating in culture as self-aware repositories of culture; but writers-in-process split by drives and desires, or writers whose aesthetic products speak against control and wholeness and understanding? That frightens us.

So, what would a Kristevan intertextual prosaics be? Sallust seems best to recall the revolution in poetic language that Kristeva attempted to theorize. His text speaks in several registers as it responds intertextually and intratextually to a revolution in his world and in his life. So, how does the writing-in-process present the text for our pleasure and dismay? I will focus on the opening four sentences of Sallust’s BC. The unusual content, the number of texts engaged (Cato Maior, Ennius, Plato, maxims), the totalizing language and its necessary adjustments, the hexameter pulse and archaic alliterations all leading to a word/world that either promises a stabile reward (habetur) or leaves only desire’s illusion (habetur). Here the attempt to find and fix the truth of history, fact and writing, finds only the real of the world, which is our inability to grasp and fix what lies outside the fragile negotiations of the symbolic.

Alluding to Reality: Towards a Typology of Historiographical Intertextuality
Jane D. Chaplin

This paper asks whether and how intertextuality operates differently in historiography than in poetry and, if it does, whether and why any difference matters. The paper begins by noting differing approaches to historiographical intertextuality, with particular attention given to the work of Ayelet Haimson Lushkov and David Levene (in the 2011 APA seminar on the topic), and John Marincola and Cynthia Damon. The work of these scholars indicates ways in which the current taxonomy of intertextual approaches to historical narrative can be expanded. In particular, where other genres allow allusions to originate with the author, the text, or the reader, historiography adds the historical actor as a source.

The central section of the paper takes as its starting point A. E. Astin’s observations about the similarities between Scipio Aemilianus and Scipio Africanus. The paper then contends that
Scipio Aemilianus deliberately pursued a program of imitation and quoted his biological father and adoptive grandfather until he achieved their renown. The wide range of evidence from Aemilianus’ career shows that he was interested in modeling and exemplary thinking, that he was expected to live up to his famous forebears, and that he actively imitated and constituted as intertexts for his own conduct the lives of both Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Scipio Africanus. While Polybius features prominently in the source tradition for Aemilianus, independent evidence makes clear that the similarities between the two Scipios are not solely of his fabrication.

The final section of the paper relates the case for Aemilianus as an ‘author’ of intertextuality to the questions about authorship and exemplarity raised by the work of Levene and Marincola (as discussed in the first section). The Roman habit of manufacturing allusions to events means that historical agents must be considered as sources of intertextuality. While other genres, particularly Roman historical epic, allow for this type of intertextuality, it is most suited to historiography and its claimed relationship to reality. The more important implications, however, may be for the practice of history. If the second Aemilianus fashioned himself from his father and grandfather and in so doing made them into his intertexts, then it is necessary to rethink our understanding of Paullus and especially Scipio Africanus. The ‘rise and fall’ pattern applied to the latter obscures the shift in sources that the available evidence promotes; in practice the ‘rise’ comes from the Polybian/Aemilianic narrative and the ‘fall’ from Roman authors. If, by contrast, the rise was less glorious and the fall less extreme, Scipio Africanus may not prefigure the first-century warlords, and we may need to recalibrate our interpretation of the senate in the early third century. The paper concludes that the practice of Roman history requires attention to the tendency to make past and present allude to one another.

**Free Spirits: Sallust and the Citation of Catiline**

Andrew M. Feldherr

In the first directly reported speech of his De Coniuratione Catilinae, Sallust has the conspirator recount the dishonors heaped upon him and his followers and then ask, “How long will you endure these things?” (quae quo usque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi viri?, 21.9). The words had long been read as an allusion to the famous opening of Cicero’s In Catilinam I; in the wake of Renehan’s (1976) affirmation that Sallust was indeed conspicuously citing the orator, debate shifted to the question of the function of the citation. Was it parody or tribute? Malcolm (1979) introduced a new complication by arguing that quo usque tandem was originally a catch phrase of Catiline himself, so that Cicero’s oration was already re-appropriating the words of his enemy. More recent practices of intertextual reading applied particularly to Latin poetry (Hinds 1998: esp. 34-39) suggest replacing questions of whether Sallust is citing Cicero or Catiline and whether his intention was parody or not with an approach that allows the historian’s text to be read in dialogue with both and reveal how the interpretive issues raised by hearing the words spoken by these contrasting authors extend far beyond Sallust’s attitude toward Cicero. My paper thus begins from the assumption that both intertexts were available to Sallust’s readers: that Cicero’s exordium quickly became notorious has been well established, and whether or not Catiline was in actual fact the source for the phrase quo usque tandem, Sallust retrospectively makes him its author by putting the words in his mouth at a moment in time before Cicero’s speech.
However borrowing a poetic approach to intertextuality in this case brings into focus two problems important for the generic definition of Sallust’s work as historiography: these involve simultaneously the historicity of the events reported by the historian—whether he evokes reality or merely a prior representation of reality, and the reception of his text in turn by an audience whose understanding of it will be historically determined by the real events the text describes. The subject of Sallust’s first monograph arguably makes the greatest impact on the history of the late republic by being talked about. As accusations spawn debates about the punishment of his accomplices, then about the guilt of their accuser Cicero, and then about the virtues of the men who spoke for and against their execution, a sequence of politically interested representations of Catiline link the actual event Sallust described to the precise historical moment of his text. The overlapping of the voices of Cicero, Catiline, and Sallust at 21.9 provokes reflection on this phenomenon and on the crucial question of Sallust’s relationship to the long process of speech that his text at once incorporates and attempts to control. On the one hand, Sallust characterizes his choice to write historiography as an effort to escape from the distorting language of political invective, fama and invidia (3.5). Yet the historian is equally aware that it is in precisely this interpretive climate that his work will be read: his audience will assume that he writes out of envy, even as their own jealously prompts them to read accounts of great virtues not as history, but as fiction (3.2). In addition to emblematizing the chain of speech that distances his written history from events, even as it threatens to determine its own reception as a mere product of invidia, Catiline functions even more directly as the voice of invidia itself. For in aiming to stir resentment against his political rivals and offering the promise of material rewards, he speaks to rather than against the historically conditioned inclinations of his audience. Catiline the “author” therefore raises the problem for Sallust of exposing and countering such a contemporary voice, without being taken merely as another in the long list of his rhetorical defamers, of being neither a Catiline nor a Cicero.

Ennius' *Annales* and allusion in the Roman historiographical tradition
Jacqueline M. Elliott

Ennius’ *Annales*, a poem that positions itself squarely at the intersection between epic and historiography, represents a challenging test-case for the question of how intertextuality differs among the genres. Recent discussion has centered on the idea that historians, unlike poets, were circumscribed by their commitment *qua* historians to transmitting the truth about the past, whether they chose effectively to reproduce a text unaltered or covertly and productively to toy with it (Levene 2010: 82–163; 2011). This paper explores how Ennius’ epic largely meets such criteria for historiographical allusion, not only in the respects which it is generally conceded that historiographical allusivity shares with its poetic analogue but also in what is claimed as largely if not exclusively (Damon 2010: 375, n. 4; Levene 2010: 84–6; Pelling 2011: 5) distinctive to the historiographical genre: the claim to representation of the truth, including “hard core” historical fact, was no less fundamental in the *Annales* than in the *Ab urbe condita*, as allusions to the epic in its prose descendants in part testify. Moreover, the reality the *Annales* claimed to be representing only derived conviction and persuasive power from the Greek epic and historiographical accounts it extended and re-enacted, so that here too the poem can be seen to share its prose competitors’ technique (for the latter, see e.g. Pelling 2011). The question that thus presents itself is whether the *Annales* were something of a special case or whether the poem
is in fact representative of other epic, or even of other poetry more broadly, in its modes of allusion and their relation to the truth-claims it had to make about its presentation of the past. The claim this paper makes is that there is every reason to posit a history in the *Annales* for the behaviours of allusion as they appear in the Roman historiographical tradition.

In the vision of historiographical allusion here at issue, apparently inert reproduction of the material of preceding tradition in particular signals a commitment to a transhistorical, transtextual reality that can trump allusion’s other possible functions. Thus, summary accounts of previous texts, such as the *periochae* or Justin’s version of Trogus, crystallise what is true in part of all historiographical accounts: there exists a notional core of historical ‘fact’ to them (however imperfectly it may in any given instance be represented), and this core transcends the political and ideological refinements or re-interpretations that literary authors may super-impose onto it (Levene 2011). Here too it is worth considering the role of the *Annales* in contributing to the ability of these latter-day arrivals on the historiographical scene to appeal and to stand their ground: they are fraught with phrases that point back by the specificity of their language to Ennius, via Livy, Sallust, and Vergil. These phrases include Sallustian *varia victoria* at *HP* 2.5.4–5 and 44.2.7, Sallustian-Livian *suis eos opibus, suis viribus, suis armis* . . . at *HP* 31.5.6, and Ennian-Vergilian *somno ac vino sepultam* at *HP* 43.4.7 (quoted here in their mutated Trogan/Justinian iterations). The phrases are sometimes comfortably integrated, elsewhere curiously at odds with the context in which they appear. This paper argues that, especially in the latter case, they work in concert with the texts’ claim to transmit the notional core of history by abetting the texts’ claim to carry the authority of tradition, linking their new textual homes, however tenuously, back by means of pointed recall to the epic granddaddy of Roman historiography, Ennius’ *Annales*, via its most famous progeny in the prose historiographical tradition.

**PRESIDENTIAL PANEL: Comic Dimensions of Greek Myth**

**Where the Humor Lies in Demodocus’ Song of Ares and Aphrodite (Od. 8. 266-369)**

Lowell Edmunds

The second song of Demodocus contains three references to laughter (Od. 8.266-369). That which is laughable, or humorous, is different each time. Hephaestus the cuckold is laughable at first and anticipates laughter. He then reverses the situation by entrapping Aphrodite his wife and Ares her lover in bed. The sight of them inspires the laughter of some of the other gods. The verbal joking of these gods inspires further laughter. These three instances of humor have each a different explanation, but all of them exclude the old idea that Hephaestus is a buffoon and as such always good for a laugh. In Demodocus’ account, Hephaestus defends himself as best he can, through his craft. Further, human norms for the reparation of adultery are preserved. Poseidon guarantees the payment that Ares owes Hephaestus and apparently also the return of
the bride-price from Zeus. The “moral anthropomorphism” (Hainsworth) of this scene of daily life on Olympus is ultimately proper, even if gods, like humans, commit adultery and some gods joke about it.

This story has an obvious comparandum in the story of the chair that Hephaestus sent to Hera after she threw him off Mt. Olympus. When she sat on the chair she became bound to it by invisible chains. No one could release her. Ares went for Hephaestus but was driven away by his fire—another triumph by the smith god. Then Dionysus went with wine, and was able to bring the drunken Hephaestus back.

The story of Hephaestus’ failed union with Athena is variously linked with one or the other of these stories.

It is always Hephaestus as smith, not buffoon, who creates humorous situations that provoke laughter. He himself becomes laughable, when he becomes laughable, only secondarily. It seems to lie in the nature of laughter, not in the nature of Hephaestus, that once it starts, one does not know who will have the last laugh.

The Birth of Helen on the Comic Stage

Alan Shapiro

The birth of Helen from an egg was a natural subject for Greek comic drama, though we know for certain of only one great, early treatment of the subject: Kratinos’s Nemesis, staged in Athens ca. 431. Recent work, especially by Emmanuela Bakola and Jeffrey Henderson, has done much to illuminate both the mythological background and the reconstruction of the plot from the exiguous fragments.

Approaching the subject from the visual iconography, we may be surprised to note that, in an extensive series of both Attic and South Italian vase-paintings extending over about a century (ca. 430-330 B.C.E.), only one clearly depicts a comic performance: an Apulian phlyax krater now in Bari that was recently exhibited at the J. Paul Getty Museum. Though known for more than a century, the scene has not elicited any agreement on its interpretation, because it includes so many elements not found on any other vase. In particular, one phlyax (Tyndareus?) threatens with an axe the baby Helen starting to emerge from egg concealed in a wicker basket, while a woman (Leda?) watches in fear from behind a door. A second phlyax (a slave?) frantically gestures to try to stop the attack.

By sorting through the various mythological traditions about the birth of Helen and that of her brothers the Dioskouroi, this paper suggests that the story underlying the scene could have been a variant on a motif much better known from another amorous adventure of Zeus, in which Alkmene conceived the hero Herakles by the god and the mortal Iphikles by her husband Amphitryon in the same night. So, too, here, a comedy of marital infidelity and mistaken identity plays out, in which Leda, with the help of a slave, tries to conceal a strange pregnancy from her
jealous husband. This hypothesis also helps to explain the body language on at least one other South Italian vase whose interpretation has been unclear, but is surely more comic than serious. The Bari krater is not proposed as a reconstruction of Kratinos’s Nemesis, with which it may have no connection, but as an example of how various visual cues would have enable the ancient viewer to read and interpret scenes that continue to elude us.
Staging Hearing: The Acoustic Space of the Stage in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*
Miranda Robinson

Oliver Taplin’s 1977 publication, *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus: The Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek Tragedy*, was a watershed moment in the study of staging in Greek tragedy and of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* in particular. Taplin offered an insightful picture of Clytemnestra’s actions and character in the *Agamemnon*: she dominates the stage and the entrance to the palace. This paper engages with the topic of Clytemnestra’s domination of the stage from an aural perspective, showing that Clytemnestra’s control of the stage is mirrored in her control of ‘aurality,’ of who hears and what gets heard. Taplin’s insightful observation regarding Clytemnestra’s control over the threshold can be pushed to reflect on the aural as well as the visual dynamics of the staging of the Agamemnon: her visual dominance is reinforced by her aural control. Sight and sound work together to point up her control over the stage. By recognizing the aural aspect of the power dynamics at work in Aeschylus' play we are also better able to appreciate one of the most striking acoustic moments in Greek tragedy, the off-stage screams of the dying Agamemnon.

I focus on initially on the theme of silence: the chorus (261-3; 548), the watchman (34-7) and the house (37-8) are all silenced in both the presence and the absence of Clytemnestra. Their forced silence establishes the queen’s control over aurality in the play. I then consider the entrance of Agamemnon and the acoustic terminology describing his verbal defeat in his *agôn* with Clytemnestra (795-8; 830-33; 956-7). By way of comparison, I examine the self-imposed silence of Cassandra (1035ff) as well as her ability to hear what others do not upon Clytemnestra’s reentry. In particular, Cassandra is able to hear the supposedly silenced house and act as an aural go-between for the chorus and the audience, with whom she shares what she hears (1064-8). But, while this passage demonstrates that Clytemnestra’s aural mastery is not complete, the chorus’ continued silence and strange inability to hear what Cassandra is saying allows the queen to complete her plan. It is only with the screams of Agamemnon, which escape from behind the façade, that the chorus truly hears (1341ff). These screams, I contend, mark the culmination of Clytemnestra’s domination; her plan has succeeded and Agamemnon is dead. The members of the chorus have not interfered. But, at the same time, these cries signal the termination of her control over the acoustic space. She does not, or cannot, prevent the sound from finally escaping the house. By contrast, the chorus is able to cast off its submissive silence and assume a more potent role as a δικαστής ἐπήκοος (1420-21).

Taplin’s observation that Clytemnestra visually controls the threshold is the starting point of an investigation on the aural dynamics of the staging of the *Agamemnon*, in which we see that both
visual and aural dominance work together to highlight her control of the stage. One of the main ways that Clytemnestra aurally controls the stage is by controlling who speaks and who is heard, by controlling silence in the play. But the screams from the skene reverse her aural mastery. And the house voices itself through Agamemnon, an act that paradoxically highlights both the culmination and the dissipation of Clytemnestra’s power. That is, she possesses a complete mastery, until the end of the play, of the acoustic space of the stage. Yet, beginning with her final dominant entrance, in which she reveals her deed and the corpses of Agamemnon and Cassandra, Clytemnestra’s control over the acoustic space is gone.

The antiphonal ending of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis*
Naomi A. Weiss

Nowhere in the Euripidean corpus is the problem of “authenticity” so thorny as it is in the case of *Iphigenia in Aulis*, which was produced a year after the tragedian’s death. Sometimes, however, the textual debate over apparently spurious lines can neglect certain thematic and musical motifs within them that may indicate, if not Euripides’ own authorship, then at least his intention as envisaged by an attentive, early reader. In this paper I argue that the remarkable exchange between Iphigenia and the chorus in lines 1475-1532 should be read in this light, not in terms of which section is or is not Euripidean: only then can we appreciate the ways in which the songs here fit within a larger pattern of mousikē throughout the play.

If, as seems likely, the last 100 lines of *Iphigenia in Aulis* are interpolated, then we seem to be left with an unusual ending to this play: first Iphigenia’s song at 1475-1499; then a brief, iambic exchange between her and the chorus at 1500-1509; and finally a short, astrophic choral song at 1510-1532. This last song has traditionally been regarded as inauthentic, largely due to the striking degree of repetition between it and Iphigenia’s monody. Recently David Kovacs has countered this view by arguing for the authenticity of the ode and suggesting instead that Iphigenia’s monody is spurious, in which case she was originally meant to depart to her sacrifice after giving her instructions to the chorus to sing to Artemis at 1466-1474.

I argue instead that the monody and choral song need not be mutually exclusive: the repetitions between them do not demonstrate the sloppy language of interpolators but rather are deliberate within an antiphonal exchange typical of a military paean. The paean that Iphigenia bids the chorus to sing to Artemis at 1466-1474 is therefore not just a sacrificial song, but also one to rouse the Greeks to battle now that, through her death, they can advance to Troy (hence her title of ἑλέπτολις, 1475, 1511). She begins this paean as a chorus leader, directing the chorus’ dance movements (ἔλισσετ’, 1480) and instructing them to sing with her (συνεπαειδετ’, 1492). Not only do the similarities between the songs of Iphigenia and the chorus suggest an antiphonal paean, but so do their militaristic tone and the repeated refrain of ἰὼ ἰ. However, unlike the almost exclusively male performance of paeans outside tragedy, here, in a gender inversion typical of Euripides, both the chorus and leader are female. This type of song marks a significant transition at the end of the play from the music of female lament (which Iphigenia has previously performed at 1279-1335) to that of the paean, paralleling Iphigenia’s own changed resolve to submit to sacrifice for the sake of the army. It also exemplifies just the sort of mixing of genre and gender that is so criticized by Plato in his *Laws* as the practice of recent musicians (700d, 669c).
Finally, the return of the chorus here is significant in a play in which they sing over a quarter of all lines in the first two thirds but are largely silent in the last 500 lines, when the musical focus of the drama is directed at Iphigenia instead, who herself utters very little until this point but thereafter becomes the dominant voice of the tragedy. I suggest that the chorus’ response to her song in the closing scene of the play also replaces it, marking the end of both her singing and her presence in the drama as a whole: choreia returns with Iphigenia’s departure and death. Such “aberrant” chorality may be compared with that in other late plays of Euripides, particularly Helen and Heracles.

Dancing in Delphi, dancing in Thebes: The chorus in Euripides' Phoenissae
Enrico Emanuele Prodi

The purpose of this paper is, first, to argue that in the parodos of Euripides’ Phoenissae (ll. 202-60) the chorus is characterized as a chorus within the dramatic fiction; second, briefly to sketch the relevance of this characterization for their stance in the rest of the play.

The notion that the chorus of the Phoenissae and the odes it sings are unrelated to the plot goes back to antiquity (schol. Ar. Ach. 443 Wilson), and its role within the play has been the object of intense scrutiny in modern scholarship. Among other things, it has been remarked how the chorus’ songs constitute a continuous cycle on the mythical history of Thebes (Riemschneider) that bridges past and present from the foundation of the city to the time of the drama (Arthur); how the Phoenician maidens’ journey retraces Cadmus’ while they emphasize their kinship with Thebes (Nancy) and, through their very marginality, express their collective memory of Theban events (Gould), thus offering a more effective civic perspective (Foley 2003) and a broader viewpoint on the play’s events (Medda) than the other characters can have. The chorus’ envisaged status as a chorus in ll. 234-8 is noted by Foley 1985, but without examining the complexity of its characterization and its wider implications. Such examination, proceeding from a close reading of the parodos, is the main concern of this paper.

In the first strophic pair, the maidens describe themselves as an offering to Apollo at Delphi (ll. 202-7, 214f., 220-5), repeatedly emphasising their excellence and beauty (203, 214f., 223f.) and pointedly comparing themselves to statues (220f.). From the evidence of dedicatory inscriptions, where such discourse of attractiveness frequently refers to the objects whose gift the deity is invited to appreciate (Day 1994, 2010), I argue that these traits reinforce the chorus’ self-presentation as an offering. I then recall Depew’s remark (after Svenbro, Day 1994, Pulleyn) that both an emphasis on attractiveness and explicit or implicit (self-)construction as an offering frequently occur in reference to ‘hymns’, songs that can be construed as a means of human-divine interaction functionally parallel to dedication and sacrifice. In order to offer further support to Depew’s conclusion and relate it to the Phoenissae I cite Pindar fr. *122.17-20 Snell-Maehler, where the offering of a (female) choral performance is depicted with language that overtly recalls a dedicatory epigram. Therefore I argue that that the established equation between choral performance and cult offering ostensibly underlies the first strophic pair, only to be confirmed by the chorus’ subsequent explicit projection as a Delphic χορός (ll. 234-8).
I further note that the chorus’ journey from Phoenicia to Thebes and Delphi closely recalls a *theoria*, that is, the ritual visitation of a place of worship retracing a mythologically significant route and often including a chorus (Rutherford, Kowalzig), one of whose preoccupations can be to express on the mythical level a link between sending community and receiving sanctuary (e.g. Pindar *Pae.* 5.35-48, Limenius *CA* p. 149 ll. 11-20). Thus, by way of conclusion I argue that reading the Phoenician maidens as a (quasi-)theoric chorus is instrumental to a fuller understanding of both their commitment to extended narrative in the stasima, after the fashion of late archaic choral lyric, and more importantly their involvement with the action: not quite the often-remarked distance or “estrangement” (Medda) from it, but engagement of an unusual (for tragedy) yet altogether profound sort, one which enriches the dramatic performance with a strong echo of the familiar traditions of cultic choral song-dance.

**Tinker, tailor, soldier - herald? Identifying the Ὑλλου πενέστης in *Heracleidae***

Florence Yoon

The anonymous character who arrives onstage at *Hcl.* 630 is generally identified by editors as θεράπων, following the *dramatis personae* of the hypothesis; only Mastronarde (1979:96 n.64) notes that “he is a soldier, not a servant.” There are, however, strong reasons for identifying this character as neither a solider nor a servant, but as Hyllus' herald, who functions not only as a reporter figure but as the only onstage representative of his absent master.

The figure's usual identification as a servant depends primarily on his self-introduction as Ὑλλου πενέστης (639); however, comparison with other plays shows that similar expressions are commonly used in the introduction of heralds, while the term κήρυξ is suggestively used at 648 and 655. The military context accords with the functions of heralds in both literature and history, and the character's dramatic role is comparable to those of other heralds as against those of so-called messengers; he is not an independent witness presenting an offstage event, but an emissary representing an offstage entity. His identity would have been clearly conveyed to the original audience by his costume.

This identification has subtle but wide-ranging effects. It accounts for the unusual directness of tone adopted by the Ὑλλου πενέστης in his exchanges with both Iolaus and Alcmene, and casts particular light on the contested attribution of 961-72. The potentially ephebic appearance of heralds heightens the effect of the character's interactions with Iolaus, and highlights the play's thematic exploration of age and youth. Most importantly, the identity of this figure gains particular significance from the conspicuous absence of Hyllus throughout the play and the uniquely representative quality of the herald's role. The Ὑλλου πενέστης provides an important point of contact with the son of Heracles; his identification as a herald - a passive and obedient agent of his master according to Greek convention - encourages us to further associate his speech, actions, and even characterization with the absent Hyllus, providing us with an onstage representative to complement the reporter-figure's account of the hero's battlefield exploits. He therefore contributes significantly to the play's concern with and complex use of representation, as demonstrated in the many absences, reports, and reversals of expectation that feature in the play; his role provides suggestive parallels with those of Eurystheus' herald in the opening and the anonymous daughter of Heracles in the central episode. The Ὑλλου πενέστης grants the
audience greater access to Hyllus than has hitherto been acknowledged, and recognition of his identity as a herald allows us to more fully examine the representation of Heracles and his family in this play.

**Electra’s Urns: Props and the Poetics of Tragic Reception**  
*Melissa Y. Mueller*

Recent years have seen a greater appreciation of props as vital components of tragic performance (e.g., Segal 1980; Chaston 2010). There has also been a generous amount of work done on metatheater (“theater within theater”) and its tragic applications (e.g., Segal 1982; Bierl 1991; Ringer 1998). Missing from these discussions, however, is the role of repetition, and what it means in terms of theater and theatrical tradition to have the same prop showing up in various guises in rewritings of a particular tragedy (or tragic story-type). In this paper, I focus on how certain props help craft something like a literary genealogy, sensitizing their audiences to the notion of tragic tradition. Taking the urn and its various manifestations in all three “Electra” plays as my case in point, I argue that in its appearance as a prop in each of the later *Electra* tragedies by Sophocles and Euripides, the “urn” offers its audience an interpretive handle on the present work and the presently featured Electra character; its “meta” status invites the audience to engage with the performance event as already an act of reception, and therefore to read the praxis as it unfolds as being self-consciously in dialogue with other Electra performances.

In the world of the theater, no sign is to be discarded straight off as irrelevant, no act as mere accident. Everything—word, gesture, or object—is potentially significant. Even within the semiotically charged space of the theater, however, props can be elusive entities. Props are subject to the conflicting interpretations of human characters within the play, of course; but certain props also gesture metapoetically to source texts and contexts beyond the present performance. In Euripides’ *Electra*, for example, the heroine’s insistence on carrying her own water vessel has metadramatic implications. Wanting to “make a display to the gods of Aegisthus’ hubris” (*El.* 57–58), Electra positions the jug as a key witness in her personal quest to prosecute Aegisthus before a divine jury. The iconoclasm of the prop’s new role, however, depends on the audience’s familiarity with its poetic precursor(s). As an act of reception, Electra’s display of her “urn” derives meaning from the tension between the urn’s original role (as a libation vessel in Aeschylus’ *Choeophoroi*) and its transformation into a domestic accessory that Electra self-consciously deploys as a theatrical prop.

Sophocles’ *Electra* also uses the urn to retool Electra. Prompting reflection on the pain of her original separation from her brother, the urn’s weight in her hands transforms Electra’s grief over a past loss into extended mourning for her present, childless status (*El.* 1126–70). Electra as a mother in mourning is Sophocles’ bold revision to the Aeschylean prototype of Electra as grief-stricken daughter. Only the urn brings out this strangely moving facet of her character, however. The mourning-mother motif is hinted at earlier in the play, with allusions to Niobe and Procne (*El.* 107, 145–152), but only in the somatic remembering the urn elicits from her does the audience grasp the peculiar nature of Electra’s pathos. My argument will focus primarily on these two Electras as protagonists within a literary tradition shaped by the urn’s stage appearances. In the final part of my talk, however, I draw attention to how such props point also to their future reception(s). From the vantage point of posterity, tragic props possess the curious ability to gesture to their own afterlife. Props “predict” the modes of reception that will guarantee
their continued survival, not only in theatrical performances, such as that of the remarkable actor named Polus, who supposedly substituted the ashes of his own son for Electra’s empty urn (Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 6.5.5–8), but also in iconography such as the fourth century B.C. Lucanian bell-krater attributed to the Sydney Painter, where the urn functions as a visual shorthand for the dramatic praxis and the tragic “Electra” tradition.

Session 32: Language and Memory in Greek History and Historiography

Ironic and the Periclean Obituary, or: Why Does Pericles Receive a Premature Burial in Thucydides?

Thomas H. Beasley

Even if the notion, “we always prematurely inter the ones we love,” has not quite attained to the status of aphorism, it does accurately reflect the peculiar position of the Periclean obituary (2.65) in Thucydides’ history. As befits a *locus classicus*, the passage has been much discussed: as one of the infrequent and therefore precious expressions of political opinion by Thucydides; as evidence for the historian’s position on the viability of Pericles’ war strategy; as a witness to Thucydides’ opinion of Periclean imperialism; as the location of a surprising verdict on the Sicilian Expedition; as a site of textual difficulty; and as a key piece in the puzzle of the *Kompositionsfrage*.

And yet for all that the Periclean obituary does and contains, it cannot even be said to accomplish the first task of a true obituary: to inform the reader of when, precisely, Pericles died. Thucydides has written that Pericles “lived on for two years and six months” (2.65.6), without quite pinning down the point from which he “lived on.” This temporal indeterminacy is closely related to the fact that the obituary is proleptic: Pericles’ death is narrated at least one and one half years out of sequence. To my knowledge no adequate explanation for this has yet been offered. The tacit assumption may be that Pericles’ premature burial is guided by purely historical considerations—i.e. Thucydides has interred him after he was fined by the *demos* and his influence began to wane—but this assumption is not only unconfirmed by independent witnesses, it is contradicted by Thucydides himself, who writes that, “not much later ... the *demos* elected him general and entrusted to him all their affairs” (2.65.4).

I suggest that Thucydides has prematurely interred Pericles for a different purpose: to position his death within an ironic juxtaposition in the mold of, e.g., the Funeral Oration and plague narrative. The problematic events with which the historian juxtaposes the obituary are those following it in the war narrative: the Spartan naval campaign against Zakynthos (2.66) and the Peloponnesian embassy to Persia (2.67).

These events represent, respectively, the debut of the Spartan navy and the first concrete Peloponnesian overture to Persia *in the war narrative* (not, significantly, in the war itself; see 2.7
and 2.67.4). As such, they have an obvious resonance in the immediate aftermath of the Periclean obituary, which not only looked ahead to Athens’ defeat, but also highlighted the role played by Cyrus in supplying funds for Sparta’s navy (2.65.12). Given that the obituary concludes with the sentence, “So much was there in superfluity for Pericles out of which he himself foresaw that the city would altogether easily overcome the Peloponnesians alone (2.65.13),” there is an obvious irony in the events which follow. Immediately after Pericles’ (narrative) demise, his confident prediction begins to be symbolically upended by the appearance of two factors which would ultimately help cost Athens the war.

Because of irony’s notorious slipperiness, I do not speculate on whether this ironic juxtaposition cuts for or against Pericles. Instead I conclude with two methodological observations. First, if I am correct, the Periclean obituary is implicated more profoundly in its narrative context than has been realized. This reinforces a frequent objection to conjecture about the text’s composition: how can one put a date to a given passage when there are methodological obstacles even to defining “a given passage”? Secondly, the juxtaposition problematizes the use we make of passages which are written in propria persona. If the Periclean obituary gains an important dimension from its narrative context, then it and passages like it cannot safely be treated as interpretative anchors. Rather than constituting individual outbursts of opinion, their purpose and meaning is conditioned by the context in which they occur.

King Archidamus and the inversion of language in Thucydides
Tobias Joho

In his analysis of stasis at Corecyra (3.82-83) Thucydides notices how, under the pressure of civil strife, people’s use of language is transformed. Recognizing Thucydides’ intense interest in the topic scholars have found it reflected also outside the chapters on stasis (Cohen 1984, 45; Connor 1984, 100-1; Macleod 1984a, 96 and 1984b, 108-9, 114-15; Loraux 2009, 281-83; Pelling 2012, 311). Taking the same approach as these scholars I aim to show that the word σωφροσύνη comes under pressure during the great debate at Sparta (1.67-87). I will focus the investigation on the Spartan king Archidamus who attempts to counteract what he considers to be a distorting use of σωφροσύνη. He tells the Spartans not to be ashamed of τὸ μέλλον and τὸ βραδύ and continues: καὶ δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη ἐμφρων τοῦτ’ εἶναι (“And this mode of behavior signifies in the truest sense sensible moderation”; 1.84.1). Since τὸ βραδύ and τὸ μέλλον are words used by the Corinthians, Archidamus is correcting the Corinthians’ use of words. In their revised use of language the Corinthians foreshadow the revolutionaries at Corecyra, while Archidamus takes on the authorial role of Thucydides.

At the debate in Sparta, the Corinthians repeatedly characterize the Spartans as hesitant (1.69.4; 1.70.4; 1.71.1) and slow (1.71.4). Archidamus tries to show that the Corinthians are changing the reference of language by using derogatory words to describe a behavior that people used to consider σωφρον. He tells the Spartans not to be ashamed of τὸ μέλλον and τὸ βραδύ and continues: καὶ δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη ἐμφρων τοῦτ’ εἶναι (“And this mode of behavior signifies in the truest sense sensible moderation”; 1.84.1). Since τὸ βραδύ and τὸ μέλλον are words used by the Corinthians, Archidamus is correcting the Corinthians’ use of words. In their revised use of language the Corinthians foreshadow the revolutionaries at Corecyra, while Archidamus takes on the authorial role of Thucydides.
Unlike Archidamus, the ephor Sthenelaidas urges the Spartans to take an aggressive course of action by going to war against Athens. A σώφρων-word appears also in his speech: καὶ τούς ξυμάχους, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, ὡς περιονύμεθα ἀδικουμένους οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν (“And if we are prudent, we will not allow that injustice is committed against our allies, nor will we hesitate to take revenge on their behalf”; 1.86.2). Sthenelaidas considers an aggressive policy σώφρων and thinks that deliberation is inappropriate for the Spartans (1.86.4). Archidamus senses that Sthenelaidas is promoting an inverted understanding of σωφροσύνη by equating it with abstention from reflection. In order to oppose this view, Archidamus recalls the basic ideas inherent in σωφροσύνη as it was traditionally understood: its opposition to ὕβρις (1.84.1), its kinship with αἰδώς (1.84.3), and its ties with εὐβουλία (1.84.3; cf. 1.80.2; 82.4; 84.4; 85.1; 85.2).

Thus Archidamus’ outlook mirrors the analysis that Thucydides develops in the chapters on stasis. Both Thucydides and Archidamus notice that people begin to use language in a different way than they used to, and they both recognize that this shift constitutes an attack on virtues which “might be summed up in forethought and prudence” (Edmunds 1975, 92). Therefore they agree that the new language undermines σωφροσύνη.

Yet unlike the authorial voice of the Pathology, Archidamus is implicated in the processes he tries to curb. At one point in his speech he endorses an understanding of σωφροσύνη as άμαθία (‘ignorance’; 1.84.3). In order to win the favor of his audience he is compelled to pay lip-service to Sthenelaidas’ view. Archidamus feels the need to adopt elements of the position which he tries to oppose, but in making concessions, Archidamus comes to foreshadow Cleon in the Mytilenean Debate. When Cleon whole-heartedly equates σωφροσύνη with ignorance and promotes rashness, his wording (3.37.3) closely resembles that of Archidamus (1.84.3). Thus Thucydides puts forward Archidamus as the paradigm of the noble figure who becomes entangled in a tragic struggle against the destructive political forces of the Peloponnesian War. Even when he speaks up against the dangerous new mode of language, he is forced to pay lip-service to it and thereby contributes to the spread of the new way of speaking.

**Forgetting Aieimnestus: Memory’s Place in Thucydides’ Plataea**

Rachel Bruzzone

In Thucydides’ Plataean narrative, the city that was the site of Greek victory over barbarians suffers a peacetime attack by the formerly Medizing Thebans. Plataea remains stubbornly loyal to Athens, resisting Peloponnesian aggression for years. Eventually the besieged Plataeans are executed, Thucydides tells us, because the Spartans felt it expedient (3.56.3, 68.4). I argue that Thucydides’ use of significant names in the final Plataean plea for mercy underscores an important facet of this story: the Spartans’ nearly sacrilegious disregard for the glorious past that Plataea represents.

Thucydides reports the names of the men who deliver the final Plataean speech, Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon son of Aieimnestus (3.52.5). Hornblower observes that the name Asopolaus appears nowhere else in ancient Greek sources. Similarly, Aieimnestus appears only twice elsewhere, well after the classical period. Gomme remarks that the names seem superfluous to the narrative. He also notes that two men apparently deliver one speech while the
answering Theban speakers are left unnamed. The abundance of names is surprising, as Thucydides is normally sparing with names, using them about half as often as Herodotus (Hornblower (2011) 105). He also almost never uses patronymics to identify minor characters such as these men, whose one appearance is an exercise in tragic futility. But although the historian does not normally exploit meaningful names, as many of his contemporaries do, he does so here. The first three names invoke significant concepts associated with the Plataean past: bravery in battle, the river Asopos (important in the Battle of Plataea; cf. Hdt. 9.36-59) and the ties between Plataea and Sparta. But the final name, Aieimnestus, is the most significant, the father’s inappropriate name becoming grim wordplay in the son’s execution.

The concept of eternal remembrance invoked by the name Aieimnestus is out of place in the Plataean narrative, where refusal to remember the past features prominently. In 429 BCE, the Spartan Archidamus treats Plataea’s history reverently, offering what is in Thucydides a nearly unique prayer to the gods and heroes of the land before he invades it (2.74.2). By 427, his fellow Spartans deem the past irrelevant. In proceedings that make a mockery of justice, the Spartans propose to determine the Plataeans’ guilt or innocence on the basis of one question, whether they had rendered aid to Sparta "in the current war" (3.52.4 ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτι), a question that emphatically rejects the past. After the Plataeans deliver a speech extolling their role in the Persian Wars, the cruel question is simply repeated (3.68.4). The Plataeans fail “because the past, and the values a living memory guarantees, mean nothing in war” (Macleod (1977) 234).

The Plataean speech explicitly discusses memory, the vocabulary for forgetting serving as ironically distorted echoes of Aieimnestus’ name. The Plataeans open the speech by promising to create a “reminder of the good deeds” of the Plataeans (3.54.1 τῶν εὖ δεδραμένων ὑπόμνησιν). They claim “it is not proper to forget these things” (3.54.5 ὦν οὐκ ζεῖκος ἀμνημονεῖν) and beseech the Peloponnesians “not to forget” their forefathers’ oaths (3.59.2 μὴ ἀμνημονεῖν). The verb ἀμνημονέω appears only once elsewhere in Thucydides, and there in an inscription (5.18.11). The aptly named pair conclude the speech by reminding the Spartans (3.59.2 ἀναμμήνησκομεν) that the two cities fought side-by-side in the glorious earlier battle. But Aieimnestus’ name will be tragically disproven.

The Spartans’ willful refusal to value the past is one of the more unsettling moments in Thucydides. The contrast between Archidamus’ earlier reverence and his compatriots’ later disrespect suggests that a weakening respect for the past accompanies the growing power of expediency in the societal deterioration that characterizes the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ choice to flood the narrative with rare and significant names, and especially the bitterly ironic name of Aieimnestus, brings this concept, an especially disturbing element in a work of history, to the fore.
Forg[er]ing and Forg(ett)ing the Past: The Decree of Themistocles redux
Michael Arnush

Over fifty years ago Michael Jameson published the editio princeps of an inscription from Troezen purported to represent a decree of the Athenian strategos Themistocles (Jameson 1960; rev. 1962). The text provides the evacuation orders for Athens before the arrival in Attica of Xerxes’ army and the subsequent Battle of Salamis in 480 BCE and makes clear reference to the preparations for a naval engagement off Artemision. Because the text appears to conflict with the account of Herodotus (8.40.1-42.1), who situates the evacuation after Artemision and Thermopylae, for over half a century scholars have struggled with the authenticity of this document.

Jameson, who read the text as an authentic version of a decree of Themistocles, nonetheless recognized that the letter-forms indicated that the inscription did not belong to the early 5th century BCE and dated it to the last quarter of the 4th century. Sterling Dow associated the letter-forms instead with the 3rd century BCE, possibly 275-250 BCE (Dow 1962), which most now accept. Then what is this document, with its anachronisms, garbled chronology, and later provenance? Is it a faithful or, alternatively, an inept Hellenistic copy of the original? or is it a forgery, a 3rd century attempt to reimagine the past for contemporary purposes? The current study proposes that the decree of Themistocles is an amalgam of documents from the 5th-3rd centuries, produced by the Troezenian polis as a means to underscore its long-standing relationship with Athens.

Most studies have focused on supporting (e.g., Hammond 1982) or refuting (e.g., Johansson 2001) the inscription as originating during the Persian Wars, while all assert it was inscribed on stone in the late Classical or early Hellenistic eras. Only one investigation (Robertson 1982) attempted to consider the document as a product of the 3rd century, and envisioned the decree as a Troezenian acknowledgement of the military superiority of Ptolemy II Philadelphus. Robertson understood the references in the decree to the Athenian fleets that engaged the Persians at Artemesion and Salamis as metaphorical recognition of the Ptolemaic control of the Aegean in the 3rd century. While the attempt to situate the decree in this period is logical, I propose a different setting, interpreting the inscription as part of a more comprehensive articulation of Troezenian-Athenian relations in the context of the Chremonidean War of the 260s. Troezen, the safe haven for the evacuated Athenian women and children during the Battle of Salamis, erected a statue group to honor these temporary refugees (Paus. 2.31.7) and possibly another inscription honoring Troezen’s relations with Athens (Mitsos 1970; Frost 1978). The period during or after the Chremonidean War until as late as 243, when Troezen joined the anti-Athenian Achaean League, provides the perfect context for the inscribing of a decree purported to be by Themistocles. The years 268-243 constituted a brief window in the Hellenistic age when Troezen would have wanted to underscore the aid it had provided Athens in 480 and it is in this context that I propose to locate the inscribed decree of Themistocles. I will review the critical evidence that situates the decree in the mid-3rd century, provide the context for Troezen’s long and varied relationship with Athens, and argue that Troezen had good reason to celebrate its connections to Athens in the period following the outbreak of the Chremonidean War.
This paper analyzes a series of contemporary religious and political glosses transmitted in a manuscript copy of lectures delivered on Thucydides in early Reformation Germany (Hamburg, Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, cod. philol. 166). As it stands, this manuscript claims a unique and important status as one of the oldest – if not the oldest – examples in existence of lectures delivered on Thucydides in the Latin West during the Renaissance. This group of lectures, moreover, can be connected to no less a figure than the eminent reformer Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), professor of Greek at the University of Wittenberg and theological right hand man to Martin Luther.

Studying the popularity of Thucydides during the resurgence of Greek studies in the Renaissance proves to be an endeavor with many blank spaces. Virtually no extensive commentaries on the historian exist from the Italian Quattrocento, and there is very little evidence (outside of Lorenzo Valla's 1452 Latin translation) to suggest that Renaissance scholars were actually interacting with Thucydides' infamous style of Greek. Modern studies on Thucydides' reception often make a considerable jump at this point, occasionally looking to the political theory in the works of Machiavelli or Guicciardini in the early 1500's, or going still further to the monarchial absolutism of Thomas Hobbes and his English translation of 1628. Thanks to Marianne Pade's work on Thucydides in the Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum, however, we can now see that Thucydides enjoyed considerable popularity across the Alps in the German Renaissance, and especially among certain Humanist members of the early Protestant Reformation. In this environment, numerous commentaries, translations, and teaching aides appeared on Thucydides' thought and language.

Despite Pade's work, however, very little detailed research has been done on the reception of Thucydides in German Protestant Humanism. This paper is a small step toward correcting this gap in our knowledge of Thucydides' reception. The manuscript itself consists of copies of lectures on the first three books of Thucydides, consisting of three different parts, one dated to 1542, one to 1555, and another undated. It begins with a prolegomena section, situating Thucydides' history into the wider frame of universal (and, by extension, theological) history. What remains is largely a loose Latin translation with short informal introductions to important sections, along with historical and rhetorical explications on the text.

Though this manuscript acts primarily as a teaching tool, it does employ a number of short comments about affairs external to the text; specifically, biblical correspondences to the time frame that Thucydides writes about, and comparisons to contemporary political and military affairs. These brief but exceedingly interesting comments will be the focus of my presentation. As Melanchthon sees it, Greek power had lasted 600 years, from the Trojan War to its demise in the Peloponnesian war, corresponding to the 600 year period between king Saul and king Cyrus. Individual states (Sparta, the Roman Republic, Israel, Poland, etc.) last 500 years. Now, the “Germanicum Imperium” (the Holy Roman Empire), had reached its 500th year, and was in the process of falling apart; very likely, apocalyptic end times were close at hand. Art-hating
Spartans become the uncouth Turks, Venetians look strikingly Athenian, and *foedera/σπονδαί* become one of the defining causes of the war, something we need to eschew as much as possible. But these are just a few examples.

There is just one short article dealing with this particular manuscript (also by Pade), which gives only a brief overview of its contents and connects it with other scholars within Melanchthon's circle. No work has been done on the comments that Thucydides elicited about contemporary politics and religion in this incipient phase of his scholarship, but there certainly is much to learn. In a period of wildly complicated and constantly shifting political and religious relations, it should not be a surprise that Thucydides piqued the interest of these Humanist reformers.

---

**Session 33: Unruly Satire from Horace to Spenser**

**Passing By or Bypassing the Ancient Altar: Principles of Transgression in Satire**

Heather Vincent

As Paul Grice noted in his foundational work on the pragmatics of language, communication (hence, narrative) involves a set Cooperative Principles (CP), which irony and other forms of humor must necessarily violate (1975: 53-56; 1989: 53-54, 90, 120 *et passim*). If discrete Cooperative Principles govern truthful, i.e. *bona fide* (BF) modes of communication, is there an analogous set of principles that may be applied to ironic or humorous modes of discourse? And if so, what can these (Non?) Cooperative Principles reveal about the structure of narratives that rely heavily on irony and other non-truthful narrative postures, such as we find in satire? In this essay, I use a Gricean model to understand the relationship between satiric narrator and audience in Juvenal’s sixth, eighth, and ninth satires. What are the rules of the game? How do we, as readers, identify our roles in the satiric or *non bona fide* (NBF) communicative mode?

Scholarship on Roman satire has addressed issues of *bona fide* (BF) vs. *non bona fide* (NBF) communication primarily by focusing on the satiric narrator himself: the persona theorists (e.g. Kernan [1959], Anderson [1982], and Braund [1988, 1992, 1996]) first opened our eyes to the narrator’s masks; later scholars illuminated the art of his practices, whether by articulating more fully his various roles (Freudenburg 1993, 2001; Keane 2006), or by systemizing his methods of “lying” and “cheating” (Plaza 2006). All of these approaches, however, view the communicative process as unidirectional, proceeding from narrator to audience or reader. What a Gricean analysis offers us is the opportunity to analyze interdependencies between speaker and reader in this communicative process.

Consider, for example, the episode in Juvenal 6. 306-13, the women’s rendezvous at the altar of Chastity. We may easily observe how the narrator stages the episode as a mini-drama in two acts: the spectacle of the nighttime orgy, Act 1 (ll. 306-11), and the rise of the curtain in daylight, Act 2 (ll. 312-313). We may also find it easy to analyze the reader’s reaction by noting the many instances wordplay and thematic reversals. (Cf. Vincent’s [2010, 429-30] application of the General Theory of Verbal Humor [GTVH]; on the linguistic model itself, see Raskin 1985;
Attardo 1994, 2001, 2003, 2008, et al.). But what sort of rules ensure a humorous rather than a serious frame in which to appreciate the dramatic tropes, allusions, and wordplay? Applying a Gricean model to this example requires not only that we ask, “how does the reader react?” but also, “how does the text signal or set forth the terms of agreement on which the reader’s reactions are predicated?” Thus, the present essay attempts to fill the gap between narrative performance and reader response by observing how cooperative violations at the phonemic, morphemic, syntactical levels (i.e. the phenomena that create jokes) are mirrored by violations of genre and narrative structure at the macro-level. The interplay among these elements suggests a discrete principles of (Non-)Cooperation, or what I will call “Transgressive Principles” (“TPs”) analogous to Gricean CPs.

Inasmuch as previous literature has explicated acts of transgression in satire (e.g. Gold 1994, Walters 1998, Plaza 2006: 133-155), a coherent set of transgressive principles connecting the syntax and style with the substance or themes of transgression has yet to be articulated, and this essay is a small step in that direction. In addition, if the identification of TPs can help us to establish the metatextual parameters within which the satiric mode operates, it may also help us reassess the satiric poem not merely as a kind of anti-narrative that subverts traditional “rules” (cf. Carroll’s [2001] theory of narrative), nor merely as a hybrid narrative, featuring mixtures of various generic tropes. Instead, TPs promise to take us further in understanding what satire actually is and how we may interpret satiric vignettes in a more nuanced fashion.

Saepe stilum uertas: Moral and Metrical Missteps in Horace's Satires

Julia D. Hejduk

Horace’s famous advice to the aspiring writer, saepe stilum uertas, iterum quae digna legi sint/ scripturus (Serm. 1.10.72-73), seems straightforward enough: something worthy to be re-read must be frequently re-written. But this very injunction to polish exhibits a striking metrical irregularity, a short vowel not lengthened before the “st” beginning the following word (a phenomenon I shall call “sest”). Commentators tell us merely that Horace does this sometimes (Serm. 1.2.71, 1.3.44, 2.3.43, 2.3.296; see Palmer 1883: 238). Yet aside from the five in the Satires, only one other “sest” appears in hexameter poetry after Lucretius (Prop. 4.5.17)—a distribution lopsided enough to create suspicion that this feature was considered a uitium. Moreover, the other two other “sests” in Satires 1 touch on a theme central to the work as a whole: for both satire and sanity, one should combine the acumen to discern shortcomings with the wisdom to forgive them. In line with his thematically significant exploitation of dissonance between form and content (Morgan 2011: 334-45), I suggest that saepe stilum uertas is the punch-line of a subtle metrical joke, a choice illustration of Horace’s interweaving of the moral and the aesthetic throughout the Satires.

I begin by discussing how the other two “sests” in Satires 1 reinforce the message of intentionally overlooking flaws. The first hails from the outburst of an animus muttonis, berating its owner for excessive choosiness: when furious with passion, the member exclaims, it does not demand a consul-begotten cunnus cloaked in a matronly garment, uelatumque stola (1.2.71). The poem’s first “sest” thus accords well with the speaker’s persona, its crudity of language and meter (see Nilsson 1952: 34-35, Eskuche 1890: 386), and its message of getting the job done
without too much consideration for niceties. The book’s second “sest” is even more apt, for it comes from the sermon in 1.3 on choosing to regard our friends’ defects as endearing traits. After scolding those who turn a bleary eye upon their own faults while discerning with eagle-eyed exactitude those of others (25-27), Horace suggests that we should view our friends through the rose-tinted glasses of lovers or parents. The “sest” appears precisely where the poet tells us that “similarly, as friends, we should not be fastidious if there’s some flaw. ‘Squinty’ is what a father calls his cross-eyed son” (sic nos debemus amici/ si quod sit uitium non fastidire, strabonem/ appellat paetum pater, 43-45). Especially given the thematic importance of his own lippitude—which prevents him from seeing too clearly things it might be better to ignore (Oliensis 1998: 27-28, Reckford 1999: 525, Gowers 2002)—Horace may well be reinforcing with a metrical illustration the desirability of “squinting” at uitia.

The precedent established by these first two “sests” helps to illuminate the self-mocking humor of the final instance in book 1. The advice—to re-write what one hopes to make worthy of re-reading—already calls attention to itself as illustrating its own precept: we have in fact just “re-read” Horace’s criticism of Lucilius’ hasty composition from Serm. 1.4 (Gowers 2012: 333). Yet Horace is as critical of the effeminate preciosity of the neoterics (17-19) as he is of the “muddiness” of Lucilius (50-51) (see Crowther 1978, Schlegel 2010). By placing a “sest” in the middle of his injunction to polish, Horace displays his own fallibility, his ability to poke fun at himself, and the avoidance of extremes so central to his poetry and his philosophy.

I conclude with a glance at Horace’s two remaining “sests,” which confirm the phenomenon’s “vicious” nature. Both appear in 2.3, the diatribe of the fanatical Stoic convert Damasippus, whose unique licentiousness of meter mirrors his moral deficiency: “mad men are best painted in mad verse” (Freudenburg 1996: 205). Alertness to such metrical “madness” can help us to pinpoint the nature of that human madness which is the satirist’s overarching theme.

**Genre Manipulation for Subversion and Humor in Pompeian Graffiti**
Jacqueline F. DiBiasie

This paper offers an analysis of genre manipulation in Pompeian graffiti for the creation of humor. Building on recent work by Benefiel 2010 and Milnor 2009, I re-contextualize graffiti within Roman cultural discourse and show that Pompeians were knowledgeable of graffiti genres and adept at manipulating them in order to create jokes. In particular, I combine a cultural approach to graffiti with the study of visual humor (cf. Clarke 2003), and emphasize attention both to the graffito as a text and to its location as a determinant of humor and meaning. I demonstrate the widespread nature of this phenomenon through examples from various graffiti genres. Finally, I argue that the graffito’s location, when taken in context, can add further nuance to the humor found within the text.

This paper’s main example is CIL IV.1384, which was found outside a supposed brothel (though identification is not clear) in Region VI.11.16 in Pompeii. The graffito is in the format of a programma, or political advertisement, and urges the reader to vote for Isidorus, though his qualifications for office are most unusual (ISIDORUM AED II V(os) (f)AC(iatis)/OPTIME CUNULINCET IV . . T . .). Most programmata ask voters to vote for the candidate as he is
dignum r(ei)p(ublicae) but this graffito emphasizes his sexual abilities instead. The graffito contains several features of the *programma* (candidate’s name in the accusative followed by the office, abbreviations, qualification for office, located on façade) but blends it with several features of the brothel graffito (sexual services, name of prostitute). The location of this graffito adds to the humor as it faces several other graffiti of the ‘brothel genre’ which advertise Isidorus’ services as a prostitute (CIL IV 4699, 4441).

The author of this graffito, I argue, has effectively blended the *programma* and brothel graffito genres to make fun not only of Isidorus, but also of the genre of electoral *programmata*. The format and language of the *programma* invite the reader to expect the political message that usually accompanies this genre. The reader is therefore surprised when the qualifications for office are divulged; this reversal of expectation creates humor. Further, this graffito uses the generic devices of an upper-class genre, the *programma*, to display a sub-elite message; as such, it offers an example of intergroup humor that is used as a weapon of social conflict and as a means to retain the ascendancy of one group over another (Clarke 2003).

This is not an isolated example; other graffiti (CIL IV 575, CIL IV 9131, CIL IV 1177, CIL IV 10619, and CIL IV 5244) prove that examining graffiti and the genres within them calls for a more nuanced approach than has been used previously. In conclusion, I show that analyzing graffito genres allows the humor of these graffiti, often obscured by examining them out of context, to emerge. Their unique location within urban space allowed for a wide dispersal and audience for the jokes. Thus, analyzing their context allows for a deeper understanding of the purpose for the graffiti and the genre types being manipulated for humor's sake.

**Derideas licet: Tacitus’ Death of Seneca as Satire**

Philip T. Waddell

In this paper, I examine Tacitus’ portrayal of the death of Seneca through the lens of satire in order to better understand Tacitus’ deployment of pointed humor and *exitus* literature in the *Annales*. The depiction of Seneca in the *Annales* has long excited comment from such scholars as Alexander, Henry and Walker, and Syme. The ambiguities in Tacitus’ portrayal of Seneca, especially in his death scene, while often discussed, have been misinterpreted due to the affinity of scholars for Seneca and a desire to see Tacitus present him favorably. Recent scholarship (e.g., Ker 2009) continues to read Tacitus’ Seneca positively and at face value. Much better on Tacitus’ Seneca is Dyson (1970) who reads the Seneca of the *Annales* as a negative figure, properly castigated by Tacitus by comparison to other force suicides of the Neronian books. I differ from Dyson in that I examine Tacitus’ Seneca not only as a satirical counter-example to such figures as Thrasea Paetus, Petronius, Lucan, and Epicharis, but also as one who is emblematic of the Neronian preference for illusion over reality. While Nero had become Senecan (14.55-56), Seneca has become Neronian.

At several points during Seneca’s death scene, Tacitus cues the reader to the satirical reading. Tacitus silences Seneca’s final (and loquacious) speech by refusing to reproduce it in any way (15.63.3). Seneca’s overly self-conscious attempt to enact Socrates’ death by hemlock (15.64.3) is ridiculous not only in the poison’s pointed failure, but in the very possession of the hemlock in the first place! Tacitus also highlights the aspects of illusion inherent in this scene as Seneca gives a lecture to those present, as if to an imaginary general audience (*velutin commune*)
Further, as Seneca is moved to his fatal hot bath, he makes reference to the spilled bath-water as a libation of Jupiter the Liberator (15.64.4), a statement made later by the much more decorous Thrasea Paetus (16.35.1), recalling Seneca’s self-conscious illusionism. Most tellingly, Seneca bequeaths to his friends the one and best thing he has (unum et pulcherrimum): the imago of his life. Tacitus has shown through Seneca’s involvement with Neronian power-politics and murder (14.11.3) that Seneca’s true imago, as distinct from his philosopher-persona, is that of the professional courtier and guilty collaborator.

Through a satirical reading of Seneca’s death, the reader can better understand other suicides in the wake of the Pisonian conspiracy. Petronius, Nero’s fellow profligate, redeems his life through his death (16.18-19). Thrasea Paetus dies correctly, in proper imitation of Cato and as a noble exemplum to his son, a future victim of Domitian (16.35). Most forcefully, Seneca’s assumed Stoicism is outdone by Epicharis’ heroically Senecan suicide (15.57). Seneca, much of whose literature focused on how and when to seek an end to one’s own life, is so caught up in staging his own death correctly that not only a Roman senator, but a satiric novelist and a slave die more stoically. Seneca’s theatricality is echoed in the death of his nephew Lucan, who dramatically recalls portions of his own poetry dealing similar imagines of death (15.70.4). Again, the reader can see the preference of literature and illusion over reality in the court of Nero. Through the satirical presentation of Seneca’s death, Tacitus depicts Seneca, not as a Neronian outsider (cf. Ker 2009), but as the ultimate product of Neronian illusionism, who dies farcically choosing to believe in his self-styled image rather than acknowledge the ambiguous realities of his life.

### The Patron and the Peacock: Juvenal and Edmund Spenser on Poetic Patronage

**James Uden**

This paper argues for the importance of a previously under-emphasized intertext for the ‘October’ eclogue of Spenser’s *Shepheardes Calender* (1579): the seventh Satire of Juvenal, which voices the complaints of intellectuals about the lack of available patronage. As I show in this paper, Spenser’s use of Juvenal sheds light on the literary project of both authors. The allusions to the seventh Satire in ‘October’ suggest that, like many modern commentators (Hardie 1990, Braund 1988: 24-68), Spenser interpreted Juvenal’s arguments about patronage as ironic. The satirist is not earnestly advocating for increased investment in poetic activity, but subtly mocking the venality and dependence of court poets, who are concerned (in Spenser’s words) with ‘price’, not ‘prayse’, with ‘gayne’, not with ‘glory’. Moreover, Spenser’s introduction of this strain of satire into his characterization of the shepherd Cuddie, who represents ‘the perfecte patterne of a Poete’, suggests an awareness of the possible ethical and social pitfalls of Spenser’s own ambitions for a Vergilian poetic career.

Like the poets of Juvenal’s seventh Satire, the disillusioned poet Cuddie in Spenser’s ‘October’ eclogue complains that his poetry has brought him no economic benefit. Juvenal had compared the rich of his time, who merely admire intellectuals without paying them, to children marveling at a peacock (ut pueri Iunonis avem, 7.32). The image reappears in Cuddie’s speech in October: ‘So praysen babes the Peacoks spotted traine’ (line 31). Both Juvenal and Cuddie look to Maecenas as an ideal but long-dead archetype of the patron (Sat. 7.94-5; ‘October’ 55-62), and
both self-pityingly imagine an impoverished old age without any material support (Sat. 7.32-5; ‘October’ 67-70). In both poems, freedom from troubles is also posited as necessary for successful poetic production. Juvenal says that the true vates has a ‘mind free from cares’ (anxietate cares animus, 7.57) and ‘a longing for the woods’ (cupidus silvarum, 7.58), and can drink from the Muses’ springs. Spenser’s naïve Cuddie is, of course, already in the woods, but he bungles all the other tropes: he declares that the Muses love, not a mind vacant from cares, but a vacant mind (‘the vaunted verse a vacant head demaundes’, 100), and claims that, rather than drinking from the Muses’ springs, an abundance of wine will stimulate his poetic ability (‘And when with Wine the braine begins to sweate,/ the nombers flowe as fast as spring doth ryse’, 107-8). Cuddie, it seems, is a ridiculous figure. But the allusions to Juvenal suggest that Spenser saw also the ridiculousness of the poets in Juvenal’s original poem, who (among other things) long to take the position of their patrons’ expensive domesticated pets (74-8).

The satirizing of Cuddie, who is also on a Vergilian career trajectory (he is urged by his interlocutor to abandon pastoral and sing epic), significantly complicates Spenser’s own self-presentation as a new Vergil. In the seventh Satire, Juvenal notoriously likened Statius to a pimp prostituting his poetry (7.82-7; Markus 2000); the Shepherdes Calender begins with a preface likening the book to someone who is presently ‘unkiste’ but will soon be ‘kiste’, ‘beloved’, ‘embraced’, and the editor half-humorously calls himself a pander in recommending this new work (Oram et al 1989; 13). In this pastoral poetic debut, Spenser displays an ambivalence about the ethical compromises involved in the attempt to secure patronage, and a cynical awareness of the humiliating dependence of intellectuals seeking the approval of the wealthy. He does so partly through the intertext of the seventh Satire of Juvenal – a poet all-too-aware himself of the often humiliating nature of the client-patron relationship.

