Umit Ozturk, Stanford University
The study of institutional diffusion and isomorphism is an undertheorized topic of inquiry in ancient history, partially due to endemic data scarcity. The traditional narratives of diffusion primarily operate on a center-periphery model, assume one-way diffusion from the center to the periphery through coercion, and neglect any mode of local adaptions of or reactions to the institutions imposed by imperial systems. This old institutionalism is rightly outdated, and the last two decades of scholarly work have explored both the exogenous and endogenous origins of imperial institutions, emphasized the pragmatic flexibility of imperial systems, and illustrated the creative responses to imperial fiscal extraction at the local level. Building on this scholarship, the purpose of this paper is to provide, firstly, a complete conceptual framework on institutional diffusion following DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) distinction between coercive, mimetic, and normative processes leading to the convergence of institutional practices and organizational schemas. Secondly, in order to leverage the explanatory power of non-coercive processes, this paper examines the role of mimetic processes with respect to the ways in which they can account for imperial state formation in the fiscal domain as a case study.
To do so, I focus on institutional learning pertaining to imperial tribute and tax farming practices in three imperial systems: Athens, Persia, and Ptolemaic Egypt. While the diffusion of fiscal and monetary institutions between Athens and Persia as well as diffusion between Athens and Ptolemaic Egypt have been studied separately, the possible role of mimetic isomorphism forces us to complement the short-term network-based explanations for why imperial systems in the fiscal domain tend to converge despite their dissimilar political economies and cultural textures. In particular, I argue that modeling the Athenian tribute system on the Persian one and the Ptolemaic tax/rent farming system on the Athenian one is a choice primarily concerned with reducing uncertainty and managing risk in response to abrupt changes rather than a result of revenue-maximizing decisions. The act of emulation in each case provides a familiar toolkit for negotiation, offers legitimacy thanks to an already successful model, and still allows for divergence from the original models in the course of adoption and adaptation. Finally, I conclude with the larger implications of mimetic processes for explaining the institutional change in non-imperial transformations. While the historians of the archaic period already make use of emulation as a means of diffusion, classical and Hellenistic institutional history relies heavily, if not solely, on coercion and competition as the dominant modes of explanation. In return, I propose that a focus on mimetic isomorphism can help us not only reframe the history of ancient empires but also bridge the historiographical ruptures across different periods and geographies, and tailor truly connected histories of the eastern Mediterranean and beyond.