Taylor S. Coughlan (University of Pittsburgh)
Over the past several decades literary studies have profited from theoretical advances in cognitive science and the study of human consciousness (e.g. Zunshine 2006; Leverage et al. 2010). The cognitive turn has now arrived to the study of ancient literature (e.g. Meineck et al. 2019). In particular, Theory of Mind (Nichols and Stich 2003; Goldman 2006), the innate human tendency to speculate about the thoughts of others, has enriched our understanding of literature, including consciousness and characterization in epic (Scodel 2016; Minchin 2019) and tragedy (Budelmann and Easterling 2010). In this paper, I extend the concept of Theory of Mind to our reading of literary epigram. Since epigram often provokes and invites readers to supplement the information provided in an epigram with their own knowledge (Bing 1995), Theory of Mind presents a complementary conceptual framework to explore the cognitive processes at play in epigram.
As a case-study, I apply Theory of Mind to ecphrastic epigram. Ecphrastic epigrams often prompt the reader to speculate on the mind within or behind the image they describe, highlighting the blurred boundaries between art and personhood. Asclepiades AP 16.120, on Lysippus’ bronze portrait of Alexander the Great, underscores the lifelike quality of the bronze, especially its brazen gaze, through the creation of a hypothetical scene that invites mind-reading: Alexander appears as if he is just about to address Zeus in acknowledgement of their shared regal roles on earth and in the heavens (cf. Posidippus AB 64 on the bronze statue of Idomeneus). Antipater of Thessalonica AP 16.143, the first in a series of epigrams on Timotheus’ famously incomplete painting of Medea (Gutzwiller 2004; Gurd 2007), directs the reader to observe (ἴδ᾽) the eyes of Medea. The speaker of the poem reads one eye as raised in anger and the other subdued in pity for her children, thus using non-verbal cues to access and read the divided mind of the tragic mother (cf. the later Antiphilus AP 16.136 on the ἤθεα δισσά detectable in Timotheus’ painting).
To conclude, I turn to a non-ecphrastic epigram in order to consider the broader application of Theory of Mind in the study of epigram. I focus on Callimachus AP 12.134, whose speaker coolly observes the mental anguish of love-sickness in one of his fellow symposiasts. While the stranger thinks he keeps his suffering hidden (ἐλάνθανεν), our speaker reads his mind. Callimachus’ epigram perceptively acknowledges the human impulse to read the minds of others through their non-verbal behaviors while also underlining the challenge of accessing the mind of another. The speaker of the poem has special access to the mind of the symposiast not because he can simply read his demeanor (ἀπὸ ῥυσμοῦ; cf. Archilochus 128W; Theognis 963-64W) but rather through the shared cognitive experience of heartache (φωρὸς δ’ ἴχνια φὼρ ἔμαθον).
As snapshots of lives and objects, Hellenistic epigram compels its readers to imagine and speculate. Theory of Mind offers a fresh framework to access and appreciate the cognitive mechanics of the genre.