Session 34: Myth and Mythography in Roman Poetry

Lucretius’ Cow and the Myth of Ceres: Didactic Latency in De Rerum Natura

Seth Holm

In this paper, I examine an implicit reference to the myth of Ceres in Lucretius’ poem and its didactic relevance to his philosophical program. To illustrate the principle that invisible atomic particles may “look” different, Lucretius offers a surprisingly vivid and emotional depiction of a cow searching for her lost calf, who, unbeknowst to her, has already been killed at the sacrificial altar (DRN 2.352-366). Other scholars have noted rightly that this passage is an example of Lucretius’ “sustained attack upon religio” (Segal 104, and cf. Amory), but beyond the fact of the sacrifice, it is the cow’s search and her expressions of grief which capture the reader’s attention and beg our consideration. Considering these elements, the cow passage becomes irresistibly similar to the myth of Ceres. The image of the cow’s grief, “pierced through with longing for her calf,” desiderioperfixa iuvenci (DRN 2.360), reflects the sadness of Demeter, “wasting away with longing for her deep-breasted daughter,” πόθῳ μινύθουσα βαθυζώντοι θυγατρός (H.Dem.201). And like Demeter, Lucretius’ cow abstains from food and
drink (DRN2.361-3; H.Dem. 49-50) and continues to grieve amid other calves, the sight of whose happy frolicking does not ease her maternal anguish:

\[
\text{nec vitulorum aliae species perpabula laeta} \\
\text{derivare queunt animum curaquelevare} \\
\text{usque adeo quiddam proprium notumrequirit}
\]

nor can the different faces of other calves throughout the happy fields divert her mind and lighten her sadness, so earnestly does she seek the one she recognizes as her own (DRN 2.364-366).

In this detail, Lucretius’ scientific exemplum recalls the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, when the goddess arrives at Eleusis and her grief cannot be lightened by the Daughters of Keleos (H. Dem. 181-182), who are themselves described as happy calves (H.Dem. 174-175). Demeter’s grief holds as long as her own daughter is lost, and with the same dejected apathy Lucretius’ cow grieves before actual calves leaping about their happy pastures. Ovid helps to confirm for us Lucretius’ intention to echo the myth within this naturalized setting, when, in his own version of the Ceres myth in the Fasti (4.459-464), he likens the goddess to a cow, incorporating themes and language that conspicuously imitate the Lucretian passage: indem puellaris nacta est vestigiaplantae | et pressam noto pondere vidit humum (Fasti 4.459-464); atmater viridis saltus orbata peragrans | nanquit humi pedibus vestigia pressabisulcis (DRN 2.355-356).

I propose that Lucretius invites his reader to see Ceres in his scientific exemplum as an “implicit” or “latent” myth (Lyne 139-44, Gale 156-207), designed to add to the poem’s surface argument an undercurrent of association that furthers the poem’s larger philosophical goal of naturalizing myth. In this case, the thrust of the book in which this passage appears is to assert the earth’s insentience (DRN 2.589-599) and to move its reader away from notions of a provident “Mother Earth” (DRN 2.655-660). Later in the book, Lucretius will attack the Magna Mater, another Roman instantiation of the Earth-goddess figure, by describing her violent and terrifying rites in a critical vein (DRN 2.600-43). In the cow passage, he allows the latent myth to address this rival cult by implicitly reducing Ceres’ divine status to the natural and the animal. Again, Ovid provides a test case. As a reader, Ovid seems to have grasped the mythological undercurrent running beneath Lucretius’ scientific exemplum. Some questions about intention must inevitably remain, but by adopting Lucretian themes and vocabulary in his retelling of the Ceres myth, Ovid reacts to Lucretius’ passage as we might expect. Lucretius’ implicit reference inspired him to assimilate the goddess and Lucretius’ cow, creating within his ostensibly reverential version of the myth an explicitly naturalizing allegory that simultaneously subverts it.

**Eidōla of Helen and Anactoria: Allusion and invective in Catullus 42**

Susan E. Drummond

In poem 42, Catullus marshals his army of hendecasyllables against “Dogface” (catuli ore Gallicani, 42.9; canis...ore, 42.23), the moecha who has stolen his writing tablets. Putnam (2006: 86-87) has noted the intertextual connection between the canine epithets in Catullus 42 and Helen’s famous autocriticism κυνῶπις (“dog-faced,” i.e., “shameless”) at Iliad 3.180 and Odyssey 4.145. In this paper, I suggest that Catullus’ two Latin adaptations of κυνῶπις, paired
with a novel feminine form of the Comic insult *moechus* (a transliteration of μοιχός), connect the *moecha* to Helen-qua-infamous-Greek-adulteress in a sophisticated allusion to Stesichorus’ palinode, fr. 192: ὀψὶν ἔστ’ ἔτυμος λόγος οὗτος / οὐδ’ ἔβας ἐν νησίν ἐσέλμως / οὐδ’ ἴκεο πέργαμα Τροίας. According to tradition, Stesichorus composed the palinode in order to regain his sight after the Dioscuri had blinded him for maligning Helen in a previous poem. Just as Stesichorus had regained his vision by recanting his slanders, Catullus reverses his insults (*mutandast ratio*, 42.20) in a last-ditch attempt to win back his tablets, calling the woman withholding them *pudica et proba* (42.24) instead of *moecha*. Catullus, in a sense, "one-ups" Stesichorus by combining ode and palinode into the same poem. Moreover, within this composite Catullus uses Sappho as a via-point for his allusion to Stesichorus by inverting her characterization of Anactoria, an absent woman whom she connects to Helen. Catullus’ description of the *moecha* “strutting foully” (*turpe incedere*, 42.8) is an inversion of Sappho’s recollection of Anactoria’s “lovely way of walking” (ἔρατὸν τε βάμα, 16.17). Where Sappho highlights the charms of Anactoria’s face (λάμπρον ἱδην προσώπω, 16.18), Catullus fixates on the unsightliness of the *moecha*’s “face of a Gallic dog” (*catuli ore Gallicani*, 42.9). Catullus signposts his reference to Sappho by mediating the two perverse allusions with *mimice ac moleste ridentem*, a distortion of the phrase *dulce ridentem* from line 5 poem 51, his own adaptation of the first three stanzas of Sappho 31; the connection is particularly strong because these are the only instances of the present participle of *rideo* in Catullus’ *libellus*. Within poem 42, then, Catullus insults the *moecha* using inverted terms of praise, while at the end of the poem he reverses his earlier slights to her chastity.

As I shall argue, Catullus’ change of tactic effects the return of his tablets, which is signified by the departure of his hendecasyllables, i.e., the end of the poem. Thus, Catullus presents praise and blame as two sides of the same coin: both serve a persuasive function. In a broader sense, the degree of rhetorical efficacy in Catullus’ hendecasyllables represents the potency of his own authority as a lyric poet. Poem 42 is part of a larger conceit wherein, via his *odi-et-amor* complex towards his emasculating mistress Lesbia, Catullus playfully expresses anxiety about the effeminizing poetic influences of his predecessor Sappho of Lesbos. The insult *moecha*, which appears elsewhere in Catullus’ oeuvre only at 68.103, where it refers to Helen as the cause of the Trojan War and its attendant calamities, aligns Catullus with the invective strains of Alcaeus fr. 283, a negative take on the theme of Sappho fr. 16, stanzas 2-4. Yet even as Catullus attempts to adhere to his invective model, he slides into emulation of Sappho’s erotic poetry by inverting her diction; thus, Sappho has figuratively wrested his poetry tablets from his grasp. Faced with the intrusion of Sappho’s poetry of praise into an invective mode modeled on Alcaeus, Catullus adopts Stesichorus’ palinode form in order to construct his own poetics of praise, synthesizing and surpassing all three lyric models.

**Icarian Flights in Horace’s *Odes*: A Mythological Vocabulary of *hubris***

Blanche Conger McCune

Repeated motifs, such as *carpe diem*, wine, or “too old for love,” and characters, such as Lydia, the merchant, or the *paraklausithyron*, can be found running throughout Horace’s *Odes*, and studies of them often find that, far from revealing a lack of imagination, they form by means of repetition and variation an interdependent network of poems that have a cumulative effect on the
mind of the reader (see e.g., Commager 1957, Henderson 1973, Johnson 2003). This vocabulary of motifs and *topoi* is part of Horace’s poetic toolbox; it allows him to use poems to build on or comment on one another, which renders each poem, each repetition of the *topos*, more meaningful.

I argue that Horace does much the same thing with repeated mythological figures and motifs in the *Odes*. Myths, repeated, become an idiosyncratic lexicon, a mythological language Horace uses to speak about themes such as hubris, poetry, and immortality. This mythological lexicon, like the vocabulary of *topoi*, can be read across poems so that the interpretation of a mythological figure in one poem can aid in understanding the use of the same mythological figure in another poem, and the collective effect of all of the uses of that figure is itself something that can be analyzed and interpreted. Such an approach takes us beyond previous surveys of myth in Horace, which have either simply catalogued references (Oksala 1973) or confined analysis to the mythological content of individual poems (Breuer 2008). My approach, using a general survey to interpret individual poems, is a hybrid of the two.

A test case for my new approach is afforded by Daedalus, Icarus, and their ill-fated flight. *Odes* 1.1 contains a seemingly ornamental reference to Icarus, via a reference to the Icarian Sea (“luctantem Icariis fluctibus Africum | mercator metuens,” 15-16). The other references to Icarus in the *Odes* (1.3.34-35, 2.20.13, 3.7.21, 4.2.1-4) serve as aids in interpreting the reference to Icarus in 1.1 and cumulatively build up a nexus of associations. In these poems Icarus is associated with *hubris*, and often specifically poetic *hubris*. In 1.3.34-35 and (much later) in 4.2.1-4 Icarus’ flight is clearly introduced in the context of human or poetic overreaching. The “rocks of Icarus” in 3.7.21 are similar to the “Icarian waves” of 1.1.15 in that the reference to Icarus could be seen as merely a toponym devoid of interpretive force; however, the phrase *scopulis Icari* occurs after a series of mythological *exempla* illustrating *hubris*, connecting it to the pattern seen in 1.3 and 4.2. In 2.20, Horace can be seen as being humorously self-deflating (as he is, arguably, at 1.1.35-36) in comparing his post-mortem poetic success to Icarus’s well-known, and fatally hubristic, flight (“iam Daedaleo notior Icaro | uisam gementis litora Bosphori,” 21-22).

Finally I will show how the significance of the subsequent references to Icarus in the *Odes* is relevant to understanding the reference in 1.1. First, the connection to these other references adds another dimension to the use of *Icariis* to describe *fluctibus* in its context: it not only highlights the danger of drowning but also highlights the overreaching nature of the merchant. Second, it leads to a reassessment of the connection between the figures in the priamel and Horace himself, who on another occasion described his poetic *hubris* in Icarian terms (2.20.21). Icarus’ flight is only one example of Horace’s use of a mythological lexicon whose recurrence reveals not only the cumulative significance of the myth throughout the *Odes* but also aids in the interpretation of individual poems.

**Vergil's Mythmaking: Mezentius and Tarquinius Superbus**

John D. Morgan

It has long been recognized that there are significant differences between the account of Aeneas’ opponent Mezentius, the king of the Etruscan city Caere, in the traditional stories that were written down in the 2nd century BC by Cato the Censor in his *Origines* (fragments 9-12 Peter)
and later by Roman historians such as Livy (1.2) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 1.64-65), and that in Books 7-10 of the Aeneid, in which Vergil incorporated various aspects of other mythological figures (e.g., Polyphemus and Ajax) into his portrait of Mezentius. In this talk I present evidence that Vergil’s imaginary portrait of Mezentius as an Etruscan tyrant was based heavily on the traditional tales of the tyrannical behavior of Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome.

In the traditional tales, Mezentius came to the aid of Turnus, the king of the Rutuli, and together they fought against Aeneas’ Trojans and the Latins a great battle, in which both Turnus and Aeneas died but Mezentius survived. Later, a war broke out between the Latins, who were ruled by Aeneas’ son Ascanius, and Mezentius, in which Ascanius defeated Mezentius and either killed him (thus Cato) or after killing his son Lausus forced him to sue for peace (thus Dionysius). In the Aeneid, however, Vergil makes Aeneas kill first Lausus (Aen. 10.791-832) and next Mezentius (Aen. 10.873-908), before eventually killing also Turnus in the concluding verses of Book 12. Clearly Vergil felt under no compulsion to adhere closely to the traditional versions of the war(s) fought by the Trojan immigrants to Latium against Turnus and Mezentius.

Another innovation in Vergil’s portrayal of Mezentius is that he makes the Etruscan king not the current ruler of Caere (a.k.a. Agylla), but rather an exile from that city who had taken refuge with Turnus after he had been driven out by its citizens, after their patience had been exhausted by his tyrannical misbehavior (Aen. 8.478-495). There are close parallels between Vergil’s portrait of Mezentius as a murderous oppressor of his own citizens and the traditional portrait of the last Tarquin king of Rome. After seizing power in Rome, which had flourished for over 200 years, Tarquinius Superbus surrounded himself with a bodyguard (Livy 1.49.2: armatis corpus circumsaepsit) and proceeded to begin purges of the leading senators who had favored Servius Tullius, which Livy calls “the king’s slaughters” (2.1.10: caedibus regis). The diction employed by Livy to describe Superbus’ misdeeds at Rome is strikingly similar to that in Euander’s description of Mezentius’ tyrannical misdeeds at Agylla in Aen. 8.481-484:

hanc multis florentem annos rex deinde superbo imperio et saevis tenuit Mezentius armis.
quid memorem infandas caedes, quid facta tyranni effera? di capiti ipsius generique reservent!

There are other parallels too between the flights into exile of Tarquinius Superbus and Mezentius. When news of the revolution at Rome reached Tarquinius Superbus, who was besieging Ardea, a city of the Rutuli, he left camp and returned to Rome, where the citizens had closed the gates, and then went into exile at Caere (Livy 1.60.1-2). Conversely, Vergil says Mezentius fled from Caere and went into exile at Ardea, the native city of the Rutulian Turnus. Hence Vergil’s imaginary flight of Mezentius from Caere to Ardea is the reverse of the traditional flight of Tarquinius Superbus from Ardea to Caere.

To the best of my knowledge these parallels, which are not mentioned in the commentaries on the Aeneid by Conington and Nettleship or by R.D. Williams, nor in those by Eden on Aeneid 8 or Fordyce on Aeneid 7-8, nor in any other work known to me, have not been noticed before. They strongly suggest that Vergil substantially altered the traditional portrait of the Etruscan
king Mezentius, which he had found in Cato's *Origines* and other sources, by introducing into it traditional aspects of the tyrannical behavior of the last Tarquin king of Rome.

**Mythography in the Boeotian Catalog of Statius' *Thebaid***

R. Scott Smith

In this paper I analyze a single section of Statius' *Thebaid*, the extensive catalog of Boeotian allies (7.243–373), in order to determine the extent to which Statius relies on prose mythographic sources. Recent scholarship (e.g., van Rossum-Steenbeek 1998, Cameron 2004, Smith/Trzaskoma forthcoming) has asserted the importance and wide availability of mythographical works—that is, subliterary summaries and lists of mythical lore. Scholars have also begun to analyze Roman poets, primarily Ovid, with an eye to their use of prose mythographical works (e.g., Feeney 1999, Hardie 2005, Farrell, forthcoming). A close study of the Boeotian catalog will, I think, add to our understanding of Roman poets' use of mythographical sources and suggest that prose mythography was more important to Roman poets than previously recognized.

Catalogs in imperial Latin poetry are, of course, common; these set pieces were meant to put on display the erudition of the poets. But surely no writer could have retained, say, the names of Actaeon's 50 dogs (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* book 3) or Homer's catalog of ships (Seneca, *Troades*, Ode 4). These poets are instead dependent on lists that have been compiled from other sources. The passage on which I plan to speak is a case in point. Statius enumerates a vast number of allies that have come in defense of Thebes. Many of the names, as Juhnke (1972) points out, come from Homer's *Catalog of Ships* (II. 2.482–877). The most recent commentator on *Thebaid* book 7, J.J.L. Smolenaars (Leiden 1994), goes even further, "Statius carefully studied Homer's treatment of the motif." This is entirely possible; according to papyrus finds (Cribiore 1994, 1996, 2001) *Iliad* 2 was the most intensely studied, and literary evidence suggests that some students were asked to memorize the catalog. Yet, there are numerous divergences from Homer's account. Some of these are Statius' own invention, but, as I hope to prove, some are due to Statius' consultation of mythographic writing.

One such category of divergence is found in place names. On 16 occasions Statius omits or adds a name to the Homeric list. In the latter case, Smolenaars, in his otherwise excellent commentary, thinks (p. 122) "Statius was probably drawing on Pliny's enumeration of Boeotian and Phocian towns." But it is highly unlikely that Statius is drawing on a *Latin* encyclopedia, which was itself compiled from mostly Greek sources. Rather, as I will argue, he looked to Greek mythology for grist for his mill.

To take one example: although Homer begins his catalog with the town Hyria, Statius begins with Tanagra and its king, Dryas, who Statius is keen to point out is the son of Orion. Why would Statius diverge from Homer's catalog at the very outset? First, ancient scholarship on Homer's catalog in the historical period established that there was no town in Boeotia by that name; second, the city of Tanagra had become by the 4th c. BCE the most powerful city in the region. But there is more, and the key is the mention of Orion. Many of our mythographical sources specifically call Orion the son of *Hyrieus*, thereby linking him to the Homeric town. Thus, Statius has cleverly both honored the largest and most powerful city in Boeotia while giving a nod to Homer through a clever allusion. Although Statius could have made this
connection himself—i.e., this would be an example of his poetic artistry—he did not have to. It had already been done for him in a prose mythographic summary (schol. II. 18.486, attributed to Euphorion; cf. Strabo 9.4.4):

Ὑριεὺς ὁ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ Ἀλκυόνης μιᾶς τῶν Ἀτλαντος θυγατέρων, ᾧκει μὲν ἐν Τανάγρᾳ τῆς Βοιωτείας...

Other examples of mythographic influence will be noted in the course of the paper, in particular, Statius' artful association of the Thessalian Hypseus, son of the River Peneus, with the Boeotian river Asopus based on a little-known mythographical source.

Session 35: Attica beyond Athens: The Athenian Countryside in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods (Joint APA/AIA Panel)

The Monumental Definition of Attica in the Early Democratic Period

Jessica Paga

This paper seeks to explore how the vast geographic territory of Attica was defined and delineated during the period between the reforms of Kleisthenes in 508/7 B.C.E. and the Persian Wars of 490-480/79. These decades were a transitional time in Athenian history, when a new chapter in Athenian identity – specifically, a new democratic identity – was being forged (Anderson; Loraux). Part of this new conception of what it meant to be an Athenian hinged on both the abstract notion of “belonging” to a deme and the physical concretization of what was considered Attica. This dualistic definition, the former predicated on the use of the demotic and registration within a single deme and the latter on built structures, road networks, and topographic modifications, contributed to the overarching transformation of the countryside from a loosely-conceptualized area subservient to and/or ignored by the astu, into an integrated and integral component of Athenian citizenship, democratic identity, and socio-political functionality.

Previous scholarship concerning the countryside of Attica and its definition has frequently focused either on individual demes or regions (Mylonas; Pouilloux; Eliot), or the northwest border areas between Attika and Boiotia (Ober; Munn; Munn and Munn). In this paper, I argue that we should instead approach the Attic countryside as an unified topographic entity, rather than a collection of disparate villages and geographic areas. One of the ways in which such an approach is made possible is through the analysis of monumental architecture built along the border areas – both coastal and terrestrial – in the late sixth and early fifth centuries. It is during this particular period that “Attica” as both a coherent geographical space and intrinsic component of the Athenian polis comes into being.
In 506/5, the Athenians achieved an astonishing double victory over the combined Boiotian and Chalkidian forces in northwestern Attika (Hdt. 5.74-78). At the same time, the Spartans and Corinthians, who had previously gathered at Eleusis in the hopes of making a triple-pronged invasion, disbanded and made their way home without recourse to any military engagement (Hdt. 5.74). These military episodes, documented both in Herodotus and inscriptions (IG I3 501; SEG 54.518), speak to a concern with the western borders of Attika in the years soon after the Kleisthenic reforms. Concurrent with these attacks on the southwestern and northwestern edges of the territory of Athens, the Aeginetans continued to dominate the coastal areas, attacking Phaleron (Hdt. 5.79-89) and causing havoc along the southern border. The Athenian response to these attacks can be measured in the buildings erected along border areas during the period between ca. 508/7 and 480/79.

An examination of large-scale monumental construction projects at Eleusis, Rhamnous, Thorikos, Brauron, Sounion, Halai Aixonides, and Piraeus demonstrates how the Athenians attempted to define their borders during this period of socio-political upheaval, transition, and military threat. The building of temples, theatrical areas, and fortifications indicates an interest in the delineation of Athenian territory as well as an attempt to announce the newly established Athenian socio-political and military power in monumental fashion. Moreover, the geographic distribution of the new buildings, their chronological specificity, and their forms and materials indicate that they were part of a comprehensive building program in Attica during the first three decades of the nascent democracy. In this way, the evidence of the built environment, when taken together with the accounts of Herodotus and the epigraphic testimonia, shows how the Athenians quickly and concretely established the physical boundaries of Attica as a visible counterpart to the adoption of the demotic in order to establish the conceptual and visual definition of “Attica.”

The Border Demes of Attica: Settlement Patterns and Economy
Sylvian Fachard

Northwestern Attica has attracted scholarly attention since the end of the nineteenth century. The most systematic study of the entire region remains unpublished (Edmonson), while much work has been dedicated to the fortifications known on the Attic-Boiotian border (Vanderpool; Ober; Lohmann; Munn 1993; Camp). The most intensive survey work was done by the Stanford Skourta Plain Project in the late eighties (Munn 1989; Munn and Munn 1989; Munn and Munn 1990). Still, the borders of Attica remain unsettled and a systematic geo-archaeological study of the borderlands – from Eleusis to Aphidna – has never been attempted.

This paper focuses on the border demes of Attica in the Classical and Hellenistic period. Based on a new mapping of all known archaeological sites, this study examines the ways in which the different microregions which form Attica’s borderland were settled and exploited. In addition, it also examines the specificities of the border demes in comparison with the rest of Attica, assesses their economic resources, and defines the profile of a particular “border identity.”

The study is divided into three parts. The first part uses GIS (a geographic information system) to combine archaeological sites with geological and soil maps, in order to study the ways in
which the landscape was settled in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Focusing on the demes of Eleusis, Oinoe, and Phyle, as well as the region of Panakton and the Koundoura valley, I show how the best alluvial soils were well exploited at an early stage by people living in nucleated settlements. Some of them were fortified, offering a superior degree of protection to the people working the agricultural surfaces. The more marginal lands could attract people as well, although their settlement patterns tend to be influenced by more short-time issues.

Based on the profile of land-occupation, I then estimate the “carrying capacity” of the borderland. I calculate the potential production for Western Attica by recording the surfaces which could be used for grain (wheat and barley). I also assess how many people the different microregions could feed. For example, the deme of Oinoe could exploit some 627 hectares of prime soils, half of them being exploited annually (biennial fallow). Such a surface could produce some 7,400 medimnoi of grain, enough to feed 1,000 people. Most of this land could be exploited by walking less than 4 km from the fortified deme-center, although it seems that isolated individual dwellings were built in the deme as well. Similar minimal estimates can be established for Eleusis, Panakton, Phyle, and the Koundoura valley.

These results can then be compared with other demes of other regions of Attica. Such a detailed bottom-up estimate of the border demes has never been attempted before. It leads to a discussion about the economic potential of Athens borderland and the role it played in the broader chora.

Finally, as communities exploiting the productive opportunities of the microregions in which they lived, the demes often had their own identity. I consider whether the border demes of Attica differed from demes situated in other regions, and if the presence of the border had an influence on the settlement patterns and the economic exploitation.

**Ancestral Deme and Place of Residence in Classical Attica**

Danielle Kellogg

This paper examines the epigraphic evidence from several rural Attic demes as an important, yet hitherto under-examined, aspect for the determination of social and economic historical patterns in Classical Athens. It is well known that a substantial percentage of the Athenian population did not reside full-time in the deme to which they were politically affiliated (Whitehead; Osborne 1985; Jones; Etienne and Müller). Prevailing theories often contain two underlying assumptions about the movement of people in Athens: first, that the movement was bipolar, i.e., from the city to the country or the country to the city; second, that the movement was centripetal, with the Athens-Piraeus urban complex acting as the locus of attraction for movement within Attica, to the virtual exclusion of other locations. Such assumptions privilege the political and economic attractions of the city and port over other factors in determining residence in the territories of ancient Athens, and fail to recognize the sophistication of the dialectic between city and country (Bintliff; Polinskaya). Even studies that have attempted to nuance the picture of mobility in Attica (Osborne 1987 and 1991; Hansen et al; Damsgaard-Madsen; Nielsen et al) have focused nearly entirely on evidence from the funerary inscriptions, ignoring other avenues of investigatory relevance.

Demographic analysis of the entirety of the epigraphic record demonstrates that this picture does not accurately reflect the true circumstances of personal mobility in Attica (Taylor 2007 and...
2011; Akriig 2007 and 2011). Instead, we see the emergence of several different residence patterns that demonstrate, first, that the Athens-Piraeus complex did not exert a centripetal pull upon the inhabitants of ancient Attica to the degree which is sometimes assumed, and second, that a complex nexus of factors – social, political, and economic - influenced the decision of an individual to reside or own property in a given locale.

My study combines a close examination and analysis of the extant material culture as contextualized by the literary tradition with an exploration of current scholarly theories on the economic and social networks of ancient Athens. By comparing the epigraphic record from several rural Attic demes, whose locations, economy, and settlement structure differ from each other, I demonstrate that a surprisingly large percentage of those residents whose movements we can track remained in the ancestral deme or moved to other areas of rural Attica, rather than moving full-time to city or port. This finding has important implications for how we should view the relationship between Athens and rural Attica in the Classical period. My analysis also reveals that smaller, regional networks in the Attic countryside existed, which allowed some “rural” locations to act as loci of population attraction. The existence of such regional networks supported the emergence of more localized spheres of influence in the political, social, and liturgical realms which had little to no overlap with those of the asty. It becomes clear that the migration patterns of rural Attica reveal a far more dynamic interaction between city and countryside than has hitherto been fully appreciated.

Territoriality and Mobility: Defining Space in Attica through Graffiti
Claire Taylor

This paper uses rock-cut graffiti to examine territoriality and claims of belonging in the Attic countryside. It argues that the large number of short textual and pictorial graffiti which appear across the Attic landscape represent ways in which both citizens and non-citizens laid claim to space and negotiated personal identities. Examination of this material questions current ideas about territoriality within demes and also provides new ways to think about mobility within Attica.

Most studies of rupestrian inscriptions in Attica have focused on horoi (boundary markers) and have situated these within political or economic contexts, interpreting them as ‘quasi-official’ or ‘authoritative’ texts which delineate deme boundaries (Lauter; Traill; Stanton) or private property (Ober 1981). As such, they have become integral to the debate on the territoriality of demes and closely linked to the political machinery of Athens (Thompson; pace Langdon 1985b; Lalonde 2006). But horoi are not the only form of epigraphic material which appear within the Attic landscape, and arguably not the most common: the past twenty-five years have revealed large quantities of graffiti dating to the Archaic through Hellenistic periods (Langdon 1985a; Langdon and van de Moortel; Langdon 2004, 2005). These comprise personal names, kalos inscriptions, sexual insults, abecedaria, ships, horses, dogs, footprints and phalluses carved into rocks in a variety of locations. If horoi have a quasi-official function (which is by no means certain: Ober 1995), this corpus is, by contrast, intensely personal, and interrogating it in terms of spatial dynamics, identity negotiation, and human mobility prompts a reconsideration of the nature of territoriality within Attica.
This paper therefore compares graffiti from two different Attic contexts: hillsides (Hymettos, Vari) and on streets within demes (Thorikos). Recent work has argued that the graffiti at these sites can be interpreted as a mechanism in which communities were created over space and time (Taylor); if this is the case these two case studies raise questions about the use of space, and the movement of different types of persons between it, from a non-institutional and (probably) non-elite viewpoint. Graffiti therefore define space differently to the deme acting in an official capacity. The following questions will, therefore, be posed: Why do we find relatively large quantities of writing (textual and non-verbal) in seemingly isolated places such as hillsides? To what extent are these markings similar to or different from those within a busy deme streetscape? Are they inspired by the same cultural impulses or do they negotiate space in different ways? Does the content reveal by whom – or for whom – they were made? What do these marks suggest about temporal aspects of mobility within Attica, not only to and from busy ‘industrial’ areas, but also to what appear to be out-of-the way places?

Recent work on graffiti has shown that this mode of writing was not necessarily an anti-social activity in the ancient world (Baird and Taylor). Therefore simply arguing that these were the subversive marks of bored peasants does not interrogate this material fully enough. Instead, here it is argued that these graffiti defined space in sophisticated ways, provided a way in which personal, sexual, and religious identities were negotiated over space and time, and demonstrate contexts of mobility within Attica. They therefore suggest that territoriality was of interest to a wider group of people than the deme qua deme alone.

Session 36: Classical Tradition in Brazil: Translation, Rewriting, and Reception

Odorico Mendes and the Poetic Translation of Classics
Paulo S. Vasconcellos

Manuel Odorico Mendes (1799-1864) was one of the greatest Brazilian classicists. He began his career as a politician during a period in which the country was governed by Portuguese emperors. However, in 1847, after he had translated two tragedies of Voltaire and portions of the Aeneid, he decided to abandon politics and move to Europe, where he could dedicate his time exclusively to the translation of classical literature and have access to useful books he could not find in Brazil. In France, he published Eneida Brasileira [a Brazilian Aeneid] (1854) and Virgilio Brasileiro (1858), a translation of all works of Vergil. After the complete translation of this Latin poet, he translated the Iliad and the Odyssey, which were published posthumously. His Iliad was the first complete translation of the poem in Portuguese.

Odorico Mendes called his works “poetic translations”. He tried to recreate in Portuguese the poetic effects (in terms of sound, rhythm, and word order) he read in the originals. Even the quantitative rhythm, when strongly marked by light or heavy syllables, receives from Odorico an analogous one, aimed to have analogous effects on the modern reader.
A peculiarity of Odorico Mendes’s translations is its remarkable conciseness; for instance, several books of the Brazilian Aeneid have a smaller number of verses than the original ones. The translator believed Portuguese was a very concise language, and his translations are much more concise than all the others that employ the same regular meter – decasyllables – as Odorico.

In this paper, I will present Odorico Mendes’s classical translations, which are considered pioneer in Brazil, for their concept of “poetic translation” and their practice of translation as “creative task”. Authors such as Schleiermacher, Ortega y Gasset, Haroldo de Campos (maybe the greatest theorist of “poetic translation” in Brazil) will help us understand what Odorico Mendes intended in his work, which created, more than a translation of Virgil, a Brazilian Virgil and a Brazilian Aeneid for his country.

Machado de Assis and the Brazilian uses of the Roman World
Brunno V.G. Vieira

The myths, texts, and history of ancient Rome are well represented in the work of Machado de Assis (1839-1908), a seminal Brazilian writer (Graham, 1999). Although the influence of other literatures and authors have always been professed by Machadian scholarship (Rocha, 2005), classical tradition is eminently present in the author’s imagination, as well as the narrator-writer of the novel himself alludes, allegorically (Hansen 1999), in chapter two of Dom Casmurro: 

era gosto do tempo meter sabor clássico e figuras antigas em pinturas americanas (“it must have been the taste of the time to put classical flavor and ancient figures into paintings done in America” (sc. Brazil) – Dom Casmurro, transl. Gledson, p. 5). A small number of studies about classical themes within Machadian work have been written and, among these, one should single out the articles of Brandão (2001, 2008) and Ramos (2011), which explore the influence of Greek literature and mythology in Machado’s works, respectively.

Nevertheless, none or almost any work about this subject appeared in Anglophone contexts, and the aim of this paper is to put this discussion into a more extensive dialog. The diasporic ancient legacy is received in Machado’s early postcolonial context (the Brazilian independence hallmark is 1822) in a paradoxical manner: the author uses ancient reminiscences in his literary creation, but he also criticizes the use of the same legacy because sometimes it becomes a weapon of postcolonial elite oppression or of persistent “colonial iniquities”, as Schwarz prefers (2005:2). What could explain this Machadian appropriation is the likewise paradoxically poetic and oppressive way by which classical tradition arrives to the neoclassical palaces and to the slums of Rio de Janeiro, as the paper seeks to demonstrate.

The Portuguese dactylic hexameter: an overview
João Angelo Oliva Neto

The history of the Portuguese dactylic hexameter, its use both in original poems and translations, has not been done yet. Unlike what happened in Italian, Spanish, English and German literatures, the adoption of this meter in Portuguese is much less common and a much more recent
phenomenon (from the 18th century), but also almost completely understudied. If its use was up
to the poets to decide, studying it is the duty of scholars, as Bernhardt-Kabisch did.

Portuguese dactylic hexameter, on the other hand, lasted enough to be until some ten years ago
the meter adopted in what was then the last Portuguese language poetic translations of the Iliad,
the Odyssey, both published in the decade of 1940 (a 12-syllable verse translation of the Iliad by
Haroldo de Campos was published in 2001; in Portugal, in 2003, Frederico Lourenço published a
Poundian-verse translation of the Odyssey, and in 2005 of the Iliad; Lourenço’s versions, though
he does not acknowledge it, are very much alike Fagles’; in 2011, a 12-syllable verse Odyssey
translation by Trajano Vieira, being himself a pupil of Campos, was published in Brazil).

Dactylic hexameter is also the meter of the last Portuguese poetic translation of the Aeneid,
published in 1981: all these versions were done by Carlos Alberto Nunes (1897–1990), a
translator that has long been studied, though almost completely neglected both in Brazilian
classical studies and studies on the history of Brazilian poetic translation.

The paper seeks to establish the lineage of a very small group of Brazilian poets who employed
dactylic hexameter in Portuguese—which begins with the poet and mathematician José
Anastácio da Cunha—and discover who was his immediate model. I shall discuss how
differently that meter has been employed and point to the critical resistance on the part of some
poets. The paper will focus on Carlos Alberto Nunes’ outstanding work as translator, the first
and the only that has used hexameter in complete versions of seminal classical poems.

Roman poetry and Brazilian poets—1960s to 80s
Guilherme G. Flores

The most recent Brazilian avant-garde movement, called Concretism, began in the middle fifties,
bound – like any other avant-garde movement – to the “tradition of rupture”, both in aesthetic
and theoretical terms. Nevertheless, they were very interested in revamping it (in a very
Poundian manner), not only by looking into the future, but also by the creative recovery of the
literature of the past. Therefore, the fact that most of those poets engaged in poetic translations of
both contemporary and older poets should not be surprising. During that time, classical literature
received great attention from the brothers Haroldo and Augusto de Campos, Décio Pignatari, and
later from Paulo Leminski, which is usually categorized in the Marginalis movement of late
sixties and seventies: we have translations (or “transcreations”, in the words of Haroldo de
Campos) of Homer (H. de Campos, 2003, 2009), Sappho (A. de Campos, 1994; H. de Campos,
1998; Pignatari, 2007), Alcaeus (Pignatari, 2007; H. de Campos, 1998), Pindar (H. de Campos,
1972), Vergil (A. de Campos, 1994), Horace (Pignatari, 1986; H. De Campos, 1998; Achcar
(ibid.), Martial (Pignatari, 2007), Ausonius (A. de Campos, 2000), Petronius (Leminski, 1985),
among others.

When we investigate those translations, it is possible to notice that in general they perform a self-
aware rewriting (as theorized by Andre Lefevere, 1992) of the Roman texts in order to make
them part of a living Brazilian literature, in a way that could be compared to the
“anthropophagy” proposed by Oswald de Andrade in the middle 20’s as means to accomplish a
real Brazilian poetic achievement with few (or no) debts to the European contemporary
literature; thus inverting the myth of the good savage who only learns and repeats the colonizer’s
tradition, trying to become a ‘white man’. According to Oswald de Andrade (2011), we could act as literary cannibal Indians, devouring foreign literature and mixing it to our previous native culture (such as Indian or African) in order to produce a new object, different from that European flesh, but at the same time embodied by it. The goal of the paper is to discuss the ways in which these avant-garde poets recreated/anthropophagized the Roman tradition, mostly by means of innovative translations, and how those translations created an intertext, or a macrotext involved by the works of those Brazilian poets.

The Saint and the Sow: Plautinisms and Suassunisms

Isabella T. Cardoso and Sonia A. dos Santos

The influence of Plautus’ work in Brazilian theater is illustrated in the subtitle of the comedy O Santo e a Porca (The Saint and the Sow), by which Ariano Suassuna (1927- ) presents his play as “a Northeastern imitation of Plautus”. Verbatim translations of certain scenes that exploit comic mistakes, as well as the use of “speaking names” (Guapiassu 1980; Boldrini 1985) are some of the dramatic techniques this Brazilian play has in common with its Plautine model, the Aulularia. Previous research has also emphasized the differences between the Roman original and its Brazilian reworking in terms of plot, such as the increasing prominence that female characters receive in the Brazilian play (Pociña López 1996).

However, Suassuna (who is also professor of Aesthetics at the University of Pernambuco; Suassuna 1975) imitates to a certain extent a pattern used by the Roman playwright to adapt his rewritings of Greek plays to a “barbarian” culture (e.g. uortit barbare, Trin. 19) (Moore 1998; Gonçalves 2009, Cardoso 2010, 2011). Plautus’ notorious employment of popular Italic oral traditions in his adaptations (Vogt-Spira 1998) results in a kind of hybridism, also found in Suassuna, who combines the Roman play (now in the role of the erudite text) with traditions of Northeastern popular art.

The goal of the paper is twofold. Firstly, it will demonstrate how The Saint and the Sow is supposed to “desacralize” Greek-Roman literature in terms of Brazilian popular culture and identity (Santos 2007). This approach is consonant with the principles of a successful cultural movement, the “Movimento Armorial”, founded by Suassuna (Santos 1999). Secondly, it will call attention to the meaning and function of such imitation (Cardoso 2009) investigating on it in the light of recent research on Roman literature and identity (e.g. Habinek 1998). Therefore the paper shall contribute to a much-needed reflection on the deeper aesthetic analogies between Suassuna’s and Plautus’s comedy.
Julius Caesar in Science Fiction

Robert W. Cape

Julius Caesar is not the subject of science fiction as often as the emperors, but references to him are frequent and when he appears in his own SF novel, John Barnes’ *Caesar’s Bicycle* (1997), his keen intellect and capacity for military/political strategy make him the prime candidate from the ancient world to realize the potential of technology and use it to change history, for the better.

Romans appear in the science fiction primarily through stories about parallel universes or alternate histories, whereas Greek gods, heroes, and historical characters are found in a wider variety of science fiction sub-genres. Indeed, in the first parallel universe story by Murray Leinster (“Sideways in Time” [1934]), it is the appearance of Romans in the 20th century that signals time is out of balance. Likewise, one of the classics of early alternate history is L. Sprague de Camp’s *Lest Darkness Falls* (1939/41), which introduces technology into late antique Rome to change history. Most alternate history SF featuring the Romans begins after the time of Julius Caesar, as do the recent novels by Robert Silverberg (*Roma Eterna* [2003]), Sophia McDougal (*Romanitas* [2005], *Rome Burning* [2007], *Savage City* [2011]), and David Drake (*The Legions of Fire* [2010], *Out of the Waters* [2011]). The same evocative blend of political intrigue, lust for power, moral decadence, slavery, etc., that makes imperial Rome inviting for the cinema (Wyke, *Projecting the Past* [1997]), makes it irresistible for SF. The future(s) envisioned, however, are usually the epitome(s) of the military imperialist state, now on an inter-planetary level.

Julius Caesar is spared association with the worst of Rome’s vices in SF partially because he represents the republican ideal and not a later imperialism. In *Caesar’s Bicycle*, Mark Strang must travel to another timeline to assassinate Caesar in 49. If he is successful, he will bring an end to war across all timelines, the ascendance of Romans to become the rulers of the universe, and an easing of restrictions that will allow for tourism across all timelines for all people. There will be complete peace and harmony. But Strang cannot believe he should kill Caesar, a good man: “...just to begin with, every Latin student in thousands of timelines is going to hate me.” (94) Indeed, Caesar shows himself remarkably adept at using new technology creatively, beyond the expectations of even the more technologically savvy agents sent from the future. Of the numerous Romans who use new technology in recent SF stories and novels, Caesar best understands the potential of science to advance his and the Roman cause.

The characterization of Julius Caesar and the Roman Republic illustrates the popular appeal of a republican political system over empire. Caesar becomes the pivotal figure between republic and empire and thus can be seen as the key to a future of peace vs. a future of war and aggressive imperialism. However, the complexity of Caesar’s character carries both positive and negative potential in SF. As with the most widely known representation of Caesar in SF, actually a blend
of Caesar and Augustus, Senator Palpatine in Star Wars, there is great danger that this brilliant political and military strategist may be evil.

Caesar’s Bicycle reverses the usual trajectory of SF alternate histories featuring the Romans by focusing on the potential of Julius Caesar to be good. It reimagines the future of the universe with the Romans as rulers, when the Roman Republic never became the Roman Empire and the Republic never fell.

New Visions of Caesarism: Screening the Dictator in the Twenty-First Century
Hunter H. Gardner

This paper considers recent on-screen representations of Julius Caesar in light of comparable cinematic representations of the dictator produced in 1950’s and early 1960’s. I argue that, over the past fifty years, a subtle transformation in Caesar’s motives for attaining the dictatorship, along with shifts in emphases regarding his strengths and vulnerabilities, offers a useful index of Anglo-American attitudes toward the political concept of “Caesarism,” frequently a term of abuse in post-Revolutionary American politics (Malamud 2006). In a post-millennial political climate defined by the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon and subsequent formation of a coalition (conspicuously spearheaded by the United States) to invade Iraq, televisual portraits of the West’s most famous autocrat reflect upon and shape viewers’ responses to unchecked imperial ambition.

Drawing on recent scholarship chronicling the life of Caesar as an icon of Western culture (esp. Wyke 2008; Yavetz 1983), along with film studies evaluating Roman imperialism of the Hollywood epic (Cyrino 2005; Solomon 2001; cf. Burgoyne 2008), I situate recent portrayals of iconic moments in the life of Caesar relative to their post-World War II counterparts (Rex Harrison, Cleopatra [1963]; John Gavin, Spartacus [1960]). Clips of Rex Harrison’s regretful musings on the field of Pharsalus at the opening scene of Cleopatra are profitably contrasted with the victories enjoyed by Ciaran Hinds (Rome: Season One, HBO/BBC 2005) and Jeremy Sisto (Julius Caesar, TNT 2002). The serial dramas of the “small-screen” allow a more extensive treatment of Caesar’s manipulations of political amicitia, motivation by personal vendetta, and (in the case of Sisto) sense of divinely ordained purpose. Representations of Caesar’s interest in Egypt (“the East”), moreover, have diverged from Harrison’s dictator, moved equally by love and political ambitions, to recent portrayals that foreground his calculating desire to control the grain supply (cf. Empire, ABC 2005; Futrel 2008).

Hollywood’s treatment of Greco-Roman history has proven a useful index of shifts in American politics, as “Rome” is cast as an avatar of the pretensions and vulnerabilities of the American Empire. In light of this role that Rome plays in national cinema, and given the increasing importance that historical films have played in shaping national identity (Hughes-Warrington 2007), changes in the representation of Rome’s most iconic figure can help articulate anxieties about America’s changing role as a super-power since World War II. The political climate of the 1960’s, marked by civil rights reforms and increased scrutiny of a fledgling United Nations, famously infused the “dream” shared by Cleopatra and Caesar for a world united under Rome and Egypt (Cyrino 2005). More recently, however, the Caesars generated in popular culture
function as a negative reflex against the imperial aggressions of George W. Bush, a president often described as Caesarian (Wyke 2006). The final section of this paper speculates, amidst a current climate of increasing hesitation over U.S. foreign military presence, on the future of Caesar, whose televisual roles have been all but scripted (e.g., *Spartacus: Blood and Sand*).

**Playing Caesar: Rex Harrison, Thornton Wilder, and Julius Caesar in Joseph L. Mankiewicz's *Cleopatra* (1963)**

Robert Gurval

In his acclaimed autobiography, *A Damned Serious Business* (1991), the suave British actor Rex Harrison confesses that he accepted the role of Julius Caesar in the Hollywood epic film *Cleopatra* (1963) only to support his vineyards and villa San Genesio in his beloved Portofino. He claims that no one, including the film’s director and chief screenwriter, Joseph L. Mankiewicz, helped him very much in the challenge of playing Caesar. He complained of the verbose script, garish costumes, funny wigs, and make-up to erase all the lines from his face. Even though Mankiewicz explained that much of the original material came directly from Plutarch, Suetonius and Appian, Harrison turned to the recent biography by Carlo Maria Franzero, *The Life and Times of Cleopatra* (1957), which was credited in the film, and the epistolary novel by Thornton Wilder, *The Ides of March* (1948). The more Harrison studied Caesar the more fascinated he became. He had mixed feelings about the film’s outcome, but he believed that Caesar was “a good part”, and he enjoyed it “because he was a fine man and it was worth doing, and there were other compensations” [i.e. working with Elizabeth Taylor]. He would later receive an Academy Award nomination for his portrayal of Julius Caesar, the only acting nomination in a film that claimed a total of nine, including Best Picture, and later won four Oscars. *The New York Times* hugely influential but at times mean-spirited movie critic, Bosley Crowther, singled out Harrison’s performance as the best in the film and characterized his Caesar as a “fascinating study in political ambiguities” and “a statesman of manifest wisdom, shrewdness and magnanimity” (June 13, 1963).

As the fiftieth anniversary of the celebrated film approaches and the publication of Stacy Shiff’s Pulitzer Prize-winning biography secures a contract for a new Cleopatra of the 21st-century, rumored to be played by Angelina Jolie, it is fitting to re-evaluate its cinematic ambitions and achievements. This paper seeks to analyze Harrison’s nuanced portrayal of Julius Caesar and to assess his personal choices for understanding the part and the director’s contributions into shaping a contemporary figure of Caesar. Franzero’s biography was in a long tradition of popular, intimate lives of the Egyptian queen but it is hardly read today. Instead, Wilder’s creative novel, also mostly ignored, is an original and engaging portrayal of Caesar. Intricately designed in four uneven parts of the last year of his life, the story is told by a series of curiously invented documents in the form of letters, official papers and diaries, all transposed in a vivid present tense. Caesar emerges as a serious thinker on matters of politics, religion, love and fate. He is also profoundly in doubt and disappointed by those closest to him. Catullus, Brutus, and of course Cleopatra figure prominently in the work. But Thornton’s Caesar, influenced by the existential philosophy of Sartre and Kierkegaard, owes its origins to George Bernard Shaw’s play *Caesar and Cleopatra* (1898) and his conception of a ‘Superman’ borrowed from Nietzsche. This paper will also explore how Shaw’s character shaped the words and deeds of Caesar in Mankiewicz’ film as a moral, just, and remarkably dispassionate political leader. The
cinematic Caesar instructs the much younger Cleopatra (the age difference is a comic matter) in the art of statecraft and equips her to rule, even though Taylor’s character belongs to the 1960s and bears no resemblance to Shaw’s childish queen. The historical Caesar is a more enigmatic and complex figure, and if Suetonius can be believed, unrestrained and certainly impassioned.

Harrison followed up his role as Caesar with the Oscar-winning performance in My Fair Lady the next year. His Professor Henry Higgins teaches Cockney Eliza Doolittle to be a duchess and in the process falls in love. The resemblance between the two male characters is perhaps not coincidental. The popular Broadway show and film is based on another Shaw play, Pygmalion (1912).

The Imperfections of Caesar in Napoleon and Nietzsche
Daniel Barber

This paper treats two intertwined receptions of Julius Caesar by two of the nineteenth century’s most famous marginalized figures: Napoléon Bonaparte, living out his final years on St. Helena and Friedrich Nietzsche, retired from the University of Basel and convalescing in various southern European cities. Both men in their respective isolation turned, for different reasons, to Caesar’s life and works, captivated by his accomplishments but examining his weaknesses and personal failings with a critical eye. Both men drew inspiration from Caesar but, as I shall argue, both stand apart from the generalizing impulses of the Caesarism so prominent in nineteenth-century political discourse: both Napoléon and Nietzsche were especially interested in humanizing Caesar rather than condemning or defending his acts. I shall endeavor to show how these disparate but parallel attempts to re-imagine Caesar’s legacy, while in a sense disingenuous and self-serving, nonetheless throw light upon imperfect and human facets of Caesar’s image.

Napoléon Bonaparte dictated his Précis des Guerres de César to his valet de chambre Marchand during his exile on St. Helena. Napoléon was a close and critical reader of Caesar’s text: he attempted to ascertain details such as dates, distances, and battle maneuvers, and he was critical of Caesar’s imprecision in these matters. He admired Caesar’s personal leadership, his management of his provisions and his speed of movement, yet he questioned his tactics on occasion and even considered the invasions of Britain and Germany poorly planned and executed. He disapproved of Caesar’s occasional lapses of clemency during the Gallic Wars and doubted whether his personal courage in battle really compared to that of a modern general, who must constantly face hostile fire. The humanizing impulse to critique Caesar as a fellow general, rather than revere him as the founder of an empire, is in keeping with Napoléon’s rejection, throughout his political life, of easy generic analogies between modern and ancient circumstances (cf. P. Baehr, Caesar and the Fading of the Roman World (New Haven, 1998): 92-94).

Despite Napoléon’s disinclination, the analogy between Caesar and the French emperor became the dominant mode of understanding the legacy of both men in the years following the latter’s death. Nietzsche himself was seduced into admiring Napoléon as the Roman ideal of nobility and strength incarnate (On the Genealogy of Morals 1.16). Yet his final image of Caesar was more nuanced and more idiosyncratic than this bold analogy implies. In his late works, Nietzsche fixated upon two episodes from Plutarch’s Life of Caesar: young Caesar’s contemptuous treatment of pirates who had taken him hostage and his struggles with headaches and epilepsy
(Plutarch, Caes. 2 and 17). Caesar’s almost farcical boldness when held captive demonstrated to Nietzsche his ability to overcome a desperate situation through sheer force of will; his weak constitution spoke to the isolated and threatened nature of all true genius, which is fragile and especially at risk of annihilation. This Caesar is a Nietzschean sage: a dyspeptic, untimely, imperiled genius who wills himself even in his direst moments to be both calm and relentless. The resemblance is no accident: Nietzsche signed one of his last letters ‘Nietzsche Caesar’ (cf. A. Holzer, “Nietzsche Caesar” in H.W. Siemens and V. Roodt (ed.), Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought (Berlin, 2009): 371).

The solipsism of both approaches is evident: to judge Caesar’s campaigns by the standards of the Napoleonic Wars, or to cast him as a suffering and misunderstood genius is hardly to give the full historical picture. Nevertheless, both readings counterbalance the unabashed Caesarism of, for instance, Napoléon III, in that they both resist understanding Caesar the dictator as the inevitable product of historical necessity; they celebrate rather the perseverance and endurance of a remarkable but flawed human being who struggled and sometimes failed. They prove, in other words, that the image of Caesar is capacious enough to accommodate mortal qualities.

Caesar in Two 16th Century Neo-Latin Playwrights
Patrick Owens

This paper explores the stark contrasts of Caesar’s character in two important sixteenth century Neo-Latin works. Almost half-a-century before Shakespeare penned his Julius Caesar Marc-Antoine Muret (b.1526), a French humanist and classical scholar, wrote his Senecan tragedy by the same name, which brought into vogue the subject matter and indirectly influenced Shakespeare. Muret’s work revolves more around Caesar’s demise rather than the aftermath of his death, and therein lies a fascinating picture of this tragic hero. Nicodemus Frischlin (b.1547), a Latin poet and satirist from Würtemberg, brings Caesar back to life, as the epitome of the best of the ancient world, who peruses contemporary Germany, its technology, philosophy, and history. Frischlin satirizes the political and social state of affairs in his own Germany, which have been explored elsewhere, but this paper investigates what Julius Redivivus reveals about views towards the historical Caesar, who in Frischlin’s play is hardly recognizable.

Session 38: Transgressive Spaces in Classical Antiquity (organized by the Lambda Classical Caucus)

The Love of Achilles: Warfare as a Space of Transgression
Sebastian de Vivo

In this paper, I explore warfare as a liminal space in Archaic and Classical Greece, and in particular, the role of this liminality in conceptualizing male-male relationships that transgress traditional patterns of gender and sexual norms. How do fellow warriors relate to each other in
the space of battle? What are the means by which these bonds are constructed, expressed, signified, understood? And how, specifically, do these bonds transgress or defy the traditional patterns of male-male relationships codified in the political and daily life of the community?

I begin with an examination of the space of warfare as a potentially liminal one: given the nature of battle at the individual level—a chaotic, profoundly difficult experience, framed anthropologically as ‘betwixt and between’ social structures—ruptures and discontinuities arise that by necessity call upon the individual to develop coping mechanisms specific to this space. One, in particular, acquires special importance: namely, the bonds of companionship and comradeship that, to a great extent, predicate success upon the battlefield and enable the individual to manage warfare as a human experience. This becomes the case especially with the advent of hoplite warfare and phalanx tactics.

I then discuss the nature of these male-male bonds forged in and through warfare, focusing upon two principal exempla: first, the portrayal of Achilles and Patroklos in the Iliad, and the controversial nature of their bond as elaborated (and discussed) later in the Classical Period; and second, the construction and narration of the Sacred Band of Thebes and its social and philosophical contexts.

Given these two instances, I conclude that within the difficult, liminal space of warfare, absent in part the social structures that define transgression, the possibility arises of conceptualizing qualitatively different human bonds that lie outside these traditional structures, bonds in many ways unique to the space of warfare. Thus, these two instances provide us with a potential model that exists outside the traditional gender and sexual norms of Archaic and Classical Greece, and in so doing, open up and complicate the varieties of engagement available to individuals within these spaces of transgression.

**Euripides' Medea: Playing the Prostitute in Corinth**

Kate Gilhuly

This paper will examine the representation of Corinth in Euripides’ Medea. I will suggest that Euripides’ decision to explore the myth of Medea and Jason as it unfolded in Corinth has repercussions for the interpretation of the play. Euripides’ tragic Corinth anticipates and correlates with more transgressive visions of Corinth in other genres, especially comedy. In Athens, Corinth was imagined as a land of luxury and prostitution. Indeed, the Athenians associated Corinth so closely with prostitution that the verb comic poets derived from the city’s name, korinthiazesthai, “to play the part of the Corinthian,” means either to be a courtesan (hetairein) or, in the case of a male, to be a pimp, (mastropeuein). Since tragedy was a genre of the highest level of decorum, it did not accommodate the representation of prostitution of any kind. Nevertheless, the same Athenian conceptions about Corinth that comedy articulated through the register of prostitution are evident on the tragic stage. Awareness of Athenian stereotypes about Corinth will enhance and transform our interpretation of the events and characters that tragedy locates there.

Corinth was a major travel hub, and when people passed through, they had the opportunity to indulge in its expensive pleasures. Medea participated in the image of Corinth as a city through which many travelers passed. Jason and Medea arrive in Corinth having slaughtered their way
through the east and are greeted by the Corinthians with a great big welcome mat. The Nurse
describes Medea as “pleasing as an exile to the citizens of Corinth.” (10). Aegeus just happens
by. He is what Mark Buchan calls “a foreign presence, a haphazard addition and an affront to
any organic unity of the plot.” The fact that Aegeus is just happening by does however correlate
to the reputation of Corinth that exists beyond the tragic stage— for Corinth is the thoroughfare
par excellence.

Medea finds herself an unmarried woman in Corinth, a city known as a center of exchange and
movement, traffic in goods and services, with a specialty in sex trade. In any genre other than
tragedy, the image of a female metic in Corinth would raise the specter of the courtesan. Indeed,
juxtaposing the character of Medea, and her language with the semantic field of the courtesan
reveals a robust set of correlations. Scholars generally interpret Medea through the lens of one of
two typologies—the barbarian witch or the Greek male aristocrat. This paper will show that it is
precisely these two strands that come together in the figure of the *hetaira* as signaled by the
drama’s location in Corinth. To put it another way, we can read Medea as an exploration of the
courtesan type, writ large and tailored to the tragic stage. D.L. Page has emphasized the
importance of Medea’s foreignness to our interpretation of the play. Medea’s language and
comportment have also been interpreted as conforming to the Greek heroic code. Indeed, Helene
Foley has argued that Medea’s self is divided between a male heroic side, and a feminine
maternal side, and my argument builds on this observation, identifying the way masculine and
feminine are intertwined as analogous to the gendering of the *hetaira*. Medea’s efforts to engage
in the masculine sphere of exchange are persistently intertwined with her sexuality. While it
might seem strange to search for the invisible courtesan in a genre from which she is excluded,
the setting of the play in Corinth prompts us to do this. Indeed the imprint of the courtesan in the
portrayal of Medea was perceptible in the ancient world, for there are numerous fragments from
Machon’s *Chreiai* in which courtesans parody the lines of Euripides’ *Medea*.

**Wisdom's Main Stage: Queer Spaces and Personified Wisdom in Proverbs 1-9**

M. Tong

עירם בשער אמאದה אמאד תוקאר / במחנה שברתי צרה / בחביתา שברתי קרנה / ברחבת תחנ קולות / ברחבות תחנ קולה

Outside, Wisdom gives a ringing cry, / In the streets she bestows her voice; / At the head of the
crowds, she calls out, / In the city gates, she speaks her piece. (Proverbs 1:20-21)

Most readers of the book of Proverbs in the Hebrew Bible assume that Wisdom is a woman.
Although it is true that later Wisdom literature, such as Ben Sira, would unequivocally label
Wisdom as female, the book of Proverbs presents a more complicated impression of Wisdom's
gender. Drawing from the ideas of performative gender expression from Judith Butler, as well as
taking seriously the symbolic nature of Wisdom's characterization, this paper seeks to
problematize the traditional assumptions about the gender of personified Wisdom in Proverbs.
Since all meaning is constructed contextually, I demonstrate that there is no compelling lexical
reason to define Wisdom as female and argue that a close reading of how Wisdom's gender is
constructed textually and narratively is essential to determining her gender. In particular, I argue
that the spaces where Wisdom can be found are consistently characterized in the Hebrew Bible
as spaces of masculine power. Personified Wisdom's occupation of such masculine and masculinist spaces troubles a superficial reading of her gender performance resulting in a Wisdom who is either genderqueer, gender transgressive or both.

Wisdom is surprisingly public for a female character in the Hebrew Bible. Unlike most women in the Hebrew Bible, she speaks outside (בַּחֲצָרָם, הבָּאָר) and in crowded places (הָיָה, השֶׁרֶץ), not just as a member of the multitude, but at its head (שָׁבְרַא, שַׁבְרַא). However, it is Wisdom's location "at the city gates" (בֵּית הַלַּיְלָה, בֵּית הַלַּיְלָה), which is particularly interesting. This paper focuses specifically on how the city gates, usually understood both in Ancient Israel and the Hebrew Bible as a space of masculine power, is the main stage upon which Wisdom acts out her queer performance. Her calling out at the city gates is reminiscent, not just of transgressive women such as Tamar who seduces her father-in-law at the entrance to Enaim (עָנָי בֶּית הָעָנִי, Genesis 38:14), but also of the socially transgressive prophets such as Jeremiah who prophesies at the Potsherd Gate (פתח עָרֶשׁ, Jeremiah 19:2). Proverbs unites these elements in its characterization of Wisdom who appears more like a fabulous drag queen dispensing knowledge to the young men who flock to her. Her power and allure seems both generated and contained by the city gates, a space of liminality where oppressive masculine power is simultaneously maintained and resisted.

Transgressive Choral Space in Horace, *Odes* 2.5
Lauren Curtis

This paper examines the construction and transgression of female space in the final stanza of Horace, *Odes* 2.5. In this surprising stanza, Horace compares the beautiful Lalage to a male figure named Gyges "who, if you set him in a chorus of girls, would amazingly trick even wise guests, difficult to distinguish with his flowing hair and ambiguous looks" (2.5.21-4). I first suggest that the female chorus, a prime site for gender performance in the Greek world, is the ultimate space in which to present Gyges subverting gender norms and diverting the ode’s narrative of female desirability. I then argue that this space is invested with a complex range of associations: the reader is invited to confront the tensions between vulnerable virginity and available sexuality that arise when a female body is displayed in choral performance. Like the figure of Gyges himself, the space into which he steps partakes in ambiguity and hybridity that is constructed in the process of reading. Horace’s manifold response to Greek choral poetics contributes to the creation of an imaginary landscape of erotic display.

