Sinja Küppers (Duke University)
Rhetoric was part of the standard education of churchmen. Nonetheless, its use in Christianity was contentious (see Asay 2015). This paper analyzes how the fifth-century church historian Sozomen made Classical rhetoric acceptable in a Christian context by emphasizing persuasion through truth and character rather than the art of eloquence. He thus informs us about Christian communication culture and practices of community building in a formative period of church history. My paper defines what is at stake in the discussion of Christian rhetoric, explores the Christian distinction of persuasion and eloquence and critically discusses the extent to which persuasion was a matter of persuasion or force.
A recent edited volume (2020) demonstrates that the ancient art of persuasion has gained much interest across genres and topics but omits persuasion in Christianity. This paper seeks to close the gap and argues that rhetoric carried the traditional rivalry between philosophers and sophists while developing into a Christian rhetoric of persuasion. Bishops either successfully “convinced” (πείθειν) peers of their own interpretation or were deemed heretic “innovators” (νεωτερισμοί, Soz. HE 1.15, 1.18, 6.26). Church historians mapped these persuaders and innovators on the traditional rivalry between philosophers and sophists. Heretics were thus portrayed as contentious sophists (see Socr. HE 5.10, Eus. HE 7.30.8) while bishops opposing heretics, such as Gregory and Basil, renounced sophistry and committed themselves to philosophy (see Soz. HE 6.17).
Despite this cultural appropriation, my paper shows that the church historian Sozomen attempted to redefine Christian rhetoric as distinct from sophistic rhetoric. E.g., Eustathius, who was famous for the purity of his life, was neither eloquent nor had studied the art of eloquence but was highly skilled in persuasion (see Soz. HE 3.14). Even John Chrysostomos who had studied rhetoric and was highly eloquent did not convince people by rhetorical art but with sincerity (see Soz. HE 8.2). These two examples indicate that Sozomen made persuasion through character and truth a condition for Christian rhetoric and, unlike Aristotle (see Classen 1989, Sprute 1994), did not separate rhetoric from moral use. He thus reaffirmed Christian persuasion as distinct from sophistic eloquence, whose primary goal was to display argumentative skills, not to persuade (see Gagarin 2001).
However, studying descriptions of consent in church history reveals that behind the pretext of persuasion through character and truth often lied force. E.g., when Constantine declared Christianity the state religion, Sozomen frames this imperial declaration as completely consensual (κοινῇ συνθήκῃ): Constantine persuaded the whole nation (πανδημεί; παντὸς τοῦ ἔθνους) to prefer Christianity (μᾶλλον Χριστιανίζειν ἀνέπειθεν, Soz. HE 2.7). When persuasion was unsuccessful – i.e. people did not obey (πείθεσθαι Soz. HE 1.21) –, Constantine “threatened [them] with punishment” (ἠπείλησε τιμωρεῖσθαι). Finally, anecdotes embedded in church history illustrate that this Christian rhetoric of persuasion also impacted families and private power relations. E.g., a man pressured his wife to either convert or leave him. She secretly adhered to heresy until, exposed by a divine sign, asked for forgiveness and consented to her husband (ὁμοφρονοῦσα τῷ ἀνδρὶ συνῆν, Soz. HE 8.5).
This paper should appeal to scholars in ancient rhetoric, Second Sophistic, church history, philosophy, gender and sexuality.