Evan Rodriguez (Idaho State University)
In this presentation I argue that the dominant narratives about Plato’s rivalry with his sophistic contemporaries do not sufficiently account for formal similarities between philosophical and sophistic methodology. Rather than showcasing a superficial opposition on every point, the two sides in fact form a single family of inquiry that, in their own terminology, essentially involves the use of antilogic (ἀντιλογία) to systematically incorporate multiple sides of a debate. We need to appeal to non-formal elements to understand Plato’s own distinction between philosophy and sophistry and to develop a more accurate picture of their historical relationship.
Despite the ample attention given to Platonic and sophistic method, scholars have framed these topics in a way that does not allow for revealing methodological relationships both within and between these two domains. Individual methods are often discussed in isolation from one another and treated as simple alternatives. Some works, such as Marina McCoy’s Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists, take it as a given that Plato puts the truth front and center, while the sophists care little for the truth or for their pupils. Others, such as Håkan Tell’s Plato’s Counterfeit Sophists, offer an independent analysis of sophistic texts to push back on this interpretation, but they do not question whether it is one that Plato himself believes. I argue, however, that Plato himself draws attention to the formal similarities inherent in the use of antilogic and that, despite real methodological differences, both can and did show a genuine interest in truth and wellbeing.
The ancient usage of ἀντιλογία and its cognates shows that antilogic can refer to one long speech given in response to another (for example Thucydides 1.31, Aristophanes’ Wasps 545, and Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1414b3), but also that it can refer to a short retort or simple reply (for example Thucydides 8.53, Lysias fr.2b, and Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1418b23–24). Despite not having these associations in the literature today, both Plato and his contemporaries also use this term for short question-and-answer debate (for example, Plato’s Sophist 225b11 and Isocrates’ Antidosis 45). The latter is usually associated with Plato and Socrates, while longer opposed speeches are usually associated with the sophists; as it turns out, we can find both types of antilogic on either side. In the end, Plato uses non-formal elements to distinguish philosophic and sophistic methodology, what I call a method’s “internal aim”, in dialogues such as the Sophist, Phaedrus, and Euthydemus. Internal aims are distinct from aims external to the method in question; in other words, a single method can be used for different ultimate ends.
As a result, I argue that historical sophists such as Protagoras and Gorgias were likely, at least sometimes, engaged in philosophy in the Platonic sense. Plato was most worried about more superficial followers coopting any of their methods for “sophistic” (in the Platonic sense) ends. Plato’s engagement with the sophists, then, was much more dialogical and inclusive than the dominant narratives suggest.