I begin by demonstrating the central role of Greek choral poetics in the ode’s final turn. When Horace concludes his catalogue of female desirability with the subversive figure of Gyges, he asks the reader to conduct a thought experiment by placing him in a “chorus of girls” (puellarum...choro, 21). The venue is coded as female, and the word chorus further evokes Greek performance spaces where young women performed their status as objects of male desire. Gyges’ ability to pass as a woman in a traditional venue of female performance demonstrates the extreme flexibility of his identity. I then trace the multiple spheres of reference of this choral space, demonstrating how each of its associations with Greek chorality is activated and revised. On the one hand, the ode’s imagery depicted Lalage as a model of young female virginity on the cusp of readiness for a husband (maritum, 16). The other figures of comparison, Phloë and Chloris, further contributed to an impression of skittish and modest maidenhood (fugax, 17; pura, 19). With this in mind, the reader might well imagine the “chorus of girls” as a maidenly group of parthenoi in the Greek tradition, where the chorus acts as a space that mediates between
potential bride and potential husband. However, line 22 causes this interpretation to be revised as a piece of new information is added: an internal audience of “guests” (hospites, 22). Suddenly the associations are sympotic, and Gyges is part of a more overtly sexualized troupe of “dancing girls” where the term puella takes on a more loaded sexual meaning. The exact valence of Gyges’ transgression is ambiguous, but in both cases he destabilizes the viewer’s ability to posit normative gender distinctions in a space where sex is active currency between viewer and viewed.

The final part of my paper posits a comparison between the final stanza of Odes 2.5 and Lycomedes’ manipulation of female chorality in Statius’ Achilleid. The reading both confirms my interpretation of Odes 2.5 and offers new insight into Statius’ narrative. It is well known that Horace’s Gyges is an important model for Statius’ treatment of Achilles’ sojourn on Scyros, where the hero both participates in and disrupts the choral rites of Lycomedes’ daughters. I suggest that the influence of Odes 2.5 can be further seen in Lycomedes’ decision to woo his guests (hospites, 1.823), Ulysses and Diomedes, by transforming his daughters’ ritual chorality into a sympotic entertainment that puts them on display. As Peter Heslin has recently argued, Lycomedes’ behaviour distorts the boundaries between different kinds of female performance in an act of profanity. I argue that Statius thematizes the ambiguity of female chorality in a way that makes more explicit the manipulation of chorale space in Odes 2.5.

Walk on the Wild Side: Queer Landscape in the House of Octavius Quartio in Pompeii
David Fredrick

Despite their differences with respect to penetration and heteronormativity, the sex-gender systems of classical antiquity and the contemporary West seem to agree in presenting nature as a female body that must be tamed and controlled (Bordo, Carson, Detienne). Indeed, porticoes and picture-windows in Roman houses arguably function to subordinate a feminized landscape to the male gaze through a sequence of framed, orderly views (Bergmann, Clarke 1991). However, an analysis of the frescoes and gardens of the House of Octavius Quartio in Pompeii (II.2.2-5) suggests that its landscapes, both painted and real, elide the boundary between nature and the male body. As represented by the statue of Hermaphroditus in its garden, landscape in this house shifts queerly between “feminine” and “masculine,” a labile metaphor for the penetrability of either gender, or both.

As Platt and von Stackelberg have pointed out, the frescoes of the upper terrace (i) illustrate the dangers of the voyeuristic gaze turned back on itself. At the same time, they open up provocative connections between landscape and the male body. In the paintings flanking the doorway of room f, Diana’s grotto is not simply a vaginal metaphor, but also representative of the wounded surface of Actaeon’s body. In the paintings flanking biclinium k, the locus amoenus is in part a metaphor for the desirable bodies of Narcissus and Pyramus, and each will be transformed into a landscape element, Narcissus a flower and Pyramus’ blood the ripe mulberry. The painting of Orpheus west of the doorway to triclinium h, now lost (Spinazzola vol.1, 390-91, Tronchin vol. 1, 262), encapsulates the tension between male control of or immersion in landscape. Orpheus is depicted charming nature with his song, much as the view out of triclinium h seems to frame and master the lower garden. However, this painted cycle depends on Ovid’s Metamorphoses, and so
the Orpheus fresco implies the content of Orpheus’ song in book 10: eroticized male bodies transformed into landscape elements (Cyparissus, Hyacinthus, Adonis, Hippomenes). Orpheus himself will be dismembered by the Thracian women at the beginning of book 11, dissolved, like Actaeon, back into the landscape.

As the visitor moves down from the terrace (i) to the lower garden (j), s/he discovers a grotto which is the source for the lower canal. Within is a second depiction of Diana and Actaeon, but now the visitor has been cast as Actaeon, stunned at the sight of Diana by peering into the grotto. If the visitor then continues down the canal, at the other end s/he comes upon a statue of Hermaphroditus, roughly one-third lifesize. Its recumbent posture, right arm lifted up behind the head in the “come-hither” pose (Clarke 1998.68-70), matches that found in sculptures and paintings of Hermaphroditus discovered by Pan. Meanwhile, the uplifted right arm of Pan found in these images matches the uplifted arm of Actaeon looking upon Diana. Thus the visitor, having played Actaeon, now seems to play Pan. Within the billowing fold in Hermaphroditus’ lap Pan (and the visitor) finds an erect phallus, implying the reversability of the scene and thus his (her?) own penetrability.

The queer mutability of landscape in the House of Octavius Quartio is captured by the sculpture of Hermaphroditus, or more fundamentally, by the recess/grotto/orifice it implies in the body of the spectator. Moving in sequence, the painted grotto beside Diana on the terrace (i) leads to the constructed grotto of the biclinium (k), to a second grotto of Diana underneath the terrace, to the drapery fold in the lap of Hermaphroditus, to the penetrable “folds” of the viewer’s own body. Rather than affirming social boundaries, this queer play with landscape dramatizes the complex negotiation of status in this house, elaborately remodeled after the earthquake but reduced in size, with close connections to the shops in front, and potential use for commercial production.

**Don't Sext in the Orchard!: Transgression and Sensation in the *Carmina Priapea***

Elizabeth Young

When we think of a “space,” what comes to mind is unlikely to be a poem. But poems are linguistic spaces par excellence whose form and style mark them off from the space of everyday speech. This paper treats a corpus of Latin poems that mobilize the spatial element of poetic language to explore the intersection of spatial, verbal and sexual transgression. The *Carmina Priapea* is a collection of anonymous polymetrics that fixate upon a single unsettling scenario: the ithyphallic god Priapus lording over his garden and threatening would-be thieves with anal rape. The thematic premise of these poems thus combines an act of spatial violation (invading Priapus’ garden) with an act of sexual violation (invading the thief’s body). This thematic scenario is then restaged at the level of discourse: these poems are verbal gardens the reader is invited to explore. Of course, this exploratory reading is also an invasion that, within the Priapic scenario, has an inevitable outcome: rape. The reader enters these orchards knowing full well that the trespass will result in their own verbal violation. The reader is thus positioned as a sexual deviant, a *cinaedus* who luxuriates in an experience more commonly considered a humiliating assault.
My primary purpose in this paper is to explore the nexus of verbal pleasure/punishment and sexual transgression that governs the space of these poems, conducting an analysis of these poems at a phenomenological level. The past two or so decades have witnessed a flurry of scholarly activity that has greatly aided our understanding of this confounding corpus. This work includes commentaries, translations and textual discussions (Goldberg, Hooper, Jackson & Murgia, Parker) as well as a monograph on Priapus as a literary character (O Connor) and several studies of the *Priapea* in relation to mainstream Latin texts (Uden, Hallett, Habash). Amid this wealth of material, Richlin has done the most to illuminate priapic poetry by positioning it within the broader contexts of Roman sexual humor.

My paper seeks to add something to this developing conversation by approaching the *Priapea* in phenomenological terms. Drawing on the growing body of scholarship on ancient sexuality (Davidson, Hallet & Skinner, Halperin 1990 & 2002, Williams, etc.) as well as theoretical studies of poetic phenomenology (Stewart, Ngai) my paper investigates the interplay between language, sensation and transgression within this corpus. I argue that the *Priapea* enact a variety of somatic effects that allow readers to luxuriate in contradictory experiences: transgressor and transgressed, “normal” and deviant, seeker of poetic pleasure and reveler in poetic pain. With the 15-minute time limit firmly in mind, I address these large-scale issues through a close analysis of a few select poems. For instance, I explore the experiential effect of an obscene pun in poem 7 which consists of a single elegiac couplet. I discuss the phenomenological implications of transgressive intertextual borrowing in poem 2, a hendecasyllabic poem that coyly inverts familiar Catullan slogans. The sum of these highly detailed readings is a novel take on the *Priapea* that also adds to our knowledge about the ways poetic spaces toy with familiar Roman categories of sexual deviance and spatial transgression. If poetry is, as Susan Stewart suggests, “an archive of lost sensual experiences” (332), the *Priapea* might allow us to recover how a Roman actually felt as he transgressed the lurid spaces of these alluring poems.

---

**Session 39: Ancient Greek Philosophy (organized by the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy)**

**Seeing, Knowing, and Explaining in Plato's *Republic***

**Gary Hartenburg**

Over the course of the *Republic*, Plato gives an account of knowledge that is important to the project of the *Republic*. However, readers have not always been able to parse the elements of Plato’s account of knowledge in the right way. This paper attempts to lay out the main contours of that account and disentangle it from a common misconception, which is that knowledge is akin to a kind of mental gaze, along the lines of sense perception. Given the parallels Plato draws between sight and knowledge, this misconception is in some sense understandable, but it is nonetheless mistaken. Thus, in what follows, I will explain why Plato thinks sense perception is deficient (compared to knowledge), what Plato’s account of knowledge is, and, briefly in conclusion, what sight and knowledge really have in common.
Aristotle on the Truth of Things
John Thorp

Most of Aristotle's texts dealing with truth are unexceptionable: truth belongs only to sentences or beliefs, and it does so in virtue of a correspondence between those sentences or beliefs and the things in the world that they are about. Single words cannot be true, and the things in the world, whether single or compound, cannot be true either. There is however one text, Chapter 10 of Book Theta of the Metaphysics, that breaks with these familiar and comfortable views; it allows that single words or thoughts can be true, and also that things in the world, whether single or compound, can be true as well. This paper reviews a number of attempts to make sense of the truth of things – Brentano, Aquinas, Heidegger – and finds them all wanting. It then goes on to make a new proposal, exploring that part of the semantic terrain of alêthîes and its cognates that has to do with genuineness, with realness, and so, ultimately, with existence.

Aristotle on Reciprocal Love
David Jennings

In EN 8.2, Aristotle says that “friendship is said to be reciprocal love.” I argue that reciprocity is foundational in Aristotle’s account of friendship because it makes possible the goods distinction of friendship and is built into the nature of friendly love itself.

Session 40: Religion and Violence in Late Roman North Africa (Seminar)
Making Space for Violence
Catherine Conybeare

At the beginning of Sacred Violence, Brent Shaw observes that "violence is rarely seen as a thing in its own right and is radically under-theorized" (4). In this paper, I shall begin to meet the implicit challenge to provide a theorization of violence. Ritual violence, the violence of sacrifice, has been well explored; what we need is an account of quotidian violence, the inglorious aggression and brutality that may erupt in the course of daily life. I shall reach towards this theory of quotidian violence with inspiration from the work of Hannah Arendt - using not her own remarks on violence, which again bespeak something on a grander scale, but her description of politics as what is generated "in the space between people". If politics is generated "in the space between people", is that not equally true of violence? What precipitates the shift in nature of that space, or the way it is used? How - to put it another way - do we shift between words and blows? And is it apt to call violence, as Shaw does, a "thing in its own right", or do we need a more dynamic concept to capture its peculiar force? I shall explore these notions with reference to some of the late antique primary sources from North Africa that Shaw brings to our attention, particularly the conciliar records; but lest we be tempted to assign this turn to quotidian violence
to the realm of "otherness", I shall also use as comparandum a well-documented event from the late twentieth century, the murder of Pierre Laporte during the 1970 October Crisis in Quebec.

**Monotheism and Violence**

*Hal Drake*

In Sacred Violence, Brent Shaw devotes more than 800 pages to the study of two centuries of religious violence in North Africa without once invoking, or even acknowledging, the paradigm that ancient historians have long relied upon to explain such violence: that it was bred by inherent Christian intolerance derived ultimately from the inability of monotheists to recognize belief in other deities. Paradoxically, I will argue that this may well be his book's most important contribution to our understanding of this period. The reason for this apparent neglect seems to reside in two traits that have distinguished Shaw's career as a whole. The first is that Shaw, whereas the intolerance argument relies primarily on a priori reasoning, Shaw is rigidly empirical in his approach. As he says on numerous occasions, the specifics of acts of violence work against any effort to provide a universal explanation for the violence of this period. Second, Brent Shaw is one of the few ancient historians who have ventured out of their comfort zone to compare religious violence in the ancient and modern world, and the intolerance argument results in an inward-looking scholarship that discourages such an effort. Shaw's decision to open his study by looking at acts of what might be called traditional civic violence is decisive, for it allows Shaw to situate his study under the rubric of "violence," rather than "religion." This in turn accounts for a crucial insight. He discovers that the "circumcellions" who are usually held up as examples of a peculiarly north African form of religious violence are a literary construct used by Catholic bishops like Augustine of Hippo to lobby for government support against their sectarian rivals. Far from being unique or irrational, these "bad boys" as Shaw has labeled them here and elsewhere, were no more than a subset of itinerant laborers whose brawling conditioned them to serve as both enforcers and guardians of a religious identity deeply rooted in the tradition of martyrdom. The result is a book that contributes to our understanding of religious violence not only in this period, but also in the pre-modern and modern periods.

**Shock horror or same old same old? Everyday violence in Augustine's Africa**

*Cam Grey*

Recent studies of violence in the ancient Mediterranean world have stressed just how radically under-theorized the phenomenon is in modern scholarly literature. In response to this, they have identified a particular aspect or expression of violence, and used that as a foundation for generating a theoretical framework for understanding violent behavior more generally. But what relationship does general, generalized, or everyday violence have to the more reified, bounded forms of violence that have been the subject of scholarly attention to date? How should we best interpret the place of violence within households and communities, and its relationship to “non-violent” means of communication and interaction? If we accept the proposition that the ancient world was, on the whole, a more violent world to live in than the one in which we live, what implications does that realization have for our analysis of everyday life in antiquity? It will be the purpose of this paper to explore these questions, focusing principally upon the written sources from Augustine’s Africa. I will examine the relationships, boundaries, and transitions
between violence and other social strategies for expressing or effecting the goals or objectives of an individual, household, or community. In particular, I will explore moments where the movement from “non-violent” to “violent” acts—and in some instances, back again—follows a trajectory that is shocking or unexpected to modern observers. I will argue that in the ancient Mediterranean world, violence need not necessarily be interpreted as a last-order option, or even a particularly unusual or paradigm-shifting tactic, but, rather, as simply one element in a complex, and perhaps not completely cohesively and hierarchically organized, set of possibilities. Such an approach offers much to the social historian of everyday life in antiquity.

Harnessing Violence: Armed Force as Manpower in the Late Roman Countryside
Noel Lenksi

Surplus violence is a product of all societies, a normal – and generally male – subset of social discourse. Bar fighting, sports rowdyism, and gangbanging are modern – western – expressions of a phenomenon that cuts across cultures and time periods. For community and political leaders, such violence often goes unremarked, but it always constitutes a potential threat to their claims to authority and a legal monopoly on the use of force. For this reason, it well behooves such leaders both to minimize the opportunities for the expression of surplus physical aggression and, whenever possible, to reinscribe these into frameworks that support their ongoing claims to power.

In Sacred Violence, Brent Shaw has lucidly and vividly shown how rival Christian communities in late antique North Africa appropriated random violence and reinscribed it into structures of religious meaning. The circumcelliones, decried in ancient Catholic sources as roving bands of Donatist marauders, were not ancient labor protestors nor the violent wing of an ethnic uprising against imperial authority, as has previously been argued. They were, rather, mobile seasonal workers whose surplus violent energy was deployed in socially constitutive ways to assert property claims and coerce compliance in favor of a cause. Using the discourse of scripture, religious leaders reinterpreted their expressions of violence as sacred or profane depending on where they stood in relation to the perpetrators: for supporters of the perpetrators these acts represented the enactment of theodicy against the unholy; for victims the manifestation of diabolical transgression against the divine order; and for both the potential for sanctification through confession or martyrdom – the sacred victimhood so prized by Christians.

This paper will outline Shaw’s vastly important argument with an eye to presenting its complex contribution to ancient history and the history of religious violence in digestible form. It will then contextualize Shaw’s work by framing it against the backdrop of private violence in other regions of the late antique Mediterranean. It will show how the rapid retreat of the state in the late fourth and early fifth century fostered a rise in claims to violent authority at the personal and local level. Building on arguments made elsewhere for the increased use of armed dependents and private security forces in the period, it will ask why the larger phenomenon of sub-state militias expressed itself variously in the different regions of the failing empire. Emphasizing the key role of violent verbal and physical discourse in community building and identity formation, it will attempt to explain why the North African expression of an empire-wide problem took on the coloring of “sacred violence.” Using Post-Marxist theory, it will portray the surplus violence
of social dependents as an exchange commodity that could be harnessed and redeployed, but also
given symbolic meanings contingent upon ethnic and religious contexts.

FIFTH SESSION
FOR THE READING OF PAPERS
Session 41: Some Late Antique Vergils

Labor hilaris non improbus: Redefining Labor in
Nemesianus’ Cynegetica
Lisa Whitlatch

As part of his attempt to surpass the Augustan-era works of Vergil’s Georgics and Grattius’
Cynegetica, Nemesianus redefines labor as a straightforward and positive endeavor. The
improbus (“relentless”) labor of the farmer in Vergil’s Georgics (1.145-146) and the inpensum
(“excessive”) labor of Grattius’ Cynegetica (1.234) contrasts to Nemesianus’ hilaresque
(“cheerful”) labores (1.1). The choice of adjective may strike the reader as unusual, but only if
we do not consider the entire poem and its tradition. The labores on the one hand are literary,
metaphorically referring to the creation of poetry, and represent the literary polemic of the proem
(ll.1-102), which establishes the work as a superior poetic project. But the labores are also the
actual hunting labors taught in the fragmentary Cynegetica (ll.103-325), and they display
didactic polemic, or the intent to prove itself more functionally useful than its predecessors. The
Cynegetica not only is a work of late antique literary reception, but also rehabilitates the attitude
towards work in a didactic project. Hard work, a necessity to accomplish any goal, can be
approached in a positive way.

It has been established that Nemesianus, a Carthaginian from the late third century AD, engages
in literary reception. Scholars have accepted the influence of Vergil upon Nemesianus’
Cynegetica (e.g. Luiselli 1958, Küppers 1987, Paschalis 2000), in particular features of Georgics
Book 3: untrodden paths (Verg. G.3.40-41, Nem. 3-9), recusationes for non-mythological
subjects (Verg. G.3.3-8, Nem.15-47), and praise of the emperors (Verg. G. 3.46-48, Nem. 63-
85). Grattius’ influence upon Nemesianus has been more in doubt (e.g. Luiselli 1958, Paschalis
2000), but Luiselli 1958 argued convincingly for Nemesianus’ awareness of the earlier
cynegetica writer. There is no scholarly consensus on whether Nemesianus (e.g. Mastorosa
1994, Gitton 2001) or Grattius (e.g. Orlandi 1979) is a more useful and serious didactic author.
From Nemesianus’ polemical attitude, however, it is clear that he intends his work to be read as
more useful whether or not the content is more accurate.

Nemesianus’ polemic is made clear in both the arrangement and the presentation of the
material. In the proem, he seems to present the hunt as a light-hearted game (Nem. 1-2) free
from the stress of the real world (Nem. 99-102). On the surface, the hilaresque labores (Nem. 1)
 starkly opposes the improbus labor of the Georgics (Verg. G. 1.145-146), and as the change of
attitude is optimistic and playful, scholars have viewed Nemesianus’ lessons as literary and not
practical (Orlandi 1979, Paschalis 2000). However, this understanding ignores the hard work
that is to be expected in the hunt. The reader cannot confuse calm with the absence of work or
cheerfulness with the absence of physical struggle (cf. Toohey 2004 on the complexity of leisure activities in antiquity). Nemesianus also fashions his attitude as serious by the organization of the material: for example, he discusses dogs first while Vergil and Grattius only said that dogs should be discussed first (Verg. G. 3.404, Grat.151 -152, Nem. 103-104). The presentation of the didactic content in Nemesianus’ poem is also polemical towards its predecessors in the way that it presents the material--sometimes ruthlessly--without a consideration towards moral or religious lessons. Nemesianus’ test for the strength of puppies, for example, requires that the owner enclose the puppies within a ring of fire to see whom the mother saves (Nem. 144-150). Grattius’ advice is merely to weigh the puppies (Grat. 286-300). The content of the plague narrative in Nemesianus is streamlined to the point that it quickly dismisses concerns about divine causation and intervention, which are central concerns in Vergil’s and Grattius’ works (cf. Verg. G. 3.440-566, Grat. 344-497, Nem. 195-223). The labor in Nemesianus may be described as hilaris, but it is nevertheless demanding and serious, and it helps Nemesianus to establish his relationship to two influential authors and the Latin poetic tradition.

**Remembering ‘Maidenly’ Vergil: Sex and Intertext in Ausonius's Cento Nuptialis**

Ellen Cole

As a sexually explicit epithalamium constructed from a patchwork of Vergilian verses, Ausonius’s *Cento Nuptialis* represents a complex poetic that straddles the barriers between writer and reader in late antiquity. Ausonius draws a parallel between himself and Vergil (as well as his text and the Vergilian corpus) in sexual and military terms that deconstruct textual authority. Although Adams, Pollmann, and McGill discuss some of the intertextual play in which Ausonius engages, I argue that, through allusive repurposing of Vergil, Ausonius not only interacts with Vergil poetically, but confirms and reinvigorates the reception and memory of Vergil in late antiquity. (See Hinds and Martindale for intertext and reception, respectively.)

The Vergilian cento, as an exhibition of the centonist’s mastery over the hypotext, casts the author as both reader and (re)writer of Vergil, and, as I argue, Ausonius frames his relationship to Vergil in terms of domination. Within the cento, Ausonius aligns himself with the dominating bridegroom and Vergil with the passive bride, although, in the cento’s prose epistolary frame, he displays deference to the dignitas of Vergilian verse and worries about making parthenius Vergil impudens. The intercourse between the centonist and the hypotext’s author is portrayed as a shockingly violent, plundering assault. When the cento’s bride entreats her groom to delay her deflowering, Ausonius duplicates the Aeneid’s depiction of the defeated Turnus pleading for mercy. Through intertextual play, Ausonius assigns himself both the roles of the despoiling bridegroom and of the conquering Aeneas, while Vergil plays the role of the virgin bride and the subjugated Turnus. Writing is both sex and war, and the later poet must dominate his predecessors.

However, as I demonstrate, Ausonius problematizes this representation of the centonist’s power over the hypotext. Ausonius makes clear in his prose that Vergil, although not the active partner in the cento’s production, is not stripped of his textual authority. Ausonius argues that his critics should forgive his playful ribaldry because, after all, the text is de Vergilio and, therefore, blameless. Despite his rape at the hands of Ausonius, Vergil remains an authoritative figure and,
in fact, maintains so much power over his text that he becomes the primary champion of the vulnerable cento, while Ausonius appears on the margins, as a mere reader of Vergil, just like everyone else. Vergil’s “maidenly” sensibilities may recoil from the cento’s themes, but his literary reputation remains intact.

I resolve these seemingly inconsistent portrayals of the power relationship between Ausonius and Vergil by framing the cento in its cultural and historical context. I argue that Ausonius’s manipulation of Vergil’s poetry, despite its rough and ravaging nature, corresponds to prevalent methods of establishing and remembering literary authority in late antiquity. As a late antique reader of Vergil, Ausonius was part of a literary society that deconstructed Vergil as an integral part of scholarship. The practices of memorizing Vergilian verses piecemeal, constructing grammars and commentaries, and collecting *cacemphata* help the reader remember Vergil, while simultaneously splintering his verse into increasingly smaller *membra*. Ausonius’s cento, although it portrays such dismantling as molestation, confirms and enacts the memory of Vergil by compelling the reader to participate in the intertextual exchange between the cento’s use of these *membra* and their context within the hypotext. For example, in quoting the phrase “*non iniussa cano*” (*CN* 10), Ausonius references not only Vergil’s *recusatio* in *Eclogues* VI.9, but also evokes the better-known usage of the same verb in the *Aeneid*’s first line, recalling multiple Vergilian passages for the reader simultaneously.

The late antique reader would have recognized Ausonius’s cento as both a virtuosic display of memory and an act of poetic creation that strengthened Vergil’s authority, rather than devaluing his verse, through its ribaldry. The reuse of Vergilian verse in the *Cento Nuptialis* of Ausonius does not function as obliteration of Vergil, but rather as recognition of and evidence for the poetic and cultural worth of Vergil and his poetry in late antiquity.

**Lactantius, Vergil, and the Sibylline Oracles**

Scott A. Lepisto

This paper argues that the indeterminacies of Vergil’s fourth *Eclogue* are best understood as operating in the context of a literary culture of Sibylline song. While some scholars have attempted to pin down the poem’s vague referents (for instance its setting and the identity of the child referred to in the poem), I argue that such readings run the risk of overlooking how practices of oracular writing and reading inform the text. Although there has been debate over whether or not Vergil referred to a specific oracle (e.g. Norden 1931:169), as this paper demonstrates, such considerations are often not germane to the culture of oracular writing. Given the methods of recomposition and reinterpretation that are hallmarks of the Sibylline Oracles (Parke 1988), indeterminacy and ambiguity are not to be dispelled, but rather understood as functional assets of Sibylline song, which allow the text to be applied to circumstances that the author may not have foreseen. In the brief history that I provide, even oracles meant to commemorate particular events are shown to fit new circumstances. The temporal collapse of *Eclogue* 4 with its repetition of *iam* (Breed 2006:138), the allusion to the Cumaean *carmen* in the fourth line, the indeterminacy of setting (Jenkyms 1989: 28), and the ambiguous identity of the child (Coleman 1977: 150-152) all act as markers of the poem's potential for reapplication to new circumstances independent of Vergil’s awareness or intent. Moreover, the way that Sibylline Oracles speak to multiple moments seems to be depicted in the incongruous temporal movements of the poem.
Lactantius’s rewriting of the poem in the *Divinae Institutiones* points in this direction (7.24.11). One of his primary and most influential innovations is in using the *Eclogue* pragmatically just as any other Sibylline Oracle. In doing so, he exposes the ambiguities of the fourth *Eclogue* as hermeneutic entry points for oracular methods of literary engagement (reinterpretation and recomposition). His use of the poem to describe the Second Coming shows the way that the hermeneutic openness of the fourth *Eclogue* allows it to offer new meanings under the sway of an ideology foreign to that of its creator. Moreover, Lactantius’s literary theories (e.g. *DI* 7.22.1-4) about the inadvertent transmission of truth can be used to understand better the oracular character of Vergil’s poem, which speaks to circumstances unforeseen by its author as well as the oracular rewriting of Lactantius himself. Through this reading of Lactantius’s engagement with the poem and a brief historical account of the fluidity of the Sibylline Oracles, I explain the essential ambiguities of *Eclogue 4* as ambiguities with a functional purpose in a culture of Sibylline song and suggest that to determine the indeterminacy of the poem runs the risk of misunderstanding the literary practices of the writing culture out of which it was born.

**Session 42: Gender and Civic Identity**

**The Origins of the So-Called "Solonic Law" on Hetairêsí**

Thomas K. Hubbard

Many scholars have considered the Athenian law disqualifying male prostitutes from political participation as fundamental to regulating the sexual ethics of the “democratic citizen body” (e.g. Dover, Halperin, Winkler, Cohen). However, the orators frequently attribute to Solon laws whose exact origins they did not know, and few legal historians consider this law genuinely Solonic (see Ruschenbusch). This paper aims to identify the most likely period for this matter becoming an issue as the aftermath of the Periclean citizenship law of 451.

One must question whether the concept of “male prostitution” as distinct from traditional pederastic gift-giving could have had any meaning in the pre-monetary economy of Solonic Athens. It is unlikely that a clear concept of “male prostitution” could have existed even in the late sixth- or early fifth-centuries. As Andrew Lear’s careful study of pederastic iconography in the vase painting of this period has shown, there is little difference between scenes that feature presentation of a money bag and those involving other gifts to boys, certainly nothing suggesting moral judgment.

Demosthenes and Aeschines, in the mid-fourth century, are the only two sources explicitly attributing to Solon any limitation of citizen rights for having once been a prostitute; only Aeschines uses this law as an actual basis for prosecution in the case argued, and even then, only to forestall his own prosecution. Demosthenes’ speech against Androtion is over a different charge relating to an unlawful proposal, but he raises the prostitution accusation in a digressive excursus whose main goal is to blacken his opponent’s character. Androtion had been active in Athenian politics for at least 30 years without anyone having prosecuted him for unlawful political involvement on the grounds of prostitution. Androtion apparently responded to Demosthenes’ charge with a technical claim that the present court was not the proper venue for adjudicating such matters, but the Thesmothetes.
Aeschines’ better known prosecution of Timarchus in 346 also did not transpire before the Thesmotheutes; the dispute over procedure and venue in the Androtion case nine years earlier suggests that prosecutions specifically on this matter were not in fact very common, and as van’t Wout has recently argued, atimia was a vague legal concept enforced only sporadically. Andocides 1.100, dated to 399, also includes a charge about his opponent’s unfitness to bring the case, but as in Demosthenes’ speech against Androtion, the matter is a digression meant to attack the opponent’s ethos, not a point of actual legal contention. That Andocides nowhere ascribes to Solon the law prohibiting former prostitutes from political involvement may suggest that its actual origin was still a matter of living memory at the end of the fifth-century.

Our earliest reference to politicians using charges of prostitution to deny citizen rights to rivals comes in Aristophanes’ Knights (875-80), dated to 424. But Cleon’s “erasure” of Grypus, presumably a reference to the citizen rolls of the phratries, appears not to be a case of atimia so much as one of denying citizen status altogether, as democratic politicians were wont to do after Pericles’ reform of the citizenship law; Aristophanes elsewhere suggests that Cleon had also questioned his own citizenship. We owe the so-called Solonic “law” on prostitution to this political context. Athenians increasingly came to value citizen privileges exempting them from the physical toil and banausic pursuits of slaves and metics. Prostitution especially was a form of labor inconsistent with citizen status, as emphasized in Apollodorus’ ugly attacks on Neaera and Phano. Independent literary and iconographic evidence suggest that elite pederasty generally came to be situated uneasily within the radical democracy of the late fifth-century (see Shapiro, Hubbard). I suspect that the so-called “law” may have never been an actual law so much as a collective memory and cultural codification of the principles behind demagogic attacks on elite opponents whose pederastic histories made them, like Timarchus, easy targets for exaggerated claims of mercenary motives or questionable adherence to “citizen” values.

Elpinikê and the Categorization of Citizen Women and Hetaira
Rebecca F. Kennedy

In the voluminous scholarship on Athenian women, the aristocratic Elpinikê is rarely mentioned. And yet we have more anecdotal information on her than perhaps any other citizen woman from classical Athens. After a careful overview of the literary and material evidence for Elpinikê's life, I argue in this paper that Elpinikê falls between two categories of women, the wife and the hetaira. Further, I argue that Elpinikê's liminality has implications for how we discuss the lives of Athenian citizen women and how we categorize women as hetairai.

Elpinikê (early to mid 5C BCE) was the daughter of Miltiades, sister of Kimon and wife of Kallias. She had a Thracian mother. She was said to have an incestuous relationship with her brother (Kerameikos O 6874; Eupolis Poleis Fr 221; [Andok.] 4.33; Plu. Cim. 4.8-9; Ath. 13.589e8-f2 paraphrasing Antisthenes), to have offered herself to Pericles to effect her brother’s return from exile (Ath. 13.589e8-f2; Plu. Per. 10.5-6 and Cim. 14.5), to have questioned publicly Pericles' leadership at a funeral oration (Plu. Per. 29.4-5) and to have modeled for and had an affair with the painter Polygnotos (Plu. Cim. 10.5-6), even possibly appearing in Naples 3232, ARV(2) 132.61. And she supposedly did all this while married to Kallias or after his death.
According to our sources, Elpinikê was not “well-behaved” (εὔτακτόν; Plu. Cim. 10.5) and, as these anecdotes show, acted more like a *hetaira* than a citizen wife.

Elpinikê does not conform to the standard understanding of Athenian woman. Though certainly a citizen-wife, her behavior does not fit the ideal as reconstructed by scholars. Further, since the modern categories of *hetaira* and citizen-wife exclude each other, she is also not a *hetaira*. And yet her life story has many of the tropes scholars associate with *hetaira*: foreign-born, wealthy, consorts with illustrious men, has a distinguished or famous name of her own that is used in public fora, is educated or intellectual, is associated with performance or modeling, and has a “semblance of respectability” making her difficult to distinguish from a *pallakê* or even a wife (McClure). The existence of women such as Elpinikê in the historical record should compel scholars to reconsider how we classify women in antiquity and whether such modern categories are useful for understanding the position of women in classical Athens. Some may suggest that Elpinikê be could be an exception to this ideal because of her elite status or because she was born before the passage of the Citizenship Law (and thus the tighter restrictions on citizen woman that are thought to have accompanied it). Rather, I suggest this makes her even more vital to understanding women’s lives in Athens.

When scholars see the name of a woman in a literary text, especially in comedy or oratory, they immediately make a succession of assumptions (e.g. Schaps, Ogden). If she is named, she is immediately labeled as “not respectable.” Such a woman is then frequently deemed a prostitute, which excludes her from the category of citizen-wife according to modern classifications. Some scholars seek to broaden the discussion of women beyond the “wives and the rest” dichotomy that such assumptions seem to rest upon (e.g. Davidson). They define “the rest”, however, as various types of sexual labor and continue to rely on the idea of a “respectable” woman who was separated or secluded from public life (except in religious contexts).

This is a problematic way of understanding women and classical Athens. Elpinikê is a citizen and a wife and yet is named in all the fora that would disqualify her from being considered such by scholars. If historians did not know her family and citizen status, Elpinikê would be considered a *hetaira*. What Elpinikê shows us is that the categories scholars use to classify women in ancient Athens are defective and that adherence to these categories disables scholars from engaging in broader possibilities for how women lived in classical Athens.

**Kicking Up Your Heels: Not Just For Spartan Girls**
*(Lysistrata 82-83)*

*Stephen Brunet*

When the Spartan Lampito appears on stage for the first time in the *Lysistrata*, she attributes her fine physique to jumping up and kicking her buttocks with her heels in a dance we elsewhere learn was termed the *bibasis*. Commentators on the *Lysistrata* regularly treat the *bibasis* as a dance practiced solely or chiefly by Spartan girls and thus a quaint feature of Spartan culture much like Lampito's Doric accent. However, Aristophanes' audience would not have associated the *bibasis* primarily with Spartan women and would have classed Lampito's boast as another of the transgressive acts for which Spartan women were noted. As a review of the archaeological evidence makes clear, Athenian males regularly practiced the *bibasis* and its popularity among
this group was likely due to the usefulness of jumping exercises in training for the pentathlon. The natural association then would have been with boys and men, not Spartan women. So when Lampito played up her skill in performing this highly athletic dance, Aristophanes' audience would have viewed this as an inversion of the natural roles of men and women.

Literary sources do provide some useful background information about the dance itself but are not as helpful as often supposed for understanding the Athenian reaction to Lampito. Without the ancient commentators' help (e.g. Suda π 3110.1-3), we admittedly would not know what Lampito meant when she said "she jumped to her buttocks" (ποτὶ πυγὰν ἄλλομαι). Likewise, Pollux (4.102.5-10) is essential for providing the dance’s name. Yet while Pollux’s oft-cited statement that Spartan boys and girls used the bibasis for exercise and held jumping contests may well be true, it does not tell us what we need to know, whether the Athenians connected this dance with the Spartans. The fact that Xenophon does not mention it in his discussion of female physical training at Sparta might actually suggest the opposite (Lac. 1.4). Moreover, we cannot extract much from the other sources sometimes cited in connection with the bibasis (Hippoc. Nat. puer. 13.4-13; Antyll. ap. Orib. 6.31; Sor. 1.60). Among other considerations, all of them refer to the bibasis with Aristophanes’ distinctive “jump to one’s buttocks,” making it likely that they were heavily influenced by the portrait of Lampito in the Lysistrata.

The Athenians clearly understood what Lampito meant, and the archaeological evidence explains why. In all, we have seven depictions of individuals doing the bibasis, five of which derive from Attic black or red-figure vases. Only one of the seven representations shows a woman doing the bibasis. Nude boys or young men dominate although a previously unrecognized example depicts nude men performing it as part of a mock pyrrhic dance. When identifiable, the dance takes place in a komos or other typically male environment, and the artists regularly focused on how much physical energy the boys or men were expending. Moreover, a vase in Basel (ARV² 430 no. 31; sometimes wrongly cited as being the bibasis) makes it clear why the bibasis would have been a favorite among athletes training for the pentathlon: ancient jumpers brought their heels to the back of their buttocks at the top of their jump in a way indistinguishable from the bibasis.

Scholars have occasionally suspected that the visual evidence might be useful for understanding Aristophanes' portrait of Lampito but it has never been analyzed in depth. Looked at closely, it reveals that Athenian men regularly practiced the bibasis, often in conjunction with male dominated activities like athletics. The skill of Spartan women at the bibasis therefore would not have been the first thing that came to the mind when the audience heard Lampito bragging about building up her physique by jumping. Instead they would have viewed her as they did other Spartan women, as set on pursuing an athleticism that was the natural preserve of men.
Domesticating the Dog: Hipparchia as Wife in the Cynic Epistles
Melissa A. Haynes

This paper evaluates the discourse on domestic life in the pseudoepigraphic *Cynic Epistles* centered on the radical relationship between the Cynic philosophers Hipparchia and Crates. This collection, which dates to the early Imperial period (Malherbe 1977), comments on Hipparchia as a female philosopher through her position as a Cynic wife and mother. Crates and Hipparchia’s *kynogamia* (‘dog-marriage’) was highlighted in later anecdotal accounts about Diogenes’ fourth-century BCE philosophical project. In this tradition, the choice by Hipparchia to marry the poor, physically deformed Crates for the sake of philosophy and her rejection of socially anticipated female roles vividly demonstrated the Cynic ideal of *anaideia* (shamelessness) as exemplified in action.

Hipparchia’s self-chosen exile has been activated as a symbol within feminist philosophical inquiry (Kennedy 1999, Le Doueff 1991), and her characterization within the letters used as a part of that re-assessment. Recent scholarship (Hartmann 2007, Grams 2007), while acknowledging the limitation of our ancient sources, presents her life as a transgressive philosophical achievement. In terms of women and philosophy more generally, Levick has demonstrated how imperial philosophy and its extension to women served to enforce normative gender dynamics, rather than radically invert those norms (Levick 2002, 151). In her analysis, however, Levick withholds her charge that philosophy works to underscore social norms from the Cynics precisely because of Hipparchia’s unique status. In this paper, I nuance this modern turn to Hipparchia as exceptional through a close reading of the *Cynic Epistles* and their particular reframing of the female Cynic. I contend that this text, in fact, does reinstate normative gender ideas by depicting a philosopher engaged in wifely and motherly activities that essentially distance her from her philosophical calling.

I analyze the cycle of letters addressed to Hipparchia from her husband Crates (1, 28-33 in Malherbe 1977). Unlike the Pythagorean tradition in which women were later given authorship in a set of pseudo-epigraphic letters, Hipparchia is only ever an addressee and never given a voice within the collection. The first letter makes it clear that she is physically absent, but also philosophically disadvantaged by that absence. Crates writes to her as Diogenes lies dying, and urges her to return quickly in order to be present at his passing and glean philosophical enlightenment from that experience (καὶ γνώςον δύναται καὶ ἐν τοῖς φοβερωτάτοις φιλοσοφίᾳ). The center point of this epistolary narrative is a series of letters that deal most directly with Hipparchia’s possible failure as a philosopher as a consequence of domestic life. In letters 28 and 29, Crates lectures her on the fundamental tenet that women are in no way inferior practitioners of philosophy than men. Yet, following this exhortation are two letters (30 and 32) that chastise Hipparchia for weaving and sending a cloak and a tunic to her husband. The making of these clothes is a sign of her possible disavowal of Cynic philosophy. I argue that the *Epistles* use her production of clothes as a mark of her distance from philosophy, and as part of an attempt to
lessen the radical aspects of her presence in Cynicism in line with Theodorus' criticism. The *Epistles* seem to have been produced in order to represent Cynicism as a moralizing philosophy of virtuous living. Many of the more radical tenets, the very disavowal of textual transmission and the preference for philosophy as a mode of living, are recast in a less severe form or abandoned. My analysis of Hipparchia as a character reinforces this assessment. This pseudoepigraphic collection must transform her unique position as philosopher-wife into a recognizably conventional one in order for the project of domesticating Cynicism itself to work.

**Session 43: Alexander and the Hellenistic World**

**A Plant's-Eye View of Eastern Imperialism**

Daniel Bertoni

When studying a concept as broad as Greco-Macedonian imperialism in the East, a fruitful method is to take an aspect of empire and explore its history during the Achaemenid period and then its use by the Greeks and Macedonians. Therefore, I propose to examine the relationship these imperial powers had with plants, which are commonly used as a tool of colonial imperialism, especially when transported from one area of an empire to another (Brockway 1983). This practice allows rulers to express the extent and productivity of their domain as well as their control over the natural world. In this way, their use of plants provides a window into the failure of the Seleucids to firmly cement their empire.

In early Greek ethnographies, plants form a part of the overall narrative of exoticism (for example, Ctesias fr. Lenfant [2004] F45.36 on a lac-producing tree), and they express differences between center and periphery (for example, Herodotus 3.106 and 4.40). The τόπος of the lush, exotic East is continued even in the works of Megasthenes, who lived in India (Murray 1972 and Kartunnen 1989). On the other hand, botanical literature from the same time period (Theophrastus) presents a less utopian picture of India.

Further, the metaphor provided by plants was put to use by eastern monarchs. In the Achaemenid period, the gardens (παράδειδοι) of the Persian kings can be considered “microcosms of empire” (Kuhrt 2007), in which even vegetation is shown to be under imperial control. This practice is continued in the Seleucid period, when attempts to introduce plants to and from their new territories either succeed (Strabo 15.3.11 on the introduction of grapevines to Susis) or fail (Pliny *NH* 16.59.135 on the failure to import cardamom to Babylon). Additionally, plant products were used as luxury items and as temple dedications (*OGIS* 214 on an offering of Seleucus I to the temple of Apollo at Didyma). Thus, the transport of live plants and of plant products is a large-scale analogy for the failures and successes of Greco-Macedonian imperialism in the East.

A case study for these interactions is provided by the garden of Harpalus, whose flight has been understood as a consequence of the breakdown in command during Alexander’s absence in India (Badian 1961 and Blackwell 1999), and whose gardening endeavors shed light on relations between the Greco-Macedonians and the colonial empire they inherited. Both Plutarch (*Vit. Alex.* 38.5) and Theophrastus (*Hist. Plant.* 4.4.1) relate the story, with special emphasis on his failure to grow ivy. This provides a close look at one particular plant that had strong resonances with imperial power (*Hist. Plant.* 4.4.1 on Alexander’s crown of ivy in India and *Il Macc.* 6:7 on...
Antiochus IV’s imposition of ivy wreaths on the Jews), and shows how ivy can be used to express both the power and the “Greekness” of an individual.

From all of these interactions with plants, some clear conclusions arise. First, the lush, wild vegetation of the eastern regions of the Achaemenid and Seleucid empires, as portrayed in Greek ethnographic treatises, was put under control in the royal gardens and παράδεισοι, which displayed the luxury and power of the kingship and emphasized the extent and fertility of the realm. Second, the ability to successfully cultivate plants was indicative of the ability to control an empire. The Achaemenids succeeded in growing foreign plants in Persepolis, but Seleucus I failed to introduce cardamom to Babylon and Harpalus was unsuccessful in planting ivy in the same city. Thus, the flight of Harpalus and the crumbling of Seleucus’ empire reflect their problems in the garden. Third, the success of the Achaemenids with the center-periphery model of hegemony was not replicated by the Seleucids: just as foreign plants would not grow in Babylon under the Seleucids, so too their empire did not take root.

The Origins of Alexander's Eastern Cities: Deportation and Resettlement in the Persian and Macedonian Empires

Jake Nabel

This paper proposes a new way of looking at Alexander’s eastern cities. Previous scholarship has understood the eastern foundations in one of two ways, each of which is connected to a more general conception of Alexander’s historical legacy. The first view sees the cities as centers for the promulgation of Greek culture, beacons of civilization in a dark and barbarous Asia. The oldest and perhaps the most influential proponent of this view was Plutarch, who insisted that “savagery was extinguished among those living in the cities.” (Mor. 329a) This was endorsed by many scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some of whom favorably compared Alexander’s “civilizing mission” to the European colonial project. W.W. Tarn (1948: 437-41), Robin Lane Fox (1974: 481-85), and N.G.L. Hammond (1980: 273; 1997: 199) have been some of the most important proponents of this view.

The second interpretation of Alexander’s eastern foundations sees them as military installations or garrisons. Its adherents argue that the cities were not about spreading culture because Alexander, far from being a benevolent conqueror who cared about the condition of his new subjects, was a selfish adventurer interested only in his own power, glory, and prestige. This more cynical view has been advocated by A.B. Bosworth (1988: 245; cf. 1996: 3 n.6), Frank Holt, (1988: 80), and Waldemar Heckel (2008: 97, 122), among others.

I argue that both these interpretations explain certain aspects of Alexander’s eastern cities, but that neither is comprehensive or conclusive. I therefore ask the reader to consider a new view. My argument is that the cities were centers for the forcible resettlement of Greek mercenaries, and that their foundation was inspired by Alexander’s interaction with the Achaemenid tradition of deporting Greeks from the western frontier of the Persian Empire. This view is meant to supplement rather than replace the two more common interpretations, and I do not claim that it accounts for everything that the cities were meant to accomplish. But the idea that the eastern foundations were meant to solve a problem that existed in Greece, rather than in Bactria or Sogdiana, has received very little discussion in previous scholarship, and the possibility that their
creation was a result of Alexander’s interaction with a Persian tradition has been overlooked. I explain how Alexander was exposed to this tradition, how he was influenced by it, and how he utilized it. I hope by doing so to expand and enrich our understanding of the eastern cities.

My paper is divided into four sections. First, I briefly review the evidence for Greeks forcibly settled in Alexander’s eastern cities – a survey that closes with the reports of mass desertions of Greek mercenaries from Bactria after Alexander’s death (Diod.17.99.5-6; Curt. 9.7.1-11). In the second section, I ask why Alexander would have wanted to forcibly relocate such a large contingent of soldiers from Greece to the distant east, and I examine the role of mercenaries in the armies of his Greek enemies. The third section turns to the episodes of Achaemenid deportation of Greeks such as the Barceans (Herod. 4.165), Milesians (6.18), and Eretrians (6.119) from the western frontier of the Persian Empire. Finally, I examine Alexander’s exposure to the Persian deportation tradition, and the effect that this may have had on his eastern foundations.

The Friendship between Rome and Athens
Paul J. Burton

This paper will attempt to answer the as yet unsettled questions of when the two most famous cities of the ancient Mediterranean world—Athens and Rome—established interstate relations, and the precise nature of that relationship, formal (via a treaty of alliance, foedus) or informal (via informal friendship, amicitia). The diplomatic relationship between Rome and Athens lies at the heart of what Arthur Eckstein has recently called a “diplomatic revolution” in the Greek East, when in 201-200 BC, numerous lesser eastern states, including Athens, called on Rome to intervene against an aggressive pact of alliance between of Philip V of Macedon and the Seleucid king Antiochus III to destroy the Egyptian boy-king, Ptolemy V, and divide Egypt and its possessions between themselves. Since 1921, when Maurice Holleaux condemned as an annalistic fabrication Athens’ status as an adscriptus on the Roman side in the Peace of Phoenike in 205 BC, scholars have debated where and in what context the beginning of the Rome – Athens relationship should be placed. John Briscoe, John Rich, Erich Gruen, Valerie Warrior, and Arthur Eckstein argue for 228 BC, when Rome sent diplomats to Athens (and elsewhere in the Greek East) in order to publicize their victory in the First Illyrian War (Zon. 8.19.7; Polyb. 2.12.7-8). But despite Zonaras’ assertion that Athens became a Roman philos (amicus) on that occasion, Polybius fails to mention this—in one of the few of his books that is fully extant. Zonaras’ account is vitiates by the additional, clearly spurious information that the Romans were granted entry to the Eleusinian mysteries and isopoliteia with Athens in 228 BC. There is also no evidence for Roman – Athenian interaction post-228 BC, including during the First Macedonian War, which is owing to the fact that this was during the period when Athens cultivated a careful neutrality. This latter point makes it even less likely that a Roman – Athenian amicitia was established in 228 BC.

Here I will argue that the best date is either 209, or, more likely, 208 BC, when the Athenians attempted to intervene and mediate an end to Philip’s war with the Aetolian League (and, incidentally, Rome’s war with Philip) (Livy 27.30, Polyb. 10.25 [209 BC]; Livy 28.7.13-16 [208 BC]). Although Eckstein questions whether such mediations, likely against Rome’s best interests, could possibly result in friendship (much less cordiality), his view is undermined by examples where this in fact occurred, including the case of Heraclea Pontica in 190 BC, when
that minor Hellenic city in Asia Minor tried to intervene, against Rome’s interests, between the Romans and Antiochus III (with whom Rome was currently at war)—and indeed, held up Rome’s war plans for at least a month—an intervention that issued in amicitia. As for Holleaux’s objection that Roman interest in the East was so minimal before 200 BC that formal relations with Athens could not possibly have resulted, and therefore Athens’ status as an adscriptus on the Roman side in the Peace of Phoenike in 205 BC was an annalistic fabrication, this followed from his mistaken notion (actually Mommsen’s) that Roman socii et amici possessed formal treaties of alliance, called foedera amicitiae. But no such thing actually existed: as has been recently systematically demonstrated (Burton 2011), amicitia was but the loosest and most flexible of diplomatic connections—intentionally so. Moreover, the annalistic tradition (represented by Livy) sometimes omitted Athens in the Romans’ lists of grievances against Philip in 201-200 BC, so it is illogical that the same tradition would fabricate adscriptus status for Athens in 205 BC to provide an additional Roman casus belli against Philip V. This paper thus confirms the broader thesis that informal “friendship,” amicitia, rather than formal treaties, foedera, typified Roman overseas relationships during the formative stages of the construction of the imperium Romanum in the East.

**Proxeny as a Network in the Hellenistic Cyclades**

John A N Z Tully

This paper argues for a regional, systemic, and quantitative approach to proxeny. Scholarship on proxeny has concentrated on three levels: individual attested cases of proxeny (Wallace 1936, Walbank 1974); proxeny relations of individual poleis, particularly Athens (Wallbank 1978, Veligianni-Terzi 1997); and the institution as a whole (Marek 1984, Gauthier 1985). There has been less emphasis on how neighbouring poleis’ proxeny networks compare to each other quantitatively and qualitatively (brief partial exceptions: Étienne and Dourlot 1996, Fossey 1996). In the light of recent work on networks in antiquity (Constantakopoulos 2007, Ruffini 2008, Malkin 2011), this paper analyses the Cycladic proxeny network, its structure, and historical embeddedness. It demonstrates the importance of a regional, networked perspective to proxeny, and draws wider conclusions for our understanding of the Cyclades themselves, and of their position in the broader Greek world at this time.

Drawing on a fresh collation of the evidence, the paper first identifies important structural divergences between the network of proxeny relations we can trace among the Cycladic islands themselves, and the network of proxeny relations traceable between the Cycladic islands and other states. The internal network is more complete and more dense both with respect to the number and the frequency of proxeny relations attested. These disparities point to different behaviour by the islanders, and so indicate that the Hellenistic Cyclades did sociologically form a meaningful region at this time. They also reemphasise the importance of the Cyclades as a broader unit in the Hellenistic Period against the more restrictive visions universally offered us by our later literary sources, which contrast the Cycladic islands encircling Delos with the Sporades of the broader Aegean (Strabo 10.5.2–3 484–485C; Pomponius Mela 2.97.111; Pliny HN 4.65–68; Dionysius, son of Calliphon 130–147). Just as our earlier Athenian sources impose an imperialising perspective (Brun 1993, Constantakopoulos 2007), so too our later literary sources retroject later economic and social patterns.
Second, the paper argues that the network structure here identified provides a powerful new explanation for Cycladic decline in the imperial period, and simultaneously justifies the disjunction between our broad networked Cyclades and the narrow Cyclades of our literary sources. It allows us to move beyond pure geographical determinism in explaining the phenomenon of regionality in the Cyclades: the ‘hub’ that was Delos itself enabled the continuing construction of the region to which it was central, but also involved its fragmentation as Delos itself declined. To embed Delos in the broader Cycladic network is thus to explain how the sack of Delos should have had systemic repercussions across the entire Cyclades, without needing either to assume widespread destruction on a range of islands at that time, or to posit that the sack of Delos was somehow uniquely extensive beyond other attacks.

Finally, the paper compares the decentralised, hierarchical structure of our proxeny network with the more distributed, non-hierarchical vision implicit in approaches inspired by the concept of peer-polity interaction, with its emphasis on the rhetorical and actual equivalence of poleis (Snodgrass 1986, Ma 2003). These paradigms are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, both the historical explanatory power of our model, and diachronic comparison with social and other networks (Watts 1999) urge a broader reassessment, to allow more space for what we may term a principle of preferential attachment in relations between poleis, and for citizens’ conscious awareness of the differences between their poleis, as well as their similarities.

Cumulatively, these three aspects argue for greater regional contextualisation of the polis and, more generally, reemphasise the importance of quantitative and regional analysis in our approaches to antiquity. At least concerning the proxeny network, to insist on each polis as an independent atomised unit fundamentally misrepresents the way in which the citizens of each polis regarded each other, and the dynamics of the world in which they lived.

Session 44: Claiming Troy: Receptions of Homer in Imperial Greek Literature

Lucian and the death of the author
Calum Maciver

Lucian’s meeting with Homer (or at least, “Lucian” the actor-narrator persona) in book 2 of the Verae Historiae is a satirical paradigm of the fantasy that all interpreters and allegorists of Homer from the earliest post-Homeric age sought: to ask Homer himself what the answers were to the famous, vexed, Homeric problems. Kim’s recent book (2010) successfully discusses the narrative and meta-literary concerns in this ideal meeting with Homer. In this paper I will focus instead on the very idea of textual control of original literary works by authors. This control versus the fluidity of post-Homeric interpretation is exemplified in the idea of a search for positivist meaning by the actor-narrator Lucian and his meeting with Homer in the Isles of the Blessed. I will suggest that Lucian, long before the post-modernists of the twentieth century, raises the spectre of the death of the author, and that the meaning of any given text is not controlled by, and should not be sought from, the author.
This paper will begin by focusing on the meeting with Homer in Lucian’s *Verae Historiae*. I will argue that the key purpose behind the encounter is to allow Lucian to call attention to the nature of literary discourse and literary scholarship. Who controls meaning? Who controls interpretation? What is the truth value behind scholarly questions? The very fact that Lucian locates these answers to the *Homeric Questions* within a work that is fictional as well as metafictional brings this idea of the author and the control of meaning even closer to the fore. Throughout the *Verae Historiae* Lucian is consistently challenging the reader to assess the truthfulness of his narrative, even at one stage inviting readers to participate in the journey of discovery to the moon themselves to test the validity of his assertions about the mirror on the moon (*VH* 1.26). By transferring this narratological framework, constructed by Lucian himself, to the readerly-authorial dialogue between Lucian *imitator* and Homer *imitandus*, Lucian creates an ideal *locus* to exemplify the process of reading and interpretation in a general sense, but also for his own narrative. I will seek to show that Lucian identifies interpretation as fluid and unfixable, even in the face of the historical person Homer, and behaves as his own readers should behave with his own text.

The paper will use as a *comparandum* Lucian’s short *Dialogue with Hesiod*, where Lucian / Lycinus challenges Hesiod on his unfulfilled claims to speak of the future in his works. Hesiod avers responsibility to the Muses, and by doing so, removes himself from the challenges of the insightful reader. This dialogue mimics the discussion in Lucian’s *The Ignorant Book-Collector*, which focuses on the problems on the origins and practicalities of ignorance in the construction of knowledge. This search for authorial authority, beyond inspiration, rehearses the challenge to Homeric and Classical authority, as typified by Dio Chrysostom’s *Trojan Oration* (discussed too, by Kim 2010 pp. 85-139). I will also raise the example of Lucian’s *The Dance*, in which the cynic Crato upbraids Lycinus (a potential pseudonym for Lucian) for backsliding away from the received norms of the Classical tradition, and therefore from traditional authority.

The paper will conclude by suggesting that Lucian highlights the process of interpretation as something slippery. As a symbolic fantasy for ancient readers, Lucian creates lies in search for the truth in the *Verae Historiae*, and finally comes to the greatest author of all, only to parody the long tradition of Homeric scholarship by having Homer himself parody the Homer constructed by those very critics.

**Athenaeus, Ancient Moralizing Criticism and Homeric Fictions**

Lawrence Kim

The dominant mode of reading Homer in antiquity was through a moralizing lens. For many such readers, Homeric poetry was thought to contain moral rules, ethical advice, and exemplary figures that could serve as paradigms for behavior (cf., e.g., Xen. *Symp. 4.6*). This moral didacticism is taken for granted both by critics of Homer, such as Plato in the *Republic*, as well as by proponents and defenders, such as Philodemus (*On the Good King according to Homer*), Plutarch (*How the Young Man Should Listen to Poetry*), Heraclitus (*Homeric Problems*), Maximus of Tyre, and many others. Despite its ubiquity and importance, there has not been any systematic study of the ancient moralizing interpretation of Homer, which comprises a wide and
varied range of techniques and methods (cf. Buffière 1956, 307-342; general accounts in Kroll 1924, 64-86; Russell 1981, 84-98).

In this paper, I draw attention to an aspect of the moralizing interpretation of Homer that deserves more emphasis, and that perhaps belies the method’s reputation as a simple-minded and outdated way of reading literature: the fact that moralizing criticism posits the poet as the inventor of his material, rather than as merely a storyteller beholden to the strictures of either ‘reality’ or the mythological ‘tradition’. In fact the latitude granted by these critics to Homer in shaping his fictional world is quite remarkable when compared to other major trends of interpretation that assume his poetry’s correspondence with history (as explored in Kim 2010) or other underlying ‘truths’ (such as allegoresis). While I suspect that such a notion of Homer underlies many moralizing readings, I focus on a particularly explicit and detailed example: the speech that opens the section of Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae (early 3rd c. CE) entitled On the Life of the Heroes in Homer (1.15-18; 8e-11b).

The speaker, most likely Myrtilus the Thessalian (Heath 2000), remarks upon an oft-noted feature of the Homeric heroic diet: their avoidance of fish (along with boiled meat, birds, and any food “requiring elaborate preparation” (1.15; 9c)). This peculiarity had frequently been taken as evidence for the frugal lifestyle of the heroes (cf. Pl. Rep. 3.404b-c; Dio Chrys. 2.47; Plut. Quaest. Conv. 8.8; Schmidt (1976), 182-185). But while Plato, for example, avoids discussing Homer’s intentions and only uses his poetry as evidence for heroic simplicity, Myrtilus insists that Homer, because he intended (βουλόμενος, λογιζόμενος) to implant moderation (σωφροσύνη) in the young and make them “good”, “set up” and “ascribed” a simple diet to the heroes (1.15; 8e-f). In Myrtilus’ phrasing, it seems as if Homer invented the simple heroic diet in order to emphasize his moral lesson.

As the speech continues, Myrtilus attributes even more creative agency to Homer. For example, Homer, he claims, does not just eliminate the trappings of luxury from the heroes’ lives, he also depicts a world in which those luxuries (like fish) are abundant, thereby emphasizing how his “well-disciplined and self-controlled” heroes resist temptation. The unusual custom of Homeric heroes being bathed by their hosts’ daughters is also seen in this light: “Homer represents (ποιεῖ) [these scenes]…in the conviction that passion and lack of self-control have no effect on men who have led good, modest (σωφρόνως) lives” (1.18; 10e). The emphasis on Homer’s moralizing ends may be banal, but I want to highlight the fictional power Myrtilus attributes to the poet here to achieve those ends. These passages, as well as others that I will examine, show how Myrtilus’ idea of Homer, as a poet who shapes his world without concern for ‘reality’, but according to his own independent aims, should be grouped among other ancient literary critical positions interested in Homer’s ability to fashion fiction, such as that of more ‘respected’ scholars like Aristotle and Aristarchus. The motivation that critics like Myrtilus assign to Homer may be overwhelmingly moralizing and didactic in nature, but their conception of the poet’s creative power deserves recognition and closer study.
Greek didactic poetry enjoyed remarkable success and influence in the Roman imperial period, yet such poetry remains surprisingly understudied even within scholarship on the Greek literature of the Roman Empire (despite, e.g., Bowie). This paper examines the treatment of Homer and the Homeric epics in Dionysius’ *Periegesis*, Oppian’s *Halieutica* and Ps.-Manetho’s *Apotelesmatica*, second- and third-century AD didactic poems on geography, fishing, and astrology, respectively. Didactic poetry is a form of literature which operates at the intersection between epic poetry and ‘technical’ literature, and this paper takes as its starting point the generic position of didactic epic as a form both intimately related to, yet constitutively distinct from, heroic epic poetry (thus, e.g., Lausberg 1990, Volk 2002, Gale 2004). Whilst the influence of Homer on late Greek epic tradition can hardly be overstated, the imperial period also witnessed widespread scrutiny of Homer’s relevance to disciplines such as geography, astrology, medicine, and fishing (see, most recently, Kim 2010). This paper traces three key ways in which imperial Greek didactic poets articulated the complex relationship between the Homeric epics and the technical disciplines treated in their own didactic poetry.

