Stephen White (University of Texas at Austin)
The isolated pronouncement traditionally known as fragment B3 of Parmenides has exercised outsized influence for its brevity: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστί<ν> τε καὶ εἶναι. For some these words express the central insight of the entire poem: “auf diesem einen Satze beruht seine ganze Philosophie” (Reinhardt 1916, cf. Cassin 1998, Kimhi 2018). For others, they underpin the decisive opening argument of B2 (Diels 1897, Wedin 2014, cf. Laks and Most 2016). Yet their enigmatic phrasing has made this incomplete verse a site of continuing controversy. Are we to understand the claim, following the ancient sources who report it, as “dasselbe ist Denken und Sein” (Diels 1951, cf. Kahn 1969, Long 1996, Sedley 1999)? Or take archaic and classical usage as our guide: “dasselbe kann gedacht werden und sein” (Zeller 1919, cf. Barnes 1982, Coxon 1986, Palmer 2009)? Or does resolution of these questions simply depend on how we understand the rest of the poem (Mourelatos 1970)?
Here I set those controversies aside to address a basic question that has yet to receive due attention: whether B3 is an authentic verse of Parmenides in the first place. The available evidence, I argue, decisively favors a mixed verdict. We have three different witnesses to B3 who cite it in various forms on eight occasions: Clement of Alexandria cites a partial verse once (Strom. 6.23.3); Plotinus cites the same wording twice (Enn. 5.1.8, 5.9.5) and similar phrases another three times (1.4.10, 3.3.8, 6.7.41); and Proclus cites similar formulations twice (In Parm. 1152.27, Plat. Theol. 1.14). All three report other verses of Parmenides both accurately and consistently, which makes the variation in their wording here at least suspicious. Worse, if B3 is an independent fragment, then considerations of meter and syntax show that their testimony is seriously corrupt. However, their familiarity with other parts of the poem provides a ready and compelling explanation for the variation. Examination of the context in which Proclus and Plotinus cite the verse shows that their wording derives instead from a passage in B8, in fact one often cited as a parallel. In short, the several variants currently joined under the umbrella of B3 do all derive from Parmenides; they simply paraphrase a genuine verse that is preserved in its original form and context elsewhere. Demoting B3 from the status of fragment to testimony, then, is not a loss but an advance, one that illuminates the poem’s reception, obviates distracting disputes, and redirects attention to the substantial body of verse that does survive intact.