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Varro and His Influence in the Fourth and Fifth Century Latin West

By Michele Renee Salzman

Varro’s vast range of writing and original learning gave him the reputation for being Rome’s greatest scholar in the Augustan age, but his influence lasted well into late antiquity. Today, most scholars state this because his Antiquitates humanarum et divinarum was attacked so forcefully, and hence preserved albeit in fragmentary citations by Augustine in his Civitas dei. Varro’s theology and learning make him the perfect representation of pagan error.

Trees into Nets: Network-based Approaches to Ancient Greek Treebanks

By Francesco Mambrini and Marco Passarotti

(Additional presenter: Marco Passarotti Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan)

"Networks" are rapidly evolving into the dominating model for scientific knowledge. Networks -­ it has been argued -­ "will drive the fundamental questions that form our view of the world in the coming era" [1: 7].

Aristotle and the Physiology of Sense Organs

By John Thorp

Much thought has been given, and many pages have been devoted, to the debate between "literalist" and "spiritualist" interpretations of Aristotle on sense perception.[1] The literalists, broadly, hold that in perception the organ quite literally takes on the perceived quality – eyes become red and tongues become salty – and that that is all that needs to be said.

Virtue and External Goods in Aristotle

By Jay Elliott

In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes two central claims about the substantive content ofeudaimonia or “happiness”: (1) that happiness is “activity of the soul in accord with virtue”[1]; and (2) that happiness “needs external goods,” such as friends, wealth, and political power.[2] Taken independently, each of these claims is intuitively plausibl

Self-Love and Self-Sufficiency in the Aristotelian Ethics

By Jerry Green

The aim of this paper is to compare two of the most vexing passages in Aristotle’s ethical works, Nicomachean Ethics (NE) IX.9 and Eudemian Ethics (EE) VII.12. Both chapters discuss the same topic, whether the self-sufficient person will have friends, and both answer ‘yes’. So it is natural to see same argument in both chapters.[1]But this, I argue, is mistaken.