The first section of my paper briefly sets out the framework for this discussion by demonstrating that, as in Latin didactic poetry (see, e.g., Thomas 1986, Gale 2000, and Schindler 2000), many of the similes in later Greek didactic poems draw closely from Homeric material, yet advertise their generic divergence and technical focus by inverting the relationship between the Homeric tenor and vehicle. This tendency, I argue, encapsulates the manner in which these didactic poets both evoke and distinguish themselves from Homeric precedent in their systematic treatment of fields mentioned only incidentally from Homeric epic.

The next strand of my argument focuses on Ps.-Manetho’s discussion of Homer in the proem to Book 5 of his *Apotelesmatica* (5.12-24). Praising Homer for his wisdom and divinity, Ps.-Manetho quotes Homer’s verses on the fates of men and associates them with his own poetry. This, I suggest, is indicative of the manner in which Homer was exploited by later poets as a powerful symbol of cultural authority, Hellenic identity, and affiliation with long-standing epic traditions. Yet in systematically treating a demarcated field of technical knowledge, Ps.-Manetho, like other didactic poets, also markedly distinguishes the scope and aims of his poetry from those of Homeric epic. This is epic poetry with a new compositional aesthetic, a body of factual information drawn primarily from archived knowledge and technical prose treatises. By explaining his decision to include these Iliadic verses in his astrological poem, Ps.-Manetho not only uses Homer to articulate a complex Greco-Egyptian cultural identity (cf. the proem to Book 1 of the *Apotelesmatica*) but explicitly probes the relationship, and the hierarchy, between Homer’s authority and his own (see esp. 5.21-24).

The association between Homeric heroes and the technical information disseminated in didactic poetry is further developed in the final section of my paper, which examines the depiction of Odysseus in Dionysius’ *Periegesis* (DP 205-207) and Oppian’s *Halieutica* (*Hal.* 2.497-505). Whereas Dionysius’ reference to the travels of Odysseus, like his verses on the city of Troy (DP 813-819), locates his poetry within a familiar Homeric (and more broadly mythical) geography, Oppian’s treatment of these Odyssean travels subversively highlights the hero’s demise. Odysseus’ ‘death from the sea’ is recounted by Oppian in his discussion of venomous fish, and I
argue that the poet’s repeated allusions to both Homer and Nicander in this passage (see Bartley 2004 pp.155-158) juxtapose the relative values of heroic and didactic epic poetry, displacing the authority of the Homeric epics in favour of a more practical, technical mode of learning. Here, as throughout this paper, we witness the ways in which imperial Greek didactic poets exploit, adapt, and question the authority of the Homeric epics vis-à-vis the disciplines which underpin their own poems, interrogating Homer’s role in a world shaped by new cultural and institutional forces.

**Adventures of the Solymoi: Jews in Homer**

Tim Whitmarsh

This paper argues that ancient Jews were much keener on Homer than most believe; and that the epics were, for many bicultural Jews, a capacious, dynamic narrative system, whose very geographical aporias created possibilities for inventive intercultural reading.

Who were the Solymoi? The *Iliad* (6.184, 206) locates them in Lycia, and indeed by Hellenistic times they were claimed by the Termessians. In the aftermath of the sack of Jerusalem in 70 CE, however, Roman writers suddenly associate them with the Jews, pseudetymologically deriving Hierosolyma ('Jerusalem') from two Greek elements (Tac. *Hist.* 5.2; Val. Flacc. 1.13; etc.). Scholars (e.g., Brenk 1999) have conventionally assumed that this association is 'pushed' onto them by triumphalist Romans, keen to magnify their opponents and thus their victory. But Josephus, at around the same time, can also be found 'pulling' the association, by referring to their city as 'Solyma' (*Ant.* 1.180, 7.67); this suggests that some Jews themselves made the link. The name Hierosolyma is securely attested as the Greek for 'Jerusalem' as early as the third century BCE, and is an eccentric formation that is difficult to explain on its own terms (Brenk 2011). Is it possible that among the reasons for the choice of this Hellenization was a desire to link the city to Homer?

There is indeed evidence for a highly sophisticated, creative reading of Jews into Homer; but whereas it was the Romans who linked the Jews to Bellerophon's troublesome foes in *Iliad* 6, the Jews themselves sought a point of entry in *Odyssey* 5, with its solitary reference to the ‘Solyman mountains’ from where Poseidon, on his return from Ethiopia, spies Odysseus back out to sea (283). The scholia identify this place (via the *Iliad*) with Termessus, an erratic route; Martin West (2011) may be right to emend 'Solyman' to 'Elyman' (i.e. Mt. Eryx). Be that as it may, 'Solyman' was already being read in the fifth century by Choerilus of Samos, who refers (*SH* 320 = *FGrH* 696 F34e and fr. 4 Kinkel) to warriors in Xerxes' invasionary entourage who live in the 'Solyman mountains' – the phrase appearing in the identical metrical *sedes* as in the *Odyssey*. Intriguingly – this is where we rejoin our main argument – this phrase is cited by Josephus, who identifies the warriors in question with the Jews (*Ap.* 1.172-4). Scholars typically dismiss this identification as procrustean; but their arguments for doing so are weak, and the case for Jews, however hazily understood, is much stronger (Radici Colace 1976). And crucially there is evidence here that he already knew of a tradition linking the *Odyssey*’s Solyman mountains to Jerusalem and its environs.

Though there were clearly some Jews who cleaved relentlessly to tradition, there were others who were culturally and literally highly mobile. There is no reason why such figures would not have read and responded to the Homeric epics, in much the same way that the Romans did. We
have fragments of two epic poems on Jewish themes (Philo and Theodotus: Holladay 1989), and hear of one Sosates, the 'Jewish Homer' (Cohen 1981).

But although Hierosolyma's Homeric undertones seem to have existed much earlier than is usually admitted, they were not thereby fossilized. I close the paper by returning to Roman imperial times, and discussing two hexameter poets who reanimate the Homeric link by associating the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 with the destruction at Troy: the fourth Sibyline oracle (115-27), which imagines the city of the Solymoi in Trojan terms, and implicitly accuses the Romans of war crimes; the second comes in Quintus of Smyrna, where Memnon's sacking of 'the city of the Solymoi' en route to Troy is (I argue) designed to evoke Jerusalem's sack (2.121-3). The Jews' Homeric heritage was thus not just a symbol of Janus-faced biculturality, but also a flexible narrative system, capable of being remolded to new circumstances and acquiring new resonances.

Session 46: Truth Value and the Value of Truth in Roman Historiography

Ementiri in Monumentis: Arguments in "Architectural" History
John Oksanish

This paper evaluates to what extent the relationship between history and truth, as established in Vitruvius' De architectura (V. and DA), can adumbrate the role of truth-value in more conventional forms of historiography. In fact, DA offers a surprisingly ideal lens through which to approach this question. Not only do V.’s monuments and text alike claim the same, memorializing function as do many historiographical texts (memorias posteris tradere [et sim.]; cf. Chaplin, Lowrie), but V. concerns himself explicitly with the role of both historia and truth-value as key components in authoritative architecture. (Vitr. 1.Pref.3; 1.1.5; cf. Liv. 29.14.9, etc.) Analysis of one of DA’s most controversial passages, the chronologically problematic “history” of the Caryatids, demonstrates that exemplary value and persuasion, not accuracy, are the goals of an architect who wants to “make history” (in both senses of that phrase) with architecture. Equally remarkable is that V.’s Caryatids, qua ornamenta, blatantly violate his infamous injunctions against decorative surrealism (4.2.5-6; 7.5.6-7), thus exposing the seemingly inflexible aesthetic criterion of veritatis ratio (a phrase we might well translate as “truth-value”) as disposable when important exempla—such as that provided by the Caryatids—are at stake.

As an example of the historiae that an architect should know in support of his memorializing craft, V. recounts the sack of Carya, a Peloponnesian city that sided with the Persians and was later justly punished for its Medizing by “the Greeks.” (1.1.5) This story, found only in V., seems to provide an aetiology for ornamental Caryatids, and has long interested historians of both Greece and art, who alike have sought both to discredit and redeem V.’s account (Plommer; Vickers; King; Lesk; etc.). Even the most generous treatments accuse V. of confusion, stumbling, and mistakes of historical accuracy, (King; Milnor) but the error lies in disregarding V.’s admission that the Caryan tale, albeit based in historia, is in fact an argumentum, defined by
rhetorical handbooks as “something made-up, but that still could have happened” (ficta res, quae
tamen fieri potuit, Inv. 1.27; Her. 1.13), and which contrasts with fully fictive fabulae (in
[quibus] nec verae nec veri similes res continetur). That V.’s technical lexicon is largely
borrowed from rhetorical theory is well known (Callebat; cf. Vitr. 9.Pref.17 on Cic.), but the
presence of the term argumentum in an account meant to demonstrate the architect’s knowledge
of historia supports recent suggestions about the distinctively textual nature of V.’s monuments
and their ornamenta. Lowrie, e.g., asserts that such monuments “acquire their memorializing
function by being read.” Taken further, the chief role of the ideal architectus is to ensure that
monuments and their exempla are read correctly. (Oksanish) The Caryan episode thus offers a
fictive narration of the kind that can be used not only to control the reception of exempla on
physical monuments, but also to control the reception of textual monuments, whether DA (on
which the Caryatids are authoritatively inscribed), or historiography proper.

And yet, as matronae who must physically support a Doric entablature, V.’s Caryatids violate his
insistence on res verae and veritatis ratio as an artistic principle. Indeed, in his infamous diatribe
against illusionistic architecture, V. specifically bans falsehoods (falsa) such as “roofs supported
by reeds,” and condemns those who “do not care if any of these things can actually exist or not”
(nec animadvertunt si quid eorum fieri potest necne, 7.5.4; cf. Inv. loc. cit.). Because neither a
reed nor a human can actually support a marble tectum, V. compels us to ask why the Caryatids
earn an exception. This paper concludes by positing that, as categories, even “natural” and
“rational” truth are useful to the architectus (and perhaps the ancient historian) only insofar as
they contribute to other, programmatic criteria, whether moral or—as is likely in V.’s case—
political.

**Truth, Belief, and Rationality: Case Studies in Tacitean Miracula**

**Kelly Shannon**

Ancient historians’ relationship with the truth is most directly tested when they report events that
are difficult to believe because they are outlandish, supernatural, or miraculous. In this paper I
analyze how one historian, Tacitus, responds to this tension by discussing two case studies: the
appearance of the phoenix in AD 34 (Ann. 6.28), and the healing miracles performed by
Vespasian at the shrine of Serapis (Hist. 4.81-2). Both events are described as miracula, and
Tacitus explicitly affirms that each one is manifestly confirmed as true by reliable evidence.

The phoenix episode seems to be exactly the kind of embellished, literary ‘purple passage’ that a
reader, ancient or modern, would seemingly be right not to believe. Tacitus’ motive for
introducing the material is ostensibly for his audience’s pleasure (Ann. 6.28.1 promere libet), but
it becomes a platform for discussing issues of truth. The more unbelievable reports attached to
the phoenix are those of the juvenile’s painstaking cremation of its deceased parent (Ann.
6.28.5), which Tacitus is careful to point out are probably a falsified exaggeration (Ann. 6.28.6
haec incerta et fabulosus aucta). The conflicting reports about the timing of the phoenix’s
appearance (Ann. 6.28.2-3) mean that many claimed the phoenix of AD 34 was a false one (Ann.
6.28.4 falsum). Recent work on the episode has taken this to indicate that Tacitus, too, believed
the phoenix of AD 34 was a fake (E. Keitel, “The Non-Appearance of the Phoenix at Tacitus
closes the section by affirming in no uncertain terms that, regardless of disagreement about their habits, phoenixes do actually exist (Ann. 6.28.6 ceterum auspici aliquando in Aegypto eam volucrem non ambigitur). This digression shows Tacitus sifting and sorting the true from the false, and finding him able to glean a kernel of truth even from something very outlandish.

With Vespasian’s miraculous healings of a blind man and a lame man, however, Tacitus performs no such ‘sifting’, but wholeheartedly affirms that what seems impossible is actually true. This time, there is scepticism from a character within the text, as Vespasian himself, unlike most miracle workers, is very reluctant to perform the requested cures, and first quizzes doctors on whether there is any less miraculous method of healing the men. Yet as Tacitus has earlier told us, Vespasian is susceptible to methods of divination, like astrology, described as superstitious (Hist. 2.78.1), and Tacitus implies that on this occasion Vespasian the rationalist eventually loses out to Vespasian the susceptible. The historian here seems to follow the lead of the emperor: although he is more cautious than other authors who report the same events, Tacitus never denies the truth of the miracles, and even goes so far as to vouch for the veracity of eyewitness accounts of the healings (Hist. 4.81.3 utrumque qui interfuerit nunc quoque memorant, postquam nunc nullum mendacio pretium). Despite all the reasons for doubting, Tacitus wishes his readers to believe. This has important implications for how we are to think about the rise of the Flavian dynasty more broadly, since throughout the Histories Tacitus speaks of the role of fatum and the divine in ensuring that Vespasian and his sons would emerge victorious from the civil wars of AD 69 (e.g. Hist. 1.10, 2.82, 3.1, 5.13).

I wish to evaluate these truth claims against other places in the narrative where Tacitus refuses to affirm the truth of much more believable reports: why should a historian assert that Vespasian’s saliva really cured blindness when he is unwilling to give credence to other stories that seem more plausible, for example the assertion that Nero and Agrippina the Younger had an incestuous relationship (A. 14.2)? Can we establish any patterns or categories for the kinds of reports Tacitus considers ‘truthful’ and events he considers ‘true’, and what implications does this have for his work as a whole?

No one wrote more truly: Truth in Florus

Owen Ewald

Two early Renaissance manuscripts of the Roman historian Florus add as a postscript words of high praise: Nemo verius, nemo brevius, nemo ornatus scripsit (“No one wrote more truly, more concisely, more rhetorically,” Malcovati 1972: xviii-xix). His brevity and rhetorical elaboration are evident in every chapter, but in what sense could we understand his “truth”? Truth in Florus is closer to the modes of emplotment in Hayden White (1973:1-43) than to von Ranke’s idea of wie es ist eigentlich gewesen. Thus, critiquing Florus’ last section (4.12.4-66) as “a farrago that avows a blatant defiance of chronology” (Syme 1984:1186) or lambasting him as “a man of egregious stupidity” (Wells 1992:37) or grouping him with Eutropius and Orosius as “hacks” (Cornell 1995:3) is to use the wrong set of benchmarks.

Truth in Florus consists of relying on the auctoritas of Livy and ancient historiographical traditions, on recognizing the discontinuities between different eras of Roman history, and on deploying the proper moralizing framework. The auctoritas of Florus’ sources is so powerful that at places, it can even substitute for physical monumenta or archaeological evidence. For
example, rather than refer to physical *monumenta* for Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, and Cloelia, as Livy does (2.10.12, 2.13.5, 2.13.11), Florus refers to the presence of these figures *in annalibus* ("in annalistic histories," 1.10.3).

Discontinuities between different eras are essential for Greco-Roman historiography (e.g. Thucydides 1.1 and Livy 6.1.1, 7.29.1-2), but Florus deals with them more explicitly and more rhetorically. For example, he writes about a time in early Roman history when suburban towns were serious threats to Rome’s existence: *Cora—qui credat?—et Alsium terrori fuerunt, Satricum atque Corniculum provinciae* ("Cora—who would believe it?—and Alsium served as a terror, Satricum and Corniculum were provinces," 1.11.6). Occasionally, Florus features outright anachronism like the inclusion of Herculaneum and Pompeii in a description of Campania (1.16.6; Baldwin 1988:137), but it is an attempt to apply the technique of *repraesentatio* (as described in Vasaly 1993) to an earlier era rather than to a distant place.

Moralizing frameworks loom large in ancient historiography, but Florus integrates them more fully and, again, more explicitly into his text, as opposed to the limited editorializing of Thucydides or the sporadic exemplarity of Livy (Chaplin 2000). For example, Albinius carries the Virgins and sacred objects in his wagon after making his wife and children get out (1.13.12; cf. Livy 5.40.9-10). Florus frames Albinius’ action with a moralizing comment about the priority of the state over the family “in those days” (*tunc*): *tunc quoque in ultimis religio publica privatis adfectibus antecellebat* ("in those days even in times of crisis, the public ritual used to be superior to private attachments," (1.13.12).

Lendon excoriates those who would apply literary theory to Roman historians like Tacitus because ancient writers cared more for facts than for rhetoric (2009: 41-61). But Florus is best read as work of a literature, as evidence for the *Weltanschauung* of the High Roman Roman Empire *via* its view of the Republic. Despite possible traces of earlier historical interpretations in Florus (Wallinga 1992), no one would ever comb Florus for fragments of lost annalists or rely on his text as a source for the First Punic War in preference to Polybius (Lazenby 1996). But the ancient historian Florus should instead be measured according to his own yardsticks—*auctoritas*, discontinuity, and moralization.
The economic autonomy of ancient deme sanctuaries was twofold: it maintained both an independence from, and dependence on, the city in which the sanctuary was located. However, if demes were responsible for building temples, paying for festivals, and organizing sacrifices in any way, a considerable amount of money had to come from within the deme itself. In an ideal deme cult, its polis would have donated money for the building of its temple, its temenos would have provided funds and animals for further construction and festivals, and its citizens would have contributed whatever money they could in the form of dedications and animals for sacrifice to support these undertakings as well. In turn, the deity would make these participants prosperous and the cycle would repeat. Temple economy relied on its temenos to provide cultivated resources for use and sale and also to be rented out or sold. Fees were also plentiful in temples and accumulated solid sources of income. Temples were also used for medical practices and oracle consultations; someone consulting the oracle was charged a fee as well as the task of performing a sacrifice, and patients who visited temples for medical purposes had to pay a fee for the use of the temple as well as present a votive offering. Aside from money that was charged or owed, many temples exploited other objects on their temenos for additional income, thus reflecting the potentially self-sustaining nature of temple finances. Given the variety of sources of income that came from the polis as well as demesmen, it needs to be determined whether or not temples could have afforded their expenses and what those were. This economic exchange shows that there was a reciprocity at the polis to deme temple level, and more prominently at the deme temple to citizen level which formed one cohesive economic system. The financial network of temples is integral to any conversation about the ancient economy because temples housed, received, and spent a substantial amount of its city’s and citizens’ money.

This paper seeks to understand the nature of the reciprocity between fourth century BCE Greek temples, their demes, and their poleis by investigating the major sources of income and expenses, as well as who was responsible for overseeing and providing funds for these transactions. This paints a fuller picture of what is entailed in an economic structure of deme cults. This also allows for an economic model of an ancient deme’s temple funds, which will put into practice the relationships between polis, deme temple, and citizens, which are discovered by investigating the transactions of money within deme temples. A closer look at the religious funds of fourth-century Erchia will provide an estimation of an economic model which elucidates the hierarchy of these relationships. These relationships clearly demonstrate that temple economy was not an area of ancient economy to be ignored; it was very strongly embedded among both its citizens and its polis.
Cost and Value in Athenian Sacrificial Calendars
William S. Bubelis

As documents critical for our understanding of Athenian religious practice, the half-dozen public sacrificial calendars preserved from classical Athens present an especially rich array of data. Notwithstanding the calendars’ profuse information on deities and offerings, too little attention has been paid to a critical feature of these texts: the monetary figures appended to nearly every offering stipulated therein. One of two assumptions has served as the default explanation. Accordingly, the figures represent either market prices outright or simply the absolute amount that had to be paid to acquire any given offering.

While either assumption may in principle be justified in the case of some calendars, especially the earliest among them, it makes little sense of the fact that these figures frequently differ between calendars. Given that the calendars range over the period c. 400-350, their various figures appear to reflect change over time. If one assumes that the explanation of fixed prices is correct, after all, then how does one account for such differences except by positing the untenable notion that there were different fixed prices across Attica in that period? While we might suppose, alternately, that whoever established a calendar or had authority over it might make a correction to reflect changes in market prices, the surviving fragments bear remarkably few instances of correction or alteration. Moreover, even if the figures did accurately reflect market prices at the moment when the calendars were first inscribed, the fragments evince no administrative mechanism by which magistrates might further adjust the figures or alter their practices should prices vary too greatly from the original figure.

Dating to 329/8, a lengthy set of financial accounts from Eleusis suggests that some calendars ought to be interpreted in an altogether different manner. These accounts detail in part the activities of the board of magistrates (hieropoioi) then responsible for providing sacrificial victims at Eleusis (IG II² 1672 [= I.Eleusis no. 177], II. 289-90 [with numbering of IG]). Whereas the calendars variously peg figures for bovines in the range of c. 70-90 drachmae (dr.), and sheep and goats for 10-15 dr., this text shows that the hieropoioi were willing to pay 400 dr. for the same bovine and 30 dr. for each individual sheep and goat during what seems to have been a drastic shortage of animals (and other foodstuffs) in the marketplace. Although we do not possess the relevant calendar to which these accounts might in principle be matched, it surely cannot have stipulated such high prices. The Eleusinian text shows, therefore, that depending upon the availability of funds some magistrates at this date had the requisite authority to spend freely enough in order to acquire the necessary victims.

In short, the figures in our extant calendars may be better interpreted as the minimum amounts that various magistrates were required to spend on the market. To whatever degree Athenian administrators employed this technique, they could be sure to purchase the finest animals possible should the market price fall much below the mark that they set and had enshrined in a calendar. But if market prices should balloon in a time of shortage, whichever figure was set would never cap the value since that might compel those purchasing the animal to provide a grossly substandard animal, or even none at all.

Since all known calendars predate IG II² 1672 by at least 30 years or so, this one text may only reflect a new understanding among the Athenians, at least at Eleusis, concerning how to best
approach changing prices, or at least those that were rising steeply. Yet the principle at work in
*IG II²* 1672 would make sense of the fact that while the calendars present diverse figures for their
offerings they offer no evidence to suppose that Athenian magistrates employed any other
technique by which to mitigate change in real market prices over time.

**Coinage and the Transformation of Greek Religion**

Matthew Trundle

This paper explores the ways in which the introduction and spread of coinage shaped and
transformed Greek sanctuaries, the communities that they served and religious practices.
Disembedding religion from Greek society is impossible and by the fifth century money
pervaded many aspects of the Greek world transforming warfare and politics dramatically.
Religion could hardly be an exception, yet money is profane by its very nature, it is impersonal,
lacking prestige, “grubby,” and profoundly un-religious.

Recent scholarship has combined the study of coinage, traditionally the bastion of numismatists
with the wider worlds of politics, society, economy and warfare. The major works on Greek
religion have yet to focus on coins and their affect on religious practice (Burkert; Bremmer;
Mikalson; Parker). Richard Seaford laid foundations for work on the way in which coinage
impacted religious and philosophical thinking. In a practical sense, many sanctuaries were major
repositories of coinage (e.g. Samons) and involved in financial transactions (Bogaert; Davies), it
would be unsurprising if coinage and religion had little relationship.

One obvious way in which coins transformed ritual practice saw the placing of coins in the
mouths of the dead for the journey to the underworld, a practice confirmed by both text (Ar.
*Frogs* 140-141) and archaeology (Stevens). If one looks at the way that coinage transformed
other areas of Greek life like the military and politics one sees that it brought with it a
democratisation, by which increased numbers of outsiders and poorer insiders participated,
alongside a growing professionalism. A broadening of the sacrificial community may easily be
envisioned. Stories like that of the woman in the *New Testament* (Luke 21.1-4) who entered the
temple by means of two small coins illustrate that coins acted as low prestige items to gain
access to religious space. In addition coins facilitated the organisation of larger more coordinated
festivals and the ability of sanctuaries to top-slice and redistribute or store its assets from the sale
of donations or animal skins. Indeed, plenty of evidence shows that coined metals replaced
prestige items used in ritual and sacrifice. Inscriptions from sanctuaries in Attica, especially like
those from Eleusis show the ease with which money functioned as markers of value in the
accounts of religious activities.

Of course, religious practice was a part of the embedded social phenomena of antiquity. Despite
the usefulness and ubiquity of coins and the obvious means by which coinage affected sanctuary
life, this paper concludes that coins transformed religious life in less profound ways than other
aspects of Greek society.
The Aims of Antony's Parthian War of 36 B.C.
Kenneth R. Jones

I propose to show that the scholarly consensus on the aims of Antony’s Parthian War of 36 B.C. is mistaken. Antony’s eastern policy was not driven by his desire for a showdown with the Parthians whereby he could achieve glory through avenging the ignominious defeat of the Roman legions commanded by Crassus. Victory in a Parthian war was not the elusive centerpiece of Antony’s eastern policy. Rather Antony sought to contain the Parthian Empire and to secure the cities and kingdoms in the Roman sphere of influence from Parthian meddling. With this aim in mind, the so-called Parthian War of 36 can be rated a success. There is some evidence from antiquity that indicates that it was viewed as such. And yet, the tradition in the sources—unanimously accepted today with only a few reservations—is that Antony was humiliated by the Parthians in a campaign destined for disaster through a combination of poor planning and inept execution on the part of the triumvir. This negative assessment is a product of the historiographical writing of the Augustan period that had to downplay Antony’s achievements in the East even while Augustus himself built on the policy foundations laid by his opponent.

The traditional view that Antony was driven to seek victory over the Parthians in order to secure preeminence over Octavian and that he set out to achieve this in the disastrous expedition of 36 is ubiquitous in modern scholarship—illustrative treatments might be found in Tarn, Debevoise, Syme, Ziegler, Bengtson, Huzar, Sherwin-White (with many reservations), and Pelling. Plutarch’s detailed account of the campaign in his *Life of Antony* provides the foundation for the narrative. It is, however, precisely in the circumstantial details that questions arise (as noted and mostly explained away by Pelling). I propose to focus on a few key items that call into question the traditional interpretation and point the way to a new one.

First, I shall argue that Antony did not need to defeat Parthia in 36 in order to avenge Crassus, because Ventidius, fighting under Antony’s auspices, had already done so in 39. Secondly, I shall argue that there were ongoing attempts at negotiation between Antony and Phraates (and Herod) both before and during the expedition of 36. In doing this it will be necessary to subject to scrutiny Plutarch’s presentation of the negotiations as ruses and deceptions. Thirdly, I shall argue that Antony’s primary aim was Media itself and that it was Phraates’ half-hearted defense of the kingdom that ultimately drove its king into an alliance with Antony. Fourthly, I shall look at the positive response in Rome to Antony’s war, which is explained away by the sources as a deception on Octavian’s part.

Finally, I shall look at the results of Antony’s campaign in 36 and explore the possibility that they offer better insight into his aims than the confused narrative of the sources. As a result of this expedition Antony recovered the initiative in Roman-Parthian relations. He detached
Armenia and Media from Parthian influence, thus allowing him to threaten Parthia’s flank. In doing the latter, he reversed the situation that had confronted Cicero during his governorship of Cilicia when it was the Parthians who had two avenues of attack against the Romans, i.e. into Syria or Cilicia. Now Rome could threaten Parthia with a northern incursion via Media or the traditional one across the Euphrates into Syria. The net effect was to put Parthia on the defensive and to prevent Parthian interference in the Roman sphere of influence in Asia. It was this, rather than head-on confrontation with Parthia, that Antony sought and obtained through the campaign of 36.

**Writing the Unwritten: The *lex lulia de senatu habendo* and the Codification of Senatorial Procedure**

Emily L. Master

This paper argues for the revolutionary content of the *lex lulia de senatu habendo* within the context of Augustus’ greater legal program. The law was an effort to codify the rules of senatorial procedural, which had been controlled by unwritten and unofficial *mos* during the Republic. Although this law is discussed in scholarship on the Roman senate (Talbert [1984]), it carries a question-mark rider in the traditional list of Roman *leges* (G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani* [Milan 1912]) and is often excluded from major discussions of the Augustan laws, which are focused largely on the ‘moral’ reforms of the *princeps* (as in K. Galinsky, *Augustan Culture* [Princeton1986] 128-138), and from more general considerations of the Augustan principate (it is relegated to a footnote in D. Kienast, *Augustus: Princeps und Monarch* [Darmstadt 1982]) and its ideology (such as J. Beranger, *Recherches sur l'aspect idéologique du principat* [Basel 1953]).

In two parts, this paper will correct this error and attempt to revive interest in the law: First, I will briefly outline the evidence for the existence, date, and content of the law. The sources for the law are literary: the title comes from Pliny (Ep. 5.13.5, 8.14.19-20) and Gellius (4.10.1); Dio (55.3) discusses the provisions of the law; Suetonius (Aug. 35) seems to refer to the law in his discussion of Augustan reforms of the Senate (though he does not name it); and Seneca (*De brev. vitae* 20) makes a passing reference to the *lex*. The use of the singular ‘*lex*’ in the letters is a precise legal term referring almost always to a Republican or Augustan statute and Pliny Ep. 5.13.5 confirms the existence of the law and, most likely, its title. Our only source for the dating of this law, Dio (55.3) places the statute in his record of the year 9 BC. While the exact provisions of Augustus’ statute are not fully recoverable, it likely contained specific stipulations on nearly all elements of Senate operation, such as quorums and the proper sequence of meetings.

In the second part of the paper, I will argue that by legislating on senatorial procedure, Augustus irrevocably altered the Republican constitution, which had kept separate the *mos*-controlled Senate from the *lex*-controlled magistracies. There is no record of the codification of senatorial procedure during the Republic and the Republican Senate seems to have been governed entirely by reliance on *mos* and by the handing down of rules of order from generation to generation (as described in Pliny Ep. 8.14). The Augustan *lex de senatu habendo* wrote down what had always been unwritten. An analysis of the discussion in Pliny Ep. 8.14.19 illustrates the reality that senatorial procedure under the Empire relied on a law and proper interpretation of its
stipulations. Pliny quotes directly from the statute and breaks down the particulars on its
regulations concerning the procedure for voting in criminal sentencing involving death and
banishment. Pliny’s analysis of the written text illustrates the reality that senatorial procedure
under the Empire relied on a law and proper interpretation of its stipulations. Changes in
senatorial procedure between Republic and early Empire appear to have been gradual, often
informal, and usually impossible to date (Talbert [1984] 221-222). There is no evidence that
Augustus’ reforms significantly altered the procedure of Cicero’s Senate and senatorial
procedure would not have been fundamentally different in Pliny’s day. What was revolutionary
about the Augustan statute was not any changes it made to senatorial procedure, but the fact that
the princeps was using a lex to govern the Senate. Augustus’ exertion of his own magisterial
power as lawmaker over the Senate was a subordination of the Senate’s authority to that of the
princeps.

Nero’s Portus Sestertii and Food Security for Rome
Steven L. Tuck

A widely published series of sestertii of Nero from AD 64 (RIC I 178, 181; BMC 134) from the
mint in Rome with the harbor at Ostia on the reverse is commonly associated with the
completion of the harbor, Portus Augusti, begun by Claudius and, allegedly, completed by Nero.
Most scholars conclude that the coin was struck on the occasion of the completion of the harbor
by Nero. I conclude, however, that the coin presents no direct claim about completing the harbor
works at Portus. The images of the harbor, its monuments, buildings and facilities that surround
the field on the coin’s reverse differ throughout the series in a number of basic ways suggesting
that it is not intended to document a specific building program. Furthermore this conclusion that
Nero completed the harbor is not supported by references in any literary or documentary sources.
If instead we examine the context for the coins and the consistent elements of imagery on them,
it seems clear that they served a different, very specific purpose: to reassure people in Rome
about the safety and security of the grain supply in the period following the disasters of AD 62.

Tacitus (Annals 15.18) records the food insecurity of 62 when two hundred ships of the grain
fleet were destroyed by a storm in the harbor at Ostia and an additional one hundred were
destroyed on the Tiber by an accidental fire, a loss of 10-15% of the grain fleet. In the same
passage Tacitus relates Nero’s attempts to reassure the Roman populace about the security of the
food supply suggesting that these events led to widespread anxiety that required an imperial
response. The ships within the harbor basin on the coin reverses are of three types, with most
variations showing one harbor boat, a galley and a larger but variable number of merchant ships.
Details of the merchant ships, notably the use of top sails, conform to the grain fleet, which as
Seneca reports from his eyewitness account (letter 77), were the only ships allowed to use that
sail in harbor. The galley is a specialized vessel type known to have accomplished the grain fleet
for protection.

The context for the fleet in the harbor is provided by the figures visible on some of the ships and
on the edge of the harbor standing before an altar. All are performing the arrival sacrifice,
thanksgiving for safe passage into the harbor. This specific sacrifice is known from an account of
Alexandrians who made it on their arrival into the important harbor of Puteoli under Augustus
(Suet. Aug. 93). It is also depicted on the Severan period Torlonia relief found at the harbor of
Portus on which another captain makes an identical sacrifice at an altar on board a merchant ship in the harbor basin.

I conclude that the message of the coin is not to commemorate the completion of harbor works under Nero, but to celebrate the arrival of the grain fleet and therefore the security of food supply for Rome following the disasters of AD 62. This security had long been the personal responsibility of the emperor (Tacitus Ann. 3.54; Suet. Claud. 18.2) and Nero’s coins are apparently one component of his program to declare that he is fulfilling that responsibility with the successful arrival of the grain fleet and the return of food security to Rome. Struck in Rome these coins were probably designed to circulate there among those most directly affected by a grain shortage. Its denomination would ensure wider circulation than a gold or silver coin and that it would be seen by more of the approximately 30% of the city that relied on the grain dole under Nero.

**Classicists, Methodists, and Jews: Rethinking the Second Sophistic**

Jared Secord

The activities and concerns of Greek scholars in the period from Tiberius to Nero helped to lay the groundwork for the obsession with the classical that characterized intellectual life in the following centuries. In Rome, scholars working at the imperial court undertook the major cumulative project of editing and explicating the corpora of classical authors, while in Alexandria and in Rome classicizing scholars attempted to prove their Greekness and to defend the value of the classical canon against the attacks of Jewish scholars and doctors of the Methodist school, again with members of the imperial household as an audience. I argue that the nascent movement of classicism and Atticism typically called the Second Sophistic grew out of this collaboration between the imperial household and classicizing scholars, and of these debates between classicizing scholars and their Jewish and Methodist rivals.

The paper I offer therefore sets out in brief a new model for the study of Greek intellectual life under Roman rule, breaking away from the periodization and narrow vision that define Philostratus’ conception of the Second Sophistic and that have been employed also in major recent studies (Swain; Whitmarsh 2001, 2005). Contrary to the arguments of these studies, I show that the major cultural challenges facing classicizing scholars came not from Rome, but from other Greek-speaking scholars, such as Jews and Methodist doctors. At the same time, I demonstrate that the period from Tiberius to Nero, which is absent even in studies that treat the Second Sophistic as an integral part of Roman history (Bowersock 1965, 1969; Spawforth), fits into a larger story of the development of classicism and Atticism.

The first component of the paper’s argument focuses on the editing and commentating work undertaken by scholars at Tiberius’ court (Hillscher; Kaplan). Collectively, these scholars produced editions and commentaries on many major classical authors, continuing the project undertaken at Rome in the previous generation by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and others. Tiberius’ personal astrologer Thrasyllus led the way, producing editions and commentaries of Plato and Democritus (Tarrant; Mansfeld), but he was joined also by many other scholars, including Seleucus the Homeric (Mueller), who treated much of the classical canon. The literary
heritage of Greece’s classical period was effectively filtered through Rome thanks to the efforts of these scholars.

Scholars at Rome and Alexandria in this period also contributed to the growing trend of employing the literature of Greece’s classical period as a touchstone for Greek identity. This trend was especially clear in debates between the Greek and Jewish communities of Alexandria which spilled over to Rome during the reigns of Gaius and Claudius, and which involved both sides labeling one another as Egyptians, rather than as Greeks and Jews. Such debates provide a larger context for a series of works produced by Alexandrian scholars concerned with establishing standards of lexicographical purity, and even in a work by the grammarian Irenaeus that attempted to prove the Attic origins of the Alexandrian dialect of Greek (Haupt 2.435-440). Irenaeus and other Alexandrian scholars turned to the classical canon and Atticism as a way to demonstrate that they were truly Greek in response to suggestions that they were not.

The paper’s final section considers the responses to the Methodist doctor Thessalus of Tralles and his anti-classical approach to medical education. His attack on the Hippocratic corpus, which he presented in a letter addressed to Nero himself (Pigeaud), provided inspiration for the Hippocratic lexicon authored by a certain Erotian, and dedicated to Nero’s personal physician Andromachus (Manetti; von Staden). The imperial household watched and listened as classicizing scholars debated with their rivals, and competed for their support and patronage.

In sum, I demonstrate that classicizing scholars viewed Rome as an ally rather than a threat in their attempts to defend the classical purity of Greece. The real threat came instead from other Greek-speaking scholars who were less enamored of the classical past and its literature.

Session 50: Horatian Metapoetics

Restoring the Lyric Racehorse: Horace Odes 4.1 and the Transformation of Epic
Veronica S. Shi

This paper explores the programmatic implications of a double allusion to Ibycus 287 PMG and Ennius’ Annales in Horace, C. 4.1.1-8. While Hardie, Hill, and Suerbaum have noted Ennius’ influence upon this passage, no attempt has been made to analyze its implications or to examine how the double allusion functions as a whole. I argue that it allows the opening of Odes IV to be read as an expression of anxiety over Horace’s obligation to praise Augustus (Thomas 19-20, Feeney 54), and well as a blueprint of a solution to the difficulty Horace faces, as a lyricist and Callimachean, in not being able to write epic, Rome's traditional genre of encomium.

At C. 4.1.6-7, Horace illustrates his erotic (and literary) weariness by representing himself as an old, jaded racehorse no longer responsive to goads: circum lustra decem flectere mollibus | iam durum imperiis (with flectere implying the action of reins). These lines allude to Ibycus’ simile comparing the aged lover to a retired racehorse forced back to the ring (ἤ μὰν τρομέω νῦν ἐπερχόμενον | ὦστε φερέξυγος ἀποτροφόρος ποτὶ γήρις | ἀέκων σὺν ὀχέσφιν δεσφών ἄγει...

203
Horace’s allusion to Ennius, however, is also ironic: as a lyricist, he cannot go on to write encomium the way Ennius did, in epic. In view of this, Horace’s faithfully erotic adaptation of Ibycus’ simile can be read as correcting Ennius’ adaptation, which divests the simile of its eroticism. I suggest that this illustrates Horace’s intention to lyricize epic encomium, and that Horace confirms his intention by alluding in *rursus bella moves* (4.1.2) to another fragment from the beginning of *Annales* 16, *quippe vetusta virum non est satis bella moveri* (fr. 403 Skutsch). For Ennius, *bella moveri* means to recount wars, i.e. write martial epic; for Horace, however, *bella moves* is an ironic reference to love’s untimely onslaught and, significantly, a phrase that implies genre-switching. In Ode 1.6, Horace employed the militarized portrayal of love (*militia amoris*) to draw an ironic contrast between epic (the genre of real wars) and lyric (the genre of *proelia virginum* | *seitis in iuvenes unguibus acrium*, C. 1.6.17-8) and to signal his rejection of the former in favor of the latter (Davis 33-6; Lyne (1997) 77-8). Here, *rursus bella moves* signals a similar generic shift from epic to lyric: Horace is re-appropriating Ennius’ horse back to its original lyric context, and that re-appropriation models and anticipates how he will lyricize epic encomium in subsequent odes.

The final section of my paper briefly outlines how Horace deploys his solution in Odes 4.4 and 4.14, which present epic material, including allusions to the *Annales* and Vergil’s *Aeneid*, in Pindarizing fashion. I conclude by noting how C. 4.1.1-8, when read as a programmatic passage for lyricizing epic in Odes IV, creates a ring composition with Ode 4.15, which celebrates lyric’s ascendancy over epic as the most fitting means of lauding Augustus in the age of the Pax Augusta (Putnam 272-3, *pace* Breed).
Horace, *Epistles I: Ex Rure*

Kristi A. Eastin

The scholarly interpretation of Horace’s first book of *Epistles* is itself becoming an *antiquus ludus*. Scholars investigating the collection divide it up for conquest, honing in on the poet and poetic themes (his private life and personal relationship with Maecenas; freedom and friendship); his turn to philosophy (which schools and to what degree?); or the genesis of his innovative genre. Yet any one of these foci by itself yields little in the way of consensus: Horace, it has been argued, is an aging poet struggling with self-worth (Johnson); a man bowing peacefully into retirement (Kilpatrick); or an artist to whose personal life we do not have access (McGann). Some find a stoic, others an epicurean or hedonist—most a mixture. He is to one a philosopher who is scantly poetic (Heinz); to another a poet only superficially philosophic (Pasquali in Rudd). The genre itself, one suggests, came in to being through epiphany (Johnson), yet another contends it was through deliberate industry, to suit a hungry poet dissatisfied with “the restless exploitation of the inherited genres of personal poetry” (Mayer, 1). *Epistles I*, it seems, remains elusive—Horace is still winning.

It is the purpose of this paper to enter back into this same arena, equipped with a few new weapons, namely the scholarship on the exilic epistles of Cicero and Ovid and the attraction to the verse epistle for poets in seventeenth-century England. My argument hinges on the notion of an impetus: the creation of the first book of the *Epistles* was set in motion by a personal experience of the poet, a crisis of sorts, that is revealed by a close examination of the text. This “tempestas” resulted in Horace’s retreat (by choice or by suggestion) to the countryside, which became, for the poet, a state of exile. The acceptance of this premise provides a “key” to interpretation—a way to reconcile the collection, many of the sundry explanations, and the impetus to genre into a unified, harmonious whole. The personal experience of the poet “in exile” informs his poetic themes and shapes both a poetic philosophy and a genre that synthesizes consolation and reconciliation.

While this proposition suggests almost the antithesis of the popular *beatusille* image that Horace and his country retreat have become, such a premise can be supported. The verse epistle in the seventeenth century, as W. C. Dowling has argued, was a response of sorts, to an anxiety over a kind of Cartesian solipsism, a skepticism, which evoked an epistemological crisis, resulting in a deep-seeded fear of isolation—“the haunting fear that one’s own consciousness is all there is” (11). The reader might legitimately ask what relevance this has for a poet living in the early years of the principate: such a thesis is clearly irrelevant to any consideration of ancient Rome. I would suggest, however, the impetus to the verse epistle that he describes might well be applied to an individual haunted by fear of isolation—an individual in exile.

The personal experience of the poet “in exile” is further supported by a consideration of scholarship on other exilic epistles. J. M. Claassen’s grammatical analysis of the letters of five Roman men—Cicero, Ovid, Seneca the Younger, Dio Chrysostomus and Boethius (all formerly powerful in their sphere)—assess how they use literary means either to sublimate powerless ness or to find new ways of wielding power. I will show how *Epistles I* corresponds to her exilic paradigm, and how the premise of a poet in isolation or exile adds scope to the poem, places it in a context, and perhaps provides answers to some of our questions.
Laughing Matters: Negative Literary Criticism in Horace's
*Ars Poetica*
Caleb M. X. Dance

This essay explores Horace's use of laughter as a recurring and precise mode of negative literary criticism in the *Ars Poetica*—a fact treated neither by commentaries on the poem (e.g. Brink (1971) and Rudd (1990)) nor by scholarship on Horatian laughter (e.g. Plaza (2006)). Laughter's power as a literary critical tool and, more specifically, a manifestation of negative criticism is invoked repeatedly in the *Ars Poetica* (vv. 105, 113, 139, 356-8, and 458) to communicate an audience's likely response to bad poetry. I focus on the clustered references to laughter in vv. 99-113 and vv. 354-360 and conclude that Horace draws upon the potentially involuntary nature of laughter to fix the source of a negative critique in a poem itself rather than the person of the critic. This critical precision makes laughter a particularly versatile form of literary criticism for Horace.

In the opening of the *Ars Poetica*, Horace presents laughter as a mode of artistic criticism. He describes an incongruous painting and asks his addressees, “[A]fter being allowed to look on, friends, would you repress a laugh?” (*spectatum admissi, risum teneatis, amici inv. 5*). His immediate transition to a discussion of literature in the subsequent verses anticipates a point made explicit in v. 361: “A poem is like a picture” (*ut pictura poesis*). Laughter is a Horatian response to bad art, whether visual or literary.

According to Horace's advice about literary characterization in vv. 99-113, an actor should externally communicate an attendant emotional state. This external communication prompts a feedback loop in Horace's promised reaction to poorly delivered lines: *malesi mandata loqueris, / aut dormitabo aut ridebo* (vv. 104-5). Horace, who styles himself a stand-in for an audience, suggests that a physical behavior like laughter expresses an emotional or intellectual response. The adverb *male* confirms that this response is negative. Similarly in vv. 112-3, Horace hypothesizes a situation in which the words of an actor are inconsistent (*absona*) with his condition. The inevitable result? A universal guffaw (*cachinnum*). As in v. 5, Horace does not appeal to what an audience thinks but to what an audience does. The physical response of laughter is offered as a representation of internal negative assessment.

In vv. 354-360, Horace uses laughter to comment on the extent to which artistic/poetic shortcomings should be tolerated. The musician first receives the critique of laughter (*ridetur* in v. 356) for persistent errors. The second laugh, occurring in conjunction with a verb of wonder (*cum risu miror* in v. 358), is a more slippery occasion of negative criticism. Horace says he marvels at Chœrilus with a laugh on the rare occasion that he gets something right. I believe that Horace's laugh here, like the *risum* of v. 5, is a crisp illustration of how perceived in congruity may elicit laughter. The disjoint between what Horace anticipates (i.e. *malum*) and what he seldom, and thus unexpectedly, reads (i.e. *bonum*) provokes his *risus* and his surprise. The laughter on each occasion remains negatively charged.

I conclude with a consideration of how laughter in the *Ars Poetica*—a physical behavior that Horace depicts as “natural” and potentially reflexive—is constructed as a critically precise negative response, more pointed than a generalized aesthetic designation of “bad.” Horace makes
this laughter a manifestation of a poem's innate deficiencies rather than a reflection of the whims of any one audience.

**Adit oppida pastor: Cheese in Horace, Vergil and Varro**

Mary K. Jaeger

By examining the role of cheese in Horace’s *Satires*, Virgil’s *Eclogues* and *Georgics*, and Varro’s *De Re Rustica*, this paper aims to contribute to our understanding of two things: first, the degree to which Roman writers used foodstuffs symbolically as they engaged in dialogue with one another—dialogue by which they explored the boundaries of their genres and questioned the nature of their common literary enterprise; second, how they used foodstuffs as a means of portraying time and change.

This paper responds to and synthesizes recent insights stemming from several lines of inquiry: central to my argument are: Freudenburg’s (2001) and Putnam’s discussion of the intertextual relationship between Horace’s *Sermones I* and Virgil’s *Georgics* and *Eclogues*; Shaw, Gowers (1993), and Purcell on the symbolic use of foodstuffs, especially as markers of progress and civilization; and Habinek, Reay, and Kronenberg on the ideology inherent in Roman agrarian texts.

Given the variety of foods in *Sermones I and II*, it seems odd that Horace mentions no cheese in his satires and refers only once to its main ingredient, milk; but this absence is explained when we remember that milk and cheese are products of the pastoral world and symbols of pastoral life (Shaw). Varro’s text too, even when discussing livestock, repeatedly delays the discussion of cheese and draws attention to its marginalization: it is pastoral, not agrarian, and it is Greek. Its proper place now is away from Rome; and the right time for it at Rome was before the city’s foundation.

As a product of economic exchange, however, cheese crosses boundaries, between rural and urban space, “primitive” pastoral producer and “civilized” consumer (e.g., Virgil, *Eclogue* 1.33-35, *Georgics* 3.392; *Odyssey* 9), in doing so it affirms the difference between these polar opposites (Shaw). In fact, Horace’s lone reference in the satires to milk (S.1.10.109-111) occurs when he reaches across the boundary of his notoriously varied genre to refer to Virgil’s *Eclogues* (Freudenburg, 2001). In the near-contemporary *Georgics*, Virgil responds and, “playing with his friend’s play” (Putnam, 1995, 312), uses a discussion of milk and cheese (3.394-406) to engage Horace in a dialogue about the relationship between rural and urban, past and present, pastoral and satire—and between his own and Horace’s completed works and his current project of agrarian poetry. As he does so, Virgil reworks Varro’s *De Re Rustica* so as to draw attention to the issue of finding the rightful place and time for cheese.

I shall first survey briefly the literary use of cheese as an item of exchange (Auberger), then consider the implications of the intertextual relationship between Horace S.1.10 and *Georgics* 3, where Virgil’s references to foodstuffs take on additional meaning from their metapoetical role in satire. (Bramble; Gowers 1993). When we reexamine *Georgics* 3.394-406, especially *ubera*, *pinguis*, *lac* and *sal*, with an eye to these metapoetical meanings, we can see Virgil claiming cheese for the Italian countryside and the contemporary agro-pastoral world. In doing so he explains to Horace, in Horace’s own terms, why satire cannot have cheese: it does not belong in...
modern, urban, urbane life. Cheese brings with it too much *sal* (the metaphor for “wit”), an excess to be avoided since it reflects the rougher (and freer) days of Lucilius, an author Horace himself recast as primitive. Cheese is *pinguis*: it fattens animals but threatens the slenderness of the Callimachean muse. Milk itself threatens to muddle the clarity of the poetic “stream.” Cheese results from *ubertas*, symbol in S.1.10 of what greedy people envy. Finally, pastoralism requires a rigorous adherence to a schedule of twice-daily milking and cheese-making that is inimical to the irregular wandering and temporal expansion and contraction of the satirist’s free and unambitious urban life (e.g., 1.5., 1.6.110-128, 1.9). Neither Horace’s nor Varro’s Rome has time or place for cheese, so Virgil claims it, and with it wit, for the country.

Session 51: Plato

**Tyranny and Temperance in Plato's *Charmides***

Richard Foley

The *Charmides* provides our richest source for Plato’s thinking on the virtue of *sophrosyne*, yet a widespread historical misunderstanding has precluded a correct reconstruction of Plato’s theory on this point. Critias and Charmides, Socrates’ two interlocutors in this dialogue, are frequently reported to have *both* been members of the Thirty Tyrants, the oligarchic government that controlled Athens upon its defeat in the Peloponnesian War. On the basis of this error about Charmides’ biography, there is an irresistible tendency to infer that Plato sought to expose a univocal character flaw, centering on a lack of *sophrosyne*, which leads both of these figures to commit atrocities against their fellow citizens. On this standard interpretation, we supposedly know that by the composition date, Charmides has opted for the depraved life represented by Critias, and so the dialogue depicts Charmides facing a stark choice between *only two* contrasting lives, exemplified by Critias’ bloodthirsty immoderation and Socratic *sophrosyne*.

Recent work by Nails has exposed this historical inaccuracy about Charmides, and thereby opened a new avenue for thinking about how the dramatic and historical aspects of this work interact with its philosophical content. Although Charmides was chosen by the Thirty Tyrants to be among the Ten governors of the Piraeus, he was not in fact himself a member of the Thirty. Charmides’ subordinate complicity has been exaggerated by Plato scholars into full membership in the Thirty, thereby conflating the two very different roles these interlocutors play in Plato’s dialogue. Correction of the historical record enables us to open a symbolic gap between Critias, leader of the Thirty, and Charmides, follower and subordinate. Thus there are *two* flaws being diagnosed in the *Charmides*: lust for domination and debilitating deference to authority. Investigating both shortcomings illuminates the conception of *sophrosyne* that motivates two related, yet logically distinct, criticisms of Charmides and Critias.

I contend that Plato defines *sophrosyne* as rational self-control. However, one remarkable feature of Plato’s account is that the lack of *sophrosyne* is not directly identified with behaving excessively or appetitively; rather, these are the indirect result of a more fundamental mental disorder. If *sophrosyne* is rational control of oneself, intemperance involves control of oneself by another. For Plato, the difference between *sophrosyne* and its associated vices depends on the
source of the control, not on its presence or absence. Once we take external control to be the
central idea behind Plato’s conception of intemperance, the roles of Charmides and Critias fall
neatly into place—intemperance becomes a relational property, control of one person by another.
It then follows that there are two vices associated with lack of *sophrosyne*, with distinct
consequences for the dominant and subordinate partners. My evidence for this novel
interpretation centers on the role of authority in the *Charmides*. The dialogue offers numerous
examples that present a contrast between noble self-reliance (160e 2-3, 164d 4-165b5, 165c 3),
and debilitating dependence on others (161a 2-3, 161b 3-8). I closely examine both types of
passage to reveal the conception of *sophrosyne* embodied by the former, and the two associated
flaws described by the latter. Plato’s choice of two interlocutors for Socrates, though not unique
to this dialogue, is thus essential to Plato’s exposition of intemperance. The difference in their
ultimate careers is intended to focus attention on the asymmetric roles they play in the dialogue.
My argument concludes by illustrating how this distinction between external control by
authorities and internal control through one’s own reasoning ability goes to the very heart of the
Socratic method. If external control is to be shunned as a vice, then we can appreciate why it
would be of paramount importance for Socrates to goad interlocutors to think for themselves,
while simultaneously resisting their demands that he simply reveal his own opinions on the
matter.

**Terms of Rhetoric and Art in the Reading of Plato**

David Schur

This paper seeks to make a methodological distinction between teleological and literary
approaches to literary form in Plato. I argue against the teleological trend in classical scholarship
that explains Plato's literary art as a traditional art of rhetoric, deployed by the didactic author to
persuade readers, however indirectly, of his univocal beliefs. When scholars in the 1980s called
for a reconsideration of the literary features in Plato's dialogues, they were feeling the impact of
deconstruction (and of Derrida, in particular). Accordingly, the world of Platonic rhetoric whose
potential is celebrated in Griswold's introduction to *Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings* (1988),
for instance, is not just the art of persuasion associated with ancient oratory; instead, it is more
akin to what Thomas Cole calls an "antirhetorical" sort of neorhetoric, concerned with
multiplying the text's significance rather than reducing it to the author's single meaning. This
neorhetorical sort of analysis is also essentially descriptive rather than prescriptive (Chatman).
From the 1980s onward, a wide range of critics (including Ferrari, Rutherford, Kahn, Blondell,
and many others) have embraced and stressed the integral relevance of rhetorical and literary
devices in Platonic argument, but they have eschewed the neorhetorical emphasis on polysemy
and overdetermination. My argument takes no issue with such a traditionally rhetorical approach
except insofar as it claims to comprehend the literary effects of literary form. A teleological
focus on the presumed end of interpretation, ruling out and bypassing polysemy in favor of
philosophical univocality, is perhaps a tenable desideratum within the academic discipline of
ancient philosophy, insofar as it reconstructs and interrogates the beliefs of ancient thinkers. In
literary studies, however, such an avowedly reductive and teleological method of interpretation,
although often considered appropriate for expository texts, is manifestly incompatible with
accepted notions of literary art.

My concern here is not to say that we should or must read Plato in the way that we read poetry,
nor to classify Platonic dialogues as belonging to a genre that should be interpreted in one certain
manner, but rather to set limits on the claims of a philosophical conception that is antithetical to literary interpretation. As an example of an overreaching approach to Plato, I consider remarks made by Rowe in his 2006 essay "The Literary and Philosophical Style of the Republic." Rowe argues that the stylistic waywardness of the Republic is only apparent; once one correctly understands Plato's use of style, one may comprehend "the content it is designed to convey" (20). I suggest that Rowe's approach effectively explains away rather than confronts Plato's art of writing. It rehabilitates literary style for philosophy by neutralizing literariness. By assuming a teleological stance that ultimately separates philosophical content from literary form, Rowe ends up falling into the familiar trap of treating literary features as mere window dressing.

I adduce Helen Vendler's discussion of interpretation in The Art of Shakespeare's Sonnets (1997) as a foil to Rowe's conception of Plato's art. Stressing that the literary art of the sonnets—self-consciously rhetorical flourishes included—is quite different from expository argumentation, Vendler lays out an unusually clear rationale for reading literary form in a literary way, as literature. Fully recognizing that almost any text can be read as an information-delivery device, Vendler defends Shakespeare from readers who would reduce the sonnets to nothing more than that. When readers treat Plato's art as merely more rhetoric in the service of fixed beliefs, they do that art an injustice from which it too deserves to be protected.

**Protagoras 309a-310a: Socrates’ Angelic Encounter**

**Alexander J. Lessie**

The opening conversation, or “frame narrative”, of the Protagoras depicts a casual meeting between Socrates and an anonymous companion that prompts Socrates to recount the discussion he concluded with Protagoras just a short time before. This paper examines how this frame narrative sets up and validates Socrates’ argumentative victory over Protagoras in the dialogue proper. Recent scholarship on Platonic frame narratives in general (Johnson 1998) and on that of the Protagoras in particular (Ebert 2003; Denyer 2008) has demonstrated that there are strong connections between these narratives and the philosophical content of the dialogues that they introduce. My analysis complements this work by uncovering links between Socrates’ competitive posturing in his discussion with Protagoras and the competitive lens through which Socrates introduces and colors this discussion for his audience in the frame narrative. Through a close reading of the frame narrative in the context of the dialogue’s use of athletic imagery and lyric poetry, I show that Socrates’ recapitulation of the discussion is configured as a means of publicizing his argumentative victory and that Socrates himself is configured as a kind of epinician messenger.

The frame narrative begins at 309a with leading questions by the anonymous companion to Socrates about whether he has just come from the “hunt” after Alcibiades, a question that Socrates then develops into a broader discussion of how the beauty of Alcibiades had come in second place earlier that day to the beauty of Protagoras’ wisdom. The comparative ranking of Alcibiades and Protagoras accords a programmatic importance to competition early in the dialogue, and at 309b Socrates provides a further detail that foreshadows Alcibiades’ contribution to Socrates’ own competition with Protagoras, namely, that Alcibiades “said much on my behalf helping me”. Later in the dialogue (336b-e; 348b) Socrates expands upon this point by relating how Alcibiades’ intervention helped to persuade a reluctant Protagoras to continue the discussion under conditions that were advantageous to Socrates’ idiosyncratic method of
argumentation. Socrates also uses the other interlocutors to pressure Protagoras in this same way and even to stall for time to formulate responses to Protagoras’ arguments (e.g. 339e). Socrates and the other interlocutors acknowledge the competitive subtext of the discussion by deploying figurative language that likens Socrates’ argument with Protagoras to an athletic match. Socrates and Protagoras are compared to unequally matched long distance runners (335d-336b), are asked if they would accept an arbiter over their discourses (338b), and at a particularly telling moment one of Protagoras’ arguments strikes Socrates like the blow of a boxer, leaving him dazed (339e). This last example is the opening salvo in Socrates’ and Protagoras’ analysis of the Scopas Ode, the content of which has been shown to have distinct resonances with the philosophical content of the dialogue as a whole (Scodel 1986; Frede 1986) and which I argue prefigures Socrates’ encounter with the anonymous companion in the frame narrative.

At 346d the internal narrator of the Scopas Ode envisions a superlatively blameless man and promises that he will herald (apaggelein) him to the audience if he should ever encounter him. Carson 1992 has compared this heralding to the activities of the poet-messenger of Pindar’s epinician poetry (see Ol. 6.90, 7.21; Pyth. 1.32,9.1; and Nem. 6.65), and Socrates’ announcement in the frame narrative that in Protagoras he has encountered a superlatively wise man (309d) appears at first glance to be a real-world fulfillment of the Ode’s promise. Only at the end of the dialogue, when Protagoras has ceded the discussion to Socrates (360d), does it fully emerge that Socrates’ initial praise of Protagoras is ironic. In fact, Socrates’ heralding of Protagoras’ wisdom allows him to become the messenger of his own victory and the speaker of his own praise. Scholars may debate which of the two antagonists in the Protagoras makes the better or fairer argument, but the narrative structure of the Protagoras leaves no doubt that Socrates has made the winning argument.

**The Harmony of Plato’s Moral Psychology in Protagoras and Republic**

Kendall R. Sharp

This paper shows that Plato’s Protagoras does not conflict with his Republic on a point scholars standardly suppose marks a profound contradiction in moral psychology between his earlier and middle periods. According to scholarly consensus, Socrates in Republic contradicts the Socrates of Protagoras, by allowing that, in human motivation and action, nonrational factors have power to overrule reason. Scholars generally suppose that in the earlier Protagoras Socrates denies the possibility that reason can lose control over emotion and appetite, while in Republic he bases the soul’s tripartition on precisely this possibility. But scrutiny of the two relevant Protagoras passages shows that Socrates denies the possibility of akrasia in a sense qualified and hedged so very precisely as not to conflict, as commonly supposed, with the later moral psychology of Republic.

Inexactitude abounds among scholars about what exactly, in Protagoras, Socrates denies. He is not adumbrating in Protagoras, as he is in Republic, an account of the soul’s structure and function, but challenging a popular view about weakness of the will as internally inconsistent. This popular view is that sometimes persons choose to do something, while “knowing” that something else, equally possible, is better, because they are overcome by nonrational factors like fear or desire (Prt. 352b-e). Socrates denies this, and very many scholars report him as denying
that “reason” can prove weaker than nonrational factors. Further, scholars cite this passage as evidence that Socrates “overlook[s] a nonrational aspect of human motivation” and thinks virtue is “a purely intellectual matter” (Kraut 1992, 5-6). But the sense of *akrasia* Socrates denies in *Protagoras* does not fit this standard picture. In *Protagoras*, Socrates does not deny that nonrational factors can overcome a person’s reason, or their better judgment. He denies only that such factors can overcome knowledge. It is a hedge for Socrates to specify knowledge, rather than one’s better judgment, as unconquerable by emotions, because in this way he refrains from denying what so many scholars believe he denies can be overcome by nonrational factors, namely, “reason.” This hedge crops up so naturally, as to escape notice as a significant move. Although Socrates introduces it, he does so in the voice of Most People. It is their claim that sometimes they “know” the difference between good and bad, which Socrates disputes. They do make a claim about the relative strength of knowledge and nonrational factors, but Socrates disputes their understanding of knowledge for being internally inconsistent, not for underestimating knowledge’s strength. In his account of the Measuring Art, Socrates makes clear that he assumes knowledge is precisely the tool the soul uses, when deliberating morally, to manage nonrational factors (*Prt.* 356b-d). The Measuring Art treats nonrational factors as distortions in perception, and corrects for these distortions (356d). In this way, knowledge rationalizes the influence of nonrational factors on decision-making. It is not knowledge if these influences are not rationalized, and, Socrates argues, it is self-contradictory to say that knowledge is present when these influences determine one’s choice (355d).

