Christopher Parkinson, University of Melbourne
The focus of this paper is to explore the meaning of the pantomime of the judgment of Paris at the end of Book X of The Metamorphoses (Met.10.29-34) and to connect this to a systematic reading of the narrative as a whole. I will argue that the location of and authorial commentary within this scene position it as a thematic climax of the first ten books, and, consequently, render this a vital section for understanding Apuleius’ authorial values. Central to this is an inset philosophical apostrophe in this passage which contextualizes a noteworthy tone shift from the bawdy humor and bad behaviors of the preceding books to the sober depiction of religious conversion in Book XI (Zimmerman. 2000). Furthermore, Apuleius’ personal criticisms of myth’s impact on real-world human decisions may provide insight into the larger narrative - both in condemnation of behaviors depicted in its variae fabulae and also as a reason underlying the need for the higher principles of the final book (Finkelpearl. 1991).
To argue this, I will be leaning on information from Apuleius’ biographical background, primarily his own history with the courts and his status as a Platonic philosopher. In particular, Apuleius’ prior history of being prosecuted (related in his Apologia) might inform our reading of his criticism of judgment corrupted by the pursuit of pleasures. This potential anxiety with the legal system calls into question the values of punishment within this scene - that of condemning a woman ad bestias. While Apuleius’ own theatrical displays of crime and punishment presented in his narratives (Summers. 1970; Francis. 2001) align with the type of performative punishments standard in Roman law (Coleman. 1990), there is a lingering question about whether Apuleius condones or condemns these practices, especially considering their conflict with Platonic attitudes towards education and punishment (Rep. 335b).
Despite facetiously referring to himself as a “philosophizing ass” (philosophantem asinum, Met 10.33), Apuleius perceived a serious link between his own prosecution and that of Socrates (Riess. 2008) - a discussion of whose prosecution is featured prominently in this passage. By extension, Apuleius’ criticism of the myth of Paris’ judgment not only aligns with the Platonic criticism of the didactics of mimesis (Gorg. 502a-e, Rep. 388c & 607b) but potentially is presented as an archetype of this problem. Considering that many of The Metamorphoses’ inset narratives have been viewed as parodies of myths set, ostensibly, in the real world, (Scobie. 1975) one is invited to consider whether Apuleius’ ultimate attitude towards such stories is that they teach misaligned values, and consequently reduce higher concepts to the base and animal. If this is so, then it might explain why Apuleius depicts the gods within this pantomime as highly eroticised human actors and why he says that such myths create “forum cattle” (forensia pecora) and “vultures in togas” (togati vulturii) who pervert the legal system (Met.10.33).
If this is the case, then the sharp turn away from mimesis and towards direct religious experience and moral legal practice by the end of Book XI, I would suggest, comes into better focus for his modern audience.