Rebecca Frank, Colby College
Croesus’ test and subsequent consultations of the Delphic oracle and his failure to understand the meaning of the Pythia’s words stand as some of the most famous examples of the Delphic oracle’s impressive divinatory ability as well as the enigmatic nature of the Pythia’s responses. The accuracy of the Pythia’s words and Croesus’ culpability for failing to understand her message underlie Herodotus’ Croesus logos. Herodotus does not question the Pythia’s divinatory powers or those of Delphic Apollo, and his tale is one of human failing, rather than divine malice or deception. Far from undermining the oracle, Herodotus uses the Delphic oracle in the Croesus logos and throughout his Histories to support the credibility of his authorial voice (e.g. Kindt).
In this paper, I trace the transformation of the Croesus episode by Greek philosophers writing in the first and second centuries CE, including Dio Chrysostom, Oenomaus of Gadara, Lucian, and Maximus of Tyre. Although the Delphic oracle’s political power had largely been in decline since the Hellenistic age (e.g. Parke, Levin), Delphi still held a prominent position in Greek literature and cultural memory during the imperial era (e.g. Luce), and this is reflected in the philosophical literature of the period (e.g. Busine). I demonstrate how imperial era philosophers manipulate the fall of Croesus as a narratological tool to present their unique understandings of divine ontology and the corresponding role and validity of oracular divination. I argue that these authors transform the tales of Croesus’ interactions with the Delphic oracle into examples proving, for example, the absence of reciprocity in the relationship between humans and the divine (e.g. Maximus of Tyre Oration 5) and the nature of divine language (e.g. Dio Chrysostom Discourse 10), while also serving as a useful tool to disprove the utility of oracular divination and standing as evidence of divine ignorance or indeed malice, should the Delphic oracle stories be believed (e.g. Oenomaus of Gadara Fr. 5; Lucian Zeus Catechized, Zeus Rants).
While the use of Croesus as an example of ambiguous oracular responses was not an invention of the post-Hellenistic era (e.g. Aristotle Rhet. 1407a 32-37), the proliferation of extant reinterpretations of the Croesus tale and their centrality to key philosophical tenants of a number of prominent imperial Greek authors warrants more careful study. By exploring how authors use the same tale as a medium to communicate and prove contradictory philosophical concepts, I reveal the central role that Delphic oracle stories played in the debates between imperial Greek philosophers over questions of both divine and human ontology and epistemology, and how through competing interpretations of the past they debated the validity and meaning behind religious beliefs and practices in their own day.