In this way, Socrates treats the popular view of *akrasia* as a knowledge claim, and denies only that people, who are thought to commit errors while knowing better, actually know better. He does not dispute whether such people are overcome by fear or desire, only that they possess knowledge when thus overcome. Even if in *Protagoras* Socrates intends the statement of his denial to cover *akrasia* more broadly, he limits his discussion and arguments to only this epistemological sense. This sense of *akrasia* is much more narrowly restricted than scholars generally appreciate, and does not run afoul of the soul’s tripartition in *Republic*, where Socrates assumes that nonrational factors frequently do disrupt the leadership of the soul by its rational faculty.

**Plato’s Laws and the Development of Stoic Natural Law Theory**

**Jed W. Atkins**

The political thought of the early Stoics has received much recent scholarly attention. Perhaps the aspect of their political thought for which they are best known is their concept of natural law. Indeed, many scholars follow Striker 1987 in crediting Zeno and Chrysippus with the first articulation of a full-blown theory of natural law. Scholars have been particularly eager to locate the antecedents of the Stoic concept of natural law and to identify the philosophical problems to which the theory responds. Some scholars have suggested that the Stoics were developing basic Socratic insights (Striker 1987, DeFilipo and Mitsis 1994); others have argued that the early Stoics articulated their particular conception of natural law in an attempt to improve upon Plato’s teaching in the *Republic* (Vander Waerdt 1994, Schofield 1999). While it is no doubt true that Plato’s *Republic* was an important target for the early Stoics, this paper argues that Plato’s *Laws* was the dialogue that more greatly contributed to the early Stoic account of natural law.
Though most scholarly attention has focused on the early Stoics’ engagement with Plato’s *Republic*, there is abundant evidence that Plato’s *Laws* also served as an important stimulant for early Stoic political thought. First, we know that Persaeus of Citium, Zeno’s close friend and disciple, wrote a seven-book critique of Plato’s *Laws* (D.L. 7.36). And in fact, a number of Zeno’s most prominent political arrangements contradict specific teachings in the *Laws*, including the Athenian Stranger’s provisions for law courts (766D), temples (778B-C), and currency for travel (742A-B) as well as his criticisms of homosexuality (636 AD). However, not all Stoic references to the *Laws* are negative. As Schofield 1999 suggests, the Stoic debate over drinking wine was likely provoked by the *Laws*. And most importantly, the Stoic understanding of law as “common law” (*koinos nomos*) or “right reason” (*orthos logos*) echoes the Athenian Stranger’s conception of law (Plato, *Laws* 714A, 890D; cf. *SVF* 1.262, 3.314).

The *Laws*’ treatment of law actually responds to a problem shared with the *Republic*: How can the defender of natural justice respond to the conventionalist’s claim that justice is “the advantage of the stronger” (cf. *Republic* 338C, *Laws* 714C)? The Athenian Stranger’s articulation of law as “right reason” and “by nature” (890D) in Book 10 attempts to meet this challenge by connecting law to *nous*, the primary force governing the cosmos (899D). How though does this argument establish the authority of laws of non-ideal cities like the second-best city of the *Laws*? Given his preceding argument, Plato can only establish the authority of non-ideal laws by equivocating on both “law” and “nature.” Plato uses “law” to refer to both ideal “right reason” and the laws of the second-best city. Likewise, these non-ideal laws can be understood as “in accordance with nature” only by shifting the meaning of “nature” from the rational nature of the cosmos to human nature, which in turn is characterized by irrationality as well as rationality.

I suggest that the particular form of natural law found in the early Stoics took its shape from the desire to remove the ambiguities in Plato’s *Laws*. The Stoics removed the ambiguity from “law” by arguing that all law is “right law,” the perfect reason of the sage. Ordinary laws of ordinary cities are not proper laws (*SVF* 3.325). Likewise, the Stoics conceived of “nature” strictly as that rational nature shared by the cosmos and sages (*SVF* 2.528). They do not also extend the designation “nature” to include human nature as defined by Plato in the *Laws* as encompassing a mix of rational and irrational qualities. As a result of these efforts to render Plato more consistent, Zeno’s *Republic* required the communality of women and property, provisions shared with that best regime described in the *Laws* as “inhabited by gods and the children of gods” (739C-D).
The tense hostage scene and the threat of incineration in the rousing finale of Euripides’ *Orestes* depend upon two interconnected literary traditions of hostage scenes: one from tragedy, and the other, perhaps more surprisingly, from comedy. I will trace the development of hostage scenes in both Euripides and Aristophanes, arguing for a literary rivalry between the two dramatists, with Euripides responding to and appropriating Aristophanes’ parodies of the hostage scene in Euripides’ *Telephus* in his *Acharnians* and *Thesmophoriazusae*.

Scholars have long noticed connections between *Orestes* and earlier tragedy. Zeitlin has famously described *Orestes* as a ‘palimpsest’ with a tightly interwoven set of intertextual allusions to tragedy and epic, and Wright notes Euripides’ self-referential tendencies in the *Orestes*. My analysis of the tragic tradition of hostage scenes is in line with these scholars’ arguments, as Euripides’ previous hostage scenes from *Telephus* and *Andromache* (309-463) resonate with the scene in his later play *Orestes* in character and plot. Orestes is the baby held hostage in *Telephus*, the savior of Hermione in *Andromache*, and the hostage-taker in *Orestes*. Menelaus is a bystander in *Telephus*, the hostage-taker in *Andromache*, and the grieved father of the hostage in *Orestes*. Euripides reworks his own plots and mythologies in a way that is not only open to these tragic precedents but also provides opportunities to draw upon comedy.

Euripides purposefully reacts to Aristophanic comedy by incorporating elements found in Aristophanes’ parodies into the *Orestes*. Aristophanes parodied the *Telephus* hostage scene twice, and as Platter argues, the later *Thesmophoriazusae* must be read against both Euripides’ play and Aristophanes’ earlier parody in *Acharnians*. This is true, but more attention must be paid to what is different about the parody in *Thesmophoriazusae*, and I submit that it is the addition of the incineration plot to the hostage scene. Aristophanes begins the *Telephus* parody with the same material covered in the *Acharnians* – the intruder pleading a rhetorical defense speech (467-519), the chorus frantically searching for the intruder (663-687), and the intruder abducting the baby (688-717).

Suddenly, Aristophanes displays his invention of incineration, marked by a bit of standard Euripidean metatheatrical coding. As Torrance has shown, Euripides constantly uses the word *metaboli* ‘change, reversal’ to mark a new direction the plot has taken (*Bacchae* 1266-7, *Iphigenia in Aulis* 500 and 1101, *Trojan Women* 615, *Heracles* 735, etc.). I would add that at *Thesmophoriazusae* 724 Aristophanes uses the related verb *metaballo* ‘change, reverse’ to mark his new addition of threatening to incinerate the hostage. The chorus metatheatrically remarks at 724-5, “Your luck has quickly changed (*metaballo*) to the bad, and heads in another direction,” and the women threaten to torch the Kinsman. The Kinsman replies at *Thesmophoriazusae* 730 - *hyphapte kai kataithe* ‘light me up and incinerate me!’

This rare set of words is linked only one other time in extant Greek literature, at *Orestes* 1618 and 1620, when Orestes commands Electra to light the house on fire (*hyphapte*) and Pylades to incinerate the battlements (*kataithe*) using the same imperatives as in Aristophanes. In contrast
with the conflagration that destroys the Thinkery at the end of *Clouds*, both *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Orestes* tease the audience with an unfulfilled expectation, much like Helen’s ‘death’ in *Orestes* or the ‘baby’ in *Thesmophoriazusae*. The uncommon verbal parallel and the novel connection of an incineration plot to a hostage plot demonstrate that Euripides implemented an Aristophanic development from the *Thesmophoriazusae* in his *Orestes*. The best term for this is paracomedy, following Scharffenberger, since just as Aristophanes could appropriate elements from tragedy through paratragedy, so could Euripides appropriate elements from comedy through paracomedy. The escalation of the plots from *Telephus* to *Acharnians* to *Thesmophoriazusae* to *Orestes* is in line with recent theorizing about rivalry, as in van Wees. *Orestes* is not only a palimpsest, but also a signpost marking the literary competition between two dramatists in different genres.

**Whatever Happened to Euripides’ Lekythion (**Frogs** 1198–1247)?**

**David Sansone**

In Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, Aeschylus subjects the opening lines of six of Euripides’ plays to ridicule by inserting the phrase ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν into one of each play’s first three lines. This paper will argue that the phrase means, “had his lekythion stolen.” Previous scholars have concerned themselves exclusively with the significance of the word ληκύθιον, finding in it a sexual (Whitman, Sider, Gerò and Johnsson), metrical (Navarre, Arnould) or stylistic (Quincey, Taillardat 297–98) significance. Little, if any, attention has been paid to the only other word in the phrase, ἀπώλεσεν, which is regularly assumed to mean “lost” in the sense of “mislaid,” as Sommerstein translates the expression. Faraone (33) argues in another connection that ἀπώλεσεν used in curses against thieves can serve as a “face-saving” device, but evidence will be presented that active forms of ἀπόλλυμι can signify “have something stolen” (e.g. *Ach.* 1022, *Nub.* 856, *Av.* 493; Arist. *Probl.* 952b18 and 22; Plut. *mor.* 18d; Ath. 338a; the same is true of Latin *perdo*: e.g. Plaut. *Curc.* 584, *Men.* 665; Sen. *Ben.* 7.16.3; Mart. 12.87; Petr. *Sat.* 30.11). By contrast, instances of ἀπόλλυμι meaning “misplace” are nearly impossible to find.

Given that a lekythion (a container for olive oil) was a personal item that one might bring with one to the gymnasium or the public bath, both of which places were notorious as targets of thieves (Dem. *In Timocr.* 114; Fagan 36–38), it is likely that Aristophanes’ audience understood that Cadmus, Pelops, Aegyptus and the other victims of Aeschylean sabotage had their lekythia stolen. This is explicit in the case of the sixth Euripidean prologue to be subjected to the insertion of ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν: After Aeschylus applies the tag to Oeneus, he is called out by the umpire Dionysus, who asks, “And who stole it (καὶ τίς ἄϑ’ ὑψεῖτο; 1242)?” No answer is given to Dionysus’ question, which brings the lekythion-scene to an abrupt end, with the apparent humiliation of Euripides. The contest between the two tragic poets next turns to their skill in composing lyrics. Euripides goes second, as he had done in the competition involving prologues. The lyric competition similarly ends with Aeschylus’ devastating parody of Euripidean lyrics, the subject of which is, significantly, the theft of some woman’s rooster and the woman’s hysterical appeals for help in retrieving the stolen item from the presumed thief, a woman named Glyce (1331–63).
Why do both scenes end with Euripidean characters being represented as victims of petty crimes? It will be argued that this is the ultimate humiliation for the tragic poet who had earlier boasted that, unlike his pretentious predecessor, he brought familiar, everyday matters onto the stage (959–63) and taught the Athenians how better to manage their households (971–79). This is “the achievement he most vividly takes pride in” (Lada-Richards 242; cf. 291–93), and the boast earns the approval of Dionysus, who notes that “every Athenian” now comes home from the theater having learned to keep a vigilant watch on every cooking utensil and every morsel of food in his house (980–91). The Aeschylean versions, however, of Euripides’ prologues and lyrics reveal a cast of tragic characters, both human and divine, who are pathetically incapable of preventing the loss of their personal belongings through theft. Thus the humor of the lekythion-scene derives not only from the absurdity of hearing an everyday object grafted onto a solemn narrative involving a mythical or divine character. Those mythical and divine characters turn out to be so far from setting an admirable example of household management for the ordinary members of Euripides’ audience that they cannot even protect their belongings from common thieves. That is not to deny that other—sexual, metrical and stylistic—factors may contribute to the humor of the scene. But sometimes a lekythion is just a lekythion.

Hijacking Sophocles, Burying Euripides: the Tragedy of Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae
Goran Vidovic

Presumably because tragedy’s contribution to Aristophanes’ comedy is considered exhausted in the Thesmophoriazusae and the Frogs, the paratragic elements in the Ecclesiazusae and the Plutus have usually, if implicitly, been regarded as non-essential and sporadic vestiges of an obsolete and abandoned practice (Rau 1967; Ussher 1973; Taaffe 1993). In this paper I argue that, by contrast, the tragic material is an indispensable component of the Ecclesiazusae, although (or, rather, precisely because) it is no longer openly acknowledged by Aristophanes.

I focus on the penultimate episode, the rape of the young man by the three ugly old women (Eccl. 975-1111), the disturbing oddity of which has long been recognized: it is a “scandal… staged… in a long scene of rarely appreciated caustic comedy pushed to the limits of objectionable” (Saïd 1986; similarly, Wheat 1992). In keeping with such assessments, I discuss several intriguing features of this scene, the two most illustrative being the imagery of abductors as Erinyes, and, especially, the similarities of the abduction-scene in the Ecclesiazusae with the one in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus.

First, an association with the Erinyes is all but natural for the three gruesome women bent on exacting due revenge (announced at Eccl. 1043), and, given the context, their description unmistakably evokes Oresteian nightmares: “dressed in a bloody blister” (Eccl. 1057) finds its closest parallel in the habitual portrayal of Erinyes with bloody ooze dripping from their eyes (A. Eum.55, Cho. 1058; E. Or. 255); indeed, a comparable Aristophanic figure, Poverty, is explicitly compared to tragic Erinyes (Plut. 423). Accordingly, the tragic development of the entire scene is in my view conveniently highlighted by the two apparently synonymic, yet perfectly antithetical expressions that frame it: at the onset of the abduction the assailant invokes proper authority: “Yes, by Aphrodite, whether you like it or not!” As the victim is finally being dragged
offstage, the invocation is appropriately updated: “Yes, by Hecate, whether you like it or not!” (Eccl. 981; 1097).

Second, and most importantly, the only direct tragic reference in the *Ecclesiazusae* is that if young men are forced into sex with older women, they will all become Oedipuses (1041). Although one might rather have expected a reference to, say, Hippolytus, the mention of Oedipus seems deliberately chosen to allude to the source-model of the scene. Namely, the rape-scene of the *Ecclesiazusae* is in details and the overall dynamics strikingly similar to Creon’s abduction of Antigone—and attempt of abduction of Oedipus—in Sophocles’ *OC* (800-885). The central section of this paper is therefore a comparative analysis of the two scenes, parsed, for convenient comparison, into corresponding units:

1) victims looking for help both from absent allies (OC 815; Eccl. 1023-4), and bystanders (OC 822-3; Eccl. 1054-5; 1056-7);

2) victims’ reluctance and denial (OC 882; Eccl. 1011), cries of despair (OC 847; Eccl. 1051);

3) abductors silencing the victims (OC 864; Eccl. 1005, 1058, 1088);

4) abductors claiming inescapability (OC 862, 883; Eccl. 1008, 1011, 1029, 1081), accordingly,

5) threatening ‘whether willingly or unwillingly’ (OC 826-7; Eccl. 981, 1097), and

6) ‘taking what is mine’ (OC 829-32; Eccl. 1037);

7) vigorous tug of war (OC. 835, 838-40, 856-7,874; Eccl. 1075, 1085, 1088);

8) when the worst seems over, yet worse comes (OC850; Eccl. 1048);

9) victims’ own descriptions of being dragged away (OC828-9, 844-6; Eccl. 1066, 1093-4).

The powerful Sophoclean scene—“perhaps the most elaborate and varied scene of violence in extant Greek tragedy”(Kaimio 1988)—stages a girl being kidnapped in front of her helpless blind father; nor should we forget that Sophocles, unlike Aeschylus and Euripides, was never a *komoidoumenos*. Thus, the abduction-scene of the *Ecclesiazusae* makes an unprecedented use of tragedy by no longer performing an unconcealed Euripidean burlesque; the practical application of the Assemblywomen’s controversial regime is, in effect and on a closer look, anything but comic. Seemingly unexpectedly, but in fact all too symptomatically, the scene is wrapped up by a burying ritual, the typically Euripidean closure—for the show must go on.
The embedded epistle is a prominent plot device in Plautine comedy (cf. Jenkins 2005). In the *Trinummus*, the epistolary deception is subverted through the unexpected arrival of the letters’ alleged author, Charmides, who encounters the sycophant hired to deliver epistles supposedly written by him. While traveling abroad, Charmides has left his daughter in the trust of Callicles, who forges two letters so as to provide a dowry for the *virgo* from a buried treasure without alerting her spendthrift brother. In his collision with the “messenger”, Charmides quickly catches on to the trickster’s fiction and takes comic advantage of his ignorance. When he finally reveals his identity, the sycophant leaves the stage, taking the letters with him – unread. Offering a close interpretation of this failed delivery scene (Act 4 Scene 2), my paper argues that the clash between Charmides and the sycophant may be read metatheatrically as reflecting Plautus’ stance of independence towards his model text, Philemon’s *Thesaurus*.

My analysis builds on Jenkins’ (2005) observations about the stunted “kinetic potential” of the letters (cf. Rosenmeyer 2001, 65), the plot’s play with the epistolary *absens*/*praesens* topos, and the trickster’s characterization as *graphicus*, which connects him to the duplicity of the written word in Plautine comedy, whereby embedded letters *qua* writing serve as a symbol for the creation of fiction (cf. also Sharrock 1996). I suggest that the letters, on a metapoetic level, represent Plautus’ Greek model – the fact that they are belied and remain unread is significant and may, I submit, yield some insight into Plautus’ mode of translation.

First, I argue that the counterfeited epistles function as images of the script for the *Trinummus*’ internal plot, its “play-within-the-play” (Slater 1985), and for the play writ large. The external and internal performances are made equivalent by the fact that Plautus’ comedy bears the same title as the day named *Trinummus* by the sycophant after the three *nummi* he receives for his role (vv. 843-44). Next, I show how the trickster’s “scriptedness”, highlighted by his repeated characterization as *graphicus*, is contrasted with, and trumped by, the improvisational nature of Charmides. The *senex* is highly self-conscious: like Pseudolus or Chrysalus, Charmides is endowed with superior knowledge and empowered to make asides to the audience. The trickster is helpless in the face of this comic heroism: even as his story begins to unravel when challenged by the letters’ “author”, he can only cling to what is *scriptum* (v.982); he cannot improvise, although the situation demands it for the success of his performance. Charmides *can*, however: his metatheatricality enables him to confute the sycophant’s role and the letters’ fiction. By dismissing the epistles *qua* scripts, he sabotages the epistolary deception (made superfluous by his arrival), thus subverting the internal plot and, I submit, the play itself.

In the paper’s final part, I propose that this comic *agon* represents a clash of the two dramatic traditions influencing Plautus’ *palliata*, scripted Greek theatre and Italian improvisatory drama, and ultimately functions as an assertion of the playwright’s poetics. It has been suggested that the scene is originally Plautine, or largely so (cf. Petrone 1983, Lefèvre 1995); Riemer (1996) argues that Plautus composed this title scene so as to underline his contribution to the model text. These critical treatments, however, attempt to discern Plautus’ innovation by separating motifs they perceive to be Plautine from those considered Philemonian. Rather than basing itself upon a
hypothesetical recreation of Philemon’s *Thesaurus*, my analysis proposes a reading of Plautus’ originality from a metatheatrical perspective. Whether or not a similar scene occurred in the *Thesaurus*, Charmides’ arrival and clash with the sycophant, his impromptu performance, stands, I submit, for Plautus’ creative contribution to the plot. Within the *Trinummus*, the scene serves to highlight Plautine aesthetics: by subverting the play’s epistolary scheme, its scripted plot, it affirms Plautus’ independence and proclaims the triumph of his improvisatory poetics through the defeat of the scripted sycophant.

**Pacuvius poeta comicus?**

Jan Felix Gaertner

The paper examines the ancient evidence for comedies written by the early Roman playwright Pacuvius and argues that several fragments that are currently attributed to his tragedies are more likely to come from *comoediae palliatae*. Pacuvius is today commonly regarded as the first Roman playwright who only wrote tragedies (cf. e.g. Valsa 1957: 8, D’Anna 1967: 242, Erasmo 2004: 34, Manuwald 2003: 137-8, 2011: 209). However, there are two quotations from comedies written by Pacuvius in Fulgentius’ *Expositio sermonum antiquorum* (Serm. Ant. 12, 32 = testimonia 11, 12 Schierl). These quotations have been either explicitly rejected or simply excluded from recent editions or discussions of Pacuvius’ fragments, because Fulgentius has been considered a fraud and there is no reference to Pacuvius’ comedies in any other author (cf. Ribbeck 1897-8, Warmington 1936: xix, D’Anna 1967: 179, 242, Magno 1978, Schierl 2006: 10). This argument does not bear scrutiny. Firstly, the 19th century view that Fulgentius invented many of his references (cf. Lersch 1844: 19-88, Wessner 1899: 135-9) has been called into question a long time ago (cf. Roth 1845: 606-15, Klotz 1845: 81-95), and more recent scholars have emphasized that Fulgentius’ references to extant classical texts are sometimes corrupt or imprecise, but certainly not invented (cf. Helm 1899: 113-14, Costanza 1955, Pennisi 1963: 99-196, Pizzani 1969: 8-17, Baldwin 1988, Smith 2005: 109-110). Secondly, there is a priori no good reason why we should doubt that Pacuvius also wrote comedies like Livius Andronicus, Naevius, and Ennius had done before him. And thirdly, it is unlikely that an ignorant fraud should have invented two quotations that are consonant with the rules of early Latin metre and comply with the motivic and linguistic conventions of Roman comedy (cf. Koterba 1905: 152-3, Pizzani 1969: 101-4, 144-6). Hence, we cannot simply discard Fulgentius’ testimony, but have to take it seriously. This has important consequences. If Pacuvius also wrote comedies, we can no longer assume that fragments which have been preserved without an indication of title or genre must come from a tragedy. Several of the respective fragments have far more in common with New Comedy than with tragedy. A good example is the philosophical reflection about the blindness and fickleness of Fortune in fr. 262 (Schierl). The verses have been attributed to Pacuvius’ historical play on Aemilius Paulus or to one of his two tragedies dealing with the myth of Orestes, but the tragic parallels adduced in Schierl’s extensive commentary are not particularly close, because they lack a philosophical dimension (cf. Enn. trag. 338-40 Jocelyn, Acc. trag. 619-20 Ribbeck, TrGF II, fr. 89b). Far closer parallels can be found in Middle and New Comedy (cf. e.g. Philemon fr. 74, 125, 178, Men. fr. 372, 682, 853 Kassel/Austin and Grey 1896, Vogt-Spira 1992). A similar case can be made for fr. 274 and 275, where *ad manticulandum* (‘for the purpose of cutting purses’) and the metaphorical use of *plaga* (‘net’) point to a non-tragic, everyday-life context and have their closest linguistic parallels in the comedies of Plautus (cf. *TLL* s.v. *plaga* 2300.50-58). For several other fragments (261, 273, 277, 278, 280, 299) a comic context is just as plausible as a tragic one. Apart from the immediate
consequences for the interpretation of the respective fragments, the observations also have two broader implications. Firstly, they cast doubt on the view that Pacuvius freely inserted philosophical digressions into his tragedies without considering the mythical or historical context (cf. e.g. Manuwald 2003: 105): several of the fragments on which this theory rests have been transmitted without an indication of title or genre, and the longest and most significant of them (262) could come from an adaptation of a Greek comedy. Secondly, the discussion has shown that previous editions impose a tragic perspective on the reader and prevent us from exploring other possible interpretations; a more cautious or neutral edition along the lines of the *Poetae Comici Graeci* is urgently needed.

**Session 53: Sport and Spectacle in the Ancient World**
(organized by the APA Outreach Committee)

**Reasoning through the Greek *agôn***

*Thomas Scanlon*

The ancient Greek stadium is one of the best arenas for students to discover the classical world and to learn methods of wrestling with complex evidence. It combines the familiar, like gymnasia and athletic events, with the foreign, such as naked oily wrestlers and the brutal ethos of winning or dying. It introduces close reading of complex texts like Homer, Pindar, and Xenophanes, yet invites the comparanda from everyday experiences of modern young athletes. And it requires students to ‘read’ visual and material culture as well as inscriptions and sites.

In such courses at all levels, including undergraduate, graduate, and school presentations, my primary objectives have been the same, namely to engage interest, arouse curiosity, situate the contests centrally in Greek culture, and foster deductive reasoning from primary evidence.

My syllabus requires both a narrative text and a sourcebook, augmented by selected additional sources and articles. The course moves chronologically from the Bronze Age Mediterranean to the Greeks of late antiquity, with sessions also discussing the modern reception. Along the way we discuss, Homeric antecedents, the Olympics, the fundamentals of the contests, Panhellenic festivals, local agonistic festivals, heroes, professionalism, the economics of the games, the Spartan *agogê*, women’s games, and Greek sport in the Roman era. Beyond sport, these topics open up discussions of literature, religion, economy, gender, sexuality, sociology, politics, art, and architecture. The narrative text (Kyle, Miller 2004b, Spivey, Tyrell, Young) frees the instructor from having to provide the detailed historical, archaeological, and scholarly contexts. A sourcebook (Miller 2004a, Sweet, or Robinson) provides fodder for close discussion of ‘case studies’ on specific issues. Readers and handbooks afford ready complements to deeper issues (König, Kyle and Chirstesen [in press], Scanlon [in press], and Scanlon and Futrell [in preparation]).

Strategies for class sessions are discussed, including a ‘field day,’ visits from modern athletes or Olympians, and, at the core, ‘case studies’ of particular issues. Three specific examples of these
studies will be presented as following: 1) games and status-anxiety in Homer; 2) women at the Olympics?; and 3) the gimmickry of the hyspex. Each will be seen as a paradigm for students to observe how classics scholars and archaeologists reason through the fragmentary data to arrive at possible and probable interpretations, and how, in broader scope, these issues relate to modern social issues beyond the stadium.

Teaching Roman Sport
David Potter

When I arrived in Ann Arbor in 1986 there was a long tradition of teaching a course on ancient sport, the class having evolved from a course concentrating on Greek sport when it was created by Professor Waldo Sweet, to one focusing on the Romans and taught by Professor John Humphrey. Either version of the course was revolutionary for the time because they challenged students to integrate text with image to discuss problems in Roman social history. When I took the course over it seemed to me to offer an opportunity to introduce students to issues in Roman social history since it is impossible to understand sport outside its social context. The problem that we faced at that time was the absence of suitable materials, and after a number of years David Mattingly, with whom I split the teaching of the course in alternate years, developed the collection of essays published by the University of Michigan Press as Life, Death and Entertainment in the Roman Empire. At the time we published that book we planned a second volume which would focus on issues of dominance and subordination. That has been a victim of circumstances, but the new edition of the book remedies what seemed the most obvious deficiency, which was a discussion of slavery, for which we used Keith Hopkins’ study of the Life of Aesop. The point that Hopkins makes for the ancient world is equally valid for the modern: students learn best through stories that they can sink their teeth into. The new edition includes translations of two major texts—the decree on public combatants under Marcus Aurelius and Hadrian’s letters on public entertainers which are not readily available in accessible English editions with accessible commentaries.

The story of Life, Death and Entertainment reflects a fundamental problem in teaching Roman Sport, which is the accessibility of source material and of secondary readings. Courses on Greek Sport are very well served with both readings and collections in translation—I would single out Waldo Sweet’s Sport and Recreation in Ancient Greece and Stephen Miller’s Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources, while for the Roman side we had to wait a long time for Alison Futrell’s The Roman Games, which now routinely answers the call. A crucial aspect of these books is that they show students how to use the range of available material. From the point of view of a Classical Civilization program this is a genuinely important aspect of this sort of course. A second aspect that is important is that such courses automatically invite comparison with issues in the modern world. Since these issues are best addressed as they arise it means that there is always something new to talk about and students can see how a Classics course addresses issues in their daily lives.

Finally there is the issue of outreach. On a campus such as that of the University of Michigan, there is an opportunity to develop links with other units, ranging from the Athletic Department or School of Kinesiology to programs in film study or sociology. Campus information officers and local media outlets, especially in an Olympic year, are likely to reach out to people teaching ancient sport which can be very helpful in showing people that what we do has meaning in their
lives. A course on Roman Sport can serve as a dollop of curricular honey to draw in both students who might not otherwise be attracted to Classics and to draw in members of the public who might not otherwise think that members of the Classics Department are there for them. The fact that this is material that is constantly renewed both through archaeological discovery, media interest such as the Starz series on Spartacus, and current events reminds those who run our institutions that our subject is one that is in constant ferment—and that is a good thing.

Who Knows Where the Discus Will Land (and Other Reasons Not to Link the Ancient and Modern Olympics)
Mark Golden

Why do we throw the discus in the modern Olympics? Because the Greeks did. Not just the ancient Greeks: the modern ones too. It wasn't originally scheduled for Coubertin's first IOC Olympics of 1896. But it had two features which recommended it to the local organizers: it provided a connection to their prestigious past and (as it was virtually unknown elsewhere) it looked likely to produce a modern Greek victory.

Dis(cis) aliter visum. An American won by throwing the discus in a very modern manner. When the games returned to Athens in 1896, the Greeks took another tack, presenting two separate discus events. One used the modern throw; the other, the “Greek discus,” a stiff motion modeled (allegedly at least) on authentic ancient Greek practices. This strategy also failed. In fact, no modern Greek has ever won the modern Olympic discus. One has come very close, taking second place in both 2000 and 2004 — but this was Anastasia Kelesidou, in the women's competition. These successes, such as they were, offered no link to the ancient Olympics (in which only male competitors were present) and were not what the modern Greeks of 1896 had in mind at all.

This discourse of the discus is emblematic of the relationship between the ancient and modern games. The past is invoked—often inaccurately—chiefly for the purposes of the present, and even those ends may be missed. I will illustrate this theme with reference to one current attempt to use the past for present-day aims, the Olympic Truce campaign. However laudable its goals, this has both misrepresented the ancient Olympics and failed to make (much) good of the modern ones. But I will conclude by suggesting that there are ways -- more effective ways -- in which the modern Olympics could be enlisted in the cause of peace.

Athletics, Victory, and the Right to Rule in Ancient Greece
David Lunt

Victory was a powerful force in ancient Greece and victory in the prestigious Crown Games brought great honors to successful athletes and elevated them above their countrymen. During the Archaic and Classical periods in ancient Greece, tyrants and would-be tyrants participated in panhellenic athletic festivals both as founder-patrons and as competitors. The regular observance of contests institutionalized victory and its attendant power and glory, allowing the festival’s patron and benefactor to capitalize on the fruits of victory without risking defeat.
Victory in athletic competitions played an important role in determining and glorifying an individual’s aretē. Naturally born virtue, in the minds of aristocracy, indicated and justified an individual’s right to political and social authority. Indeed, according to Aristotle, an individual’s aretē, or the deeds that sprang from aretē, was justification for that person to possess ruling power (Arist. Pol. 1310b). In order to capitalize on the power of athletic victory and to highlight their own aretē, Pheidon of Argos, Cleisthenes of Sicyon, and – perhaps – Peisistratus of Athens all undertook prominent roles in hosting and expanding panhellenic athletic festivals during the Archaic period. As competitors, Cylon in the 630s, and Alcibiades in 415 both attempted to parlay their Olympic successes into political power at Athens, Cylon as a tyrant and Alcibiades as commander in Sicily. The fifth-century tyrants of Sicily augmented their reputations by emphasizing their athletic (equestrian) victories in verse, statues, and on their coins. Similarly, the kings of Macedon, particularly Philip II, recognized the power of athletic victory in justifying and maintaining his hegemonic rule over the Greeks.

Mark Munn has discussed the links between sovereignty and victory, noting that victorious athletes, like kings, were “crowned, paraded, feasted and celebrated in monuments and songs.” While athletes could aspire to elite status through victory in competitions, the institution of athletic contests represented, at least in some cases, attempts “to recreate and participate in the effects of these archetypes of victory.” To the Greeks, the power of prestigious athletic victories readily equated to political power, such as tyranny, in both sponsorship and competition.

However, the responses of the Athenian people to both Cylon and Alcibiades indicate that the power of athletic victory was not absolute, nor did it automatically bestow tyrannical power on its possessor. Despite athletic competition’s ability to single out one individual for great acclaim and glory, athletics also, perhaps paradoxically, offered an avenue for more democratic involvement. In theory, any freeborn Greek male could participate in athletic contests and acquire the glorious fruits of victory, although the extent to which ancient Greek athletics were open to all remains a topic of discussion among modern scholars. Nevertheless, there existed a certain inherent equality among competitors in their contests of speed and strength. Stephen Miller has suggested that these “absolute standards” of the competitions constituted a “basic isonomia.”

This isonomia, however, was limited to the competitors, not the sponsors. To a greater extent than the competitors Cylon and Alcibiades, the patrons and sponsors of prominent Games enjoyed the aretē of athletic victory and its accompanying justification for their rule. Without risking their status against other competitors, those rulers who presided at athletic festivals claimed close associations with victory and used the glory and rewards of victory to their political advantage.
Roman Gladiators as Sports Stars
Garrett Fagan

Opinion is divided about whether gladiatorial combat can be considered a form or sport. On one side are those who insist that men fighting for their lives under compulsion are not athletes engaged in sport but wretches engaged in “a form of warfare for spectators” (Poliakoff 1987: 7). On the other side sit those who argue that gladiators were indeed engaged in a sporting activity, albeit a very dangerous one (Kyle 2007: 18-22, 312-23; Potter 2011: 258-72). On both sides the focus is on what the gladiators were doing and whether those actions can be classified as “sport.” A different approach is to consider how gladiatorial combats were viewed by the spectators. If gladiatorial combats appealed to ancient spectators for many of the same reasons that modern sport does to its fans, then we shall have gained a very different perspective on this issue, one that sidelines the knotty problem of defining what constitutes “sport” and instead focuses on what made it fun to watch.

Students of modern sport have posited a variety of why fans engaged emotionally with the action. Sports are set apart from the everyday, in both space and in time. They take place in their own designated places (in rings, fields, courts, etc.), on set days and times (during tournaments, or in specific timeslots). Contestants are often dressed and equipped in special ways and have to abide by rules and protocols during the contest. The spectators are familiar with these rules and insist they be enforced fairly, so that umpires or observers are usually on hand to make sure this is the case. As the athletes compete within the confines of the shared rules, knowledgeable spectators appreciate their artistry, skill, and endurance in striving for victory. Outcomes are uncertain, and it an upset victory by an “underdog” can rarely be ruled out.

Gladiatorial spectacles (munera) shared all of these features. The amphitheater was developed as a type of building specifically to stage them, but theaters, stadia, circuses, and forums could all be adapted to accommodate such events. The games officially began with a procession (pompa) and ended when the last gladiatorial pair had fought. In this way, the munera were aside from the ordinary in time and place. Gladiators wore often outlandish outfits and wielded modified weapons that often bore little or no resemblance to equipment used by real ancient warriors. There were rules of engagement (the lex pugnandi) and referees on hand to enforce them. Evidence that spectators could detect collusion (Sen. Ep. 22.1) or lacklustre performances (Petron. Sat. 45.12) shows that the audience were familiar not only with the rules but with the moves gladiators used to achieve victory. Gladiatorial graffiti, etched by the fans themselves, shows that they were looking not for bloody mayhem, but exciting contests fought with style by trained experts. The epitaphs of gladiators suggest the experts bought fully into this “culture of the arena.”

Roman gladiatorial combats shared many of the lures of modern sports. As such, it borders on the churlish to deny that they constituted a form of sport, no matter how deep our disapproval.
Democratization, Sports, and Choral Dancing in Sixth- and Fifth-Century BCE Athens
Paul Christesen

Both sports and choral dancing became increasingly important parts of Athenian life over the course of the sixth and fifth centuries. In the century and a half after 566 the Athenians established numerous contests in athletics and dancing, built three public gymnasia, erected monuments to successful choruses and athletes, and offered lavish rewards to victors at the Panhellenic games. (This paper considers choral dancing only as a discrete, intensely physical activity; it does not deal with choruses that were part of tragedies, comedies, etc.) During that same period Athens became one of the most democratic states in the Greek world. While there can be no doubt that democratization created conditions favorable to the broadening of participation in sports and choral dancing, the purpose of this paper is to argue that the reverse was true as well and, more specifically, that participation in and spectatorship of sports and choral dancing contributed meaningfully to democratization in Athens.

There is of course a vast literature on the origins and development of Athenian democracy, but relatively little scholarship that directly addresses the question of a possible causal relationship between sports, choral dancing, and democratization. R. Osborne (1993) argued that competitive festivals in Athens encouraged *esprit de corps* and appropriate forms of *philotimia*. S. Miller (2000) has made the case that athletic nudity promoted democracy by eroding social distinctions based on wealth and class. There has also been much discussion about the extent of participation in sports and choral dancing in Athens by non-elites prior to c. 400 BCE. The two basic positions have been most thoroughly articulated by N. R. E. Fisher (1998, 2011) and D. Pritchard (2003, 2004). Fisher’s position is that non-elites began participating in sports and choral dancing in significant numbers early in the fifth century, Pritchard’s that these activities remained the preserve of elites to the end of the fifth century. (The work of Calame (1997) and others on choruses is important but does not explore the relationship between dancing and democracy in Athens.) This paper takes a fundamentally different approach than the extant scholarship because it uses sociological concepts and theories and focuses on the socio-political mechanisms by which sports and choral dancing sustained democratization.

The paper has three parts. It begins with some brief suggestions about how sociology might inform the study of ancient sports and dance. This entails highlighting a basic societal need to find a balance between order and personal autonomy and identifying the primary means by which order is achieved, namely socialization, consensus, and coercion. The second part rapidly sketches how the democratization of Athens created new challenges in achieving a balance between order and autonomy. The third and by far the longest part of the paper discusses how sports and choral dancing (1) socialized Athenians into habits that buttressed democratization, (2) helped them achieve consensus, (3) exerted coercive force that induced obedience to written and unwritten rules without the use of overt compulsion, and (4) taught Athenians how to manage the enhanced autonomy that came with democratization. One strand of the argument will give a sense of how the whole would be presented. Democratization makes social order more difficult to achieve because the empowerment of large numbers of people makes overt coercion less acceptable. Participation in sports and choral dancing in Athens imposed a form of physical discipline of the sort discussed by Foucault (1977) and Bourdieu (1988); both activities...
engendered obedience to rules and authority figures and in that way exerted coercive force in a covert rather than overt fashion. Widespread, regular participation in sports and in choral dancing thus underpinned democratization by fostering appropriate, even necessary, habits and behaviors. The same basic approach will be applied throughout. The result is a new and expanded view of the relationship between democratization, sports, and choral dancing in ancient Athens.

Session 57: Poetry on Stone: Verse Inscriptions in the Greco-Roman World (organized by the American Society of Greek and Latin Epigraphy)

The Peculiar Case of the Earliest Greek Epigrams
Simon Oswald

Some 25 inscriptions from CEG and later publications may be dated pre-600 B.C., a rough date after which is witnessed a marked increase in the number of carmina epigraphica across the Greek world. Yet although it is these 25 inscriptions that would seemingly form the foundation from which later epigram would arise, important questions remain relating to them. Whilst Athens and Attica dominate the number of attested inscriptions in the 6th c. B.C. and later, the situation in the previous 150 years forms somewhat of a contrast, with Boeotia, Corinth, Naxos, and Corcyra equally, or better, represented in the corpus. Anomalies from such seemingly unimportant locations as Ithaca, Amorgos, and Pithecusae further complicate the regional picture. We should not, however, deny a certain fluidity between pre- and post- 600 B.C. carmina epigraphica. The usual suspects of media are inscribed - ceramics, stelai, bases, bronzes, and sculpture; the same thematic divisions may be distinguished - dedicatory, funerary, and ceramic ownership graffiti; metrical problems are found; quality is mixed - "from exquisitely turned bits of verse . . . to the absurdest doggerel" (Allen, 1888: 37). Mickey's underutilized study of dialect concludes that there was a tendency in early poetic inscriptions to write in a version of the local dialect that simultaneously avoided local dialect-characteristic features (1981: 31). The evidence would suggest that carmina epigraphica sprang fully-fledged out of nowhere with a developed orthography, form, and context that betrays a development in an earlier form that has left no archaeological or literary trace. We are, however, mistaken to stress continuity over development in this early period. In terms of epichoric alphabets, sculpture, layout, prosody, and linguistic analysis there is remarkable variation. No koine culture of carmina epigraphica in Greece can be distinguished, beyond the common poetic link. Nor should we necessarily mistake orthography for dialect. In fact, contra Mickey in a number of inscriptions a strong dialect flavor is detected. It may be additionally noted that two of the great colonial powers of the Archaic Age are well represented in this early corpus - Corinth and Euboea and their respective settlements, which can hardly be accidental. This paper will argue that the early centuries of carmina epigraphica represent an experimental and transitional period in which the possibilities of a new medium are explored, a development in many ways analogous to early prose epigraphy. This will be exemplified via an examination of script, presentation, dialect, and prosody from a number of examples, including the Dipylon Vase (CEG 432), the
Nikandre Kore (CEG 403), the Chalkodamans aryballos (CEG 363), and the Arniadas stele (CEG 145). The hypothesis will be advanced that these observations may be explained by situating early carmina epigraphica in a realm of comparatively isolated development in relation to the 6th c. B.C. and later.

**Why Inscribe? Isyllos of Epidauros and the Function of Inscribed Hymns**  
Alan Sheppard

Hymns played an important role in Greek religious life, commonly accompanying sacrifices and performing an important procedural role in giving expression to the prayers of the community. They had a specific performance context which required performance by a particular section of the community – for example paens were performed by a choir of young men. In light of such a clear performance context, it is somewhat strange to encounter inscribed hymns. What role could these inscribed hymns play when shorn of their original performance? This paper explores the reasons hymns could be inscribed and the function they played within sanctuaries in light of changing literary and religious attitudes in the early Hellenistic world. I shall use Isyllos of Epidauros' paian to Asklepios as an example since the extensive accompanying text (including a metrical lex sacra) allows an unprecedented glimpse into the reasons for the paian's inscription. Although the text has recently attracted attention for its political content and the details it provides concerning the cult of Asklepios (Furley and Bremer 2001, Kolde 2003, Vamvouri Ruffy 2004), little attention has been paid to how the inscription functioned and the role it played within the sanctuary. The first part of my paper will discuss the purpose of inscribing Isyllos' paian. Building upon previous discussions of the readership of Greek prayers, in particular curse tablets (Depew 1997), I shall suggest that there existed an assumption that (regardless of questions of readership and literacy amongst human viewers) the paian would be designed to be read by the divinity so that they would act on the paian's requests. The prayer of the inscribed paian is preserved forever – a factor which could help to explain the somewhat general nature of requests in inscribed hymns. Furthermore, this idea goes hand in hand with the suggestion found in earlier Greek literature (e.g. Pl. N. 8.16, h. Cer. 494) that prayers and hymns could function as offerings in their own right, without the need for accompanying sacrifice. Thus an inscribed hymn could perform the same function as a dedicated statue, reminding both human and divine viewers of the original offering of the hymn's performance. The second part of my paper will examine how Isyllos' paian constructs its authority through the aid of the accompanying text. The paian attempts to establish the Epidaurian Asklepeion as the primary sanctuary of Asklepios in the Greek world and I will build upon previous discussions (Kolde 2003) by analysing the role played by the metrical lex sacra in asserting the paian's authority. Exploring the suggestion that metrical leges sacrae attempt to portray themselves as divinely inspired (Petrovic & Petrovic 2006), I suggest that the inclusion of a metrical lex sacra accompanying the paian and Isyllos' ambiguous remarks concerning its discovery play a crucial role in asserting that the paian and the accompanying religious proposals it makes are divinely ordained. Furthermore, the command of the lex sacra to establish an annual procession ensures that both Isyllos' actions and the paian itself survive not only on stone but in the cult life of Epidauros. By prefacing the paian with an account of the ritual procession, Isyllos appears to prefigure later mimetic hymns in establishing a performance context for the reader of the paian. I close with a couple of suggestions: the tendency towards inscribing hymns in the late-Classical and Hellenistic periods suggests a
diversification of the genre; features such as mimeticism and the anticipation of future readers hinting at subsequent developments under Hellenistic writers (following Petrovic 2011). Within an era marked by changes in religious and literary practice, the decision to begin inscribing texts such as Isyllos’ paian demonstrates an early awareness of these factors. Isyllos positions his paian as a marker of religious change, demonstrating an awareness of the power of inscribed hymns to construct authority and to preserve the claims of its sanctuary in perpetuum.

**Celebratory Epigram for Itinerant Intellectuals, Artists, and Musicians of the Hellenistic Period**

*Angela Cinalli*

In the literary view of the Hellenistic Period, a significant space is occupied by wandering intellectuals, artists, and musicians of various talents. They coexisted with poets who worked in the court (Van Bremen) and travelled from city to city, travelling all around Greece, the Aegean Sea and the coasts of Asia Minor, in search of fame, glory and money (Guarducci). This "movement", which increased in the Imperial Era (Bowersock; Porter; Korenjak), finds its roots, its reasons and its first developments in the Hellenistic Period. This cultural phenomenon is documented mainly by epigraphic sources, which are sometimes validated by literary evidence. The inscribed evidence consists mainly of honorary decrees, but also of dedications and celebratory epigrams, which allow us to reconstruct important phases of the artists' careers. In fact it is possible to learn the specialties in which these intellectuals distinguished themselves and the occasion of the performance (Pallone), the birthplace and family home (Cinalli), and the privileges granted. It is also possible to understand the extent of their fame (Bouvier) and in those cases where, thanks to the approval of the public, the text and the content of performances have been transcribed, it can be observed the modus operandi of these specialists and the features of their compositions. While in decrees and dedications it is clear that in many cases, people honored for artistic skills were often employed in diplomatic missions between their city of provenance (not necessarily the birthplace) and the one in which they performed (Chaniotis), in epigrams a willingness to celebrate their artistic career emerges, highlighting the nature and topics of their compositions and recording the victories obtained in agonistic exhibitions. Considering the situation of Delos as an example, thanks to the epigram in honor of Apollonios (ID 2551), poet devoted to Apollo, we learn that he gained fame thanks to a composition of astrological topic; with the one for the herald Zenobios (ID 2552) instead, we can reconstruct the stages of his career through the victories in major contests. These and other important headlines can be inferred from the analysis of the inscriptions, and in this sense the epigrammatic evidence is particularly relevant to shed light on the artistic life of itinerant androi mousikoi of Hellenistic Age and gain a perspective view, and as much as possible exhaustive of a cultural and to some extent "popular" (Gentili) occurrence, that had a large following in the centuries to come.

**Paulina’s Poetic Defense of Roman Religion**

*Meghan DiLuzio*

This paper examines a poem authored by Fabia Aconia Paulina in defense of traditional Roman religion just a decade before the temples were permanently closed. In late 384 A.D., Paulina delivered a laudatio at the funeral of her husband Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, one of a very few occasions on which a Roman woman is known to have performed such a public function. This
circumstance is made even more remarkable by the fact that a version of the elogium has been preserved epigraphically in poetic form (CIL 6.1779). There is general agreement that Paulina authored both the elogium and the laudatio on which it was based (see, for example, Dronke 1984; Kahlos 1994; Stevenson 2005). She therefore belongs to the small group of women writers whose words have survived from antiquity. Even more importantly, however, her poetry provides a unique perspective on a period otherwise dominated by male authored religious polemic. Paulina's poem is an essential text for the comparison of Christian and pagan ideas about the afterlife and immortality in late antiquity. In line 9, she claims that the gate of heaven (porta caeli) lies open to Praetextatus because of his philosophical studies, while in lines 22-3, she praises her husband for initiating her into the mysteries and thus freeing her from the fate of death (sorte mortis eximens). Paulina, at least, seems convinced of her personal immortality and mounts a strong defense of the pagan way of life. The laudatio evidently attracted the attention of the eminent church father Jerome, who was in Rome in 384 working on his Latin translation of the Bible. In a brief note to his friend Marcella concerning the death of a Christian woman (Hier. Ep. 23.3), Jerome contrasts her eternal fate to that of the recently deceased consul designate. Praetextatus, Jerome scornfully insists, had not reached the heavenly palace, as his unhappy wife disingenuously claimed (commentitur), but was instead dwelling in foul darkness. Paulina's laudatio provides a unique counterpoint to Christian polemics of this kind and reminds us that pagan women also had a stake in the debate over the legitimacy of their religious system. While the poem is addressed to Praetextatus and lavishes praise on him, it is also strikingly autobiographical. Paulina offers a full account of her public commitment to traditional polytheism, providing her own counterpart to Praetextatus' elaborate cursus inscribed above. Her impressive list of initiations includes the Eleusinian rites, the most prestigious mystery cult in the entire Mediterranean. Paulina was also a recipient of the taurobolium at Rome, a hierophantria of Hecate, and an antistes of the Magna Mater. In lines 36-7 of the poem, Paulina boasts that men and women alike commend and desire the honors (insignia) that Praetextatus has bestowed upon her. Paulina here vocalizes the otherwise unspoken personal and social fulfillment that women could find in religious practice. For this reason, her elogium of Praetextatus not only illuminates the religious dynamics of the late fourth century, but also compliments the otherwise impersonal and indirect evidence for women's religious activities in ancient Rome.

**Fecit ad astra viam: Commemorating Wives in the Verse Epitaphs of Late Ancient Rome**

**Dennis Trout**

In the year 382, late in the episcopate of Damasus, Theodora Afrodite was interred at the cemetery of S. Agnese on Rome's Via Nomentana. She was twenty-one years old and her elaborate verse epitaph celebrated her soul's ascent to the stars (ICUR 8.20799). Composed or commissioned by her husband Evagrius, Theodora's ten classicizing hexameters catalog her Christian piety while proclaiming her family's affinity for the poetry of Vergil. At the time of her burial, both Theodora's age at death and the medium in which she was memorialized were typical. At S. Agnese women, primarily daughters and young wives, outnumber men two to one as the subjects of metrical epitaphs. The ratio is not an anomaly elsewhere in Rome's suburban cemeteries, where (young) wives are frequently the subject of epigraphic commemoration in poems that deftly manipulate the classical legacy. The phenomenon demands explanation. Metrical epitaphs like Theodora's may be considerably more forthcoming about the lives they
memorialize than are the thousands of brief and formulaic inscriptions that otherwise fill Rome's catacombs. Nevertheless, such epitaphs frequently reveal more about contemporary ideals of feminine deportment, broadly shared schemes of the Christian (after)life, and the social strategies of commemorators than about the characters and personalities of the women they honored. Yet, within the limits imposed by these considerations, the metrical epitaphs of women, both in aggregate and individually, do have much to tell about religion and society as well as poetry and commemoration in late ancient Rome. Moreover, the epitaph of Theodora—like those of Bassa in the Catacomb of Praetextatus (ICUR 5.14076) or Acilia Baebiana on the Via Flaminia (ICUR 10.27296)—preserves the social and poetic gestures of a literate but sub-elite segment of late Roman society. This paper, then, singles out for consideration several exemplary texts while also situating them within their social and epigraphic background. It argues that a number of factors lie behind the disparity between husband-to-wife and wife-to-husband commemoration in many of Rome's late antique cemeteries. It may be, for example, that differential rates of mortality, especially those related to childbearing, are reflected in these figures. It must also be the case, however, that the disproportionate number and the nature of metrical epitaphs composed for young wives reflect the social and ideological functions of memorialization. Through such commemorative practices male commemorators displayed the moral and social integrity of the households they administered. Praise of feminine piety and assurances of earthly merit and heavenly reward, therefore, underwrote not only a family's claims to religious legitimacy but also a husband's social authority. In an age of shifting cultural and religious boundaries such claims required re-statement. Similarly, recourse to classicizing verse allowed a family to trumpet the literary expertise that might seem to be merely the special preserve of more aristocratic households. Analysis of the metrical epitaphs of late ancient Rome, therefore, must effectively balance consideration of the ideological and affective qualities that make these epigrams a unique source of ancient cultural praxis.

Session 58: Intellectual Culture in the Third Century CE: Philosophy, Religion, and Rhetoric between the Second and Third Sophistic (Seminar)

Porphyrius philologus: Philosophy and Classicism in 3rd Century Platonism
Jeremy Schott

Porphyry of Tyre, best known as the intellectual heir and literary executor of the Neoplatonist Plotinus, had a double intellectual pedigree—he had studied with the great philologist Cassius Longinus before his tenure as a disciple of Plotinus. Porphyry’s oeuvre, which ranges from exegetical treatises on the Iliad to detailed commentaries on Aristotle, bears out this twofold training in philosophy and philology. But Porphyry’s two teachers also represented, in effect, the “philosopher” and “sophist,” further contributing to a sense of the complex position that Porphyry occupied among these intellectual traditions. Indeed, the contrast was not lost on Plotinus, who once remarked “Longinus is a philologist, but not a philosopher” (VPl. 13.19-20).
This paper considers the ways in which Porphyry, as an individual at the threshold of the third
sophistic, negotiated his double lineage and represented himself as both a heritor of classical
literary culture and a scion of the Greek philosophical tradition. An investigation of Porphyry’s
correspondence with Longinus (preserved in fragments within the Life of Plotinus) as well as the
extant fragments of his Lecture on Literature (apud Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 10.3)
indicates the fluidity of the boundaries between philosophy and rhetoric in the third century C.E.
Although Porphyry’s career has often been periodized into pre-Plotinian “philological” and post-
Plotinian “philosophical” periods, the evidence of the Lecture on Literature and the
correspondence with Longinus preserved in the Life of Plotinus show that Porphyry never drew
clear boundaries between his “philological” and “philosophical” interests and concerns. This is
perhaps best evidenced by his inclusion of the preface of Longinus’ On the End within the Life of
Plotinus (VPl. 20.15-105). Within the preface, Longinus offers an assessment of the literary and
stylistic value of various philosophers’ work, including Plotinus and Porphyry himself. The fact
that Porphyry includes this assessment within the Life of Plotinus suggests that Porphyry wished
his audience to view his own and his teacher’s work as having literary as well as philosophical
value. To write good philosophy was, for Porphyry, to participate in the classical literary
tradition.

This analysis also points to Porphyry’s liminal status as a figure in this particular socio-historic
moment: he is emblematic both of the defining characteristics of classical paideia and of how
that tradition (and those associated with it) came to be employed against the growing number of
Christian intellectuals in this period. The “classicism” of fourth- and fifth-century pagan
intellectuals, which has often been characterized as the last refuge of pagan public intellectuals in
the face of the increasing prestige enjoyed by Christian bishops, can be found already in
Porphyry—a scholar whose career flourished during a period in which Christianity enjoyed
neither imperial patronage nor social caché.

Ratio, Rhetoric, and Religion: Lactantius against the
Philosophers
Kristina A. Meinking

Scholars have long noted the Ciceronian eloquence of the Christian apologist Lactantius (c.250-
326C.E.) and the evidence thereof in his Divinae Institutiones. In both its structure and its
argumentation, Lactantius’ De ira Dei also clearly illustrates the classical rhetorical training in
which its author was most experienced. Here, however, it is no longer merely Lactantius’ style
that admits of Ciceronian influence, but the very structure and framing of the argument itself.
Against the philosophers, namely the Stoics and Epicureans, Lactantius maintains that the
summus deus experiences anger. Lactantius’ reluctance to engage with the philosophers on their
terms has often been taken as evidence of his ignorance of philosophy. Yet the apologist himself
(in a clearly rhetorical move) says that his opponents operate in the realm of conjecture, without
reason (ratio). To ascertain the truth of the matter, he argues, one must follow a logical
argument, grounded in proofs and reasoned discussion. Lactantius’ rhetorical argument
represents a distinct choice on the part of the author: to formulate a theological claim in
rhetorical terms. It is not just that Lactantius looked toward his training in rhetoric or to the
principles of reading and articulation that he could extract from it, but rather that he presented a
doctrinal matter in this manner.
This paper aims to question accepted notions about the role of both rhetoric and philosophy in third century Christian intellectual discourse. To that end, I discuss two important and overlooked facets of Lactantius’ argument in *De ira Dei*. In the first section, I set out the structure and rhetorical points of the treatise and examine Lactantius’ use of the term *ratio*. The applicability of rhetoric’s principles to philosophical (or in Lactantius’ case, theological) matters is not, however, the only way to understand the argumentation of the treatise. The deeper motivation behind Lactantius’ strategy was that he, like Cicero, saw in the proper exercise of rhetoric the pursuit of a reasoned and logical argument, particularly of philosophical or theological questions. Thus in the second section, I demonstrate that Lactantius adopted rhetorical techniques because he believed rhetoric to provide the soundest *ratio* for his material. Lactantius’ disillusionment with philosophy together with his training (educational and vocational) made rhetoric the most accessible and the most natural way for him to express his beliefs about the true religion. Equally importantly, rhetoric gave him a way of articulating theological arguments that allowed him to be most persuasive.

Religion, for Lactantius, is a rational choice, thoughtful and reasoned out; it is not a system of beliefs to which one dedicates himself based solely on revelation. A decision reached by such a method requires a similar method of exposition and explication; philosophical terms and thought are inadequate to the task, but the principles of rhetorical argumentation are those by which Lactantius can convince and persuade his audience. The rhetorical system and principles that Lactantius adopted for the purpose of persuasion indicate a conscious and intentional decision on the part of the apologist. We come to see that he is the “Christian Cicero” in ways that outstrip mere stylistic parallels; the similarities between the two include a greater cultural initiative. For Cicero, this involved the translation of Greek philosophical terms and ideas into Latin and the introduction thereof into Roman culture. For Lactantius, this involved the pairing of biblical ideas with familiar pagan notions and the introduction thereof into a culture educated in the Roman tradition. Rhetoric, although an ever-present and important facet of all intellectual production of the period, is the centerpiece of Lactantius’ intellectual project.
Cultural history is a central concern in the study of Late Antiquity. Given the pivotal role that paideia played in Roman society, the assessment of the changes that Christianity brought about in the educational field is a key step in understanding the Late Antique world. Scholars have in turn emphasised the establishment of Christian educational centres (such as monasteries), the endurance of the pagan tradition of the rhetorical-philosophical schools, or a combination of the two following different synchronic and diachronic patterns.

Additional evidence for the debate may come from Syriac translations of Greek secular literature (5th – early 6th cent.), which contemporary researchers have so far neglected. On the one hand, the selection of the authors that were translated can be related to the curriculum of the rhetorical-philosophical schools of the Late Empire, while, on the other hand, the treatment and the transmission of the Syriac translations attest early monastic culture.

Early Syriac translations of Greek secular literature are represented by Lucian’s De calumnia, Plutarch’s De cohibenda ira and De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, Ps.-Plutarch’s De exercitatione (lost in Greek), Ps.-Isocrates’ Ad Demonicum, Themistius’ De amicitia and De virtute (lost in Greek). A comparison of the Syriac translations with the Greek originals shows that: (i) the Syriac texts have been Christianised through the omissions of all references to pagan religion; (ii) the exempla drawn from Greco-Roman culture have been selected mostly through the omission of mythological material; and (iii) proper names of most of the figures drawn from Greco-Roman literature and history, such as Gaius Gracchus, Socrates and Philip, have been rendered with formulas such as ‘a wise man,’ ‘a philosopher,’ and ‘a king.’

The Syriac translations add to the evidence for the cooperation between Christian leaders and teachers of rhetoric. Direct traces of such cooperation are limited and usually confined within a private dimension, as attested in the letters between Basil of Caesarea and Libanius, between Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Isocasius, and between Isidore of Pelusium and Harpocras. The promotion of Greek texts drawn from the rhetorical-philosophical tradition into early monastic communities must have originated from the efforts of Christian leaders who had experienced a traditional rhetorical education. In particular, John Chrysostom and Theodoret, who were both familiar with our corpus of texts, repeatedly emphasised the presence of Syriac speaking monks living in their see, and they fostered the interaction between Syriac-speaking monks and the towns’ population.
Achilles Tatius’ *Leucippe and Clitophon* is generally seen as having had a limited ancient readership. In this view, several 2nd- and 3rd-century papyri, followed as they are by the passage of almost two centuries for which we have little evidence, attest to a certain vogue in the immediate aftermath of the novel’s composition and then an apparent decline. Heliodorus clearly knew the work, but we remain uncertain about the later novelist’s date--it may be the 3rd century--and his interest in prose fiction may not be representative of a broader readership if he belongs to the 4th. Then in the 5th century, Nonnus may betray some influence, while we can be very certain that later in the same century Musaeus imitates *Leucippe and Clitophon* (Orsini 1968, Kost 1971, Bowie 2003, Morales 1999). Photius, the 9th-century Patriarch, then becomes our next confirmed reader, to be followed by Michael Psellus in the 11th before the reemergence and revival of Achilles Tatius’ fortunes in the 12th when the Byzantine romances appear. It is now time for us to revise this scenario of an initial but brief enthusiasm followed by centuries of neglect with only occasional interruptions before Photius’ time.

