Skip to main content

Pleasure and Motivation in the Eudemian Ethics

By Giulia Bonasio

The nature of pleasure and its role in the good life are much debated topics among Aristotelian scholars. Scholars agree that perceiving something as pleasant often entails believing that it is good. They stress that this process may lead one to consider something as good when it is not and they tend to emphasize the illusory and deceptive nature of pleasure. Jessica Moss argues that pleasure is the apparent good.

Why the view of the Intellect in De Anima I.4 Isn't Aristotle's Own

By Caleb Cohoe

The status of nous in Aristotle’s De Anima (DA) has been controversial from antiquity onwards. Is it simply a power of the human soul, albeit one that may be able to function without the body (I will call this the Human Intellect view)? Is it a unitary extra-bodily intelligence, human in species, which individual human beings temporarily participate in (I will call this the Platonist Intellect view)? Is it the first unmoved mover of Metaphysics Λ (I will call this the Divine Intellect view)?

Inventing Incommensurability. Traces of a Scientific Revolution in Early Greek Mathematics in the Time of Plato

By Claas Lattmann

Most of early Greek mathematics lies in darkness: though Thales at the beginning of the 6th century BCE might have been the earliest Greek mathematician, as the ancient tradition has it, the first auth­entic first-hand testimonies date only from the first half of the 4th century BCE. All that we know about the earlier stages of Greek mathematics comes from later authors who, however, were (re-)writing them in the terms of (post-) Euclidean mathematics.