Jonathon Greig, KU Leuven
In texts like the Timaeus Commentary, Proclus argues that sensible particulars, which are characterized as divisible and partitioned, contain in themselves a “partless form” (ἀμερές εἶδος: cf. III.34.12–15 [Van Riel]/II.25.6–9 [Diehls]) from which divisible, separate qualities, matching the divided character of bodies, come to be. This stands in stark contrast to Plotinus in texts like Ennead VI.3.8, for whom sensibles are each collections of qualities but lack any underlying substantial form or essence by which those qualities are united—in other words a “bundle theory” conception of sensibles. Proclus clearly denies such a conception (e.g. III.35.1–3 [Van Riel]/II.25.15–17 [Diehls]): for him, even if particulars at the sensible level are not true being (τὸ ὄντως ὄν), an explanation of the qualities that pertain to such particulars, even if they are divided and partitioned, must relate a proximate, immanent form which is the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) for those qualities.
Why Proclus rejects Plotinus and affirms this conception of sensible particulars is still somewhat unclear and hasn’t been well-considered in the literature. On the one hand, Proclus agrees with Plotinus’ basic Platonic position that the Forms, at the level of Intellect, are the true basis for substance found in sensibles: the latter mirror their transcendent causes, in contrast to an Aristotelian position denying transcendent causes for sensible particulars’ substance. Unlike Plotinus, however, Proclus still finds the need to affirm the ontological status of immanent, substantial forms, if in a derivational sense, in juxtaposition to Plotinus’ denial of any derivation between the intelligible and sensible (cf. e.g. Enn. VI.1.3.1–9).
In this paper I aim to give a closer look at Proclus’ understanding of sensible substance, looking particularly at his interpretation and rejection of Plotinus’ bundle theory, and how he understands the ontology of sensible particulars in light of his broader metaphysical framework. One clue in this will be Proclus’ conception of participation (cf. e.g. Proclus, Elements of Theology, Prop’s. 23–24, vs. Plotinus, Enn. VI.5.11.31–38), where instead of all particulars participating one source (for Plotinus), the framework for participation is divided between one unparticipated source and many intermediate participated causes: hence, for Proclus, each particular participates in a proximate, participated cause which is unique only to that particular and not another, while the source of the participated principles, by not belonging to any specific participants, remains unparticipated. Connected to this, and perhaps more importantly, is the shifting conceptions of identifying the individual, e.g. either as a unique, non-repeatable configuration of qualities (ala Plotinus) or as a unique, non-repeatable substrate or immanent form as the container for qualities (ala Proclus). Hence this paper will try to give a thorough examination of Proclus’ notion of sensible substance amidst the late antique concern to address the ontology of sensible particulars—an important consideration as the foundation for natural philosophy.