The case for a broader and more continuous readership has been made before, but very badly, by Lehmann (1910), whose lists of supposed imitations by later authors are filled with questionable examples and supported by little discussion and have, by their weakness, brought more recent scholars to a point exactly the opposite of what he was trying to prove. However, the admiration that Photius and Psellus express for Achilles Tatius’ style was shared by late antique and early Byzantine writers as well, and I have traced distinctly his influence in this regard through imitations scattered in literature from the 4th through the 8th centuries. Musaeus and Heliodorus, in other words, are not isolated readers, nor does Achilles Tatius drop out of sight completely until Photius’ “rediscovery” of him. I will focus on four examples of imitation. First, two of the three Cappadocian Fathers imitate him in the 4th century in very public ways: Basil in his epistle of 373 to the newly installed bishop of Alexandria, Peter II, and Gregory of Nyssa in his funeral oration for the Empress Flacilla in 385. In the 6th century the so-called *Anonymous de scientia politica* models a sentence on the thought and words of a passage from the novel. In the 8th century, the author of the ε recension of the *Alexander Romance* on at least two occasions introduces phrases from *Leucippe and Clitophon* into his reworking of the earlier text.

This means that in every century but the 7th (and no doubt that hole will be plugged one day through more systematic investigation) we can confirm that other authors in the eastern Mediterranean were reading the novelist, found him worthy to imitate, and did so in a variety of genres. I will present these imitations, give some indication of what made the source passages so imitable, and briefly discuss the ways in which these Christian writers sometimes reworked the thought of the pagan novelist (who became a Christian, according to later tradition) while retaining his style and vocabulary.
Encomiastic Origins: Atypical Praise in the Suda's Article on Adam
John P. Mulhall

This study argues that the Suda’s article on Adam (Alpha 425) is an encomium dating from Late Antiquity. The Suda is a 10th century Byzantine lexicon compiled by an unidentified scholar or team of scholars that draws from a wide range of both Classical and early Christian sources. The Suda often leaves its readers to guess from where, if anywhere, its compilers are drawing, and the source for the Suda’s article on Adam has to this point been unidentified. The entry is strikingly positive in its outlook on Adam, who usually receives negative press from theologians and Church Fathers who associate him with the Fall of Mankind. This unusually laudatory narration of the life of Adam has too been unexplained. I argue that, based on the late antique rhetorical tradition and schooling, its similarity to the encomia of early Christian Fathers such as John Chrysostom in both style and content, and the explicitly anti-pagan sentiment the article expresses in a vehement psogos (vituperation) against classical learning, the entry must be an encomium on Adam that dates from the 4th-5th centuries.

There is a poverty of scholarship on the Suda in general and there has been none on this article whatsoever, which has denied scholars of Late Antiquity a valuable addition to the corpus of Late Antique rhetoric and to our understanding of early Christian attitudes toward Adam. There is an affluence of scholarship on rhetoric, however, and I have found none more helpful on Late Antique and Byzantine rhetoric than George A. Kennedy, who posits that the encomium was a permanent fixture in the formal education system of the Greek world during Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages as a facet of the progymnasmata, or rhetorical training exercises, and that no authors were more emulated than John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nazianzus (Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors, 218). Finding in the works of Chrysostom numerous encomia on Old Testament figures that bear close resemblance to the Suda’s entry on Adam, it is clear that, if the later was not directly influenced by the former, it must have derived from a common study of progymnasmata and is without doubt consciously an encomium.

Despite its abundant adulations, the Suda entry does not put forth any variant Christian beliefs and, when discussing Adam’s role in the Fall, attempts to retain the audience’s admiration of Adam by emphasizing the power of the Devil as opposed to the weakness of Adam when he is tempted with that infamous fruit. In order to emphasize the Devil’s guile, the author begins a psogos against the Devil’s deeds on earth and specifically against Classical learning and the Pagan gods, going so far as to call Hesiod “ὁ τῶν ἀθεμίτων γονῶν ζωγράφος” (the painter of illicit begettings). It is this psogos, when considered in combination with the similarity this encomium has with those of writers like Chrysostom, that suggests the encomium dates to Late Antiquity. Since the author does not support his hatred of Classical learning with evidence, but rather takes its evil for granted, one can surmise that the author expected his audience to agree with him on the matter of paganism’s nefariousness. Were the encomium written after the fifth century, the psogos would be not only ineffective but in fact distracting, since by that time Paganism ceased to pose any legitimate threat to Christianity.

Taking this entry to be from the twilight years of the Roman Empire, one can view this encomium as a snapshot catching literally the culture of the Classical world metamorphosize
into that of the Christian Medieval world. By taking Adam, so often treated with contempt, and making him the object of praise—something that might remind one of Lucian’s *The Fly*—one might wonder upon reading the Suda’s article for whom one has gained more appreciation: Adam, or the author.

**Between Scylla and Charybdis: Christological Polemic in Sedulius’ *Paschale Carmen***

Robin E. McGill

This paper re-examines the mention of the heretics Arius and Sabellius in the *Paschale Carmen* of Sedulius (I.322-323) in light of fourth- and fifth-century exegetical sources, Augustine in particular. I argue that the names of the two heretics serve as a Christological tag that encourages the reader to interpret the biblical epic though a Christological lens. I explore the implications of these findings as they relate to the exegetical sources available to Sedulius and also to the dating of the epic.

The mention of Arius and Sabellius is significant because it is the only explicit reference in the epic to figures outside the Bible. Nonetheless, it has been discounted as a source of historical information. Springer dismisses Sabellianism as a “dead issue” in the fifth century, and although he notes that Gothic tribes subscribed to Arian beliefs in this period, he prefers to see Nestorianism as the real opponent that Sedulius means to address (37-41). Green follows Springer’s lead in seeing anti-Nestorian polemic behind the epic, and he passes off the mention of Arius and Sabellius as a common motif consisting of a “roll-call of heretics” (243).

Yet, if we look more closely at contemporaneous sources that mention Arius and Sabellius exclusively, as Sedulius does, it becomes clear that the two heretics have particular associations with Christological issues concerning the relationship between the Father and the Son within the Godhead and also the relationship between Christ’s humanity and divinity. Augustine provides the clearest comparandum in a sermon for Easter delivered in 416 or 417 (229G). There he compares Arius and Sabellius to Scylla and Charybdis, with the orthodox believer as a sailor who must navigate a safe path between the two (3[4]-5[6]). Moreover, overlapping biblical references and parallel sentence structure suggest that Sedulius was drawing upon Augustine’s sermon as his source. Against this backdrop, Sedulius’ inclusion of Arius and Sabellius signals a Christological purpose for the epic: relating Christ’s life in a way that navigates the strait between Scylla and Charybdis.

This relationship between *Paschale Carmen* I.322-323 and Sermon 229G 3(4)-5(6) allows us to expand our understanding of the exegetical material available to Sedulius beyond the texts identified by Moretti Pieri. What is more, understanding Augustine’s Christological ideas as the framework for Sedulius’ epic frees us from Springer’s and Green’s need to date the epic after the Christological confrontation with Nestorianism, which did not make a significant impact the Latin West until the second half of the fifth century. Instead, we would do better to understand the *Paschale Carmen* as a response to earlier Christological concerns, similar to those Augustine faced in the 410s and 420s.
One does not expect a eunuch to be honored in Martial's Epigrams. But that is the case with the figure of Earinus in Book 9: Domitian's cup bearer, honored but not named, on the occasion of reaching what would otherwise be considered the age of manhood (Henriksén), with a cycle of epigrams that both overtly elide and obliquely aestheticize a fact awkward to Martial's primary elite male readership: that this figure is defined by the lack of his phallus (9.11, 12(13), 13(12), 16, 17, and 36). To grant full subjectivity to the textual figure of Earinus, equal to Martial's other dedicatees, would threaten the sexual ideology upon which Martial's epigrams are based--namely, putting his reader and text metaphorically in a sexual relationship that celebrates the possession of a phallus (Williams). But, given that he must acknowledge the presence of a eunuch among his readers historical and imagined, Martial must also cater to the imagined interests of Earinus while still keeping him "in his place" as a textual object to be enjoyed by phallic readers. Even so, the figure of Earinus radically complicates Martial's sexual ideology, and is worth study in its own right, and not just as a foil to the figure of a phallic male reader.

In this paper, part of a larger project about the figure of Earinus in Book 9, I sketch out the theoretical framework within which I read Martial's compositional strategies for solving the problem of Earinus, and I present some examples of Martial's solution. Other scholars who have studied Latin poetical representations of eunuchs (Martial's figure of Earinus, his contemporary Statius' literary treatment of Earinus (Silvae 3.4), or Catullus 63) have all focused on what these texts and their historical and cultural contexts might mean politically or psychoanalytically for their elite phallic male readers (Hoffmann, Vout 167-212, Pederzani, Newlands 88-118, Skinner, Nauta, Oliensis 111-126). However, with the exception of a few comments by Nauta, they do not look at what Martial's text might mean for a eunuch reader, or how Martial negotiates among two radically different readerships. My paper deals with textual and sexual ideological issues; for now, I set aside political implications.

In addition to reading the Earinus cycle itself to illustrate this central problem of Book 9 (viz., how Martial treats Earinus as both subject and object), I use selected epigrams elsewhere in Book 9 to argue that the figure of Earinus is, in fact, the theme that unifies the otherwise fragmented and variegated Book 9, and that Martial crafts his book in this way precisely to cater discreetly to Earinus and other eunuch readers--while still allowing phallic readers to enjoy Earinus as a textual object. The formal challenge comes from the nature of Martial's epigram books: the poet may be integrating a pre-existing libellus, or brief pamphlet, on the single subject of Earinus into the larger, book-length heterogeneous collection that we have as Book 9 (see White, Fowler). The epigrams that "bookend" book 9 can be taken as allusions to Earinus if one knows what to look for: epigram 9.1 plays on the names of the seasons in a way similar to the name-riddles that Martial composes on the name "Earinus" ("Springy") later in Book 9; and the final epigram (9.103) offers a catalogue of historical and mythological pueri delicati that ends the book with a celebration of Earinus' role as cupbearer. I then look at Martial's poems about Domitian's recent anti-castration edict (9.5 and 7) in light of these two different readerships--phallic readers and eunuch readers. I mean the title of this paper, therefore, in two ways: to read
for Earinus in the sense of looking for his presence throughout the text, and, more importantly, to read for Earinus in the sense of reading Book 9 on his behalf.

**Hesperia thule: The Changing World Map in Statius’ *Silvae***

Christopher A. Parrott

This paper is an examination of the relationship between intellectual history, imperial ideology, and poetic technique in Statius’ *Silvae*. In the aftermath of the Roman conquest of Britain, the literary use of the name “Thule” was significantly altered; it was applied in particular by Statius to the island of Britain, and located at the western edge of the world. The argument of this paper is twofold: first, I emphasize the novelty of the Flavian-era identification of Thule and Britain, in contrast to the preceding geographical tradition; second, I focus on the details of Statius’ placement and description of the island, noting the ways in which geographical innovation and poetic imagery combine to increase both his praise of his patrons and the glory of the Roman empire.

Recent scholarship has tended to read the application of the name “Thule” to Britain, and Statius’ placement of the island in the west, as being in continuity with earlier geographical thought (Romm 1992; Wijsman 1998; Evans 2003). But a survey of the prior tradition demonstrates that there is no evidence for this identification or location of Thule prior to the Flavian era. Ancient geographers consistently followed Pytheas (fr. 6–9 Mette) in placing Thule in the extreme north, beyond Britain (Strabo 1.4.2-3; Ptol., *Geog. passim*; Mela 3.57; Plin., *HN* 2.186-187, 4.104). And the few mentions in the Latin poetic tradition do not specify the location of the island, emphasizing its cosmological rather than its geographical significance (Verg., *Geo.* 1.24-35; Sen., *Med.* 375-379). By contrast, in the four references to Thule in the *Silvae* (3.5.20; 4.4.62; 5.1.90-91; 5.2.54-56), Statius clearly envisions it as the now-conquered Britain. Through the arrangement of his geographical catalogues, references to the setting sun, and the use of adjectives meaning “western,” Statius emphasizes the island’s (re-)location, contradicting the prior geographical tradition and attaching to the name “Thule” the attributes of Britain, traditionally the westernmost island. This geographical revision is found exclusively in Domitianic poetry: it is seen elsewhere only in Silius Italicus (3.597-598; 17.416-417), and is abandoned by later writers (e.g., Tac., *Agr.* 10.4; Juv. 15.111-112).

The transference of the name Thule to Britain is thus more likely associated with contemporary Roman military expansion, and is best understood as a rhetorical amplification of Flavian ideology, casting the new dynasty as having surpassed their Julio-Claudian predecessors (cf. Evans 2003) and extending their conquests to the defined limit of human habitation. The structure of the lists of frontiers in which the name appears is closely associated with the organizational principles of Roman imperialist geography (cf. Purcell 1990; Murphy 2004), and thereby implicitly fulfills the long-expressed claim that the boundaries of the empire and those of the *orbis terrarum* were coterminal. Moreover, the principal feature of Thule in the *Silvae*, its darkness, further emphasizes the new location of the island. Modern commentators have interpreted Statius’ descriptions of “darkling Thule” as references to its location on the Arctic Circle and the resulting long winter nights (Coleman 1988, *ad* 4.4.62; Laguna Mariscal 1992, *ad* 3.5.20). But Statius’ language is more closely connected to his own epic descriptions of sunsets (e.g., *Theb.* 12.228-231), and his use of this sunset-*topos* here serves both geographical and panegyric purposes. In the *Silvae*, Statius regularly employs the aesthetics and language of epic
as a means of heightening the praise of his patrons (Bright 1980; Hardie 1982; Gibson 2006); the
language used to describe Thule in these passages similarly elevates the Roman conquest of
Britain and the activities of Statius’ patrons to a more epic level, locating the events of Roman
history in what had formerly been a fantastic, unreachable place. Statius’ Thule is thus an
eexample of the ideological re-fashioning of the world map that resulted from Flavian military
conquest, and at the same time a means of furthering his own poetic end of honoring his patrons.

The Disappearance of the Divine in Statius’ Thebaid
Pramit Chaudhuri

This paper offers an analysis of the communication between mortals and gods in Statius’
Thebaid, a topic which has been relatively neglected despite the wealth of scholarship on other
aspects of the divine in the poem (cf., e.g., Feeney 1991 following Lewis 1936, Dominik 1994,
Criado 2000, Hill 2008). In particular, I examine two scenes concerned with epiphany, which are
intertextual with - yet crucially different from - their Iliadic sources. I argue that Athena’s speech
to Tydeus in Theb. 2 and, more briefly, Hippomedon’s theomachy against Ismenus in Theb. 9
show minimal direct contact with the divine compared to their Homeric counterparts. Through
this distancing of epic epiphany, Statius draws attention to theological uncertainties that will
come to a head towards the end of the poem, in which the gods play a considerably diminished
role.

After his defeat of the fifty Thebans, Athena reminds Tydeus that she granted him success ‘from
afar’ (absentes, Theb. 2.687). By raising the question of Tydeus’ dependence on the goddess
Statius puts this scene in dialogue with its Iliadic sources, in which Agamemnon (II. 4.384-400)
and Athena (II. 5.800-13) attempt to incite Tydeus’ son, Diomedes, to battle through
unfavourable comparison with his father’s bravery at Thebes. The Iliadic sequence takes place in
the context of Diomedes’ aristeia, which explicitly relies on the presence and direct intervention
of Athena (e.g., σοὶ δ’ ἦτοι μὲν ἐγὼ παρά θ’ ’ίσταμαι ἤδε φυλάσσω / καὶ σε προφρονέως κέλομαι
Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι, ‘But as for you, I stand by your side and guard you, and readily do I urge you
to fight the Trojans’, II. 5.809-10; cf. 5.405, 5.853-7). In the Thebaid, by contrast, Athena asserts
her authority despite her absence from the battle. Moreover, Athena’s instruction that Tydeus
wish only for belief in his feat (huic una fides optanda labori, Theb. 2.689; cf. 2.694-5) adapts
the Homeric concern with divine aid to an epistemological enquiry about the credibility of
communication with the gods.

As a comparandum, the paper briefly compares Hippomedon’s battle with Ismenus (Theb. 9.315
ff.) with its source in Achilles’ struggle against Scamander (II. 21.130 ff.), and observes Statius’
removal of face-to-face communication between hero and god. By raising issues of belief,
autopsy, and divine unresponsiveness in his handling of these two HomERICally-inspired
episodes, the poet stages a dialogue between two forms of epic representation and their
Corresponding theologies: a world defined either by vivid and active gods or by abstract entities
and human will. I conclude by suggesting that the final book, often criticized as disjunctive and
superfluous, in fact represents the realization of a sceptical view that runs throughout the poem:
the substitution of the gods by the mortal Theseus is the logical consequence of the scrutiny to
which the gods have been subject even in episodes, such as epiphany and theomachy, where their
presence would seem to be least contestable.
Capturing the Flavian Aesthetic: A Child Puts Words into the Mouth of Zeus
Kathleen M. Coleman

In Rome at the Agon Capitolinus in 94 CE, Q. Sulpicius Maximus delivered an extempore poem in 43 Greek hexameters, comprising the speech delivered by Zeus to chastise Helios for lending his chariot to Phaethon (IG 14.2012 = IGRPP 1.350). Then he died, aged eleven years, five months, twelve days, and his grief-stricken parents had the poem inscribed on his funerary altar. Maximus did not win a prize, but nevertheless, quite apart from his youth, the quality of his entry so impressed the judges that he received honorable mention: *fauorem quem ob teneram aetatem excitauerat in admirationem ingenio suo perduxit et cum honore discessit*, according to his epitaph (CIL 6.33976 = ILS 5177). Granted, his parents may be unreliable witnesses to the reaction prompted by his poem; but it is worth asking what a contemporary audience might have found admirable in it, and who that audience was.

When Maximus’ poem was discovered in Rome in 1871, the Italian reception was enthusiastic (Visconti 1871; Lanciani 1893), although many scholars of other nationalities expressed bitter disappointment from the outset (Henzen 1871; Kaibel 1878; Lattimore 1942; Vérilhac 1978), while some managed simply to damn it with faint praise (Lafaye 1883; Nelson 1903; Diggle 1970). More constructive approaches have since prevailed, with the recognition that the poem was both modeled upon the *progymnasmata* and *ethopoëia* of contemporary rhetorical education (Fernández Delgado and Ureña Bracero 1991) and also influenced by literary treatments—in both Greek and Latin—of the myth of Phaethon (Döpp 1996; Bernsdorff 1997). This paper turns away from the judgments of posterity back to the contemporary reception, in an attempt to understand the appeal of Maximus’ poem to its ancient audience.

Maximus’ theme is a canonical example of “disaster literature,” deploying *pathos* and tragic diction in the manner of popular descriptions of cities sacked and razed in war or landscapes ravaged by natural catastrophe. It matches the contemporary taste for epideictic performance. Its Homeric building blocks, coming straight out of the classrooms that have yielded the school papyri of Roman Egypt, must have been recognizable to his contemporaries from their own school exercises. His poem controls the internal motivation necessary to represent a two-sided conversation as a monologue, as is immediately apparent from a comparison with Lucian’s dialogue between Zeus and Helios at *Dialogi deorum* 24 (25). It has a clear moralizing message and strong authoritarian overtones, both features consonant with the climate under Domitian. It is metrically competent, even recherché; and, above all, it is the product of a highly prized capacity for extemporization.

The most immediate analogy is with the *Silvae* of Statius (Hardie 1983), poems that also originated as extempore performance and frequently employ the ventriloquism of speeches. It may be true that the Agon Capitolinus attracted mainly freedmen and the socially ambitious subélite, who were impervious to the stigma of public performance that afflicted the upper classes (White 1998); but, even if they did not stoop to enter poetry competitions, the tastes displayed by Pliny’s literary friends, almost the exact contemporaries of Maximus (Guillemin 1929; Gibson and Morello 2012), provide a useful foil for the Flavian aesthetic represented by his juvenile *chef*
d’oeuvre. Domitian himself presided at the Agon (Suet. Dom. 4.4); does Maximus’ modest success reflect his verdict?

Session 61: Greek Myth, Ritual, and Religion

Has Pollution been Exorcized from the Anthesteria? A Case of Evidence and Methodology
Marcel A. Widzisz

The Athenian Anthesteria is at once the oldest festival for Dionysus celebrated at Athens and also the one for which a good deal of evidence exists. A three-day rite of early spring, it not only features the unsealing and drinking of new wine, but also, it would seem, a drinking contest, an invasion of ghosts, a sacred marriage, and an overarching pall of religious pollution. Reconstruction, however, is fraught: while the Anthesteria has long enjoyed a synthetic consideration of the evidence in which all or nearly all attestations produce a composite portrait of the festival (Deubner 1932, van Hoorn 1951, Burkert 1983 and 1985, Noël 1999, Parker 2005, Seaford 2007), such a sympathetic treatment of the both generically and chronologically disparate testimonia stands opposed to a recent trend of what can be termed analysis, a methodological commitment to considering each piece of evidence on its own terms without presupposing unity (Hamilton 1992, Robertson 1993, Humphreys 2004). These latter studies offer a categorically different Anthesteria: gone are the ghosts, the sacred marriage, and any intimation of pollution—even the number of days during which the Athenians of the Classical period celebrated the broaching of the new wine is curtailed. According to these views of the matter, what we have in this early rite of spring is essentially a festive drinking of the new wine which had been fermenting all winter long. In the wake of such controversy, there is now some caution taken when speaking of the Anthesteria in whole or part (inter alios, Lupu 2006 and Larson 2007).

While the scope of the disagreements is large indeed, a consideration of evidence hitherto not adduced bolsters the case for accepting the darker elements of the festival along with the light: a scholium to Lucian’s Timon (ad 43), suggests that the Anthesteria’s central day, the Choes, can be considered a hemera apophras, an “unlucky” day during which temples were closed, interpersonal communication was abridged, and normal life was largely paralyzed. This scholium would thus provide independent verification, for example, that all temples save one were closed on this day and that during the Anthesteria work was suspended (Hesychius, s.v. θύραζε ΚΑΡΕΣ). Part of the reason that this piece of evidence has not yet been brought to bear upon the Anthesteria may be due to a conclusion reached by Mikalson (1975), who, in trying to keep at bay contamination of the hemerai apophrades with the Roman dies atri, denied that the Choes or any part of the Anthesteria could be such a day. The specifics however, as detailed in the aforementioned scholium (not treated by Mikalson) resonate with much earlier material, such as the Euripidean aition from the IT (946-960) in which Orestes describes the silence and lack of interaction observed during the Anthesteria.
Euripidean aetiology, it must be admitted, has aroused deep suspicion independent of debates about pollution occurring on the Anthesteria: Scott Scullion (2000) has recently suggested that all Euripidean aitia were spun out of whole cloth by the dramatist for the stage and not drawn from actual cult practice or belief. Against this contention, the Lucian scholium again proves its usefulness: using different language entirely, it too affirms that silence and intimations of pollution prevailed during the Anthesteria. Accepting this view would add another angle from which to assess the running debate about Euripidean aetiology, insofar as the substance if not the specifics of Euripides’ account is independently corroborated.

By way of conclusion, I revisit the divergent methodologies and find in the analytic approaches a worrisome tendency of “down-dating” evidence (e.g. Harpocration as 2nd CE instead of 2nd BCE) and of overlooking certain attestations altogether (e.g. Eustathius on Il. 24.525ff). Thus there is serious cause for concern given some of the sweeping conclusions reached in the newer studies, such as the assertion that the festival was wholly positive, without the negative undertones sounded in the sources.

**Bouphonia: Killing Cattle on the Acropolis**
Jeremy McInerney

This paper proposes a reinterpretation of the Athenian Bouphonia festival. The argument consists of two parts. The first section analyses the aition of the ritual and demonstrates that Dipolieia festival served to define the difference between murder (illegitimate) and sacrifice (legitimate). The aition, preserved in Plutarch and Porphyry, is as follows: a priest had placed grain on an altar as a bloodless sacrifice to Zeus only to witness a draft ox, who had returned from the fields, grazing on the grain. Incensed, the priest took a knife and slaughtered the animal. Zeus sent a famine as punishment for this act and to expiate the sin the Athenians ever after sacrificed a single animal to Zeus Polieus, protector of the city, after leading it to the altar and waiting for it to assent to its slaughter by nodding its head. Two later stages of the ritual commonly attract attention: that the priest then runs away and drops the knife, which is itself put on trial, and that after the butchery of the sacrificial animal its hide is stuffed with straw and put to a plough recalling the original animal’s status as a working beast. Contra recent studies, such as Tyrrell and Brown 1991, analysis of the details of the Bouphonia show that it is not a normative sacrifice at all. Unlike a regular sacrifice, a thysia, this is called an ”ox slaughter”, bouphonia, using the word for murder, and this sacrificer is not a thytes or magieros but a boutypos, an ”ox-striker.” Further, unlike regular sacrifice, with its methodically prescribed action, it unfolds within the realm of the unexpected: the animal is coming home from the fields, not being led to sacrifice. It nibbles on first-fruits already there for a sacrifice, and is not sprinkled with flour to get it to nod, and the killing is emphatically an act done in haste. The Bouphonia paradoxically recalls a murder, but does so in order to distinguish it from ”acceptable” murder: sacrifice.

Building on this, the second part of the argument concerns the precise spot on the Acropolis where the Bouphonia took place. In 1940 Gorham Phillips Stevens identified the rock-cut platform and cuttings located northeast of the Parthenon as the location of the sanctuary of Zeus Polieus, and the trenches and post-holes further east he identified as successive stages of a barn erected on the Acropolis to house the oxen sacrificed to Zeus. Using aerial photos of the Acropolis I propose that the cuttings are consistent not with a barn but with chutes designed to lead the cattle to a place for slaughter. This abattoir could be used both for the Dipoleia festival.
but also for the many cattle butchered at the time of the Panathenaia. The size of this operation, involving up to one hundred head of cattle, required a designated area on the acropolis for processing sacrificial animals, especially since major sacrifices were followed by the distribution of meat (kleionomia) to the population. Dressed bedrock, identified by Stevens as the foundation of a later structure housing Zeus' ox, are not foundations at all, but shallow trenches designed for cleaning out the blood and gore that were the by-products of sacrifice. Egyptian parallels, specifically from the great Aten temple at Luxor, conform to the same design and confirm that offering tables, where carcasses were disarticulated, often stood immediately adjacent to sacred precincts.

This is generally overlooked in written sources because of what took place here. While sacred laws and iconography emphasize the sacrificial animal's beauty and the importance of cooking and sharing sacrificial meat, the one element of sacrifice that generally left unmentioned was the bloody business of killing the animal. The location of the Bouphonia may in fact be the Athenian version of a spot mentioned in Linear B tablets: Sphagianes, 'the Place of Slaughter'. If so, it is one of the most venerable spots in Athenian sacred topography.

An Archaeology of Myth: Erichthonius, Erechtheus, and the Construction of Athenian Identity
Adam C. Rappold

Individual Athenians frequently disagreed on which king founded their city and each potential contender had a host of rituals, temples, legends, and connections with the local geography - Lieux de Mémoire (Nora 1989) – to bolster his claim. This paper examines the relationship in myth and ritual between two of these kings: Erechtheus and Erichthonius. The majority opinion of modern scholarship is that these two ancestral figures are interchangeable and their myths and rituals can be conflated (Burkert 2001 cf. Gantz 1993 and Kron 1976). Even in early antiquity, the similarity between the two names and the lack of evidence for their separate existence made combining them together an attractive option (Schol. Il. 2.547). However, this desire for streamlined, historical simplicity discounts the living vibrancy and changing nature of aitiological explanations and privileges elite textual rationalization of myth over the non-elite performance of rituals associated with that myth. By extending Barbara Kowalzig’s framework regarding the relationship of ritual and myth in a performative context (2007), this paper argues that the meaning 'behind' the ritual and mythical celebration of each king was not communicated from the top down but was instead constituted through a conversation from the bottom up. Thus, seeking to pare down the complexity misrepresents how myth and ritual function in society and inhibits an accurate depiction of Greek culture as a whole- especially among the non-literate groups.

Specifically, by employing and testing the categories created by Noyes and Abrams (1999) in their work over the evolution of modern festivals, this paper creates a diachronic examination of the myths and rituals surrounding the two kings and their representation in later literature. In the first and most primal category, 'customary/bodily and calendrical memory,' each king is associated with a distinct set of festivals – the Panathenaia for Erichthonius and the Skira for Erechtheus (Robertson 1996). The festivals are interpreted through their performative context and by the actors involved. This interpretation is used to create a tentative reconstruction of the
competing ideologies of the participants. As religious understanding at this level short-circuits
the need for rationalization, this explains why there are so few myths concerning these figures
from periods earlier than the fifth century. In the second category, ‘practical traditionalizing,’
participants generate the basic but fluid mythic elaborations that surround each king which are
then crystalized in texts at a later date. By focusing on the cognitive process of story and myth
generation, some of the surface similarities between the two narratives can be explained (Schied
and Svenboro 1996, Boyd 2006). In the third and most advanced category, ‘ideological
traditionalizing,’ elites consciously rework the folk traditions about the kings and employ them
to create the ideal of Athenian exceptionalism during the Peloponnesian War (Loraux 1993,
Rosivach 1983). It is this final form, where the myths are divorced of their original context and
(by definition) full of similarities to other accounts, that invites later commentators and scholars
to collapse the accounts of Erectheus and Erichthonius and thus the individuals themselves.

In addition to contributing to the long standing debate over the conflation of the two kings, this
paper cautions against the dangers of creating any static version of a mythic account because it
both misrepresents how mythology functioned but also because, as a modern construction, it fails
to offer us real insight into antiquity. This paper also offers a set of tools to deal with similar
confusion in other myths and rituals, which could be usefully employed whenever local and
panhellenic traditions collide. Moreover, it argues that the true value of a mythic story can only
be seen by accounting for its popular understanding – gained through examination of its
performative context.

Why Palaiphatos matters: the value of a mythographical
curiosity
Greta Hawes

Palaiphatos’ *Peri Apiston*, a fourth-century BC treatise on mythic rationalization, has attracted
some distinguished critics. Wilamowitz failed to see its value: "das elende Machwerk", as he
called it, wasted great effort for little reward (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1895, 101 n.184). This
assessment has frequently been echoed but seldom directly challenged. Given the recent revival
of interest in *Peri Apiston* (esp. Stern 1996; Santoni 2000; Brodersen 2002), the time has come to
reconsider Palaiphatos’ value as an indigenous critic of Greek myth. Palaiphatos’ infamy as a
banal, simpleminded and unimaginative writer provides – somewhat unexpectedly – a promising
starting point. This paper argues that Palaiphatos’ unique value resides precisely in his seemingly
pedestrian qualities. The apparent simplemindedness of *Peri Apiston* obscures a strikingly
distinctive way of understanding myth. As he works his way doggedly through the Greek myths,
Palaiphatos gives us a rare, bold vision of hermeneutic consistency seldom seen elsewhere in
antiquity. His rationalistic method is a discrete approach to the historicist problems posed by
myth which shapes the stories themselves into the very concept of mythology.

The history of rationalistic myth interpretation is conventionally traced from its origins amongst
the early prose writers, who grappled in various ways with the trustworthiness of stories about
the past, to its culmination in *Peri Apiston* (most recently: Stern 1996, 10-11; Sanz Morales
1999; 2002, 205-14; Ramelli & Lucchetta 2004, 205-7). Palaiphatos is indeed indebted to
techniques developed by Hekataios, Herodoros and others, but his text is a product of a different,
more scholarly environment and does not fit easily amongst theirs. Whereas early mythographers
and historians used rationalization as a tool to further larger arguments within more eclectic
texts, Palaiphatos took the interpretative method itself as his theme. *Peri Apiston* comprises a
Preface, which establishes the legitimacy of rationalization as an approach to myth, and 45
entries, each devoted to debunking and rationalizing a different myth in a highly repetitive
manner. This structure reflects a typically Hellenistic concern with collating material and
organizing it systematically. Palaiphatos’ innovation, then, was to transform a practical way of
dealing with individual stories into something approaching a ‘science’ of interpretation.

The systematic dogmatism of Palaiphatos’ approach is underpinned by his distinctive
understanding of the nature of Greek myth. Taking up the challenge of Detienne (1981), recent
work on Greek myth has looked at how the Greeks constructed (or, more commonly, failed to
construct) a native category of myth. *Peri Apiston* provides a unique, yet overlooked, perspective
on this debate. Palaiphatos describes as *muthoi* recognizable traditional stories characterized
primarily by their implausibility. Such a conception seems banal and simplistic to a modern
reader, familiar with the meaning of ‘myth’ in popular parlance, but it is without parallel in
extant Greek texts. This paper argues that Palaiphatos’ consistent projection of a discernible
category of Greek myth is important in that it provides us with an example of a Greek writer who
was able to dogmatically carve out a ‘mythology’ which functioned as both ‘un ensemble
d’énoncés discursifs’ and ‘un discours sur les mythes’ (Detienne 1981, 15). Although the
consistency of his viewpoint makes him a valuable curiosity, Palaiphatos is not an entirely
isolated figure. He brings together two emerging ways in which myths could be understood as a
distinctive object of study. Firstly, he collects his material in a mythographic environment: his
myths are literary artifacts extracted from their poetic and cultic contexts and utilized as
independent narratives. Secondly, he adopts the position of the historian and sets up this material
as ‘mythic’ in the sense that it must be rejected by the appropriately skeptical critic.

**The burial of Brasidas and the politics of Greek hero-cult**

*Matthew Simonton*

Upon his death in 422, the Spartan general Brasidas was buried by the citizens of Amphipolis in
their agora and worshipped as a hero with yearly sacrifices and contests (Thuc. 5.11.1). The
event has typically been treated as a religious phenomenon (Malkin, Ekroth) or as an act of
interstate diplomacy between Amphipolis and its new patron Sparta (Lewis, Hornblower). I
show, however, that there are good reasons for considering Brasidas’ heroization a point of
political contestation between democrats and oligarchs within Amphipolis. The worship of
Brasidas was not a unanimous act by the citizenry meant to placate the Spartans, but likely
constituted an attempt by Amphipolitan oligarchs to symbolize their rule, project their power,
and intimidate the demos. In these respects the example of Brasidas conforms to other instances
of the manipulation of hero-cult for highly politicized purposes, which together suggest new
ways of approaching the politics of Greek religion.

Before Brasidas’ arrival Amphipolis was almost certainly a democracy (Graham; *IACP* no. 553;
Robinson), but a minority within the city favored Brasidas (Thuc.4.104.4), and he later sent a
Spartan governor, Clearidas, to control the polis (4.132.3). It is in this context that we should
understand the actions taken after Brasidas’ death: what was likely a new ruling group of
oligarchs backed by Clearidas conspicuously tore down the monuments devoted to Amphipolis’
original, Athenian founder, Hagnon, and instituted Brasidas’ hero-cult (5.11.1). The obliteration
of one political figure and the memorialization of another strongly indicate a struggle between competing political factions: I adduce a previously neglected comparandum, a third-century decree from the Troad against tyranny and oligarchy (IKIIion 25), to illuminate the importance for ruling groups of erasing the evidence – including specific individuals’ inscribed dedications and monuments – for the regime that came before.

The politicized nature of Brasidas’ hero-cult becomes even more apparent when we compare similar treatments of other figures. The deification of Lysander at Samos and the renaming of the Heraia festival as the Lysandreia (Plut. Lys. 18.4, Duris FGgrH 76 F 71) clearly served partisan oligarchic purposes and would have impressed upon the demos their weak, subject position. From the opposite political perspective, the demos of Sicyon buried the populist tyrant Euphron in the agora and worshipped him as the true (democratic) founder of their city, to the chagrin of the oligarchs (Xen. Hell. 7.3.12). We also know of instances where political actors mistreated their enemies’ heroes: Ephesian oligarchs dug up the grave of Heropythes, the liberator of the city (Arr. Anab. 1.17.11), while an oligarchic regime at Erythrae removed a sword from the statue of Philites the tyrant-killer (IKErythrai 503). I argue that all of these acts, like the damnatio memoriae of Hagnon at Amphipolis, were meant to send a threatening signal to potential revolutionaries to dissuade them from opposing the regime.

Finally, strategic considerations along these same lines can also be seen in Aristotle’s advice to oligarchs in the Politics (1321a35-40) to co-opt and intimidate the demos through public spectacles such as sacrifices and building dedications. The Amphipolitan oligarchs would have produced just this result through the construction of a physical mnēmeion to Brasidas and the institution of thusiai. The publicity of these events and the common knowledge among the members of the demos that they were acquiescing to the oligarchy through their participation would have created an aura of invincibility around the regime and served as a powerful indicator to the demos that resistance was futile. The sacrifices to Brasidas were therefore not simply an ideological message but a practical tool for exacting everyday compliance.

My analysis of Brasidas’ hero-cult reveals the extent to which stasis lay behind seemingly unified political actions and affords us a better understanding of the techniques by which revolutionaries, especially oligarchs, secured their rule. The (nominally shared) cultural symbols of the polis could be put to highly factional ends.
Hellenistic Inscriptions: When History Fails Us
Glenn Bugh

It is well known that the Hellenistic period lacks a continuous historical narrative like the one we find in the Classical age. In order to reconstruct the period from Alexander the Great to Cleopatra (336-31 BC), historians have turned to inscriptions, our most direct witness to the life and times of this enigmatic and complex world. This paper will offer a didactic strategy to engage undergraduate students (with little or no Greek language training) in the study of inscriptions.

At my university I offer a junior-level history course entitled ‘Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic World’. Along with a short biography of Alexander the Great [Hamilton (1973)] and a survey of Hellenistic history [e.g., Walbank (1993); Green (2007); Errington (2008)], the centerpiece of the course is devoted to the study of epigraphical and papyrological texts [translated and accompanied by commentary, e.g., Burstein (1985); Bagnall & Derow (2004); Austin (2006)]. Students are assigned individual documents and are required to present their documents in class (as well as to submit a short written analysis of the content, context, and importance). In order to emphasize the importance of inscriptions in the face of sparse literary sources, I present an in-class practicum on the study of inscriptions, using an article from the Athenian Agora as a case study [Bugh (1998)]. First, however, I manufacture a fragmented unpunctuated text in English (in caps) on some well-known document in U.S. history (e.g., Declaration of Independence or the Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address), and ask the students to restore the complete text. The exercise is both fun and preparatory. Several years ago I acquired a supply of block-cut Georgia marble and purchased a selection of different chisels from a professional outlet in California; with these in hand, I demonstrate the stonecutter’s craft. Then I explain the use of squeezes (passing around a replica of the Agora inscription) and the step by step process by which an epigraphist examines the stone (stressing the importance of autopsy), establishes the preserved text, and works through a restoration to a finished text (with commentary and prosopography) suitable for possible publication. I also include a discussion of the latest advances in technology that have been applied to the recovery of faint or illegible letters on stone (e.g., lasers, digital image enhancement), using the Egesta Decree in the fifth century BC as a case study in the problematic use of lasers to settle issues of dating [Bugh (2006)].

At the end of this exercise, the students approach their specific inscription with added confidence, new skill sets, and a good deal more respect for the importance of epigraphy in the service of history.
The Lithic Muse: Inscribed Greek Poetry in the Classroom

Joseph Day

Except for the rare touch of color or variation, inscribed Greek verse does not play a role in most undergraduate Greek, Classics, or Ancient History courses, especially at the lower level. I present here several ways epigrams and other poetic inscriptions can be integrated into these classes.

In Greek history courses, epigrams can illustrate the contingency of history, how “facts” are constructed and events are viewed differently through different eyes. Course texts or sourcebooks might contain a translation of the two triumphalizing elegiac couplets inscribed on the base of the chariot and team dedicated by the Athenians to celebrate their triumph over Boiotians and Chalkidians in 506 BCE (CEG 179, Fornara no. 42); but a recent find from Thebes invites more reflection (SEG 56.521): a fragmentary epigram from a dedication for the same war, one that highlights Theban successes unreported by Herodotus (5.77). Such public epigrams open an interesting lens, one we can link to hexametric and elegiac poetry and often to the production of sculpture standing on the inscribed bases, into the creation of cultural memory, or lieu de mémoire. Consider the Battle of Marathon: epigrams on the city cenotaph (IG I3 503/504, part at Fornara no. 51) and the Erechtheid tribal casualty list (SEG 56.430) not only bring new material into the classroom, they astound with the sheer quantity of inscribed verse—originally 20 couplets at Marathon and at least 16 in the city, the most extensive surviving Athenian poems (or collections of four-liners?) between Solon and Aeschylus.

Private verse inscriptions provide teachable moments on many aspects of Greek culture. Among the earliest, “Nestor’s cup” invites exploration of eighth-century sympotic behavior, gift-giving, and homoeroticism (CEG 454). Phrasikleia illustrates archaic elite display and gender roles: a kore on a base with an elegiac epitaph (CEG 24) describing her death before marriage with echoes of the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite (28f.). Epigrams on athletes’ dedications prompt exploration of parallels with Pindar (Olympian 12 and CEG 393 for Ergoteles), victor statues (CEG 397 with the Delphi charioteer), the topography of sanctuaries (many seen by Pausanias), and heroization (CEG 399 for Euthymos).

Epigram also supplies opportunities for Greek language instruction. In translation courses, I always place a photo and a Greek text beside the translation in Powerpoints: a bit of play with the alphabet (and its early varieties) and some pointing out of words and phrases capture students’ attention, and may inspire them to take Greek. In elementary Greek, epigram offers that touch of color mentioned above, including the introduction of cultural material and physical Realien; but epigrams can also illustrate grammatical points, dialectical and paleographic variability, and linguistic change over time, and all this in texts so brief beginning students can get through them. Upper level Greek offers many opportunities for the study of inscribed verse. Epigrams accompanying casualty lists are a perfect match for Pericles’ funeral oration; and in a course on drama and religion, my students read the Palaikastro hymn and compared it to literary hymns (using Furley and Bremer, 2001).
Digital Epigraphic Resources for Research and Teaching
Tom Elliott

This paper will provide a survey of the major online resources for Greek and Latin epigraphy that are currently available. It will treat the principle capabilities, functions, and limitations of each resource.

Since the early-to-mid 1990s, digital epigraphic resources have been appearing on the World-Wide Web. These have ranged in scope from static web pages of selected inscriptions, through corpora for specific sites, to major databases that span entire regions and periods. More recently, at least one publisher has begun to bring out e-book equivalents of some of its print epigraphic materials. While there will not be time to address every “selected inscriptions” site on the web, we will undertake a comprehensive summary of the following resources:

- all the epigraphic databases operating under the aegis of the Association Internationale d'Épigraphie Grecque et Latine (Rome, Heidelberg, Bari, and Alcalá)
- the Packard Humanities Institute's Searchable Greek Inscriptions
- the Epigraphische Datenbank Clauss – Slaby
- epigraphic publications prepared by Charlotte Roueché, Gabriel Bodard, and colleagues at King's College, London (including the Inscriptions of Aphrodisias, Roman Tripolitania, and Roman Cyrenaica)
- Brill's online Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum
- other regional and special-purpose digital corpora

This overview, to be accompanied by a handout containing pertinent information, will equip attendees to locate, begin using, and evaluate the capabilities of each resource. We will treat the key issues of extent and completeness; reliability and originality; content type (e.g., images, texts, translations); usability; citation; stability; and openness, availability, and license restrictions.

In effect, the paper will provide a significant supplement to Tom Elliott et al. (eds.), “Links to web-based epigraphical resources,” first published on the website of the American Society of Greek and Latin Epigraphy ca. 1998 and last updated in 2007 [available: http://www.case.edu/artsci/clsc/asgle/links.html]. The published resource is demonstrably out of date, and no longer provides accurate Uniform Resource Locators (URLs; web addresses) for all listed sites, nor is its listing of “images, texts, and the inscriptions themselves” still comprehensive.

Teaching (with) Epigraphy in the Digital Age
John Bodel

Many students and non-specialists are interested in what ancient Greek and Latin inscriptions have to say. Few know how or where to begin to find what they are looking for. The forbidding folio pages of the standard corpora do little to invite exploration, and traditional print introductions, for all their virtues, deprive inscribed objects of much of their immediacy and appeal.
This paper considers ways that recent advances in digital epigraphy and the accessibility of online databases and tools can enhance the use of inscriptions in the classroom and improve the ability of instructors to teach the elements of epigraphy to advanced undergraduates and graduate students in programs without direct access to primary materials. An innovative project at the University of Rome, La Sapienza, makes available a free iPhone application that enables users to send images of inscriptions photographed in the museums and urban environs to the Istituto di Epigrafia at the University, where the images are processed and stored, and a translation and brief commentary on the text are transmitted in return to the sender. We are not yet in a position to replicate this service in North America, but on-line digital repositories of images of inscribed objects in American museum collections not only provide indirect access to a wealth of material but also indicate the possible existence of nearby collections where inscriptions can be examined at first hand, and interactive search tools facilitate access to the vast digital databases of texts of (especially) Latin inscriptions—for those who know where to find them and how to use them.

Navigating successfully the increasingly crowded waters in a sea of digital epigraphy requires a familiarity with the virtues and limitations of the various tools and databases that few researchers are likely to have acquired in the course of their studies, and there exists no generally accessible introductory guide for those new to the material. This paper will lay out for teachers and researchers interested in exploring Greek and Latin inscriptions digitally a rational sequence and method for using the new tools to perform a variety of tasks and a responsible way to understand the data collected.

Session 63: Teaching Classical Reception Studies (Workshop)

Where does Classical Reception study lead?
Emily Greenwood

This paper will launch the workshop’s discussion of the broader issues relating to teaching classical reception studies by addressing the underlying purpose of teaching this material; or, to put it another way, by asking what students can hope to gain by learning about classical receptions. Given that some might regard such topics as extraneous to the curricula of programs in Classics and related subjects, it is important to explore and account for the pedagogical benefits of classical reception studies. Prime among them, I argue, is the capacity for reception study to foster critical and analytical skills by giving students a new perspective on antiquity and its sources. Directing students’ attention to receptions of antiquity not only develops their competencies in dealing with different kinds of material, but also requires them to reflect on how we know what we do about antiquity, and why antiquity has continued to be so important to humankind and world cultures; in this sense, classical reception studies can contribute particularly effectively to the case for, to borrow Martha Nussbaum’s phrase, ‘why democracy needs the humanities’.

We must also look beyond the ideological arguments, though, in order to consider the practical consequences of studying reception at undergraduate or postgraduate level. In particular, where
does it lead the student who wishes to pursue an academic career? If students develop a research interest in this field, is this compatible with a career as a classicist, or does it lead toward other disciplines, and how do prospects vary with different national contexts? Are there other career trajectories that can be well-served by a training in reception?

Integrating Classical Receptions into the Latin language and literature curriculum
Judith P. Hallett

My paper considers when, where and how best to integrate classical reception into Latin language and literature courses which, at my own, large, public university, are diversely constituted. Students inhabiting the same Latin classroom often have drastically different levels of linguistic proficiency (some have studied Latin in secondary school, others begin after starting university), degrees of awareness about the ancient Greco-Roman world, motivations for enrolling, and professional and career objectives. Most are undergraduates concentrating in classics, or MA candidates in the classical languages, yet a substantial number are majoring or pursuing advanced degrees in other disciplines. Some plan to be, or already are, school teachers of Latin and other subjects; some aim to enter doctoral programs in classics and related fields; others have totally different career ambitions.

My paper argues for the value of foregrounding reception at both the beginning and end of these diversely constituted courses: initially to clarify why the authors and genres we study, and the Latin language itself, matter; later in final projects that require specialized literary and linguistic knowledge, such as assessing translations from different eras or comparing classical texts with later literary works responding to them. I will also discuss the reasons why I, and my students hoping to teach Latin and pursue advanced work in classics, hesitate to take valuable class time away from close engagement with Latin texts and classical scholarship. Among them is that the Praxis examination required for Latin teaching certification in my state and two neighboring jurisdictions does not contain questions on reception, and that traditional classics PhD programs here in the US give pride of place to solid preparation in Latin and Greek.

Teaching Classics and Film: opportunities and challenges
Monica S. Cyrino

In the last decade, courses on the representation of the ancient world in cinema and television have proliferated on college and university campuses all across the world, just as the study of classics and film has continued to grow and expand as a significant and rewarding critical sub-field in the study of classical receptions. To support these many new courses, there are now numerous excellent books, articles and reviews that explore the ways in which films and television programs represent and reinvent the ancient world, whether these productions seek to depict historical events and personages, draw on mythological and literary themes, or utilize other cultural aspects of antiquity, such as the ancient languages, to imbue the entertainment on screen with a sense of drama or sophistication.

The growth in the ubiquity and popularity of such courses has clearly provided instructors with many opportunities to teach the basics of classical receptions, film studies, and popular
culture/media theory, together with a few stealth lessons about the history, literature, and culture of “real” antiquity as well. But alongside the opportunities, these courses present several significant challenges, both practical and pedagogical. This presentation will outline some of the opportunities and challenges facing instructors of “Classics and Film”-type courses, in order to initiate a conversation about best practices and strategies. Issues to be discussed include: “High” culture vs. “pop” culture clash; level of student familiarity with material; assumptions about course “easiness”; screening time practicalities; the role of “real” history; assessment of student engagement; the use of film theory; and optimal course size.

**Should We Teach Classical Receptions outside Classics and If So, How?**

*Sara Monoson*

My paper will explore the efforts of researchers in classical reception studies who are based in departments other than classics to develop courses and pathways of study. This often means expecting to work with students who have little or no familiarity with classics as a discipline or with ancient primary sources, let alone ancient languages. I will address pedagogical issues – for example, how much attention to theoretical statements of the aims of reception studies is appropriate and effective? How can we effectively stress rigor in a context that can invite dabbling? What kind of assignments have worked best?; and professional issues – should such courses be embraced by classics as gateways to the field? Should we think of these classes as introductions to an emerging field of inquiry that can stand apart from classics? Should classics chairs be encouraged to seek to cross-list such courses in classics or prefer their appearance under another department's sponsorship?). I am particularly interested in how we might conceive of a pro-seminar in classical receptions for a multi-disciplinary group of doctoral candidates with varying levels of exposure to ancient languages. I will report on my own experiences and on the results of inquiries with colleagues at a range of colleges and universities in the US, UK and Australia.

**Teaching Classical Reception in the UK context – the Oxford experience**

*Stephen Harrison*

At Oxford students of classical reception in the final year of a specialist classics course write a 6000-word extended essay for which they get four weeks’ writing time; previous preparation includes a weekly lecture course on a wide area of classical reception (currently covering poetry in English since 1900) and three one-to-one sessions with a teacher, plus an extensive reading list. This framework raises some interesting questions. On what principles should we assemble a syllabus for such a subject? Students will need to be guided towards the most interesting modern works. How can we help our classical students to close the knowledge gap which they inevitably have in dealing with the modern end of reception?

In practice, their knowledge levels of literature in English will differ dramatically, and we need to be ready to help them with this. What is it reasonable to expect a student to cover in an extended essay of this type? It is crucial to help the student scope the work properly (we require
treatment of at least three authors, one of which must be classical). How much assistance should a student get from a teacher? We find that three solo sessions is enough with adequate lecture and reading back-up. While the Oxford experience is a niche one, some generalizable conclusions can be drawn.

Session 64: Sexual Labor in the Ancient World (organized by the Women’s Classical Caucus)

Harlots, Tarts, and Hussies: A Crisis of Terminology for “Sex Labor”
Serena S. Witzke

With the renewed interest in sex labor in antiquity (McGinn 1998, 2004, Davidson 1999, Faraone and McClure 2006, Glazebrook and Henry 2011), it is time to re-evaluate terminology—to reconsider the kind of sex labor we are looking at, and how we may begin to understand it. There have been studies on Greek sexual vocabulary (Henderson 1991, Kapparis 2011) and examinations of the importance of distinctions in the technical terms for sex labor (Kurke 1999, Cohen 2006), but these studies fail to examine lived realities behind terminology. Few similar studies have been attempted for Latin (Adams 1990). I use Plautus and Terence as test cases, but my conclusions have larger ramifications. I suggest that all translation of sex work in Latin literature is faulty for two reasons: (1) Latin does not adequately express the myriad historical situations of sex workers; (2) English terminology is too fluid and cannot express Roman situations, especially when they are ill defined in Latin to begin with. When we translate situations involving sex work, we obscure the realities of the workers, often whitewashing them in a way that dismisses the horror of the lived reality (for the same phenomenon with rape, see Packman 1993).

It is unsurprising, given Latin's difficulty in expressing distinctions in sex labor, that translators and scholars are mired in ineffectual approximations. There are few words, and different terms are often applied to the same sex worker; meretrix and scortum cannot denote high- and low-status women respectively, as has generally been accepted. Translation choices elevate or lower a sex worker according to the personal bent of the scholar. The result: sanitizing of sex work and the obscuring of historical labor.

Translation is political, particularly when women and sex are involved. It often reveals more about the translator (or scholar) and modern values than about antiquity. The choices in English should give us serious pause in re-evaluating our own ideologies and politics regarding sex labor. In scholarship and in translating for students, we use words like 'prostitute, courtesan, hussy, playmate, whore, mistress, and harlot' (all found in translations of Plaut. As.), but such terms are flawed renditions of meretrix, amica, and scortum (themselves broad terms that obscure many kinds of sex work). 'Prostitute' implies agency – but enslaved sex workers have none. 'Courtesan' evokes the court of France and implies high status, but meretrix is not reserved for high-status sex workers. 'Whore' and 'harlot' are deliberately negative terms that carry moral judgment not
necessarily found in Latin. 'Mistress' is euphemistic Victorian vernacular for a partner who was not a wife. The catchall 'prostitute', even for enslaved women, further widens the gap between modern views and historical reality. The issue is particularly difficult when teaching undergraduates, who are quick to dismiss the plight of the ancient sex worker in light of modern prejudices against 'hookers' and 'hos'.

What is revealed is not a mere problem of terminology, but a crisis of understanding. The ramification is heavy: we cannot begin to understand ancient sex work if we cannot talk about it. English vocabulary used in translations of, and scholarship on, Roman comedy does not reflect the wide variety of sex workers on the Roman stage with real-life counterparts: cheaply bought sex slaves (the musician in *Epid.* insists she is not one), higher-status but unfree women performing forced sex labor for a leno (*Pers.*, *Pseud.*), women purchased by men for sex labor (*Epid.*, *Merc.*), women purchased and freed, but still expected to perform sex labor (*Most.*), women forced into prostitution by mothers (lena, *As.*, *Cist.*), free prostitutes who have their own houses (*Bacch.*, *Truc.*, *Hec.*), respectable women who slide into prostitution to survive (*And.*). Only by returning to, and acknowledging, historical realities can we begin to understand sex work in the ancient world. We must create a terminology that expresses, not obscures, these realities.

**Witnesses and Participants in the Shadows: The sexual lives of enslaved women and boys in ancient Rome**

Mira Green

Sexual labor in ancient Rome was not purely confined to those individuals who sold their wares as prostitutes. Indeed, most enslaved persons could expect at one time or another during their enslavement that their slave owners would employ—either indirectly or directly—their sexual experiences and lives. Thus, any discussion about sexual labor in antiquity needs to consider enslaved persons’ sexual vulnerability and slave owners’ instrumental use of their slaves’ sexual lives.

This paper examines the layered nature of sexual relationships between free male slave owners and enslaved women and boys in ancient Rome. In order to frame my discussion, I rely on William Fitzgerald’s claim that slaves were a ‘third presence’ who faded in and out of the Romans’ visibility and that Roman slave owners commonly treated their slaves as shadows of free humans (Fitzgerald 2007). I argue that slave owners simultaneously used enslaved persons as shadow audiences during elite sexual encounters with others and as blank canvases upon which the elite painted their emotional and physical needs and desires.

My argument develops along two lines. First, I assert that Roman male slave owners—either intentionally or unconsciously—imagined their slaves as substitute audiences and witnesses during their sexual acts with others. Masculinity and status at Rome were defined by public performances, which inherently required an audience to witness a man’s actions (Parker 1999, Edwards 1997). Additionally, Roman men sought to demonstrate their privileged status not only through their public duties but also through their ability to penetrate weaker bodies during sexual intercourse (Habinek 1997, Parker 1997, Walter 1997). Because Roman sexual relationships were wrapped up in demonstrations of social status, and because the slave’s subjectivity was
viewed as instrumental, elite men imagined and relied on enslaved individuals to act as shadow audiences during their sexual interactions. Yet, in their own relationships with enslaved persons, Roman men also envisaged slaves as instruments meant to fulfill their sexual needs and desires (Apuleius 2.7, Martial 4.7. Martial 5.46). When they sought sexual avenues that allowed them to fulfill fantasies and needs outside of traditional sexual relationships, they frequently turned to enslaved persons. Similar to his own shadow, a Roman man presumed that the sexual lives of the enslaved were dependent on his own life, and that the form of those relationships could be changed and/or distorted at any moment based upon his needs.

A comparison between a mosaic from the Villa at Centocelle and a wall painting from the House of Caecilius Iucundus at Pompeii that depict sexually suggestive scenes to Pompeii’s well-known Lupanar sexually explicit paintings showcases the distinctions between slave as shadow audience and slave as sexual partner. I then briefly explore descriptions of sexual activities with enslaved persons found in elite authors’ works, finishing my paper with Ovid’s two poems involving Corinna’s slave, Cypassis (Ovid Amores. II.7 and II.8). I conclude with these two poems because they speak to complexity of enslaved persons’ sexual roles in relationships with the free and the likelihood that their roles as witnesses and participants frequently combined.

Other “Ways of Seeing”: Hetairai as viewers of the Knidian Aphrodite
Mireille Lee

In the famous formulation of art historian John Berger: “Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at” (Ways of Seeing [London, 1972] 47). Such was certainly the case for Praxiteles’ statue of Aphrodite at Knidos, arguably the most famous sculpture in antiquity. Ancient authors describe the various erotic responses of her male viewers, overcome with lust for the sculpted image of the naked female body. But the textual sources are silent on the responses of her female devotees, who were likely her primary intended viewers. As the goddess of love, Aphrodite was venerated by proper women in search of her assistance in the marital realm; but she was also the special protectress of sexual laborers, both hetairai and pornai. A specific connection between the Knidian Aphrodite and hetairai is suggested by the conventional identification of Praxiteles’ mistress, Phryne, as the model for the statue. How might a woman whose body was her livelihood have viewed such an image?

In a “feminist” reinterpretation of the Knidian Aphrodite published in the 1990’s, Nanette Salomon argued that the pudica gesture connoted shame, as a reflection of the cultural construction of female sexuality in antiquity. While it is possible that sexual laborers would have viewed such an image in terms of their own sexual shame, recent scholars have suggested more positive readings. Natalie Kampen proposed a homoerotic response for female viewers, while Kirsten Seaman identified the Knidia as “an authoritative sexual being, a woman in control of both her own sexuality and the men under her sway” (“Retrieving the Original Aphrodite of Knidos,” RendLinc 15 [2004] 567).

The power of Aphrodite, and of the Knidia, are uncontested in the ancient literary sources. Men under the control of the goddess are powerless. For a female viewer, whose body mirrored that of the Knidia, such a perspective would have been empowering – perhaps especially for hetairai,
since the model for the statue was purportedly a courtesan as well. While the nudity of the statue is essential for such a reading, various elements of her dress would also have been significant to a female viewer. The goddess herself removes her garment, underscoring her control over visual access to her body, and therefore control over her own sexuality. At the same time, her sexuality is not completely outside the strictures of society. Her long hair, generally considered a sexual symbol, is carefully coiffed into a chignon, a style shared by both proper wives and hetaira in the fourth century. The hydria at her feet alludes to bathing, represented in vase-painting as a practice of both hetaira and brides. Finally, she wears jewelry, a marker of feminine beauty – even seduction, as in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite – and a common dedication in sanctuaries to the goddess. The Knidian Aphrodite therefore serves as a model for feminine agency: by engaging in such dress practices, the female viewer is promised the protection of the goddess, and therefore sexual power. For the hetaira, the messages of personal agency and sexual power would have been especially potent, as they assured her own livelihood.

The Archaeology of Social Relationships in Pompeii’s Brothel
Sarah Levin-Richardson

The “Purpose-Built” brothel (VII 12 18-20), as Pompeii’s only definite brothel, has figured prominently in discussions of Roman prostitution (McGinn 2004), Roman erotic art (Myerowitz 1992, Clarke 1998), moral zoning at Pompeii (Wallace Hadrill 1995, Laurence 2007, McGinn 2002), and the prosopography of Pompeian prostitutes (Varone 2005). While these previous studies have examined the building’s architecture, frescoes, and graffiti, the items found during the excavation of the structure in 1862 await scholarly exploration. These, I propose, reveal an array of activities including gift exchange, dining, and religious worship. Ultimately, I argue that the brothel’s archaeological finds demonstrate a range of commercial and emotional relationships between the clients and prostitutes, and among the prostitutes themselves, beyond the exchange of money for sex.

Hampering the investigation of these items for many years was the difficulty in accessing the original excavation records; the material finds of the brothel only become publically accessible in 1994, when Van der Poel and Capri transcribed, edited, and published some of Pompeii’s original excavation notebooks. While the notebooks give only bare descriptions and little physical context other than the structure in which they were found, the following items can be ascribed to the brothel: a small glass perfume jar, a green glass cup, fragments of other glass cups and bottles, a cylindrical bone vase, a bronze statuette of Mercury with a rectangular base, and a bronze cylindrical vase that could be suspended by the attached chains (Van der Poel and Capri 1994).

