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Cicero and Seneca as Aristotelians

By Robin Weiss

Aristotle describes reason and desire as working so closely in tandem that one can hardly be separated from the other (De An. 433a9-12; 433b21-30). One might even speak of them, under ideal circumstances, as one and the same. Our task here is to show that, unlike for Aristotle—for whom desire is distinct enough from reason that it can sometimes move in the opposite direction—the unity or reason and desire is not just an ideal state of affairs for Seneca. It is as nature preordained that reason and desire should be inseparably joined.

Aristotle on Body Sense

By John Thorp

This paper enquires about Aristotle's treatment of body sense; by 'body sense' is meant cognition of the state of our bodies, such items as itches, chills, hunger, cramps etc. At first it seems that Aristotle takes very little account them, and even fails to realize that – just as he has provided an account of perception of external objects – he owes us an account of this province of consciousness as well.

Plato's Hippias on the Power to Do Wrong

By Anna Greco

In the Hippias Minor, Socrates raises the question whether liars have the power to do something or nothing (365d). In general, cases such as telling a lie raise the question whether agents have the power to do actions that are wrong, incorrect, or otherwise such that a good person would not want to do.

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