Mariana Beatriz Noé, Harvard University
Given Plato’s interest in philosopher-kings in the Republic, one could think that the Laws includes some sort of “philosophical virtue”—understood as the characteristic of a virtuous leader. But as prominent as Plato’s interest is in the role of philosophy in the Republic, we cannot take for granted that we should look for the Laws’ stance on this issue. After all, φιλοσοφία is not mentioned once in the Laws.
This absence has always puzzled interpreters, and we can organize a lot of thescholarship about the Laws according to the types of solutions they gave to this puzzle. For the purposes of my argument, I want to focus on three prominent proposals. The first approach holds that philosophers do not “disappear” in the Laws. In continuity with the Republic, where philosopher-kings take center stage, in the Laws—they argue—different figures take on the same exact role (see Barker 1918, 340 n. 2; Cherniss 1953, 377-378; Morrow 1960, 573; Saunders 1972, 10; Brisson 2005, 109; and Rowe 2010, 42). A second approach consists in claiming that law takes philosophy’s place in the Laws. This interpretation captures the elevated role that the law plays in Magnesia (see Yunis 1996, 214; Sauvé Meyer 2006; Frede 2017; and Sauvé Meyer 2019). A third approach holds that Plato oscillates between a “guardian-centered” and a “law-centered” position, and that this oscillation responds to a pragmatic concern (see Stalley 1983, 57; Laks 1990; Schofield 1999, 221; Laks 2000; Laks 2001; Schofield 2010, 26-27; and Bartels 2017, 14).
In this paper I argue that, in Plato’s Laws, neither human beings nor laws secure the stability of the city of Magnesia. The political stability is secured by “sealed” laws. I first show that Plato designs a multi-level testing system for all state officials, who are considered forever at risk of being corrupted. Because nobody in the city has an exceptional virtue that makes them trustworthy, human rulers do not secure stability. Next, I turn to the notion of law. I argue that Plato envisages a process of ongoing revision—and thus no true stability—for them. Laws are subject to change and amendments because they must fit human needs. They require beautifying, restoration, correction, and evaluation when confronted with practice. Because laws are not naturally immutable, the Athenian proposes an artificial halt to the laws’ perpetual change—a “sealing” process. In sum, in the Laws Plato thinks more deeply and more explicitly about the question of what it means for politics that human beings are unstable; his proposal becomes pragmatic as a result.