I begin with a brief discussion of other evidence for social relationships in the brothel, including recent work on the purpose-built brothel as a locus for establishing and contesting masculinity (Levin-Richardson 2011). I point to the large number of graffiti found in the structure—representing one of the largest clusters of graffiti found anywhere in Pompeii—to demonstrate that there was both time and inclination for clients and prostitutes to scratch messages into the walls. In addition, these graffiti preserve at least five greetings (CIL IV 2206, CIL IV 2208, CIL IV 2212, CIL IV 2231 CIL IV 2239), several sets of graffiti responding to each other (e.g., CIL
IV 2212, CIL IV 2225, and CIL IV 2226), a poem (CIL IV 2258a), and an expression of local town rivalries (CIL IV 2183). I then build on Penelope Allison’s analysis of the social relationships suggested by the material assemblages in Pompeian houses (e.g., Allison 2004 and 2010) to explore the types of bonds implied by the items found in the brothel. The perfume jar and vases, for example, were perhaps gifts from a client to a prostitute, while the cups might have been used by prostitutes dining with their clients or with each other. The bronze statuette of Mercury suggests religious worship by the members of the brothel. In these activities, one can see longer-term relationships between clients and prostitutes than previously thought, as well as an environment of homosocial bonding among the prostitutes.

In the end, I use the material finds from the brothel to challenge the current scholarly status-quo, which holds the purpose-built brothel to be a place fit only for rough and ready sex.

**Apo tou sômatos ergasia: Investigating the Labor of Prostitutes in the Delphic Manumission Inscriptions**

Deborah Kamen

Greek manumission inscriptions are rich documentary sources that can illuminate legal, economic, and social facets of the transition from slave to freedman (Darmezin 1999; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005). In this paper, I examine what the manumission inscriptions from Delphi—dated between 201 BCE and c. 100 CE and recording the fictive sale of slaves to Apollo for the purpose of freedom (Hopkins 1978: ch. 3)—can tell us about the labor of freed slave-prostitutes. I argue, in light of recent scholarship highlighting the connections between prostitution and manumission in ancient Greece (Weiler 2001; Cohen 2006; Wrenhaven 2009), that the words *ergasia* and *ergazomai*, used only a handful of times in these inscriptions, refer euphemistically to “work as a prostitute” (see [Dem.] 59 passim). This continued *ergasia* is a condition of the slave-prostitutes’ manumission, in keeping with many of the inscriptions’ requirement that freed slaves remain (*paramenein*) and serve their former master, generally until the latter’s death (on *paramonê*: Samuel 1965).

I will first discuss the lengthy inscription FD III 2.169, in which a slave-owner named Dionysia is recorded as freeing four home-born slaves: two boys, a girl (*korasion*) named Aphrodisia, and a woman (*gunaikeion [sc. sóma]*) named Euemeria. All four slaves are to remain (*parameinatôsan*) by the side of Dionysia after their manumission, “doing everything that is ordered blamelessly.” While this is very formulaic language, what comes next is unusual: it is specified that the two female slaves, Aphrodisia and Euemeria, are to “work” (*ergazestôn*) for Dionysia “from their body (*apo tou sômatos*) and in whatever other way,” until Dionysia’s death. Closely echoing the way in which Neaira’s prostitution is described in ps.-Demosthenes’ *Against Neaira* (*apo tou sômatos ergasia*, 36; cf. *ergazomenê tōi sómati*, 30), this condition must refer to sexual labor, presumably labor begun while they were still slaves. We are then told that if the female slaves do not fulfill these prescribed services, Dionysia will become their master (*kuria*) once again and can punish (*kolazousa*) them however she likes.

Next, I will turn to a set of inscriptions that I believe must be paired (GDI II 1801, 1751). The first inscription records the manumission of a woman (*gunaikeion*) named Leaina, whose name indicates that she may have been a prostitute (cf. Machon fr. 12 Gow; Luc. *Dial. meret.* 5). The
condition of Leaina’s manumission is that she “work” (*ergazomena*)—most likely as a prostitute—and obey her former master (and pimp?) Philon until his death. If she doesn’t perform these services, Philon has the right to do to her whatever he wants (*poein...ho ka thelê*). Interestingly, at some point later he appears to have changed his mind about the terms of Leaina’s freedom: in the second inscription (unfortunately insecurely dated), Philon releases her “from her *paramonê* and her work (*ergasias*),” granting her complete freedom from sexual and other services. Perhaps by this point she has become too old to earn money from prostitution?

Ultimately, this paper sheds new light on the labor of slave-prostitutes even after their manumission: namely, despite their new found freedoms, these women were still required to perform servile work with their bodies.

**The auletrides and Prostitution**

Max L. Goldman

The *auletris* (female oboe-player) occupies a minor place in the scholarship on sexual labor in classical Athens. A less glamorous attendant of the *symposion* than the *hetaira*, the *auletris* has often been assimilated to the category of *porne*. Although men at the *symposion* would doubtless see a slave woman hired to perform as sexually available, I argue that the evidence suggests that the *auletris* was generally hired primarily as a musician and her sexual labor, when it occurred, was a secondary aspect of her role and status. This primary aspect has been obscured due to a certain fuzziness in the use of the term ‘prostitute,’ a fuzziness that muddies the nature of our understanding of the labor, sexual and musical, of the *auletris*. A closer look at the *auletris* can improve our understanding of female sexual labor and the role of women’s labor more generally.

Although the scholarly assimilation of the *auletris* to the *porne* occasionally goes so far as to suggest that the term *auletris* was a synonym for prostitute, the discourse of the *auletris* presents a more complicated and nuanced set of associations. It has been claimed that *auletris* was one of the many additional words used to define the *porne*, implying that the status of *porne* was somehow prior and that we should understand the *auletris* as the oboe-playing *porne*. There is little evidence supporting this view. The passage in Menander's *Perikeiromene* (337), which has been cited as support, contrasts the seducing of a citizen girl with prototypically sexually available women. This passage does not prove that an *auletris* was a synonym for *porne*.

References to the *auletris* in her paradigmatic locus of the *symposion* reveal two strands of connotation. The dominant one highlights her role as an essential musical entertainer, hired to entertain with her musical skill. The *auletris* is sent away in Plato’s *Symposium* because the symposiasts propose to entertain themselves with talk rather than with hired music. Her sexual availability is not at issue and many references to the *auletris* taken to be sexual in fact reflect her primary role of musical entertainer. The second strand highlights her sexual availability. It is hardly surprising that Athenian male discourse, which does not always make clear distinctions between *porne* and slave women, would connect the *auletris* with sexuality. There are, however, only limited references that explicitly refer to her sexuality and only a handful suggest payment for sex. The strand that highlights sexuality can be found in comedy, Attic oratory and on some vase paintings. This strand reflects eroticized and occasionally also moralized discourse on low status, sexually available women.
Even this eroticized discourse highlights the secondary nature of her sexual behavior. The sexual labor, when it occurs, comes later in the symposion. This secondary aspect is clear when Athenaeus quotes a biographer of Zeno who writes of an auction for an auletris at a symposion (Athen. 13.607). The law regulating the prices for the auletris and other performers hired for the symposion (Arist. Ath. Pol. 50), on this view, is concerned with these performers' primary function and not their secondary availability for hired sexual labor. In Aristophanes' Wasps (1335-81), the conflict for the auletris Dardanis suggests that what is classed as prostitution might at times have been closer to sexual violence. This sexualized discourse raises questions about how an auletris might try to resist or limit the sexual violence she could be exposed to as a hired female slave at a male symposion.

The modern discourse of prostitution tends often to invert the ancient evidence about the auletris, highlighting her sexual activities while ignoring or de-emphasizing her musical services. It seems certain that an auletris occasionally sold sex, although it seems perverse to define her by that aspect. It highlights only one strand of eroticized and moralistic elite male discourse and thereby occludes our understanding of women's labor in Athens.

Session 65: The Next Generation: Papers by Undergraduate Classics Students (organized by Eta Sigma Phi)

Echoes of Sapphic Voices: Masculine Constructions in the Catullan Corpus
David Giovagnoli

The Roman vir is always strong on the battlefield, strong in the forum, and strong in the bedchamber. This is the image that is passed down to us by the writers of the Late Republican and Early Augustan periods, such as Vergil, Cicero, and Sallust. This paper argues that this view was not a universal representation of the daily life of the Roman populace, but was a literary and philosophical ideal. This reading of Catullus’ works adds balance to such a monolithic portrayal of masculinity in the classical Roman world, by presenting many distinct literary personae with differing attitudes, and by identifying perspective shifts within the corpus. Specifically, Catullus 16 is fiercely invective against those who would question the speaker’s masculinity, Catullus 5 demonstrates reciprocity between Catullus and Lesbia, Catullus 51 and 75 suggest the speaker’s passivity towards his female lover, and Catullus 51 displays all three tones when dealing with a male romantic interest. These performed selves of Catullus’ personae represent a series of more flexible masculine constructions and deepen our understanding of the range of Roman masculinity.
Timaeus and the Evolution of Plato’s Bioethics
Kyle Oskvig

Plato looked down on the body, and up to the soul. This has been his reputation, anyway, for a long time now. Plotinus speaks for the Western tradition when he writes that “Plato always despised perceptible things and deplored the soul's association with the body, saying that the soul is buried alive and imprisoned inside it.”

Such an account is oversimplified and incorrect. In this paper, I give a more nuanced presentation of Plato’s views on the moral status of the human body and its cultivation through exercise, using the term "bioethics" as a shorthand. I begin by examining Timaeus 87-89, where cultivation of a strong body is placed on a moral level with cultivation of a strong soul. Having established Timaeus’ optimistic valuation of the human body, I set out on a brief survey of four other dialogues to see where Plato’s traditionally disparaging treatment of the body can be found. I spread my choice of dialogues out across the conventionally Early, Middle, and Late periods of his life, presenting relevant passages from the Republic (410c, 411e), Crito (47e), Phaedo (64d-e), and Laws (795a-796a). In the Early dialogues, Phaedo and Crito, the body is almost worthless – a ball-and-chain for the soul. It should be minimally kept up, but only to avoid acute problems. In the Republic, a Middle dialogue, gymnastics take on value, but only due to the body’s relationship with the spirited part of the soul. The body in itself remains forgettable, if not entirely regrettable. In the Late dialogues, Laws and Timaeus, the body claims gymnastics for its own, and physical training is expressly prescribed for everyone, even philosophers. I conclude that Plato condemned the human body almost utterly in his conventionally Early and Middle dialogues, but evolved a more optimistic bioethic later in life, eventually investing the body and its cultivation with great moral value.

A Critical Eye for Livy: Using an Apparatus Criticus
Ashley Gilbert

Many students go through their entire undergraduate careers without ever looking down to the bottom of a critical text at the apparatus criticus. Yet a reading of a text which does not take the apparatus into account gives too much authority to the text, treating it as a single work by a single author. In reality the transmission of manuscripts renders works that were originally by a single person into texts by multiple authors, from multiple sources. Since I have started using apparatus critici in my own reading, I now see ancient texts as unstable works. This paper is an exercise in using an apparatus criticus. I have chosen a page out of Livy's Ab Urbe Condita, which contains discrepancies of various types, outlined in the apparatus criticus. I dissect the apparatus criticus, applying it to the text above and following what I find to secondary resources, including commentaries and unabridged dictionaries. I investigate the classical scholars whose names appear within the apparatus. Through my analysis of the apparatus criticus, I show how an unstable text requires active and close reading, which means making choices through an informed comparison of the alternatives provided by discrepancies. When approached from the right perspective, these discrepancies can be windows to discovery. Unstable texts, when looked at with fresh eyes, may yield surprising new results. This is only possible when young scholars learn to use the apparatus criticus.
The Driest Work Ever Written - Just Add Water: A Look at Water Systems in Ancient Rome and Modern India
Anne Cave

My main research regards the ancient water system in the city of Rome in the first century AD during the time of Frontinus. Its primary purpose is to discuss the benefits and flaws of the aqueduct system at that time along with the changes the water commissioner Frontinus added to the system. Its secondary purpose is to show the universality of those issues by relating them to a modern system. For information about Roman aqueducts and water transport, I relied primarily on Frontinus' Latin text *De Aquaeductu Urbis Romae* for information. I also got information from a variety of sources in scholarly articles and books on aqueducts and engineering in the ancient world. To supplement the research on Roman aqueducts, I chose a modern city for comparison. This city, Pune, is one in which I lived for a span of four months and on which one of my colleagues did extensive water supply research. For supplementary information on Pune, I used my colleague's research as a base and let it point me in the right direction for other sources. In this research, I have discussed ways in which water commissioner Frontinus was important to the water systems of Rome, I have found ways in which Rome's ancient aqueduct system is superior to even some modern water systems, and I have also outlined some problems which seem universal to the water supply industry.

Corbulo and Agricola: Dying and Surviving under the Principate
Daniel Poochigian

Tactitus’ famous lament for the loss of the ancient liberties and unbridled virtue that the *res publica* permitted and men of the past exhibited is demonstrated by his focus on two anachronisms of recent memory—Gnaeus Julius Agricola and Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo. Tacitus leaves his reader with no doubt that both of these men represented the very virtues that the new principate could not reconcile. Indeed, both men served as high-ranking generals in far-flung provinces of the empire under emperors whom Tacitus considers despotic by any stretch of the imagination. And despite their virtues, loyalties, and tireless labors, which were seemingly on behalf of the empire’s well-being, both were viewed with some degree of suspicion by their respective emperors. While Agricola escapes Domitian’s paranoia by his own natural death, Corbulo suffers the ultimate fate of being ordered to commit suicide.

In this paper, I seek to explain why Corbulo was ordered to take his own life and why Agricola managed to survive to his own natural death. The topic itself is not a new one—scholars have been discussing the rationale of Corbulo’s actions for centuries. While most scholars believe that Corbulo’s arrogance, his extended stay in Armenia, and his extraordinary powers he held to accomplish his mission made him a threat to Nero, Syme believes that his extensive connections to conspiracies against the throne ensured his demise. Hammond argues that Nero perceived Corbulo as a threat because of Corbulo’s contrary actions towards his agenda for the orient. Still other scholars seek to detach Tacitus’ *Annales* from interpretation as an exemplum of Nero stifling virtue: Kristine Gilmarthan asserts that Tacitus’ account of the Parthian–Roman War of 57 serves more as a ground for Tacitus’ own musings about contemporary eastern politics. Finally,
Schoonover believes that Tacitus’ source for Corbulo’s campaign was a laudatory biography and not Corbulo’s own commentarii and therefore, when it is considered with Tacitus’ Agricola, the disparity of the two sources make the two men not comparable.

Whereas Corbulo has a body of reasons for why he was ordered to be killed, Agricola has his own list for how he managed to escape Domitian’s reckoning. While Tacitus himself notes that Agricola’s later life was filled with grave dangers coming from the throne and its many hangers-on, modern scholarship still seeks to find an explanation, with T.A. Dorey going so far as to argue that Agricola and Domitian were on perfectly amicable terms.

Yet the differences between the two generals’ charges deserve to be recalled. While Agricola was governor of Britain, Corbulo had the responsibility of ensuring Roman dominion over Armenia. Indeed, sheer geography seems to have made an impact, as, following Corbulo, no Roman emperor allowed a subordinate to launch campaigns into the East. It appears that Corbulo was a victim of not only his own successes and his character, but also the very nature of his mission—he wielded too much power too far away from Rome and therefore served as a reminder for all future emperors to go on campaign in the East personally.

**Session 66: Medical Humors and Classical Culture:**
**Blood (organized by the Society for Ancient Medicine and Pharmacy)**

**Blood: The Synecdochic Humor before Hippocrates**

Paul Keyser

Why were there humors at all? Humors are a peculiar concept and many medical models in ancient societies conceived the body in quite other terms – nor are corporeal fluids an obvious principle or *explanans* of first resort. The signs of illness and health are not primarily liquid, and bodies, human or animal, though they contain liquids, hold also many solids. Yet most Greek theories of health and disease persistently propound humors, and foremost among them blood.

For early Greeks, blood symbolized life, more so than did other liquids, so that spirits who drank it regained for a time some semblance of life (*Odyssey* 11.96, 147–149; Aesch. *Cho.* 578; Soph. *Electra* 785–786). By a very widespread, and ancient (or even prehistoric), synecdoche, blood was the substance of life, whose total loss, as in sacrifice, meant death. The palaeolithic and neolithic use of ruddle in funerary contexts suggests the same, as do also texts in the Hebrew *Torah*, and even Empedocles 31 B100 DK (on breathing).

But why would blood become foremost among humors? The clue may lie in a proto-humoral theory implicit in early Greek literature. Zeus of Olympos (*Iliad* 19.105), Glaukos of Lykia (6.211), Aineias of Troy (20.241), and Telemachos of Ithaca (*Odyssey* 4.611, 16.300) all have a descent and heritage “of blood.” The same metaphor was deployed by Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Herodotos – and indeed widely in Greek and Latin literature.
What were they thinking? What has blood to do with heritage? It is a most peculiar metaphor – despite its reach even into modern European languages – and yet it seems so “natural” that scholars have been almost entirely silent. These archaic Greek “blood-lines” were usually paternal, thus ruling out menstrual blood as the tenor of the metaphor. Nevertheless, some “blood-lines” were maternal (Aesch. Seven 141–144; Eur. Suppl. 1035), showing that the metaphorical blood was not understood as a euphemism for “seed,” for which there is anyway no parallel. At least once, even animals seem to have “blood heritage” (Aesch., Suppl. 225–226).

So, how can we explain this peculiar metaphor? Parallels are lacking from Egyptian, Hebrew, Persian, and Sanskrit – but are known in Mesopotamia. No plausible source for “blood heritage” exists in Greek thought, but Sumerian (KAR 4) and Assyrian myth (Atraḫasīš 1.204–217, 221–243; Enūma eliš IV.32, VI.5–8, 31–32) told how the gods created people from divine blood. Likewise, the ancient Semitic verb “to live” is used only of creatures with blood. West Asiatic elements in early Greek culture are widespread enough to be undeniable. Elements for which common heritage or independent invention is impossible include, inter alia, the alphabet (and the names of most of its letters), the images perceived as constellations (both on and off the ecliptic), the techniques of iron-working, and numerous names for plants and products imported from those lands, which lack any plausible Indo-European etymology.

Thus the notion that blood not only “was” the life of an individual, but also mediated life through heritage, entered Greek thought from West Asia. “Blood heritage” meant the inheriting of life, from parents, not via blood, but as manifest in blood.

Another influence on blood-theories was phlebotomy, for which the earliest Greek evidence is Herakleitos 22 B58 DK (Hippolytos, Ref. 9.10), or the Peytel aryballos (of ca. 475 BCE): the practice may be Scythian (Airs, Waters, Places §22, Littre 2.78), and is definitely neither Egyptian nor Mesopotamian. A third contribution was the Egyptian theory that disease arose when decay entered the “blood-tubes” (mtw). The concoction of these components seeded the Greek propensity to see liquids as the media of health and disease, with blood at the center.

I will also speculate on the etymology for αἷμα (agreed by etymologists to be non-Indo-European), and discuss the long dark shadow of this archaic synecdoche on medieval and modern thought.

**Blood, Magic, and Science in Early Greek Thought**
Michael Boylan

This paper will explore early Greek scientific accounts about blood and magic regarding the nature of the account and a critical appraisal of such. The approach will combine medical history and philosophy of science. It will be the contention of this essay that in this early period there is a transition from explanations weighted heavily upon magic and the divine to those that are more materially based. The treatment of “blood” is used to observe this transition. Some modern analogues are also noted.
The female is, as it were, a deformed male, and the menstrual fluids (katamênia) are semen, only not pure; i.e. it lacks one constituent, and one only, the principle of soul (tên tês psukhês arkhên). - Aristotle, GA 737a27-9

If relatively few members of the biological species are granted citizenship, that is because only they are capable of becoming fully human. - Lear 1995.64

The goal of this paper is to establish a connection between the physical inferiority of women in Aristotle's biological works, and the political inferiority of women in his Politics. This connection has either been taken for granted as self-evident, or, more recently, has been denied altogether. I argue that the physical deficiencies of women correspond quite precisely to their ethical deficiencies, focusing on Aristotle’s explanation of menstruation and the deficiencies in pneuma (physical) and thumos (ethical) that it indicates.

Blood, specifically menstrual blood, is essential to the definition of woman in Hippocratic and Aristotelian gynecology: “to be a woman is to menstruate” (King 1998.76). Aristotle differed from most Hippocratic authors in attributing menstruation to a woman’s cold nature, however; many Hippocratic treatises (notably, On the Diseases of Women) and Presocratic philosophers took menstruation as a sign that women were more ‘hot-blooded’ than men. (Aristotle himself notes this at PA 648a.) For Aristotle, menstruation proves that women do not have the body heat necessary to cook (pettein) nutritional residue into the most pure, most concentrated substance possible for humans, namely semen. (The purest, most concentrated substance that women can cook up from nutritional residue is breast milk.) duBois (1988.125) acidly comments, "Semen is simply the final stage of that coction, the most digested, most 'civilized' form of the body's blood and food."

As Aristotle asserts in the first statement above, menstrual blood differs from semen in lacking only ‘the principle of soul’. This ‘principle of soul’, which women’s colder nature cannot produce, is pneuma, or ‘hot air’ (thermos aêr: GA 736a; to kaloumenon thermon: 736b). Aristotle means a hot element of the soul quite literally in the anatomical context of the Generation of Animals. However, when considered from an ethical, less literal standpoint, ‘soul-heat’ (thermotêta psukhikên: GA 762a) becomes thumos. Plato derived thumos from the raging (thuseôs) and boiling (zeseôs) of the soul (Cratylus 419e). A precise definition of thumos in Aristotle is notoriously difficult (see e.g. Koziak 2000 ch. 3), but the cluster of associations he makes around thumos is illuminating. Aristotle asserts that men have more thumos, women less (HA 608b3, 608b11). The long-standing cultural associations of thumos with anger and the martial sphere ensure that it is primarily a masculine attribute, just as courage (andreia), by its very definition (literally ‘manliness’), can only be a masculine virtue. Aristotle associates high levels of thumos and heat with the traditionally masculine qualities of bravery (andreia), authority (to arkhon), and freedom (to eleutheron), and associates coldness and low levels of thumos with the traditionally feminine qualities of fear, cowardice, and subservience (PA 650b27-31; GA 750a11-13; EN 3.8; Pol. 1327b23-33, 1328a6-7; cf. Probl. 10.60, 27.3, 30.1, Physiog. 807a31 ff.). In biological contexts, pneuma can be understood as a literal heat of the soul; in ethical and political contexts, thumos signifies a metaphorical ‘fieriness’ of spirit. Both
aspects of ‘soul-heat’ are closely linked together (e.g., women are precluded from a high level of *thumos* by their lack of *pneuma*).

Menstruation marks a woman as lacking in ‘soul-heat’, both in the sense of *pneuma* and *thumos*, and therefore physically, morally, and politically inferior. (Likewise, natural slaves have low levels of *thumos*: *Pol.* 1327b; cf. *Airs, Waters, Places* XVI.) Women are prevented by their very physical makeup from ever achieving full virtue or citizenship in Aristotle’s moral and political landscape.

**Lactation as Salvation: Blood, Milk and *pneuma* in Clement of Alexandria’s *Pedagogue***

Dawn LaValle

The 2nd century Christian writer Clement of Alexandria begins his *Paedagogue* with an extended analysis of lactation in an important piece of medical theologizing against his Gnostic opponents. All Christians, he asserts, are children suckling Logical Milk (Christ) from the breast of the Father. Relying on basic Aristotelian theories, Clement reminds his readers that milk is fundamentally blood that has been transformed. Therefore, the milk that Paul speaks about as being the food of Christians (1 Cor. 3:2) is in fact the blood of Christ—not a preliminary food for immature Christians as the Gnostics assert, but the goal of the Christian life. Recent readers of Clement have been attuned to the medical precedents of Clement’s allegory, referencing the corresponding passages in Aristotle and Galen (Buell 1999, Engelbrecht 1999), but have failed to note the important difference between Clement and his Aristotelian s explanation of the *means* of transformation.

Clement had an array of lactational explanations from which to choose the material of his allegory. Hippocratic theory (On the Nature of the Child §21) believed that milk was fat pressed out from the stomach by a womb distended during pregnancy, which then accumulated in the nearby porous breasts. Aristotle disagreed, asserting instead that milk was blood that had been transformed through heat (*History of Animals* 7.3, *Generation of Animals* 4.8). Clement ignores the Hippocratean theory and instead uses the basic Aristotelian theory that milk is transformed blood. However, instead of emphasizing the transformative role of *heat* as Aristotle does, he emphasizes the transformative role of *pneuma*. In so doing, he aligns himself with the theories of the Pneumatist medical sect, which flourished in the first two centuries AD.

To show the significance of Clement’s emphasis on *pneuma*, this paper connects two passages in the opening section of the *Paedagogue*, the first on the formation of semen and the second on the creation of milk, both by means of the aeration of blood by *pneuma*. Connecting the two passages, which share distinct vocabulary, I argue that Clement’s *pneuma*-centric medical language relies on a source that utilizes the theories of the pre-Socratic philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia, whom Clement cites by name in his discussion of sperm formation. Diogenes of Apollonia’s most famous doctrine made air the first element of the universe, and as a result, he is seen as an important predecessor to the Pneumatist sect (Tieleman 2012).
Clement chooses to use a medical theory that ascribes blood’s transformation into milk to the working of *pneuma* instead of heat, to foaming instead of cooking, because of his broader rhetorical and theological goals. The *Paedagogue* argues against a strong bifurcation of the Christian church into two groups, the Gnostics and the Spirituals. Instead, Clement insists that there is only one important division, that between the baptized and the non-baptized. All baptized Christians are Pneumatics, having received the outpouring of the Holy Spirit (the *Hagion Pneuma*). It should come as no surprise that a near contemporary of Galen and Soranus, working in Alexandria, the center of anatomical medical theory in the Empire, should use current medical theories to support his theological debates. In so doing, he was able to overturn the argument of his opponents, showing that the Gnostics’ erroneous Scriptural interpretation was caused by their lack of biological knowledge. Furthermore, my argument suggests that Clement’s resourcefulness may have led us to evidence for the otherwise unattested Pneumatist doctrine of lactation.

Session 67: Coins and History (organized by the Friends of Numismatics)

Numismatics and Neoclassical Assumptions: A Case-Study from the Third Century Roman Empire
Colin Elliott

It is generally agreed that throughout antiquity a functioning coinage was closely associated with state power. Not only is this idea critical for explaining the introduction of coined money in the sixth century B.C., but it also underpins hypotheses concerning the possible monetary crisis in the third century A.D. For roughly the first two centuries of its existence, the Roman Empire apparently commanded a largely unassailable coinage monopoly which featured legal rates of exchange which were both enforced and generally accepted by coin users. The monetary problems in the third century were caused, at least in part, by the weakening of the central government and the related breakdown of this monopoly. However, both the idea of a third-century monetary crisis and the supposed weakening of monetary monopoly should be questioned.

Numismatic evidence is critical for understanding the monetary system as a whole in this period. In addition, there are well-known examples of third-century laws which controlled currency or related institutions such as banks, exchanges and assays. Comparing links between these two bodies of evidence reveals an important but sometimes overlooked correlation: the timing of legal actions often corresponds with reductions in coinage fineness or weight. On the one hand, it should not be surprising that fixed ratios were most strictly enforced when the state was in the most need of them – when coins were newly debased. On the other hand, this limited evidence does not conclusively prove that such laws were normal nor regularly enforced in any kind of
systematic fashion. In fact, the data from several third-century coin hoards may show that officials were attempting to increase controls and fixed legal ratios – efforts which may have contributed to a growing underground economy made up of money-users who forsook the imperial coinage in favour of localised exchange of surplus commodities, precious metals and imperial coins valued at unofficial (and illegal) rates. In other words, problems with the monetary system may not have been the result of the central authority's failure to impose itself with enough force, but rather, by increasing its enforcement of fixed ratios, the Roman state undermined its own currency and jeopardised its featured place in a monetary system which included alternatives to official imperial coinage.

In light of evidence which casts doubt upon both the totality of a coercive monetary monopoly and the way in which it changed over time, it is important to ask why this assumption persists. The answer may be that historians are not unaffected by their modern context. Developments in economic theory over the past century have largely taken place within capitalist systems which operate under the imperative that the money supply must be monopolised and directed by independent central banks in order to maximise economic growth and production. This presents a challenge for economic historians who are interested in drawing upon theoretical insights from outside of mainstream neoclassicism. However, alternatives to neoclassical economics, even if heterodox, ideological or otherwise ‘old hat’, can help historians to reappraise the third-century monetary evidence – albeit with models which reflect the qualitatively different nature of ancient economies.

**Early Imperial History and the Excavation Coins of Sardis: Field 55 and the Wadi B Temple**

*Jane DeRose Evans*

Two areas of the modern excavation of Sardis, Turkey, have uncovered remains of a neighborhood of the city that can be shown to have been devastated by an earthquake in 17 AD, and earthquake that was severe enough that Tiberius sent massive relief funds to rebuild the city. Field 55, as it is called by the modern excavators, is a huge artificial terrace built against the side of a hill, southeast of the later Synagogue and habitation section MMS. The pottery is currently being studied by E. DeRidder Raubolt (Missouri); I have made a study of the coins found in the fill. The pottery dates the fill to the Early Imperial period, and likely before the end of the Julio-Claudian period. The area was thus part of a reconstruction project paid for by the imperial purse, with fill from the destroyed city used to pack the terrace walls. The coins in the fill will help elucidate the body of bronzes available to be lost by their owners, from the Hellenistic bronzes minted in Sardis still very much in circulation to one Augustan coin. The last is a warning to archaeologists to use the coin evidence from their strata carefully, as only a terminus post quem, for the pottery clearly brings the date of the layer through the Late Augustan period. Similarly, in the adjoining Field 49, pottery of the Imperial Period is rarely matched by imperial-age coins, while the strata do have many examples of Hellenistic coins. But if we had not known the specific date of the earthquake, the coins would only have allowed us to note that it occurred after the Augustan period.
The Wadi B Temple (Ratté, Howe and Foss AJA 1986; with continuing excavations in 2005, see Greenwalt in Kazi Sonuçları Toplantısı 2. Cilt 2006) was built at the same time as the terrace was put into place; the terrace may have served as its temenos. The temple – which is an extremely large temple – was suggested by its excavator to have been destroyed in the Antonine period, due to the coins found in the fill, which the excavator suggested were in a layer of destruction debris that covered the stylobate. The pottery in this fill was entirely undiagnostic. Most of the fill on top of this temple dates to the Late Roman period, a date that is confirmed by the style of the architectural fragments, pottery and coins found in the layer. However, the destruction debris contains an unusual number of Antonine coins. Several of them are coins of the young Marcus Aurelius, minted in Sardis. Three of the Antonine coins are recorded as having been stacked beside the stylobate. All of these coins have representations of a Roman temple or goddess on them and one is a large bronze from the mint of the Commune of Bithynia (Nikomedia?). The excavators propose a date of destruction and abandonment of the temple in the Antonine period; Burrell (Neokoroi, 2004) suggested that the neokorate temple of Sardis is recorded as dating to the Antonine period was housed in the refurbished Temple of Artemis. I will explore the possible votive nature of this deposit, and suggest that the temple may have continued in use through the Late Roman period.
In this paper I explain how at *Il.* 1.234-239 Achilles manipulates the description of the scepter he is holding to strip it of its conventional associations with stability and royal power. I argue that in his oath Achilles appropriates the scepter and tree-simile—the very images that the narrator conventionally uses to praise Agamemnon and the Achaeans—in order to excoriate the king for stealing Briseis.

To craft his criticism, Achilles manipulates his description of the scepter in two ways. He deviates both from the narrator’s customary treatment of scepters and from the narrator’s standard form for tree-similes. First, he describes the scepter as the wooden product of a mutilated tree, breaking from the narrator’s habit of describing the scepter as metallic (regularly golden). Furthermore, by turning the scepter from a metallic object into a wooden one, Achilles creates here a quasi tree-simile (on tree-simile families, see Scott, 1974: 70-71 and 2009: 22-27). The verses about the mutilated tree (234-237) resemble a simile, as Kirk and Latacz duly note. In this paper, I call attention to two subtle but crucial differences between Achilles’ speech and the tree-similes of the Iliadic battle narrative. Whereas the typical battle narrative tree-simile depicts a woodcutter or craftsman successfully felling a tree to manufacture something useful (cf. Fränkel: 35), Achilles’ excursus has no woodcutter nor does he describe the scepter’s manufacture. These changes to the tree-simile, which constitute Achilles’ second departure from the narrator’s standard practice, transform an image redolent of Achaean martial success into a symbol of the death and suffering the Achaeans will endure.

Scholarly commentary on Achilles’ speech has focused more on the scepter than the tree—especially how the scene represents injustice when Achilles throws the scepter to the earth (Benardete, Griffin, Mondi, Easterling). Scholarship on the image itself has linked the mutilated tree to Homer’s conception of heroism (Nagy), to Achilles’ life story (Schein; Lowenstam), and to Homer’s fixation with the violence of combat (Lynn-George). Building on recent interest in the relationship between similes in speech and similes in the narrative (Pelliccia, Ready), I am interested to show how Achilles changes the image of the mutilated tree used by the narrator to praise the Achaeans into one that blames Agamemnon.

In the first part of this paper, then, I contrast Achilles’ description of the scepter with the narrator’s descriptions of Agamemnon’s metal scepter at *Il.* 2.41-46 and 2.100-108, showing that the narrator treats the metal scepter as a weapon duly handed down from generation to generation. Achilles breaks from the narrator’s practice in order to suppress the themes of power and stability associated with a metal scepter.
In the second part, I contrast the tree imagery in Achilles’ speech with the tree-similes of the battle narrative. Here I argue that tree-similes in the battle narrative celebrate the superior martial prowess of the Achaeans through the figure of the woodcutter or craftsman, who always stands for the heroic Achaeans successfully overpowering tough Trojan resistance to achieve glory on the battlefield. A close reading of the elaborate simile associated with the death of Simoesius (4.482-489), in which a chariot-maker fells a poplar to make the rim for a wheel, shows that the narrator uses the simile to glorify Ajax. And so the woodcutter and the story of his fashioning a useful object from the tree he cuts down comprise the elements that make tree-similes vehicles for praise. Achilles’ oath, devoid of such a character and lacking such a story, turns the cutting of the tree from something productive and admirable into purposeless violence.

When, therefore, Achilles eliminates the woodcutter from his excursus, then omits the story of the creation of the scepter itself, he accomplishes a rhetorical tour de force, using imagery designed for praise to criticize Agamemnon.

**Up the volcano: Aetna and ascent in Seneca’s *Ep. 79***

Carrie Mowbray

‘Climb a volcano for me’, Seneca requests of his interlocutor in the opening of *Ep. 79* (*...ut in honorem meum Aetnam quoque ascendas*). The ostensible purpose is scientific investigation: to determine whether the mountain is wasting away, the activity levels of its fires, and just how far from the crater one can find its unmelting snow. Seneca, however, has more in mind than just curiosities of natural science, as comments on the poetic zest for Aetna by Vergil, Ovid, Cornelius Severus, and now, Lucilius quickly reveal. Leaving to one side the fraught issues of Lucilius’ identity and the authorship of the extant *Aetna* poem (see Ellis [2008] and Goodyear 1984), this paper argues that Seneca’s presentation of Aetna leads his readers on an ‘ascent’ that parallels the one he would have Lucilius undertake, and that this progression comments on Seneca’s literary *corpus*. From the ground up, Seneca deploys the topic of Aetna as (1) physical entity, (2) literary topos, (3) metaphor for poetic creation and filiation, and (4) objective correlative for the goal of a Stoic *proficiens*.

The first step of the progression consists of investigating the volcano’s physical characteristics (cf. Pliny *NH* 2.233.1; Sen. *NQ* 2.30.1). Volcanology quickly cedes to Aetna as a well-worn poetic *topos*. In the second step, Seneca plays the dual role of literary critic and poetic adviser to his protégée. Guessing that Lucilius is ‘salivating’ to join the ranks of poets who have recently treated the topic, Seneca urges Lucilius not to steer clear of Aetna, nor to imitate his predecessors by including an Aetna passage here or there, but instead, to devote an entire poem to Aetna. The vertical ascent is cast in terms of poetic *aemulatio*, and specifically, of *escalatio*—an attribute that subtends Seneca’s own tragic poetics (Seidensticker 1985, Schiesaro 1997). When Seneca explains how the volcano operates, he is simultaneously commenting on two contrastive views of poetic filiation: destructive and preservative-accretive. Seneca explains that the mountain could be diminishing because it is eaten away (*devoretur cotidie*) or else that its overall size is unchanged because of underground channels that constantly supply it with new fodder (*in aliqua inferna valle conceptus exaestuat et alis pascitur*; *Ep. 79*.2). Seneca's observation in this letter that the mountain is merely the passageway through which heat emerges from the subterranean world accords with recent scholarship on the infernal elements of Senecan tragedy (Putnam 1995; Schiesaro 2003). Seneca’s preference for the preservative-accretive model is clear in his
comment that treatments of Aetna have not exhausted the topic but have opened additional avenues for future poets (cf. Ep. 84.9-10, in which the ‘chorus’ of poets comprises more, and more varied, voices throughout the ages).

After asking Lucilius to physically climb Aetna, Seneca exhorts him to surpass models in his poetic aspiration (nemo ab altero potest vinci, nisi dum ascenditur). The final step in the ascent is located in the arena of moral improvement. While Aetna (qua volcano or qua poetic subject) is liable to fall or be consumed by flames, virtue is not subject to destruction (Ep. 79.10). Here, the hierarchy under which Seneca has been operating becomes fully visible. The sapiens will stand on sure footing at the apex, while the poet and the scientist are on shaky ground. New discoveries overturn previously held scientific ideas, and a poet must always be concerned that his or her work will be outdone.

The volcano, appropriately enough, looms over Ep.79. This paper demonstrates how Seneca condenses massive Aetna to compartmentalize, then expand in a synthetic way, several types of ‘ascent’: scientific discovery, poetic aemulatio, and moral progress. In doing so, Seneca also presents himself in the guise of natural philosopher, poet, and moral philosopher (Ker 2006). To that end, I conclude by suggesting how Aetna can help us to imagine the relationship between the disparate elements of Seneca’s polygeneric oeuvre.

**Troy as Turning-post: Chariot-racing as a Metaphor for High Stakes, Power Politics and the Threat of Death in the Iliad and Aeschylus' Agamemnon**

Kevin Solez

In order to provide an insight into how aristocratic Greeks and those who memorialized them in verse conceived of their actions, I will focus in this paper on chariot-racing metaphors, and specifically on one recurring aspect of them – the notion of Troy as turning-post. I choose this trope because of its potency and antiquity in the literary tradition; chariot-racing metaphors are highly productive in ancient Greek literature but I do not think that they ever escape the association with Homer and his descriptions of Achilles as a charioteer and a chariot-horse circling round and round the city of Troy in Iliad 22 (22.22-23; 22.162-66). This powerful imagery stands at the beginning of the Greek literary tradition, and exerted an influence on the metaphorical vocabulary of all authors working in that tradition. Analyzing the passages in two important poetic texts that employ chariot-racing metaphors – the Iliad and Aeschylus’ Agamemnon – will help us to understand the relationship of the use of this metaphor in these two works, the significance of the metaphor’s later use, and the network of associations the notion of chariot-racing summons into the minds of an ancient Greek audience.

L. Myrick’s 1994 article discusses the frequent chariot- and foot-racing metaphors in the Orestes plays of the three major tragedians, and points out that chariot- and foot-racing metaphors are used to describe the act of murder or of having died (Euripides’ Electra 824-5, of Orestes about to murder Aigisthus; 954-6, of Aigisthus having been killed), and that death and murder often occur in a context of actual chariot-racing (Sophocles’ Electra 504-515, of Myrtilus; 749-760, of Orestes). Similar connections are made in N. Bruyère-Demoulin’s 1976 article, where she adduces a large number of examples of racing imagery in Greek literature showing that the
Greeks sometimes imagined life itself as an athletic competition, usually a foot-race. While Myrick and Bruyère-Demoulin elucidate the connection of chariot-racing vocabulary to life, death and murder, they do not address the political aspect of the chariot-racing metaphor that is very rich in the passages they cite and is clearly linked to the threat of death. The chariot-racing metaphors in the tragedians are motivated by more than an association of chariot-racing with danger, death, and murder, but rather rely on and evoke the wider range of aristocratic endeavor, involving the display of wealth, contestations for political legitimacy, proficiency in war, heroic ideology, the distribution of largesse and the receipt of honors.

The chariot-racing metaphors in the *Agamemnon*, and the related athletic and epinician vocabulary, form part of the dense network of symbolism Aeschylus uses to produce his tragic effects, which also includes images of disgraceful trampling (Goward 105), metaphors of humans as dogs (Raeburn and Thomas lxvi-lxix), and a net from which one cannot escape (Goward 106). Chariot-racing as contesting for dominance, legitimacy, and life itself is not the dominant metaphor of the *Agamemnon*, and it has not been much discussed in the scholarship on Aeschylean symbolism (no mention in Raeburn and Thomas, Goward, or Fraenkel), apart from Myrick’s and Bruyère-Demoulin’s comments on the eschatological symbolism of racing, and a brief mention in H. J. Rose’s commentary (30, s.v. 344). The chariot-racing vocabulary in the *Agamemnon* clearly links this text to the *Iliad* in meaningful ways: 1) it is employed at moments of seeming victory and high danger, where Agamemnon, like Achilles, is victorious but soon to die; 2) the two victories the metaphor refers to, Achilles’ over Hector and Agamemnon’s over Troy, are very different, but are both of the highest stakes, personal or political, for the characters concerned; 3) in both the *Iliad* and the *Agamemnon* the metaphorical race takes its decisive turn around the walls of Troy.

**Getting to the Truth: Metaphors of “Mistakenness” in Greek and Latin**

*William M. Short*

As most students of Greek and Latin know, “making a mistake” is metaphorical: In Greek, that is, ἁμαρτάνω captures this concept through the image of “missing the mark”, as when throwing a spear (cf. Hom. Il. 5.287) or in archery (Aesch. Aga. 1194–7). In Latin, erro employs the image of “wandering from a path”. But whereas the Greek martial metaphor is linguistically circumscribed and likely a “one-shot image metaphor” (Kövecses 2002), Latin’s spatial metaphor structures a wide range of conventional expressions related to concepts not only of “falseness” but also of “trueness”. (This is not to say the Greek metaphor was unproductive. Plato compares good lawgiving to archery and Aristotle likens knowledge of the good to hitting a target: cf. Lasky 1994. Elsewhere, archery metaphorizes “accurate” prophecy and perception, and even emotion: Keith 1914, 122; Stanford 1936). In Latin, such concepts are in fact systematically expressed through spatial images. Specifically, words literally denoting motion away from a location are used in reference to “falseness”, so that one speaks metaphorically of “wandering (errare)” as well as of “turning away (avertere)” or “directing away (deflectere)” or even “tearing away (disciscere)” from the truth. What is false is literally what is “distant from the truth” (procul a vero: cf. Ov. Trist. 5.6.27). Mistakenness (error) is a kind of trap in which someone can be “held (teneri)” or “twisted (versari)” or “entangled (implicari)”; into which it is possible to “lead (inducere, adducere)” or “carry off (rapere)” another person; or even into
which someone can “slip (labi)”. Correspondingly, someone or something’s “being true” or "having knowledge of the truth” or “doing right” is conveyed by terms literally denoting spatial motion toward – “going”, “coming”, “arriving”, “proceeding”, “turning”, “approaching”, “returning”, “leading” and so on – in the direction of the truth (verum, veritas): cf., e.g., Plaut. *Rud.* 1150–51, *te ad verum converti*; Hor. *Serm.* 1.3.96–7, *ventum ad verum est*; Quint. *IO.* 12.8.11, *aliquando ad uerum . . . peruenimis*; 12.10.9, *ad ueritatem . . . accessisse*. In all these expressions, the truth is construed metaphorically as a fixed location and different degrees of trueness are expressed as physical proximity to or distance from that location. This is why *ad veritatem propius* or *proxime* or *maxime accedere* – literally, “come closer (closest) to the truth” – has the sense of “have a better knowledge of what is true” (cf. Cic. *De orat.* 1.220; 1.262; *Lucull.* 6; 47; Sen. *Clem.* 2.3.2) or why “being in the truth” means to be true in an absolute sense (cf., e.g., Lact. 1.11.31; 1.17.1, *in vero esse*).

In this paper, I present evidence of the systematic structuring of Latin’s ways of speaking about “truth” through metaphors of movement in physical space. This structuring can be described in cognitive linguistic terms as a set of symbolic correspondences or mappings (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980) set up between concepts of truth and concepts of spatial motion, so that the logic of spatial experience is carried over systematically to an understanding of trueness. These mappings are not a property of individual words, however: almost the entire field of motion terms can be used in speaking metaphorically about the truth, because the mappings operate at a level of meaning that is supralinguistic. Indeed, it is possible to show that the metaphors characterizing trueness or falseness are specialized manifestations of the more general pattern in Latin whereby concepts of mental activity are delivered by spatial metaphor (cf. Short 2012). Moreover, when compared with other, similar metaphors – e.g., the material metaphor in which the truth or falsity of someone or something correlates to its heaviness or lightness (cf. Cic. *Phil.* 5.18.50, *vera, gravis, solida gloria* as against Lael. 25.91, *vitium levium hominum atque fallacium*) – the spatial metaphor appears to have the clear function of providing a basic structure to conceptualization, giving Latin speakers a convenient conceptual framework upon which to hang their understanding of relative truthfulness.

**Session 69: Selected Exostructures of Hellenistic Epigram**

**A Poem for Phanion: Sapphic Allusions in Meleager *AP* 12.53**

*Patricia A. Rosenmeyer*

While the overall organization of Meleager’s epigram collection has been brilliantly analyzed by Kathryn Gutzwiller (1998), individual poems still suffer from overly literal interpretation. In particular, scholars insist on reading Meleager *AP* 12.53, in which a ship is asked to carry news of the poet to his beloved Phanion, as a description of a real event in the poet’s life. The lines in question (*AP* 12.53.1-6) are as follows: “Richly loaded sea-faring ships that sail down the Hellespont, if by any chance you see Phanion on the beach at Cos, gazing at the blue sea, give
her this message…that desire carries me there not as a sailor, but making the voyage on foot” (με κομίζει / ἵμερος οὐ ναύταν, ποσσὶ δὲ πεζοπόρον).

Most commentators read these lines as autobiography: Meleager “stands on the shore of the Hellespont” wishing to send a message to Phanion on Cos (Gow and Page 1965.642); “the poet is a practical ancient traveller, preferring to journey as much as possible by land” (Clack 1992.80). In contrast, I argue that this epigram is a self-reflexive fiction celebrating Meleager’s own poetic skill. Constructed around erotic motifs borrowed from Sappho, and cleverly playing with the propemptikon mode, the poem anticipates not its poet’s subsequent arrival, but the delivery of the poem itself: when Meleager announces that he is “making the voyage on foot” (ποσσὶ δὲ πεζοπόρον), he puns on the idea of metrical feet.

Meleager was clearly familiar with Sappho’s corpus, alluding to her both in his poetry (e.g. AP 5.212; AP 12.132b) and in the introduction to his edition of the Garland (AP 4.1). AP 12.53 is particularly rich in as yet unrecognized Sapphic references. Sappho fr. 96 models a pair of separated lovers standing on distant shores; fr. 5, a wish for fair sailing for Sappho’s brother, functions similarly as a propemptikon; and fr. 16 suggests the syntactical juxtaposition of ships and literal foot-travel (16.1-3: “some say an army of…foot-soldiers, others of ships”).

Sappho also informs the figurative turn that follows, as Meleager alludes to his desire being communicated to Phanion across the sea “on foot”, i.e. in verse. Ships transporting papyrus rolls of poetry appear in Posidippus 122 (Austin/Bastianini), where the poems referred to are written texts of Sappho: “the shining eloquent columns of Sappho’s lovely song will survive…as long as ships sail from the Nile over the sea” (Rosenmeyer 1998.131). Behind Posidippus stands another intertext: an epigram by Nossis (AP 7.718), who asks a stranger sailing to Mytilene to announce upon arrival that she, like Sappho, is a poet loved by the Muses. This epigram most likely served as an envoi to a book of Nossis’ poems (Wilamowitz 1913.299). Thus poems stand in for their famous authors, travelling overseas where their authors cannot.

A metaphorical explanation fits the Hellenistic aesthetic and explains the curious hapax “richly loaded” (ἐὔφορτοι) in line 1: the ships carry Meleager’s poem (or poetry book), the concrete expression of his desire, and a rich gift for Phanion. Finally, Meleager’s apostrophe to the boat, as well as his pun on metrical feet, will be taken up later by appreciative Roman poets: Catullus (4: “ille phaselus..”) and Ovid (Tristia 1.1.16; Amores 1.1.4), respectively.

### An Attack on the Stoics in the Epigrams of Palladas

**Thomas R. Keith**

Over fifty years ago, the great Hellenist Maurice Bowra argued in two seminal articles that we can interpret the epigrams of the fourth-century CE satirist Palladas of Alexandria as evidence for Palladas’ changing religious views (1959, 1960). According to Bowra, Palladas moved from a pessimistic belief in the all-consuming power of cruel, unfeeling Fortune (Tyche) to the conviction that he had found a psychological “safe harbor” (limēn), where Tyche held no sway over him. While Bowra acknowledged ([1960], 124) that this supposed new attitude could be called “philosophical”, he nonetheless downplayed the influence of any specific philosophical school on Palladas’ characterization of Tyche, or, indeed, on his morality in general. In this
I shall contend that Palladas’ corpus, particularly the hortatory epigrams in Book 10 of the *Palatine Anthology*, shows the marked influence of Stoic thinking on the universe, free will, and the ethical *telos* — thinking that is critiqued and challenged in the epigrams.

We must first set aside Bowra’s conversion narrative, which, given the absence of secure dates for most of the Palladan poems, is impossible to prove (Cameron [1965a, b]). Having done so, we can immediately detect a consistent theme throughout Book X: the necessity for man to accommodate Tyche. This necessity, and its implications for the balance between fate and free will, had much concerned the Stoa from its beginnings, and we may conjecture that Palladas had knowledge (though not, perhaps, directly) of early Stoic writings on the topic. His epigram 10.73, at any rate, is startlingly similar to Cleanthes’ famous *Hymn to Zeus*. Both works suggest a distressingly blunt attitude toward fate: we should follow the divine will freely, since in the end we will be compelled to do so whether we like it or not (see further Bobzien [1998]). Yet, whereas Cleanthes is comfortable with this state of affairs because his Zeus is entirely virtuous, Palladas is deeply cynical: he finds no evidence whatsoever that the divine will is inimical to wickedness — after all, Zeus himself would have killed his father if he could (10.53).

To provide guidance in ethical living, the Stoics crafted the persona-theory, which presents human existence as a drama within which we are assigned parts (Gill [1988], Asmis [2001]). The goal of life, the *telos*, consists in playing these parts to the best of our ability. Again, Palladas evokes this theory only to undermine it: the whole world is indeed a stage, but to succeed as actors, we must put aside our seriousness (*spoudē*) or else be overwhelmed by suffering (10.72). The cosmos is not a drama, but a farce — a series of random turns of fortune without order, meaning, or moral. As proof, Palladas notes that Fortune not only does not punish the wicked, but actively rewards them — a fact to which the only reasonable response is either laughter or despair (10.87).

These epigrams demonstrate that Palladas has turned Stoic ethics on its head, by denying to Stoic divinity (right reason, *orthos logos*, or Providence, *Pronoia*) the absolute virtue the Stoics claimed for it. The *logos* that governs the cosmos may be irresistible, but it is also irrational, *alogos* (10.62). We are still bidden by Palladas to obey it, albeit only for the sake of personal peace (*hesychia*, 10.46). Nonetheless, mortals have the moral high ground over the divine. We recognize the rewards and punishments that are properly due to the virtuous and the wicked, in accordance with the Stoic definition of justice (SVF III.262), while the divine *logos* either lacks this knowledge, or willfully ignores it. Zeno and Cleanthes would surely recoil in horror at such conclusions. Nonetheless, it is a testimony to the entrenched influence of their school that an author writing at the end of pagan antiquity still felt it necessary to challenge the Stoa for defending Providence in a chaotic world.

**A Model Epigrammatist: Leonidas of Tarentum and Poetic Self-Representation in the Garland of Philip**

Charles S. Campbell

This paper reevaluates the influence of Leonidas of Tarentum on the Greek epigrammatists of the 1st century BCE. Scholars have noted a shift in Greek epigram of this period away from, for instance, traditional erotic themes and towards occasional poetry and the depiction of the poet’s
own life and social milieu (Laurens 1965; Cogitore 2010). This paper will argue, through the close examination of a few representative epigrams, that the poets of this period follow a common set of conventions in their representation of themselves within their work. In particular, it will argue that Leonidas, a figure whose influence on earlier Greek epigram is already well-known (Gow-Page 1965 and 1968; Gigante 1971; Gutzwiller 1998), served as a common model for the self-representation of poets of this time. In so doing it will shed light on Leonidas’ reception in antiquity as well as the generic development of epigram after Meleager.

Leonidas wrote himself into his own epigrams, creating a vivid poetic persona imbued with the ethical principles of ancient Cynicism. He communicated his ethical message through sermons in the manner of diatribe, dedicatory and funerary epigrams on humble members of society, and epigrams about his own life. In AP 6.302, which will serve as my primary example in this paper, the poet addresses mice that have invaded his hut (καλυβής, 1) in search of food, bidding them to go elsewhere since he leads a simple life (λιτά, 7), keeping only enough food in his meal-tub (σιπύη, 2) for himself. Mock-epic diction and the use of the language of religious imprecation contribute to the vivid characterization and the ethical urgency of the speaker; meanwhile, the poet’s material circumstances are made into symbols of his ethical outlook.

While some later epigrammatists (e.g. Ariston, AP 6.303) imitate this poem quite directly, others range further afield while still engaging with the poem’s quasi-religious language, ethical content, imagery, and key words. I will discuss three examples in detail in order to illustrate some of the techniques used by the epigrammatists in engaging with Leonidas and one another. In the first of these, AP 11.44, Philodemus recasts Leonidas’ address to the mice as an invitation, rather than a prohibition. He bids Lucius Calpurnius Piso to come to his simple cottage (λιτήν καλιάδα, 1) to enjoy a dinner in honor of Epicurus. Like Leonidas’ hut and his simple food, Philodemus’ cottage and unpretentious fare are symbols of his ethical outlook on life. Cynic irascibility is here transmuted into Epicurean friendliness, and Leonidas’ imprecation becomes a kind of prayer directed to Piso, who will enrich the company by his very presence (ἀξομεν ἐκ λιτῆς εἵκάδα πιοτέρην, 8).

In accordance with his hedonistic predilections, Antipater of Thessalonica (AP 11.20) recasts Philodemus’ Epicurean dinner party as a raucous symposium in honor of Homer and Archilochus. Returning to Leonidas’ quasi-religious language, Antipater shoos away not mice, but pedantic, water-drinking poets from his wine-jar, excluding them from the ritual pouring of libations. Merging Callimachean and Leonidean terminology, Antipater rejects those who drink “plain water” (λιτόν ὕδωρ, 4). Antipater has thus made his symposium and his wine-jar, in a way analogous to Leonidas’ hut and meal-tub, serve as physical representations of his ethical and poetic principles.

Crinagoras (AP 5.545) ingeniously references both Leonidas and Philodemus at once. He presents to Marcus Claudius Marcellus a copy of Callimachus’ Hecale, a poem featuring a prominent scene of hospitality offered by a humble person (Hecale) to a hero (Theseus). The setting of this hospitality is a simple hut (καλιήν, 3). Like Leonidas, Crinagoras has an ethical purpose—to inspire Marcellus to a virtuous life (κλεινοῦ τ’ ἱσον βιότου, 6) in part through the appreciation of poetry. Like Antipater’s krater or Leonidas’ meal-tub, meanwhile, the book Crinagoras gives to Marcellus serves as a physical symbol of the ethical principles he espouses.
Reading a Mime Sequence: A.P. V. 181-187
David Kutzko

In the middle of the erotic epigrams in Book Five of the Greek Anthology, three poems stand out for not being personal or entirely erotic. In each epigram a speaker addresses a servant about the preparations for a symposium. If it were not for the epigrammatic context, 181 (Asclep. 25, Gow-Page), 183 (Posidipp. 10, Gow-Page), and 185 (Asclep. 26, Gow-Page) might be mistaken for dramatic fragments. Gow and Page 1965 (132), who termed these poems “thumb-nail mimes”, observed that 182 (Mel. 171, Gow-Page) and 184 (Mel. 172, Gow-Page) also seem to have been modeled on dramatic scenes (132). Gutzwiller 1998 (295-96) has further asserted that 181-187 are a designed “mime sequence” within Meleager’s Garland. Scholars are correct to note the intentional ordering of these epigrams, but to group them together as a “mime” sequence without further explanation does not show how unique 181, 183, and 185 are. 182, 184 and 186-87 are personal erotic epigrams that borrow from drama, while the other three epigrams actually imitate drama. Significantly, Meleager is the author of all but one of the personal epigrams. Therefore, we can examine this sequence as Meleager’s interaction with his Hellenistic predecessors’ experiments with mime and comedy. Furthermore, we can read this dramatic sequence firmly as book poetry by the time of Meleager’s collection and can then infer back about the much debated relationship between reading and performance in the Hellenistic period.

181 and 182 programmatically introduce the impersonal and personal poems in this sequence. In 181 Bacchon scolds a servant for laziness and accuses him of theft. The speaker’s name and the names of the other characters, Phryne and Aischra, are all evocative of the world of mime (Sens 2011, 163). Like other Hellenistic imitations of mime, such as Theoc. 15. 27-33 and Herod. 7. 5-13, Asclepiades develops the character of his speaker through the orders to his servant; indeed, this is also the appeal of the other two thumb-nail mimes of Posidippus and Asclepiades (Sens, 173-74). In the last lines, Bacchon tells his servant to go to Aeschra to acquire five silver flasks, one for every time he had sex with her in a single session (181. 10-12). As proof, he says their bed was inscribed as a witness (12 κλίνη μάρτυς ἐπεγράφετο). While ἐπηγράφομαι can have the technical meaning of “to cause to be endorsed”, it is probable that Asclepiades here is also drawing attention to his “inscribed” art, τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, at the close of his imitation of a dramatic scene (Sens 172), similar to allusions to the textual imitation of drama in Theocritus and Herodas (Kutzko 2007, 141-55).

In 182 Meleager orders Dorcas to send a message to his mistress (1-2), then stops her to revise the message (3-6), and finally resolves to go with her to convey the message himself (7-8). His speech is filled with implied stage directions – τρέχε (2), ἐπίσχες (3), ποῖ σπεύδεις (4), σὺν σοι καύτος, ἰδοὺ, προάγων (8) – and Gutzwiller (328-29) notes that Meleager focuses on the lover’s emotional ambivalence through a dramatic setting. Interestingly, the standard manner for portraying a lover’s ambivalence in both epigram and comedy (i.e. Men. Sam. 325-56) is through a monologue. Meleager here follows the technique of Asclepiades, who develops Bacchon’s character and the epigram’s scenario solely through imitation of dramatic dialogue, and applies it to his own epigram. Interweaving the rest of the thumb-nail mimes with the erotic epigrams, Meleager shows the influence of drama on his predecessors and himself.
Not enough has been made of Aclepiades’ and Posidippus’ imitations of mime in the epigram form or Meleager’s engagement with them. A full reading of this mime sequence supports the view that Hellenistic poets actively experimented with the non-dramatic imitation of drama that influenced both later Greek and Roman book poetry.

Session 70: Catullan Identities, Ancient and Modern

Non horrebitis admovere nobis: Encountering Catullus in the Chinese Context
Yongyi Li

This paper examines the reception of Catullus in China today. Catullus is a poet long known, but rarely read, in China: there was simply no substantial translation of his work available before Yongyi Li’s Latin-Chinese version of Carmina appeared in 2008.

This belatedness can be attributed to the fact that very few Chinese know Latin, but more importantly, scholars who are proficient in the language usually let Catullus alone as they are secretly convinced that much of his poetry is “improper” and offensive to the Chinese aesthetic sensibility. Dominated by the Confucian doctrine of exercising restraint and avoiding excess, classical Chinese poetry exalts implicit presentation and affective balance. The ubiquity of sexual and abusive vocabulary in Catullus is disturbing, even repugnant, to poetry readers steeped in that tradition, and tortures their moral sentiments when they have been taught all along that poets excel not only in talent, but also in character, a myth that has survived many counterexamples. How could a poet threatening to punish his detractive readers with his phallus and smacking of a pedophile be reconciled with the image of the Confucian gentleman of “complete virtue”?

