JM.Romney (Mac Ewan University)
At the end of the sixth century, Cleomenes asserted that only a fool would think the Spartans would travel three months from the sea (Hdt. 5.50); at the beginning of the fourth, however, Agesilaus was planning to do just that when a revolt among Sparta’s erstwhile allies drew him back to the Peloponnese (Xen. Hell. 4.2). Within roughly one hundred years, something drastically changed in how the Spartans perceived the space of the oikoumenē, their place within it, and the ease of crossing that space. This paper proposes to examine this change, beginning with archaic Sparta’s perception of itself within wider Greek and Mediterranean networks before turning to how the Peloponnesian War, the march of the Ten Thousand, and finally Agesilaus’ campaigns in Asia affected Spartan perceptions of the space of the wider Mediterranean world.
To do so, I will begin with archaic Sparta, where the local ivory carving school and tradition of grotesque masks shows evidence of sustained contact with Syrians and Phoenicians (Barnett 1948, 13-16; Dawkins 1929; Dickens 1929; Burr Carter 1987). Historiographical sources speak of Spartan campaigns across the Aegean against Samos (Hdt. 3.39), while Sparta’s alliance with Lydia (Hdt. 1.69-70) may have contributed to theories centering the world on Sparta and Sardis (Munn 2006, 200-202); both show engagement with the “near” spaces of Anatolia and the surrounding islands, while the Spartan delegation to Cyrus the Great in Sardis (Hdt. 1.152) speaks to Spartan confidence in crossing the spaces of the eastern Greek world. Analysis of the Corinthian complaints about Spartan conservatism in the opening stages of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.68-71, 1.120-25), however, suggest that this confidence wavered in the Classical period, perhaps due to the combination of Pausanias’ blunders with the Ionians in 478 and the helot revolt in 464. The multiple theaters of the Peloponnesian War forced this to change, as Sparta operated (to varying degrees) in Sicily, across mainland Greece, and Ionia. A new, mobile Sparta emerged from the war, one whose new confidence in its capacity to cross space is seen in the willingness of Spartan officers to follow Cyrus the Younger into Babylon and of the Spartan body to support Agesilaus’ campaigns in Asia.
As this paper will argue, this analysis of Sparta’s place within Mediterranean networks indicates that the perception of Sparta as “landbound” is questionable. Sparta is not bound to its land, but rather to its capacity (or its perception of its capacity) to move. As their capacity changes, the Spartans’ willingness to move changes accordingly, something that Agesilaus takes advantage of in the early third century. I will also suggest that alongside changing perceptions around Sparta’s place in the oikoumenē, we can also see shifts in how Sparta defines itself as protector of Greeks. In the Archaic period, Sparta presents a defensive face against Cyrus, whereas by the end of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartans take a far more offensive stance, which includes a willingness to go beyond the boundaries of Ionia, let alone mainland Greece.