Lies and Laughter: A Metaliterary Reading of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes

Lies and Laughter: A Metaliterary Reading of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes

Although Hermes’ lies in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes have been widely discussed in the scholarship (Bungard, Fletcher, Heiden, Pratt), an interpretation of these lies within the debate about the nature of archaic poetry and its relationship with truth, lies, and literary fiction is still lacking. In this paper, I propose a metaliterary reading of the hymn, treating it as a song about songs and their nature. I argue that, while there are many elements that contribute to shaping a traditional vision of poetry as an expression of truth, Hermes’ ability to manipulate language and the playful way in which his lies are recognized by Apollo and Zeus suggest a new conception of poetry, where lies (and literary fiction) are welcomed and appreciated.

First, I analyze those features of the text that support a metaliterary reading. Hermes is portrayed as the inventor of the lyre and as a singer himself, whose songs mirror the entire hymn in which they are embedded, but also as a manipulator of reality and language, able to lie and create misleading signs (Vergados). Thus, the hymn shows a high level of self-reflexivity: the ambiguity of language becomes the core of the narration and poetry is the principal subject of poetry itself.

I proceed then to analyze the elements that might suggest a traditional conception of poetry: the invocation to the Muse (1), usually connected with a claim of truthfulness; the invocation to Mnemosyne in Hermes’ second song (429-430), which emphasizes the historical nature of the song; and the parallelism between poetic art and prophecy, both seen as expression of divine knowledge, suggested by the repetition of the verb ἐρεείνω/ἐξερεείνω (483, 547, 564).

If these elements point toward a “poetics of truth” (Finkelberg) and a traditional vision of the poet as maître de vérité (Detienne), in this case the poet himself, Hermes, god of deception, does not really fit this role. There are indeed other elements that suggest a different view of poetry, in which lies are admitted and enjoyed. I analyze the words connected with the semantic range of pleasure and joy, associated with the lyre and its sound (28-32, 419-423), but also with Hermes’ mendacious speeches (281, 389-390): both poetry and lies provide pleasure and elicit the same feeling of amusement, as expressed by the same verb γελάω. I suggest that this association shows a new awareness of the possibilities of poetic language and an increasing recognition of the concept of literary fiction.

Hermes’ lies have long been associated with Odysseus’ lies (Pratt, Shelmerdine), but they differ in their nature and reception: while Odysseus’ lies are usually believed as truth, Hermes’ lies are not intended to deceive, but rather to charm and amuse. Apollo and Zeus laugh because they appreciate Hermes’ ability to speak skillfully, ἐπισταµένως (390). The author of the hymn is proposing a new concept of lies, as a literary tool that the poet can use, and a new concept of poetry, more open to personal creativity and invention.