Stephen James Hughes (Harvard University)
While dramatised trials and references to law are common throughout Athenian tragedy (see e.g. Allen 2005; Harris, Leaõ & Rhodes 2010), Euripides’ Hippolytus stands out especially for its close engagement with contemporary legal discussions. In a set of opposing speeches (936-80, 983-1035), Theseus and Hippolytus effectively partake in a form of litigation as they argue concerning the latter character’s supposed sexual violation of his stepmother Phaedra (see e.g. Barrett 1983 ad loc., Lees 1891: 28-31). The allegation in question —which the audience knows to be false—stems from a suicide note left Phaedra, levelling a spurious accusation of rape to protect her own reputation while destroying that of Hippolytus (715-21, 724-31). As Theseus condemns his son and Hippolytus protests his innocence, discussion inevitably turns to the matter of evidence, with each party proffering different forms of proof in arguing for the truth or falsity of the charge. For his part, Theseus presents an argument from likelihood (eikos) that Phaedra would not have killed herself out of enmity (958-65) or instability (966-70), construing Phaedra’s corpse as the most reliable witness (971-2) and crediting the libellous document over Hippolytus’ pleadings (1057-9). In defending himself, by contrast, Hippolytus contends that the accusations against him are inconsistent with his character (994-1006), citing the absence of motive (1007-20), complaining about the lack of witnesses (1022-4, cf. 1074-5) and finally tendering an oath that he did not act as alleged (1025-31). While the chorus (1036-7) and the messenger (1249-54) accept Hippolytus’ arguments, Theseus curses his son and drives him into exile, only to later learn from Artemis herself that he did so prematurely and with insufficient confirmation (1321-4, cf. 1051-2).
Through a close comparison with surviving forensic speeches, the present paper argues that this dispute as staged by Euripides engages closely with contemporary discussions regarding problems of fact-finding in the courts of democratic Athens. In addition to debates regarding the proper quantum of evidence (cf. Hughes 2021), 5th- and 4th-century speeches feature lively disputation regarding the most appropriate methods of proof and the relative probative values of different forms of evidence. Theseus’ credence in the libellous note of Phaedra in this respect emerges as a questionable approach given the pitfalls inherent in interpreting documentary evidence (cf. Dem. 1.12-3, 46.16-7; Is. 1.41-3, 4.12-5) and the potential for various forms of tampering (Dem. 29.36, Isoc. 17.23, 17.33-4, cf. Is. 4.13, 7.1-2) and forgery (Ant. 5.53-6; Dem. 43.4, 45.2, 45.22, 46.11, 46.28; Is. 3.23-5, 9.7, 9.14-5, 9.31). In addition, Theseus’ dismissal of Hippolytus’ defence cuts against perceptions regarding the stability of character (Dem. 34.38-40, 36.55, 44.37-8, 52.29; Din. 1.45) and inverts the hierarchies which litigants elsewhere seek to establish between different forms of proof (Dem. 47.8, 55.35; Hyp. 1a.15; Lys. 19.61). In effect, by depicting a flawed approach to fact-finding, whose disastrous consequences are all too apparent, Euripides’ Hippolytus offers a salutary lesson to contemporary theatregoers in their capacity as prospective jurors, exemplifying the potential for tragedy more broadly to contribute to the decisions of the city’s popular courts.