Benjamin J. Folit-Weinberg (University of Bristol)
aēr in Homer has rarely been discussed; the few studies that do address it usually focus on the word’s semantics and scope of reference in the world of physical objects (Louis 1948). This paper argues that that approach is misguided, and that we should focus instead on how aēr works and what aēr does, both for the poet responsible for composing the Iliad and the Odyssey and to characters within these poems. Ultimately, I argue that, in the first case, aēr offers the poet a stratagem for navigating complex narrative demands, and, in the second, aēr is best understood in terms of the phenomenological effects it produces on Homeric characters. In the remainder of the paper, I explore implications of these claims for, first, discussions of Homeric things and objects, particularly those influenced by New Materialism (Bielfeldt 2014, Purves 2015, Canevaro 2018, Grethlein 2020), and, second, our understanding of the Presocratic thinker most associated with aēr, Anaximenes. The paper thus makes contributions not only to Homeric scholarship, but also to discussions of New Materialism, Anaximenes, and the history of archaic thought.
The first phase of the paper examines Aphrodite’s use of aēr to rescue Paris in Iliad 3 as a paradigmatic appearance of aēr in Homer. Noting its close association with divinities and counterfactuals (Louden 1993), I argue that aēr appears primarily when the poet confronts a set of complex, often incompatible, narrative demands; aēr offers the poet a resource for negotiating these successfully. Second, looking at two further episodes where aēr appears (Apollo’s assault on Patroclus in Iliad 16; Odysseus’ movements among the Phaeacians in Odyssey 7), I argue that within the world of the story, aēr produces a phenomenological effect on characters by rendering things impermeable to sight and disrupting other cognitive and epistemic processes.
The second phase of the paper develops these insights by observing incompatible claims made about aēr by two distinguished Homerists. Kirk claims that aēr in Homer is “visible and obscuring” (Kirk 1985), while West insists that it is “the very stuff of invisibility” (West 1966). I argue that both views find solid support in Homer (e.g. Il. 17, Od. 7, respectively), and suggest that rather than advocating for one view or the other (as commentators usually do), we should instead reconsider what it means for something to be a stuff, thing, or object in Homer. In this, the paper both contributes to, and also challenges, existing discussions of New Materialism in the field.
Finally, I build on this last claim by touching briefly on the role played by aēr in the theories of the Presocratic thinker Anaximenes. I observe that aēr’s ambiguous qualities make it ideal for Anaximenes’ physical theories, which, given his place in Milesian thought, require an entity that is both somehow visible and invisible. This discussion helps us understand Anaximenes better; by providing a more sophisticated understanding of archaic stuffs, things, and objects, it also points the way toward addressing the paradox identified in the previous paragraph.