Plato

This paper argues for two theses based in Socrates' digression on midwifery in the Theaetetus (148e-151d). It posits, firstly, that the philosophical significance of this famous passage has surprisingly suffered relative neglect in the literature. It submits, secondly, that the philosophical significance of Socrates’ account of his midwifery calls for a reevaluation of the role played by Socrates in this dialogue and its sequels.

The claim Protagoras makes in Plato’s Protagoras that only satisfied students pay his fee is often ignored, yet this payment structure proves the incompatibility between Protagoras’ pedagogical practice and the teaching of virtue. The dialogue revolves around an examination of whether virtue can be taught, as Protagoras insists that his instruction makes men better, despite Socrates’ skepticism.

Plato’s use of proverbs has largely been ignored, even though proverbs appear more frequently in the dialogues than other prose of the time. This paper demonstrates how Socrates’ reference to the folk proverb “If a wolf sees you first, you go dumb” as first-person narrator in Republic 1 frames the exchange with the arch-sophist Thrasymachus as a competition to coin the most memorable and quotable proverb to define justice.

This paper explicates Plato’s engagement in the Crito with the ideology of courage specific to Athenian democracy, thereby complicating the traditional interpretation of the dialogue. In the Crito, Plato depicts Socrates refusing to escape from prison, where he awaits execution, and arguing that to break the law would be to harm the common good.

This paper argues that the Euthyphro and the Phaedo work together literarily to contextualize Socrates’ relationship with Athenian religion in the Apology more consequentially than is usually recognized. The question of the literary, philosophical, and chronological relationships between Plato’s dialogues remains lively and contested.

I argue for the following claims: (1) The overall cosmogony presented in Plato’s Timaeus ought not to be read literally but as an extended metaphor; (2) Reading the text metaphorically shifts the explanatory emphasis from efficient causation to final causation; and (3) in light of this approach I retain ἀεί at 28a1.

In Plato's Critias, Hephaistos is set apart from the other gods for his philosophia and philotechnia. As philosophia is a loaded term for Plato, this raises the question: what makes Hephaistos philosophical? And, can exploring this throw light on Plato’s conception of his own philosophical project?

This paper develops a novel interpretation of the account of Solon’s Egyptian trip in Plato’s Timaeus. Plato’s purpose in having Solon travel to Egypt to acquire his fabulous story about Atlantis, I argue, is not to bolster the story’s authority and credibility, as is usually supposed (see, e.g., Joly 1982: 259-62; Capra 2010: 206-9, 213). Rather, his aim is to invite careful reflection on the story’s philosophical value.

Aporia and Insight in Plato’s Parmenides

A major crux in the biography of Lysias is establishing when he and his brother Polemarchus returned to Athens from Thurii. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the two’s close connections to Athens made them personae non gratae after the Sicilian Expedition, leading to a return post-413 (D.H. Lys. 1). This, however, clearly contradicts the appearance of the two in Plato’s Republic and the references to Lysias’ presence in the city in the contemporary Phaedrus, both set around 420 (Brandwood 1990).