Leo Trotz-Liboff (Duke University)
Four Forms of Philosophic Esotericism in Cicero’s De natura deorum
Cicero published his philosophic dialogue De natura deorum in 45 BCE just a few years before his death. Not only is it the earliest fully extant work devoted to theology from the Greco-Roman world, but Voltaire called it, along with the Tusculans, one of “the two most beautiful works that merely human wisdom has ever written” (1878, 181 my trans.). Voltaire’s unqualified praise is perhaps less shocking now that a veritable renaissance of Cicero’s philosophy has taken place in the 20th and 21st centuries (on Cicero’s philosophy, see e.g. Büchner 1971; Leonhardt 1999; Fox 2007; Atkins and Bénatouïl 2021; for his influence, Altman 2015; Hawley 2021; Stuart-Buttle 2021).
Another element of Enlightenment philosophers’ reading of Cicero, however, still has the power to surprise, namely their claim that Cicero, along with other ancient philosophers, was esoteric, meaning that he concealed the views he actually held (see Rousseau 1776, 54 n. 17; Diderot 2013; Szczekalla 1988, 86-87 on Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; see Melzer 2014 on esoteric philosophy generally). While these Enlightenment figures view Cicero positively, Augustine, an ancient critic of Cicero’s, also contends that Cicero hid his true atheism through the structure of De natura deorum (De civ. D. 5.9).
In this paper, I follow these philosophers’ lead to argue that Cicero makes esoteric philosophy thematic to a greater extent in De natura deorum than in his other works. I do not, however, agree that Cicero’s atheism is the true teaching concealed in the dialogue. Rather, I identify four forms of philosophic esotericism Cicero explicitly discusses in the work. The first is pedagogical: Cicero conceals his own views so his authority does not prevent readers from exercising their own judgment (N. D. 1.10-13; cf. Tusc. 5.10-11). Aligning with teaching methods of the skeptical New Academy, this is the only type of concealment previous scholarship addresses (e.g. Atkins 2013, 19; Wynne 2019, 44; Brittain and Osorio 2021, 28). Next comes protecting oneself against religious persecution, shown by atheists’ reticence to express their true views following the impiety trial of the agnostic Protagoras (N. D. 1.63). Third is public utility, indicated by the Academic interlocutor Cotta’s insistence that Roman religion must be upheld for political stability (1.118), although he himself doubts whether the gods exist (1.61; cf. Döring 1978). Finally, the Stoic Balbus reads poets as concealing philosophy allegorically (2.63-64; see Buffière 1956, 137-154). Authors who interpret allegorically may also adopt this practice in their own compositions, and Cicero elsewhere endorses allegory as a rhetorical technique (De or. 3.166-167; Orat. 94).
After examining these passages in relation to prior and contemporary authors, especially Critias (DK 88 B 25), Plato (Tht. 152c8-10; Prt. 316c2-317c1), Polybius (6.56.6-15), and Varro (R. D. fr. 7-11, 20-22 Cardauns), I will consider whether, and if so why, Cicero as an author practices one or more of these forms of esotericism in De natura deorum and indicate the broader implications of my argument for the study of Cicero’s philosophy.