Given this mindset, it would have seemed impossible for Chinese readers to embrace the complete translation of Catullus. Surprisingly, the book was a success: it was given a second printing within a month. When we reflect on comments and reviews, a picture of complex motives and attitudes emerges. The first factor is a toleration of “the foreign.” Adopting a cosmopolitan complacency, Chinese readers, recovering from initial shock and indignation, quickly reassure themselves with the belief that after all, these poems only represent “their” views whose world is millennia and oceans apart from “ours.” Some readers are attracted to Catullus for the very human reason that they secretly enjoy what they publicly condemn, who treat his poetry as highbrow pornography. There are other readers, mostly amateurs of literature, who accept Catullus wholesale because they know he is a great name in history, and great poets have their poetic license: Shakespeare, Goethe, Pushkin wrote obscene lines too. As the recent decade has witnessed a boom of Western classics in China, part of the Catullan readership here takes interest in the bilingual version out of a passion for learning the Latin language and Roman culture.

The most enthusiastic audience is found in poets. Many of them, especially those in academia, are well acquainted with the Modernist and postwar poetry in the English-speaking world.
Masters like Yeats, Pound, Stevens, Frost, Cummings and Ginsberg, with artistic views and techniques inherited from Catullus, have prepared these Chinese poets for a full exposure to his oeuvre. They now have a chance, aided by nuanced Chinese texts and extensive notes, to see why this Roman bohemian is revered by so many 20th century artists obsessed with innovation, and why the sophistication of his poetry can withstand the bewildering complexity of the modern and postmodern condition. It is this group of readers, with their in-depth knowledge of Western poetry and a historical perspective, that finds the greatest zest in Catullus and imbibles the most from the translation. Even though they know no Latin, they understand the poetry better than most Chinese scholars in Western classics. They are the ideal audience Catullus craves, possessed of the golden apple that ensures enjoyment of his guarded treasure: “Tam gratum est mihi quam ferunt puellae / Pernici aureolum fuisse malum, / Quod zonam soluit diu ligatam” (c. 2b).

Me, Myself, and I: Caecilius as an Alter Ego of Catullus in Poem 35
Leah Kronenberg

Poem 35 appears to be a straightforward request from Catullus to the poet Caecilius (via Catullus’ papyrus) to hurry to Verona to hear “certain thoughts of a friend of his and mine” (quasdam...cogitationes / amici ...sui meique, 35.5-6). These “thoughts” seem to relate to the poem on the Magna Mater which Caecilius has started but not finished, and which has so inflamed his learned girlfriend that she doesn’t want him to leave Novum Comum for Verona. However, this simple reading leaves many unanswered questions, particularly concerning the identity of Caecilius and his puella. Most scholars believe that Caecilius is a neoteric poet in Catullus’ circle who has disappeared without a trace, along with his poem on the Magna Mater. This paper will argue, however, that Caecilius is an alter ego of Catullus. Poem 35 is Catullus’ exhortation to himself to leave behind his puella (i.e. his Lesbia poetry) so that he can bring to a conclusion his learned poem on the Magna Mater (i.e. Poem 63).

A few previous scholars have emphasized the close connections between Caecilius’ poem and Catullus 63 (e.g. Basto 1982), or between Caecilius’ girlfriend and Lesbia (e.g. Pascal 1921). Biondi 1998 (supported by Hunink 2000) has even suggested that Caecilius’ Magna Mater poem is Poem 63, but he believes Caecilius is a friend who has stolen Catullus’ poem—and not Catullus himself.

Interpreting Caecilius as an alter ego of Catullus explains not just the mysterious disappearance of “Caecilius the neoteric poet” from the historical record, but adds layers of meaning to Catullus 35, which becomes a poem of self-criticism and metapoetic reflection. Fisher 1971 has read the puella’s resistance to Caecilius’ journey to Verona as a metapoetic statement about Caecilius’ preoccupation with writing love poetry instead of finishing a learned poem, though Khan 1974 rejected this thesis because of the deep connections in Poem 35 between Caecilius’ love affair and his learned composition. I would suggest that both readings are correct: Catullus sets up a potential opposition between the love poetry of “Caecilius” and his learned, Alexandrian poem only to thoroughly conflate them. Just as Attis and the Magna Mater model (and inspire) the relationship between Caecilius and his puella in Poem 35 (cf. Basto 1982), so do Lesbia and Catullus hover in the background of Poem 63 (cf. Harkins 1959 and many others).
Catullus/Caecilius is a poet of both love and learned poetry, and his divided self is not so divided.

Catullus’ own papyrus is a fitting intermediary between his two poetic selves, and the frequent identification of the “friend of his and mine” (35.6) with Catullus himself (e.g. Merrill 1893, Copley 1953, Godwin 1999) makes even more sense if Caecilius is Catullus, too. The name “Caecilius” might pun on caecus (“blind”). In Catullus’ poetry, blindness or “not seeing” is associated with insane love (e.g. 64.197 amenti caeca furore, 67.25 caeco...amore), as well as with a failure to see one’s own faults, whether of a literary nature (e.g. like those of Suffenus; 22.21-22) or amatory (e.g. the cuckolded husbands in 17.21 and 83.3). In addition, the pseudonym cleverly makes Catullus into a double of Lesbia’s husband Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (assuming the standard identification of Lesbia with Clodia Metelli is correct). Catullus’ advice to “Caecilius” to escape the clutches of insane love and love poetry attempts to counter both types of blindness, though, of course, in an ironic way: Poem 35 shows that Catullus is just as capable of enslaving his mistress as she is of him and that he is a master of mixing love poetry with Alexandrianism.

Catullus' Ameana Cycle as Literary Criticism

George Hendren

Few women earn Catullus’ characteristic vitriol quite like Ameana, whom the poet fondly described as a puella defututa (41). This paper will reevaluate Catullus’ venom in poems 41 and 43 (the so-called “Ameana Cycle”) to show that his attacks on Ameana are in fact veiled criticisms of Mamurra’s loathsome poetry. Based on the assumption that Mamurra tried his hand at verse (105), I argue that references to his mistress Ameana are metonymy, meant to replace the love poetry Mamurra composed on her behalf. Catullus’ descriptions of Ameana substantiate this reading: her physical features are disproportionate and ill-suited to Roman conceptions of beauty, she is entirely without wit, and despite her patent imperfections, she has no idea how hideous she really is. Scholars have for some time considered the poetic genius of this cycle (Skinner), the literary critical subsets to which these poems may belong (Forsyth, Dettmer), and even the dichotomous portrayal of Catullus’ life and that of Mamurra (Deuling). I wish to expand on Deuling’s points concerning the opposition Catullus creates between himself and Mamurra, namely that the author’s attacks on Ameana can be reread as attacks on the abhorrent verse Mamurra composed for his lover.

The image of a hideous or disproportionate body as a metaphor for poorly composed poetry or prose finds ample evidence in Greek and Latin literature. Plato (Phaedr. 264c2–5), Callimachus (Papangelis on fr.1.11–12 Pf.), Cicero (Or. 229) and the Roman rhetorical handbooks (e.g. TLL 4.1020.62–1021.39 s.v. corpus IV.A; see Keith) all could have influenced Catullus’ depiction of Mamurra’s poetry. Poems 41 and 43 are no longer assessments of beauty, then, but denunciations of Mamurra’s haphazard compositional style, which prefigures, for example, the Frankenstein poem envisioned by Horace at the opening of his Ars Poetica. Catullus supports this reading with his own claims concerning Ameana’s intelligence: she is not merely ugly, but witless in the extreme (43.4), and anyone who finds Mamurra’s girlfriend/poetry pleasing is counted among the saeculum insapiens et infacetum (43.8). Diction also supports my literary critical reading: another author, Suffenus, is also infacetus whenever he tries his hand at verse (22.14).
Ameana’s disagreeable proportions and intelligence are matched by outright delusion: she does not know her own value (41.1–2) or bother to look at herself in the mirror (41.7–8). Each of these can be read as Callimachean concepts to which the self-aware Roman elegists strictly adhered. That Ameana could consider her body worth 10,000 HS (41.2) matches Mamurra’s pretentions to poetic genius (57.7), and her refusal to look at herself in the mirror (41.7–8) crosses the world of feminine beauty with the aesthetics of Callimachean and Hellenistic poetry as adopted by contemporary Roman poets. Suffenus again provides a comparandum: previously described as infacetum (like Ameana’s admirers), he also suffers from delusions of poetic grandeur (22.20–1), and, like Mamurra and Ameana, is condemned by his lack of self-awareness.

Finally, Catullus’ use of the mistress in this manner has parallels both within the Catullan corpus and later Latin literature. Fisher has already considered how poem 35 can refer to Caecilius’ actions as a love poet “by presenting him as engaged in a love affair” (3–4). There, Caecilius’ lover stands in for his actual composition of love poetry, which keeps him from returning to Verona and receiving Catullus’ advice. The practice of conflating mistress with poetry was known among later Latin elegists as well: we need look no further than Propertius’ “Cynthia,” with which he begins the monobiblos (Enk; Lieberg; Stroh; Wyke). Even Martial replays this interpretation of the Ameana cycle when he lambasts a poetaster on similar grounds, calling him a “Mamurra” (10.4.11–12). In conclusion, Ameana’s disproportionate body, lack of wit, and delusions of beauty are criticisms aimed as much at her physical appearance as at the poetry of her bankrupt lover.

Session 71: Political Maneuvering in Republican Roman History

Ut seditiosi tribuni solent: shutting the shops as a political and rhetorical tactic in the Late Republic

Amy Russell

At de Domu Sua 54, Cicero accuses Clodius of giving an order to shut the tabernae – presumably the shops immediately around the Forum. Coming among such charges as enrolling slaves in his gangs and tearing down the stairs of the temple of Castor, the exact reference of the accusation is hard to pin down. Most scholars (Vanderbroeck 1987: 126-7; Pina Polo 1996: 132-3; Mouritsen 2001: 59; Morstein-Marx 2004: 129) interpret this and other instances of shutting the shops as a last-ditch attempt to gather a crowd for an otherwise badly-attended meeting, and use it as evidence that those politicians who resorted to it drew their support from shopkeepers and other members of the lower strata of society. This is indeed what Cicero implies at Dom. 89, but it would be wrong to take his invective at face value. If Clodius or someone like him wanted to gather a crowd of shopkeepers eager to support him, ordering the shops which provided their livelihoods to shut down would be a singularly ill-considered tactic. In this paper I reevaluate why a Roman politician would have chosen to shut the shops, considering not only the practical but also the symbolic implications of such an action.
I combine close analysis of the Ciceronian texts with other mentions of the *tabernae* and *tabernarii* in Livy, Sallust, and Asconius. These sources show that shutting the shops would not have helped gather a large and willing crowd. Those affected were not a uniform group. We must consider shopkeepers themselves, their employees, and their clients, and how each would have reacted to a forced closure. Some lost money when the shops were shut (Cic. *Cat.* 4.17); others could simply move on. Most were seriously inconvenienced and thus presumably unlikely to join the political demonstration, at least on the side of the man who forced them to shut up for the day. In any case, the numbers which could be drawn from the shops immediately around the Forum were not large enough to form the kind of crowd Clodius depended on. The practical effects of shutting the shops would actually therefore have been negative for a politician like Clodius. More important were the symbolic effects, which were successful in rousing a crowd. In Livy (3.27.2; 4.31.9; 9.7.7), shutting the shops appears as a feature of the *iustitium*, an institution which has much in common with and has sometimes been confused with Clodius’ decrees. Traditionally, a *iustitium* was a pause in all public business, usually declared so that attention could be focused on a military threat. In 133, Tiberius Gracchus declared a similar stoppage of public business as part of the struggles surrounding his agrarian bill (Plut. *Ti. G.* 10.8; Dio 23.83.5-6). Whether or not this was technically a *iustitium*, it would have been understood in those terms. The politicians of the 50s who ordered the shops to be shut were alluding to the *iustitium* as a way to advertise the importance of their meetings and the threat that their opponents’ stubbornness posed to the *res publica*. At the same time, they were able to draw connections between themselves and the Gracchi.

Cicero’s rhetorical move picks up on the ‘popular’ connotations of shutting the shops, but diminishes its impact by reducing it to a desperate attempt to get people on the streets. When late Republican politicians decreed that the shops should be shut, they were not trying to gather warm bodies for a *contio*, but making a symbolic display claiming popular support against the intransigence of the senatorial elite. A fuller understanding of this political tactic not only helps us make sense of Clodius’ actions and his sources of support but also acts as corrective against the one-sided Ciceronian view of the conventions of Roman politics.

**The Memory of Names: Roman Victory cognomina and Familial Commemoration**

Elisabeth Schwinge

This paper argues that Republican victory cognomina such as Africanus, Macedonicus, and Numidicus were not, as has often been postulated, granted by the senate. Rather, a reexamination of the sources suggests that the generals themselves assumed these names, making nomenclature yet another arena of senatorial competition. While the notion that a senatorial decree was required to add a victory cognomen is generally accepted by modern scholars (Mommsen, Doer, Alföldi, Linderski), my examination of the sources shows that this view is unfounded, and that a different dynamic must be postulated.

Beginning with Theodor Mommsen, modern scholars have proposed that senatorial permission was required to add a new name after a victory. Most recently Jerzy Linderski, using the *Fasti Consulares* and the cases of Sulla Felix and Servilius Isauricus, argued that an official senate decree was necessary to be granted the right to a victory cognomen. However, as this paper
demonstrates, there are several problems with his argument which to a large extent derives *ex silentio*. I begin by illustrating those problems by reexamining Linderski’s evidence. Then, through a survey of sources ranging from Cicero to Valerius Maximus, I demonstrate that an involvement of the senate is unlikely because this governing body is not mentioned in any ancient source. The only explicit source on the matter is Livy who states that he does not know whether Scipio received his new name from his soldiers, his family and friends, or from the people (30.45.7). Other authors do not directly discuss the acquisition of victory cognomina, but in their accounts the general in question is responsible for his new name. Cicero (Pro Mur. 31) states that it was Scipio himself who appropriated the name Africanus on his own initiative (*cognomine ipso prae se ferebat*); and Valerius (8.5.6) notes that it was Servilius who added the cognomen Isauricus to the titles of his ancestors (*qui maiorum suorum titulis Isaurici cognomen adiecit*).

Finally, I situate victory cognomina in the context of senatorial competition. Moving away from Mommsen’s *Staatsrecht* approach, scholars have demonstrated that mechanisms of commemoration were much more fluid than previously assumed (Walter, Blösel). One example is the censorial law of 158 BCE that ordered the removal of all statues in the forum which had not been dedicated by the senate or the people (Pliny NH 34.30-31). While this law shows that the senate was involved to a certain degree, it also shows that there was ample room for individuals to dedicate statues. Similarly, I argue, it was the individual *gens*’ decision to adopt victory names. Begun by the Scipiones, this practice was employed by different families to varying degrees. While some families did not employ victory cognomina at all, others, like the Caecilii Metelli, made them part of their symbolic capital. Five of the twelve generals known by their victory cognomina were members of the *gens Metella*. As Itgenshorst has shown, some *gentes* preferred a specific type of monument to commemorate victories; the Fabii, for example, continued construction of the Fornix Fabianus for centuries, and the Aemilii seem to have had a preference for porticoes. The Metelli in particular, I propose, used victory names as their distinctive monumental strategy. In this way, the names became monuments in their own right and can be read as such. Like the Hölkeskamps’ *Erinnerungsorte*, the cognomina offered a way to anchor a general’s legacy in the collective memory of the *populus Romanus*. They could be inscribed in victory and funerary monuments, into the stemmata in aristocratic atria, and be engraved onto coins.

Victory cognomina, far from being granted by the senate, or simply serving as a means of distinguishing family members, functioned as monuments in their own right. Examining them as such reveals that they were part of senatorial competition and could be employed similarly to other forms of monumentalization.

**Cooperation and Competition in Republican Boards of tresviri coloniae deducendae**

**Amanda J. Coles**

Although the Roman boards of three men for the foundation of colonies, *tresviri coloniae deducendae*, were irregular magistracies during the Middle Republic, they comprised a valuable political tool, which was subject to maneuvering to promote individual magistrates’ ambitions. The composition of these commissions varied widely in the twenty-two cases where Livy
mentions the tresviri by name. Instead of a single, prescribed method for the formation of a commission and foundation of a colony, the leges coloniae seem to have been *ad hoc* measures, a fact which suggests that the magistrate or magistrates who proposed each colonial foundation had a great deal of influence over its stipulations.

Previous approaches to the composition of these boards (Scullard 1973, Cassola 1962), determined no consistent factional alliances among the colonial commissioners. Such prosopographical analyses of rival factions and their motivations are mainly conjectural (Feig Vishnia 1996). On the other hand, personal ambitions and rivalries between magistrates created lively and diverse electioneering throughout the Republic (Feig Vishnia 2012, Yakobson 1999). Thus, where Scullard’s broad factional analysis of the colonial commissions fails, my closer examination of the individual commissioners indicates that many actively sought a position as *triumvir* in order to fulfill regional, economic, or political ambitions. Focus on the individual, where possible, is crucial in order to remove the imposition of anachronistic political parties and to acknowledge the diversity of personal motivations in Mid-Republican politics.

Gargola (1995) suggests that the magistrate presiding over elections of special commissions, such as those to found colonies, presented a small number of candidates to carry out the provisions of the *lex coloniae*. While Gargola’s hypothesis fits the election process for the colonial commissions as a whole, I demonstrate that there was considerable flexibility within this process. Sometimes the would-be commissioners cooperated among themselves to determine the composition of the boards of tresviri. Then, they presented their names as a group to the presiding magistrate, who offered the *comitia tributa* a choice among one or more pre-formed commissions. The membership of the boards for the supplement of Narnia (199) and the foundations of the five maritime colonies of 194, Potentia and Pisaurum (184), Parma and Mutina (183), Aquileia (183-181), and Luca (180) support such an hypothesis. These six boards were comprised of magistrates with known connections to one another, such as P. Aelius Paetus and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (coss. 201) on the commission to supplement Narnia (199); the third member was S. Aelius Paetus, Publius’s brother (Livy 32.2.6-7). Another indication of cooperation in forming these boards is the election of men, such as M. Fulvius Flaccus and Q. Fulvius Nobilior, *tresviri* for the foundation of Potentia and Pisaurum (Livy 39.44.10), who had never held an office before. It is unlikely that two untested Fulvii would have been chosen in a general election. The composition of the boards to establish colonies in Northern Italy in the 180s indicates that there could be a stiff electoral competition between such prearranged commissions.

An alternate method for forming commissions was through direct election or appointment of prominent men. For example, the board to supplement Venusia in 200 comprised C. Terentius Varro, T. Quinctius Flamininus, and P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, who seem to have had no significant links outside of this commission (Livy 31.49.6). Thus, these men probably did not align themselves before the election, but were chosen based on their individual qualities or popularity. In short, due to the *ad hoc* nature of the leges coloniae and motivations of individual magistrates, there arose several ways to form a commission, including a prearranged board, appointment, or direct election. Thus, the flexibility of elections for this minor magistracy embodied the overall elasticity of the Mid-Republican political system, in which individual ambitions strongly influenced public procedure.
The affectatores regni: Republican accounts and modern misconceptions
Jaclyn Neel

In this paper, I argue that modern scholarship has misunderstood the Republican demagogues known as the affectatores regni. These three men, Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius, and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus, share a number of characteristics, such as their benefactions to the plebs and their condemnations to death. Because of this, it has been argued that Cassius, Maelius, and Manlius form a complementary group in Roman political thought (e.g., Vigourt 2001). I argue that there is no indication in the ancient evidence that these three men occupied a distinct place, that of affectatores regni, in the Roman tradition; rather, they were first grouped together by Mommsen (1871). By examining these men outside of the frame of affectatio regni, I argue that these stories must be considered within the context of the larger dialogues on tyranny at Rome, on elite over-reaching, and on the benefits of political competition.

Previous work on the affectatores has suggested that these stories are late Republican inventions, inspired by post-Gracchan politics: they were arranged as a connected trio to highlight the danger of popular politicians to Roman political life and to reinforce conservative values (e.g., Lintott 1970; Pina Polo 2006). Such scholarship points to Cicero as an instrumental promulgator of such stories, because of his firm belief in the SCU as a means of eliminating possible threats to the Republic (such as Catiline). But closer examination of the Republican sources (Cicero, Livy, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus) indicates that the triad of Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius, and Manlius Capitolinus is in fact illusory. The three never appear by themselves to indicate political malfeasance. Instead, the variety of combinations of malefactors from the early Republic immediately stands out, highlighting diverse dangers to the early Republic (see Smith 2006).

A re-examination of Cicero's use of these figures confirms that the modern concept of affectatio regni has been wrongly applied to the surviving evidence. For Cicero, these men are much less important than their opponents. He most frequently refers not to the so-called affectatores, but to the virtuous men who saved the Republic from them (e.g., Dom. 86; Sest. 143). These references are closely linked with his own self-presentation as a savior of Rome. Cicero rarely mentions Cassius, Maelius, or Manlius when we would expect it, such as the Philippics or the Catilinarians. Instead, Cicero's interest in the Maelius story in particular (e.g., Mil. 83; Att. 2.24.3), where he takes pains to insert himself into the heroic narratives of the past, indicates that his primary concern was in controlling the discursive use of this tale to portray himself in the best light, rather than in relating attempts to establish tyranny at Rome.

I argue that we must return the so-called affectatores to their original context: as parts of a larger pattern of attempts to transgress the boundaries of permissible behavior. Abandoning the modern framework of the affectatores regni clarifies the Republican conception of regnum. Attempting kingship was a threat that could take many forms, rather than following the pattern set by the three affectatores; it was not confined to simply gaining too much popularity with the plebs. Re-examining the exempla in context, rather than from the perspective of the affectatores, reveals concern over elite interaction at the highest level. Most dangerous, in Cicero's view, was the possibility that political bickering harmed the best men and impaired their ability to benefit the
state. In this sense, the affectatores are warnings of the dangers inherent in not (only) tyranny, but also excessive competition.

Session 72: Language and Meter

The Doric of Southern Italy in the Hellenistic period
Susana Mimbrera Olarte

As a continuation of my earlier work on Sicilian Greek, I have examined the inscriptive evidence for dialect levelling and Koiné influence in the Doric dialects of Southern Italy. I find that the previous claims for the existence of a Doric Koiná in this region are not supported by the data, and that the patterns of influence from the Attic-Ionic Koiné are also open to reinterpretation.

For example, in the model of Bartoněk (1975: 26) this dialect levelling involved the spread of the 'mild' Doric vocalism from Rhegion and Lokroi Epizephyrioi, where it was supposedly native, to the other colonies which had a 'severior' Doric. However, this is not consistent with the evidence that we have. In fact, inscriptive evidence not available to Bartoněk actually seems to point to the opposite situation, at least for Lokroi.

On the other hand, according to Consani (1995: 81, 1996: 113-117), there would have been some linguistic convergence towards a Doric Koiná (its base would be the dialect of Tarentum), which was the most important city in Hellenistic times (see also Landi 1979a: 257, 262-267; 1979b: 200-206). Again, proof of this supposedly lies in the vocalism. 'Severior' vocalism is attested at Lokroi, and since Consani assumes that it cannot have been original (the mild or 'mitior' vocalism would be expected), he attributes it to the influence of Tarentum. As for the impact of the Attic-Ionic Koiné, he maintains that, in the Doric colonies, Doric would have been spoken by the higher classes, whereas the Koiné would have been spoken predominantly by the lower classes.

My paper attempts to show that some of these assumptions are wrong or cannot be defended with the available evidence. Unfortunately, the material from Tarentum itself is still extremely limited, which makes it very hard to prove the theory of dialectal levelling either way. However, the analysis of the linguistic data from the whole of Southern Italy shows that there are several points in which the Greek dialects of the Doric cities differ: not just the 'mitior' versus 'severior' vocalism, but also the athematic infinitives in -\(\mu\varepsilon\nu\) as opposed to -\(\mu\varepsilon\nu\), the infinitives in -\(\varepsilon\nu\) vs. -\(\varepsilon\nu\) or -\(\eta\nu\), the preposition 'towards' (\(\epsilon\zeta\gamma\zeta\) plus accusative vs. \(\epsilon\nu\) plus accusative), the preservation or modification of the vowel sequence /eo/, the dative plural ending of the third declension, the tolerance or avoidance of aspirated stops in consecutive syllables, the outcome of *\(\gamma\), and the variants of the preposition ποτή (Attic πρός).

These patterns of variation tend to argue against the idea of a Doric Koiná based on the dialect of Tarentum or Herakleia, especially since the material we have shows differences from the other Italian cities.
As for the impact of the Attic-Ionic Koiné, we are well informed about the language of the public documents, but we know much less about the language of private inscriptions, simply because they are much more scarce. Therefore, Consani's idea that the Koiné would have been more prevalent among the lower classes cannot be proved. The public inscriptions show a consistent Doric base to which a few Koiné features have been added, and the parts of the grammar where Koiné influence appears earliest are often the same as in other Doric areas such as Sicily: the lexeme ἱερο- (where Doric typically shows ἱαρο-), the i-stem dative singular in -ei (dative πόλει along side genitive πρυτάνιος), the definite article οἷ(sometimes side by side with the dialectal τοί), the forms of the numerals, the absence of the dual, and the use of the analogical third plural ἀπέδωκαν.

Greek Words in Plautus
Bianca C. Hausburg

The paper analyses the dramatic function of Greek words in the comedies of Plautus. Previous studies interpret Plautus' Graeca as evidence for the transfer of Greek culture and lifestyle (Middelmann 1938), analyse how Greek words are adapted to the rules of Latin morphology (e.g. Kahle 1918, Sturtevant 1925, Friedmann 1931, Maltby 1995), use the frequency of Greek words to establish anachronology of Plautus' plays (Hough 1934), or examine whether the use of Greek expressions is determined by the respective speaker’s age, gender, or social status (Leo 1883: 566, 1912: 106, Gilleland: 1979: 84-178, Jocelyn: 1999: 169-73). Little attention, however, has been paid to the dramatic function of the Greek expressions and to the question how they were perceived by Plautus’ Roman audience. The only exception is an article by Shipp (1953), who argues that the Graeca reflect a Greco-Latin slang that was spoken at Rome around 200 B.C. by slaves, foreigners, and members of the lower classes: “For Plautus the use of Greek is a mark of servile status or of frivolity” (1953: 112). This view has often been repeated in Plautine scholarship (e.g. MacCary/Willcock 1976: 180, Thesleff 1960: 50-2, Petersmann/Petersmann 2003: 112-3), but does not bear scrutiny. Firstly, Shipp simply postulated the existence of a Greco-Latin slang on the basis of Plautus’ comedies and did not provide any additional evidence from other sources; hence, Shipp’s Greco-Latin slang remains a hypothetical construct. Secondly, Plautus carefully embeds the Greek expressions and prepares his audience for the code-switching by means of introductory particles (Pseud. 712: euge) or by explicit references to the change of language (e.g. Stich. 707: cantio Graecast, Pseud. 479) or the Greek setting of the play (Stich. 671: nunc Athenas colamus); such markers would be superfluous, if Plautus was simply imitating a Greco-Roman slang that was commonly spoken in Rome. And finally, an examination of the linguistic evidence shows that the Greek expressions which Plautus incorporates into his plays have close parallels in the remains of Greek New Comedy and are more likely to stem from Plautus’ reading of Attic plays than from contact with a sub-standard slang at Rome.

The objections show that Shipp’s interpretation is implausible and that it is time to take a fresh look at Plautus’ Graeca. Recent linguistic and literary studies have shown that code-switching can serve a variety of different functions. For example, speakers or authors may employ foreign language to evoke the exotic, to encode their message, to mark a quotation, to create a comic effect, to achieve euphony, or to characterize themselves or others (cf. e.g. Horn 1981: 226, Adams 2003:297–416). If we consider the Plautine Graeca in their respective context, we can observe that they serve similar functions. In some cases the switch to Greek indicates the
quotation of a Greek saying (Stich.707: cantio Graecast: ἢ πέντε ἢ τρία πῦ ἢ μὴ τέταρτο) or produces euphony (cf. Most. 41, Poen. 137, Pseude. 211). More frequent is the use of code-switching for the purpose of linguistic characterization: Greek words are often put into the mouth of overbearing slaves and bumptious parasites (e.g. Cas.727–30, Capt. 880-3, Pseude. 483-9); the fact that these characters no longer employ the same language as their master or benefactor underscores their insolence. Most often, however, the code-switching has a comic effect: at Cas. 729, for example, Plautus translates the common expression magnum malum and produces an absurd, hybrid mix of Greek and Latin (dabo tibi μέγα κακόν), and at Capt. 881 he exploits the similar sound of Kόρα (Persephone) and Cora (an Italian city) for a wordplay (cf. also the similar puns at Bacch. 240, Pseude. 653-4, 712, 1197-9, Mil. 436-8).

The examination of the Greek expressions shows that Plautus employs code-switching very carefully and for a variety of effects. It demonstrates Plautus’ originality and challenges the conventional picture of the sociolinguistic realities in Plautus’ Rome.

**Epigraphic Evidence & the Rise of Acatalectic Iambic Dimeters in Latin**

Emmett P. Tracy

The acatalectic iambic dimeter has long been connected with the poetics of late antiquity and early Christianity (Bede de arte 8.1, Isid. eccl. off. 1.6.13). For centuries, this has been explained by the rise of a "simpler and more natural type of prosody" or "a simple . . . very popular form" (Phillips 1937, Ferguson 1990). This paper examines epigraphic evidence from the most recent research on inscriptional verses (Cugusi 2007a, Blänsdorf 2011) and proposes that the stichic acatalectic iambic dimeter was not a regular feature of vulgar poetics and that its use in early Christian poetry may mark the confluence of classical and Biblical elements.

Fourth and fifth century poetry's use of the acatalectic iambic dimeter and its association with epigraphic verses deserves renewed consideration. Thirty years ago, Alan Cameron questioned the correlation between stichic iambic dimeters and popular inscriptional verse (Cameron 1980), and the most recent scholarship on verse epigraphy appears to support Cameron's position (Cugusi 2007a, Blänsdorf 2011). Late antique studies, however, have suggested that iambic dimeters were a "familiar" or more "natural type of prosody" which "no doubt had existed all along in the songs of the people" (Phillips 1937, Raby 1953). The disparity between these positions remains problematic, and confusion over the issue continues to cloud a modern understanding of early Christian poetry.

With a systematic presentation of epigraphic material (from Courtney 1993, 1995, Cugusi 2007a, Blänsdorf 2011), this paper examines the connection between extant Christian acatalectic iambic dimeters and inscriptional verses. It demonstrates that the stichic iambic dimeter offers an extremely rare form in late antique epigraphy, and its use as a popular meter remains doubtful. Considering the challenges and limitations of this evidence, the paper re-examines the motivations of Christian poets who employed the dimeter form and suggests that the symmetry and octosyllabic structure of acatalectic iambic dimeters indicate an understated allusion to Biblical theology.
To highlight the possibility of Biblical influence, the paper explores the prologue of St. Ambrose's *Expositio psalmi CXVIII*, a text that emphasizes "unity not plurality" and evidences the theological significance of an eight-part structure. St. Ambrose's reading of psalm 118 makes a clear allusion to the importance of symmetry and theological numeration – especially in regard to Christian salvation (on the eighth day) and spiritual re-birth (on an eight-part cycle). St. Ambrose's emphasis on numeration and unity in early Christian verse is thus presented as an important exegesis of Christian poetics and a possible motivation toward octosyllabic iambic dimeter compositions.

It is the primary aim of this paper to address the disparity between Cameron's view and the traditional approach to the "popular" dimeter. Fontaine (1981) and den Boeft (1993) have already hedged Cameron's claim, yet a more systematic and comprehensive catalogue of epigraphic material would assist future research in the field. Furthermore, this paper highlights the possibility of Biblical influence on Latin prosody and comprehensively addresses the notion that Christian poets assimilated vulgar Latin rhythms into Christian liturgy. The fact remains that according to available inscriptions from the late antique and classical world, the acatalectic iambic dimeter was a rare epigraphic meter, and the extremely regularized iambic patterns of Christian poetry suggest a unique farrago in fourth century literary creativity.

Session 73: (Dis)Continuities in the Texts of Lucian

**Parallel Plays: Lucian's Philosophers and the Stage**

**Kerry Lefebvre**

Lucian’s *Nigrinus* poses difficult questions of interpretation (Hall 1981, 157): is this work serious (Anderson 1978; Francis 1995; Whitmarsh 2001; Dillon 2002) or satirical? If Lucian is writing satire, what or whom exactly is he mocking—the city of Rome (Hall 1981; Jones 1986; Swain 1996; Nesselrath 2009), Nigrinus himself (Tarrant 1985), or the convert who listens to him (Tarrant 1985; Clay 1992; Paulsen 2009)? I believe that Lucian has given us linguistic clues about how to interpret the *Nigrinus* through his use of words related to the stage and theater and through his other philosophical lives. While others have explored the historical reality of the theater in the second century A.D. as reflected in Lucian (Tarrant 1985; Karavas 2005 and 2008), I argue that Lucian uses the language of the stage at key moments in the *Alexander the False Prophet*, the *Peregrinus*, and the *Nigrinus* to highlight fraud. By reading these works together (Anderson 1976 and 1994; Clay 1992; Georgiadou and Larmour 1994), we discover that Lucian employs theatrical language in the *Nigrinus* to expose and mock a variety of figures, including Nigrinus, the convert, false philosophers, and perhaps his readers as well.

Throughout the *Alexander the False Prophet* and the *Peregrinus*, two negative portraits of philosophers, language related to the stage and the theater appears at critical moments in order to highlight the superficial and fraudulent nature of these false philosophers (e.g. *Alex*. 12-35; *Peregr*. 36-45). The *Nigrinus* continues this trend and opens as the convert employs an extended theatrical metaphor to describe his conversion; unlike poor comic and tragic actors who get hissed off the stage (τραγικός ἢ καὶ ἦ Δία κωμικός φαύλους ἑώρακας υποκριτάς, τῶν
"συριττομένων λέγω, Nigr. 8," he does not wish to play his part in a laughable fashion (γελοίως αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι, 8), nor does he wish for his ‘performance’ to be judged unfavorably (καταγνῶναι τοῦ δράματος, 8). He continues to refer to his narrative as a performance and to himself as an actor in it (e.g. ὁ ποίός τις ἔμετι τὴν μνήμην ὑποκριτῆς, οὐδὲν ἄγγέλου τὰ ἄλλα τραγικοῦ διαφέροντα, 9; ἐμὲ δὲ κἂν ἐκσφριττῆς, 9). Although the convert uses this metaphor in an attempt to legitimize his narrative and his conversion, in the world of Lucian’s religion and philosophy, to be a performer is a negative characteristic, as we know from reading the other philosophical lives. By creating an image of himself as a philosopher and performer, the convert reveals himself as a duplicitious character and as a target for Lucian’s satire.

In the course of these theatrical metaphors, the convert also creates an image of the playwright, unconcerned and not even himself a spectator in the theater, as the performers do a poor job of presenting his play (ὡς ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς ἡμῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἐμφασεπάνω καὶ τῆς σκηνῆς πόρρω ποι κάθηται, οὐδὲν αὐτῶ μέλον τῶν ἐν θεάτρῳ πραγμάτων, Nigr. 9). Following the implications of this metaphor, the ‘playwright’ is Nigrinus, and he is doing an unsatisfactory job of philosophical instruction. Nigrinus himself gives a similar picture of his disinterest in the theater of life a short while later (18), even taking pride in this distance, and thus exposes himself as a fraudulent philosopher. Additionally, if Nigrinus is a poor example of philosophical teaching, then the convert is perhaps to be mocked for being so easily converted.

Finally, it is possible that Lucian mocks us as his readers—will we see through the illusion of the theatrical language and notice that Nigrinus is a fraud, or will we, like the convert, be convinced that Nigrinus is a legitimate philosopher? Are we, as Lucian describes at the end of the Alexander, included in the group of sensible thinkers who are able to read and understand (all of) his works correctly (τῶν εὖ φρονοῦντων, Alex. 61)?

Philosophers Redux: the Hermotimus, the Fisherman, and the Role of Dead Philosophers
Anna Peterson

The Hermotimus has long been considered an anomaly for two main reasons: it is significantly longer than Lucian’s other texts and it offers a serious attack on philosophical dogmatism that has garnered it the label of Lucian’s most Platonic dialogue (Nesselrath 1992). Scholars have seized on this text as opportunity to pin down this literary Proteus and to examine both his philosophical leanings as a Skeptic (Nesselrath 1992) and his adaptation of Plato (Edwards 1993; Möllendorff 2000). But, as I will show, there is good reason to challenge the claim that the tone of the Hermotimus is, in fact, serious. The dialogue presents the attempts of Lucian’s persona, Lycinus, to persuade Hermotimus that his Stoic professor has swindled him by failing to deliver on the promise of knowledge given roughly twenty years earlier. While Hermotimus is initially hostile to this argument, Lycinus perseveres, imagining at one point a familiar Lucianic scenario: Plato, Aristotle, and the other philosophers from Greece’s past return from the dead to charge Lycinus with ὑβρις for daring to choose one school over another. This scenario mirrors the dramatic setting of the Fisherman in which a similar list of philosophers rise from the dead to charge Lucian’s persona, ‘Parrhesiades,’ with the crime of portraying them comically. Lucian’s persona subsequently offers a searing apology for his own literary program. This paper argues that the Hermotimus presents Lycinus as an adaptation of Parrhesiades, who is in turn a
reworking of Socrates, by restaging the “apology” for his union of comedy with philosophy found in the *Fisherman*. My paper thus seeks to redefine the *Hermotimus* as unique iteration of Lucian’s “comic dialogue,” in which Lucian’s own dialogues assume the philosophical valuable role ascribed to comedy in the *Fisherman* and consequently appear as the playful solution to the philosophical corruption Lucian sees as plaguing his own day.

I will begin my paper with a brief discussion of Lucian’s union of comedy and philosophy as presented in the *Fisherman*. In the context of this dialogue, the dead philosophers charge Lucian’s persona, Parrhesiades, with comically debasing philosophy. Parrhesiades, however, refutes this charge, by asserting that he did what was necessary, given the philosophical corruption plaguing Athens. At the heart of this dialogue is the so-called quarrel between comedy and philosophy initiated by Socrates in the *Apology* (17a-b) and reaffirmed in book ten of the *Republic*. As Macleod (1991) and Whitmarsh (2001) have shown, this tension appears in the very scenario and language of the dialogue: Lucian borrows the scenario of the dead returned to life from Eupolis’ *Demesmen*, the philosopher’s opening shouts of βαλλέ, βαλλέ from Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, and Parrhesiades’ defense from Plato’s *Apology*. The *Fisherman* thus ironically dramatizes the very union that Parrhesiades has been charged with defending. Read in this way, it represents an important discussion and illustration of the comedic approach to philosophy that we find Lucian similarly asserting in the *Double Indictment, Literary Prometheus*, and, as I will argue, the *Hermotimus*.

The second part of this paper argues that the *Hermotimus* offers a comic reworking of the *Gorgias*, wherein Hermotimus, the student of a Stoic philosopher, plays the role of Callicles and Lycinus, ironically, of Socrates. The text, therefore, recasts the famous Socratic question: can virtue be taught? Read within this context, Lycinus’ invocation of the dead philosophers, as well as several other Lucianic allusions, thus assume the role played by Old Comedy in *Fisherman*. Whereas the dead philosophers of the *Fisherman* attacked Parrhesiades for using comedy, I will contend that they are here reinvented to assume a familiar and particularly Socratic purpose: to attack the presumption of knowledge. Read within the framework established by the references to the *Gorgias*, this reinvention of the *Fisherman*, as I will argue, enacts Lucian’s comic approach to philosophy and establishes his thinly veiled persona of Lycinus in the Socratic role.

**Lucian’s Saturnalia: Rewriting the Literary nomoi**

Valentina Popescu

*Saturnalia* is a miniature simulacrum of the Lucianic corpus. It is paradigmatic of Lucian’s generic variety and especially of his generic mixis (here dialogic, historiographical, and epistolary). However, it has been generally neglected and scholars have only seen it as an unworthy appendix to other works focused on social satire, particularly with Roman subject (*Nigrinus, On Salaried Posts*).

The three sections / mini-texts that compose *Saturnalia* treat, from different perspectives, with repetitions, yet striking inconsistencies, the same topic: the social and cultural condition of the pepaideumenos. However, subtle cross-references suggest that all these mini-texts represent one and the same text, rewritten and repeatedly distorted, with the persona of the author changing masks, cultural identities, and modes of speech. In the opening dialogue the priest of Cronos promises to make a written record of his conversation with the god. The subsequent epistolary
mini-corpus translates and disingenuously distorts the dialogue, thus reflecting on both senders and addressees. For instance, the priest, who claims to be a _pepaideumenos_, deceivingly includes in the laws (nomoi) of the Saturnalia, allegedly ordained by the god himself and now communicated to the rich, specific provisions regarding the treatment of the intellectual élite. Accordingly, the _pepaideumenoi_ are to partake fully in the festival and their only form of displaying _paideia_ during the Saturnalia should consist of amusement and entertainment (_skomma kai paidian_, 13.14-15).

I argue that, as the _pepaideumenos_ complains about his inadequate social rewards (cf. Luc. _Rhet praec._, _Adv. ind._), his complaint translates here a claim to freedom, not with regard to the socio-economic establishment, but to the literary _nomoi_ (cf. Luc. _VH_ 1.7-8 and various _prolai_). I argue, therefore, that _Saturnalia_ is a form of _ars poetica_ disguised as satire, in which the author claims the right to reverse and thus rewrite the literary _nomoi_ and offers a compact and composite sample of his freedom in literary practices. The author’s shifting masks and discursive modes illustrate his literary versatility. The invocation of the festival with its reversal of rules, apparently used to makes amends for the socio-economic injustice, serves rather as a paradigm of the reversal of literary _nomoi_ to rejuvenate the tradition, as well as a paradigm of the general ambiance of Lucian’s works, where comic jest and laughter constitute the predominant discursive mode.

**Buying Books and Choosing Lives: From Agora to Acropolis in Lucian's Transformation of Plato's "Emporium of Polities"**

David Pass

This paper will attempt to identify the underlying joke about buying books which defines Lucian’s _Sale of Lives_ (Auctio Vitarum) and to argue that the work is intended as a transformation of Plato’s image of the “emporium of polities” (_Rep._ 557D8). Lucian updates the language that Plato used to criticize classical Athens in order to satirize the overly bookish audience of his own day. I will argue that the _Auc. Vit._ should be read very closely not only with its sequel the _Piscator_ but as importantly with the _Adversus Indoctum_, Lucian’s criticism of someone better at buying books than reading them. The rationale for including the latter will depend heavily on a certain word-play explained by the following line from Plutarch’s _De Iside_, a work describing a sequence of myths clearly familiar to Lucian (ex. _Gallus_ 18; _Navigium_ 5; _Philopseudeis_ 34; _Adversus Indoctum_ 34). Plutarch notes that, “we say buy Plato when we mean buy the books of Plato,” and the context emphasizes the extraordinary confusion that occurs when people read too literally the metaphorical language of their predecessors (379A7). Thus, the satire of the _Auc. Vit._ is directed against characters like the dilettante book-buyer in _Adv. Ind._ -- against the idea that knowledge can be purchased and against those who try to sell it or believe they can usefully buy simplistic versions. The dialogue subverts dull, doctrinal, venal or authoritarian interpretations of philosophy but is not actually anti-philosophical (cf. Whitmarsh 2001: 258-65).

Plato of course paradoxically provides the image of the "παντοπώλιον πολιτείαν" describing democracy in the same work that suggests that his listeners imaginatively inhabit a _politeia_ different from the one in which they actually live (592A-B). Strangely, it is thus only another
step-- when other authors also write a *Politeia* and create schools-- to the world of the *hairesis* or "choice" of doctrines. Far from creating a closed society, Plato's work inaugurated a world where books of philosophy representing entire lifestyle choices or "lives" were on sale in the book market. The description of the now pretentiously philosophical audience for Lucian's second trial (*Bis. Acc.* 6) indicates Lucian was very aware of the way reading philosophy had transformed the Athenian audience. I will contrast the possibility of buying knowledge, "as though from the Agora" in the *Adv. Ind.* (4) with the dramatic movement upwards to the Acropolis in the *Piscator*, a movement clearly playing at every step with other famous literary trials and their locations (like Orestes on the Areopagus). I will connect this to the larger theme of Lucian's attempts to frame the actual choice of lives-- his answers to the old question πῶς βιωτέον-- with a scene that mixes amusement, pleasure, novelty and even beauty to create a sense of *thauma* or wonder. Using Plutarch and the *de Iside* will thus be a step towards a better understanding of what Camerotto also notes-- some of Lucian's fundamental ideas, like that of the *mixis*, were "gía all'interno dell'ambito filosofico" (Camerotto 6).

The striking image of Lucian defending himself against these philosophers in the forecourt of the temple of Athena Polias, the Parthenon, is Lucian's dramatic answer to the dull, simplified and fruitless bibliophilia criticized in the *Adv. Ind.* and the *Auc. Vit.*; he literally brings the books to life and presents a vision of reading as creative confrontation rather than purchase. In offering a reading of the *Piscator*, I want to pay special attention to the way that Lucian's praise of Plato's prose sounds very much like praise of Lucian's own prose (22, 23; this observation supports the conclusions of Schlapbach 2010). The paper will focus on identifying the joke, connecting it with Plato’s image and showing how the dramatic movement of the dialogues invites the audience to imagine having to, like Lucian, defend their readings of ancient texts.

**Session 75: The Literary and Philosophical Dimensions of Allegory in Neoplatonic Discourse**
*(organized by the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies)*

*“In the Garden of Zeus:” Plotinus and Heliodorus on the Allegory of Love*

Svetla Slaveva-Griffin

Plotinus and Heliodorus have seldom been mentioned in the same sentence until now. There is a score of reasons that justify their segregation. The principal one is that the former is the founder of a philosophical school that transforms Platonism into a thriving intellectual force, shaping the ideological landscape of late antiquity, whereas the latter, a Christian bishop of Trikka, is the author of one of the most elaborate Greek novels, the Aethiopica, telling the love adventures of a young couple. In this juxtaposition, the only common thing between Plotinus and Heliodorus seems to be their proximity in time. A closer examination of their treatment of the concept of love, however, suggests otherwise.
This paper will examine Plotinus’ allegorical interpretation of the myth of Aphrodite in Enneads III.5 and VI.9.35 and Heliodorus’ literary allegory of the Platonic understanding of soul encribed in the character of his female protagonist, Chariklea. In so doing this examination will analyze two of allegory’s aspects: allegory as a tool of philosophical interpretation of myth, as found in Plotinus, and allegory as a literary trope, as evidenced in Heliodorus. Both types of allegories work towards the same end: to convey the philosophical conception of the transcendence of higher metaphysical realities. The notion of allegory, as Struck has argued (2010), is embedded in Plotinus’ understanding of the three-tiered organization of the universe which implies that behind every tier lies another hidden metaphysical source and especially that behind soul’s material manifestation lies a higher metaphysical reality. Plotinus’ concept of the two natures of soul, the undescended and the descended, lends itself perfectly to the mythological bifurcation of Aphrodite as οὐρανία and πάνδημος (Enn. III.5.8-9; Enn. VI.9.35). His hieratic utterance that “every soul is Aphrodite” (Enn. VI.9.35.31) captures Aphrodite’s noble birth and her ‘fallen-ness’. For him, “in the garden of Zeus” (Enn. III.5.9.22), Aphrodite οὐρανία is united with her father and comes into existence in love with god like “the noble love of a girl for her noble father” (Enn. VI.9.35.34-35), while in its fallen form, Aphrodite πάνδημος is “deceived by the blandishments of her suitors, she changes, bereft of her father, to a mortal love and is shamed” (Enn. VI.9 35.36-37). This Aphrodite, for Plotinus, is “a kind of whore” (Enn. VI.9.35.31). While Plotinus seeks philosophical truth in the myth of Aphrodite’s birth, Heliodorus explores its literary plasticity. He crafts Chariklea’s character as an allegory of soul’s duality--Aphrodite οὐρανία and πάνδημος, the rational and irrational parts of soul. His novel creates a Platonic landscape of desire and philosophical salvation not unlike Plotinus’ treatment of soul as an Aphrodite. Like Plotinus’ motherless Aphrodite οὐρανία (ἀμήτορα, Enn. III.5.2.18), Heliodorus’ Chariklea is introduced as raised without a mother (ἀμήτορες, Aethiopica 2.23.2.4). But the divine light in her eyes (Aethiopica 2.31.1), her chastity and her filial dutifulness (Aethiopica 6.9.4) hint at her extraordinary birth. Unlike Plotinus’ Aphrodite πάνδημος, however, when struck by love, Chariklea successfully controls her erotic desires and remains pure. In the words of one of her suitors, “it is not for bodily pleasure (πάνδημον Ἀφροδίτην) that I have decided that she should be mine” (Aethiopica 1.19.6).

These are only the preliminary findings of the allegorical web between Heliodorus’ portrayal of Chariklea and Plotinus’ interpretation of the myth of Aphrodite οὐρανία and πάνδημος. Both authors use allegory as a versatile tool of segregating and aggregating philosophical truth and literary form. The changing world of Heliodorus sends a powerful message of redesigning, on Platonic terms, the philosophical landscape from the Garden of Epicurus with its fleeting sensuality (Aethiopica 1.16.5), to the Garden of Zeus, the allegorical place where Aphrodite/Soul is united with the One (Enn. III.5.8). To do so one needs the contemplative acumen of Plotinus and the literary brush of Heliodorus.
Ὑπὸ Βορέου ἁρπαγεῖσα: Neoplatonic Reception of the Myth of Boreas and Oreithyia
Christina Panagiota Manolea

In the classical period the myth of Boreas seizing Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, is attested in rather well-known passages by Herodotus and Plato, while Aeschylus and Sophocles dealt with it in fragmentarily preserved works. Further on, in the Hellenistic period the myth is encountered in the works of Strabo, Pausanias, Diodorus Siculus, Philostratus, Nonnus and Apollonius Rhodius. But it is in the Neoplatonist philosophers’ works that the myth in question appears in a stimulating context. It is encountered in Porphyry (3rd cent. A.D.), Iamblichus (3rd-4th cent. A.D.), Hermias (5th cent. A.D.) and Proclus (5th cent. A.D.). Porphyry allegorized the myth, by connecting the North and South winds with the essence of the souls, the former contributing to the generation of the soul and the latter to its return to the divine. Iamblichus dropped no hint of allegory when he mentioned the myth as a reference to chronology in his discussion of the Greek dialects. On the contrary, Hermias, who actually wrote down the lessons of Syrianus, offered a double allegory of the myth - a metaphysical, that claims that the fertile power of earth is elevated thanks to divine providence, as well as a psychological, that refers to Phaedrus’ soul. Proclus, another disciple of Syrianus, was of the opinion that the myth should be interpreted allegorically because of its theological dimensions. Proclus rejected the physical reading of the story and attributed his own allegorical interpretation to Socrates himself. What is more, Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica (12th cent. A.D.), not only offered interesting etymological explanations of the name Oreithyia in his commentary on the Iliad, but in his commentary on the work of Dionysius Periegetes mentioned Hermias’ allegory of the Oreithyia myth on the one hand and proposed his own allegorical interpretation on the other. Eustathius’ reading has to do with the descent (κατάβασις) of Boreas from Heavens to Earth. What is more, he put forward a connection between the Oreithyia story and myths referring to the descent from Earth to Hades (the myth of Heracles’ aiming to seize Cerberus and Theseus and Pirithous’ attempt to capture Persephone). In our paper the focus will be on the Neoplatonic reception of the Oreithyia myth. The analysis of Porphyry’s, Hermias’ and Proclus’ allegorical expositions of it will prove that this allegory is well-placed in the complex Neoplatonic system of psychology and metaphysics. The extent to which Eustathius was influenced by his readings of Porphyry and Hermias will also be examined, so as to show that the pagan Neoplatonist philosophers formed an important link in the transmission of Greek mythology.

The Good of Dialogue Form: Proclus’ Neoplatonic Hermeneutics
Danielle Layne

The importance of allegory for the Neoplatonic interpreters cannot be overestimated. For the purpose of this paper, we shall see how allegorical exegesis allowed these thinkers to respond to a question which haunts almost all of the secondary literature on Plato: Why dialogue form? Why the use of characters, e.g. Socrates or Timaeus, and not one’s own authoritative voice? Further, why the need for extensive preludes, the elaborate references to settings like the public market or the gymnasium? In short, why did Plato use a literary medium to convey his philosophy? Was the choice of dialogue form and the use of characters like Socrates arbitrary,
mere window dressing to the arguments of the author; a charming addition that can be passed over or ignored? To this last question the Neoplatonists would have responded negatively as many of these thinkers, like Proclus, regularly began their Platonic commentaries with a detailed analysis of the literary elements of the text(s), arguing that what is “other” to the overt arguments or proofs (apodeixis) needs to be read allegorically. To focus this project we will turn to the hermeneutics of the late Neoplatonist Proclus. We shall primarily focus on how the dramatic form of Plato’s dialogues support the aim/skopos or intellect of the text while further promoting the manifestation of the Good of the text, i.e. the achievement of the skopos in the reader herself. First, the opening of the essay will discuss how Proclus’ metaphysics undergirds his hermeneutical strategy, concentrating on the fact that every part of the dialogue in some way corresponds to the whole of reality, i.e. the living cosmos. In the next section of the essay, we shall examine in detail the three parts of the dialogue that are central for understanding the integrity of the literary devices: 1) the “matter” or the characters, time and setting—what is sometimes referred to as the dramatis personae; 2) the “form” or the style of writing employed as well as the manner of conversation invoked by various characters; and, finally, 3) the “soul” or the overt subjects and/or arguments under discussion. In the penultimate section we shall discuss how these literary features contribute to discovering the intellect or overall aim of the dialogue. What shall become evident here is the importance of Proclus’ doctrine of cyclical creativity, where all the parts of the dialogue are connected in a series of causes to the “intellect” of the text that informs or causes the matter, form and soul of a dialogue in much the same way as “intellect” informs/causes all the various parts of the cosmos, from soul to matter. We will conclude with a discussion of the Good of the text which, should be regarded as clearly distinct from the aim/skopos. Remarkably, for Proclus, the dialogues are, as many contemporary scholars now assert, protreptic, i.e. they are intended to initiate a way of life insofar as they possess a transformative or purgative power. Nonetheless, as Proclus insists, for this Good of the text to be fully realized the reader of the text must engage with the text appropriately. In other words, the reader has to question and understand the pertinent symbols, icons and analogues so as to discover how all the parts of the text contribute to the skopos. More importantly, for the Good of the text to emerge, or be made actual, the reader must be affected in such a way as to actualize or realize that skopos in their life. Ultimately, Proclus shows that through the methods of allegorical exegesis Plato’s dialogues have the potential to assist in the “salvation” of all individuals “who now live” and also “for those to come hereafter.” (In Parm., 618. 11)
# AUTHOR INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apostol, Ricardo</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnush, Michael</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkins, Jed W.</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augoustakis, Antony</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avilés, Domingo</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker, Ashli J.E.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakogianni, Anastasia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber, Daniel</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiero, Emilia A.</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassi, Karen</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batstone, William</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beasley, Thomas H.</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertoni, Daniel</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billotte, Katie</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blandino, Peter J.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodel, John</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booth, Frederick J.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boylan, Michael</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradbury, Scott</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braund, Susanna</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunet, Stephen</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brusuelas, James</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruzzzone, Rachel</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bubelis, William S.</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugh, Glenn</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton, Paul J.</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell, Charles S.</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape, Robert W.</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardoso, Isabella T.</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caterine, Christopher L.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cave, Anne</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplin, Jane D.</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaudhuri, Pramit</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christesen, Paul</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinalli, Angela</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cioffi, Robert L.</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cirillo, Thomas M.</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claytor, Graham</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closs, Virginia M.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohn, Matt</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cole, Ellen</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman, Kathleen M.</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coles, Amanda J.</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conger McCune, Blanche</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connors, Catherine</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conybeare, Catherine</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cribiore, Raffaella</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cummins, Monessa F.</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtis, Lauren</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyrino, Monica S.</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dance, Caleb M.X.</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Das, Aileen</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day, Joseph</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeRose Evans, Jane</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Vivo, Sebastian</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiBiasie, Jacqueline F.</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilley, Paul</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillon, John N.</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiLuzio, Joseph A.</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiLuzio, Meghan</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Di Meo, Paolo</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodson-Robinson, Eric</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dos Santos, Sonia A.</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drake, Hal</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummond, Susan E.</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutsch, Dorota</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastin, Kristi A.</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmunds, Lowell</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehrhardt, Kristen</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehrlich, Simeon D.</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, Colin</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, Jacqueline M.</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, Tom</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellis, Anthony</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English, Mary</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewald, Owen</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fachard, Sylvian</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fagan, Garrett</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldherr, Andrew M.</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldkamp, Lisa</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flores, Guilherme G</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foley, Richard</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fomin, Andriy</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster, Andrew</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francese, Christopher</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fredrick, David</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fredricksmeier, Hardy C</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuchs, Gabriel L</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funderburk, Kevin</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaertner, Jan Felix</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner, Hunter H</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gellar-Goad, T. H. M.</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert, Ashley</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilhuly, Kate</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovagnoli, David</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goh, Ian</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden, Mark</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldman, Max L.</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green, Mira</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwood, Emily</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey, Cam</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurval, Robert</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallett, Judith P</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, Stephen</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartenburg, Gary</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haslam, Michael</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausburg, Bianca C.</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawes, Greta</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawke, Jason</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haynes, Melissa A.</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hejduk, Julia D.</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hendren, George</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henkel, John H.</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herz, Zachary R.</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holm, Seth</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubbard, Thomas K.</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irby, Georgia L.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iversen, Paul A.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izdebska, Anna</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaeger, Mary K.</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahn, Kirsten</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jazdzewska, Katarzyna</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jendza, Craig T.</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennings, David</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeppesen-Wigelsworth, Alison</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joho, Tobias</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Kenneth R.</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaiser, Anna</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamen, Deborah</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kania, Raymond</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith, Thomas</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kellogg, Danielle</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy, Rebecca F.</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyser, Paul</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Lawrence</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaiber Hersch, Karen</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klein, Viviane Sophie</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kneebone, Emily</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knox, Peter</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopff, E Christian</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraus, Christina S.</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kronenborg, Leah</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuipers, Christopher M.</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurke, Leslie</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutzko, David</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larash, Patricia</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaValle, Dawn</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavan, Myles</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layne, Danielle</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee, Mireille</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leese, Michael S.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lefebvre, Kerry</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenksi, Noel</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard, Amy</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lepisto, Scott A.</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessie, Alexander J.</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levin-Richardson, Sarah A.</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li, Yongyi</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu, Katherine</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luggin, Johanna</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunt, David</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lytle, Ephraim</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maciver, Calum</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacQueen, Bruce D.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major, Wilfred E.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marincola, John</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master, Emily L.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCallum, Sarah L.</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author Name</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGill, Robin E</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McInerney, Jeremy</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLaughlin, Jonathan</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meinking, Kristina A</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimbreta Olarte, Susana</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monoson, Sara</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, John D</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, Kathryn A</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morton, Peter</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mowbray, Carrie</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mueller, Melissa Y</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulhall, John P</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Jackie</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabel, Jake</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neel, Jaclyn</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichols, Robert</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholson, Nigel</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oksanish, John</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliva Neto, Joao Angelo</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Rourke, Donncha</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oskvig, Kyle</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oswald, Simon</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owens, Patrick</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paga, Jessica</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panagiota Manolea, Christina</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandey, Nandini B</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papakonstantinou, Zinon</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park, Arum</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parrott, Christopher A</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass, David</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payne, Richard</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perris, Simon</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterson, Anna</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phin, Timothy J</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piller, Katharine E</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poochigian, Daniel</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poole, Ursula M</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popescu, Valentina</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter, David S</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prodi, Enrico Emanuele</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappold, Adam C</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reeber, Joy E</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards, John</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riess, Werner</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigolio, Alberto</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, Miranda E.M.</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roller, Matthew</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenmeyer, Patricia A</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, Amy</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutherford, Ian C</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanders, Kirk R</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sansone, David</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanlon, Thomas</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiller, Alex K</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schor, Adam</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schott, Jeremy</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schur, David</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwinge, Elisabeth</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sears, Rebecca</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secord, Jared</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seidman, Jessica</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shannon, Kelly</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapiro, Alan</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp, Kendall R.</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw, Carl</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheppard, Alan</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi, Veronica S</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilo, Amit</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short, William M</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonton, Matthew</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skillicorn, Amy</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, R. Scott</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Steven D</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soleon, Kevin</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayskal, Byron</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stein, Charles D</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Claire</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorp, John</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tober, Daniel</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tong, M.</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torlone, Zara M</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracy, Emmett P</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traweek, Alison</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trout, Dennis</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trundle, Matthew</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trzaskoma, Stephen M</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuck, Steven L</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tully, John A.N.Z.</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uden, James</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Bladel, Kevin</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van den Berg, Christopher</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasconcellos, Paulo S.</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vidovic, Goran</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vieira, Brunno V.G.</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vieron, Matthew P.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent, Heather</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volker, Jaime</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waddell, Philip T.</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward, Laury A.</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watanabe, Akihiko</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watanabe, Albert</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wazer, Caroline.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiss, Naomi A.</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weisweiler, John</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welch, Tara</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesolowski, Deanna</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitlatch, Lisa</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitmarsh, Tim</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wibier, Matthijs H.</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widzisz, Marcel A.</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter, Thomas N.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witzke, Serena S.</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wohl, Victoria</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yates, Velvet</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoon, Florence</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, Elizabeth</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>