Carthage and the Mediterranean

In the aftermath of the Battle of Zama (202BC) the general Hannibal returned to his native city of Carthage after an absence of 36 years, at the age of 45. After so many years as an international political figure of heroic dimension, his domestic reception may actually have been more bruising than what he was used to abroad. At home, Hannibal was a deeply divisive figure both within the governing elite and, we can imagine, among the wider populace. Both Romans and Carthaginians were happy to lay all the blame for the disasters of the recent war squarely on Hannibal’s shoulders.

The sufet (or shofet) has a long history in Near Eastern politics as a designation for power. At its core, the term means nothing more than ‘Judge’. At Carthage, the office appears in the epigraphic record in the mid-5^th century BCE. The title is used to designate the chief political officials, two of which were elected annually. From the 4^th century BCE, a small number of cities in the western Mediterranean of Phoenician origin also record the office of sufet.

The monumentalization of the Punic settlements of Sicily in the late period of the Roman Republic has greatly affected the preceding Phoenician and Punic levels. Almost all significant indications of the Phoenician and Punic phases of the island come from Motya and Selinus, which were not built over in the Roman era. These cities show an urban organization with buildings aligned to the settlement perimeter.

This study presents new contributions about the Phoenician and Punic remains in Sardinia. The Phoenician and Punic phases were erased by restructuring measures in Roman times. In many cases no valuable evidence can be retrieved and documented anymore. With regard to the oldest phases of the Phoenician colonization, the most interesting data originates from Sant'Imbenia, which is located on the west coast near Alghero. Phoenician as well as indigenous materials have been found in the layers of the settlement, which argues for a hybrid culture.

‘Carthaginian imperialism’ is the term that is widely used to describe the extent and impact of Carthaginian or more generally Punic influence and power; at the same time, however, it is also a notion that has rarely been scrutinized critically – with the notable exception of C.R. Whittaker’s probing discussion back in 1978.

This paper explores Carthaginian strategies for mobilizing military manpower during the First and Second Punic Wars. Ancient and modern commentators have usually viewed Roman manpower superiority as a decisive factor behind the Roman victory, yet Carthaginian manpower resources were substantial. Between 218-214 BC, Carthage had more men under arms than Rome. Carthaginian manpower peaked at approximately 170,000 men in 215 BC, a magnitude similar to the peak Roman mobilization of the war.