Trading in the Dark: Smugglers, State, and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean
By Ümit Öztürk (Stanford University)
The proliferation of new institutionalist approaches to the making of ancient economies has been shaping our understanding of the interplay between societies and economies over the last two decades (Bresson; Lewis et al.; Ober). As part of these theoretical frameworks, the fundamental questions of economic history have been treated mainly from the perspective of legally compliant economic behavior. The large scope of narratives, theoretical necessity to do away with anomalous behavior, and data scarcity could be held responsible for this focus.
Philetaerus of Pergamon: Seleucid Servant or Independent Actor?
By Gregory John Callaghan (University of Pennsylvania)
Philetaerus, ruler of Pergamon and the founder of the Attalid dynasty, broke away from Lysimachus in 282 and used the vast wealth he appropriated from his former master to finance a robust foreign policy, with a high number of attested benefactions to numerous sanctuaries and cities. Because many of these gifts were to sites under Seleucid control, they raise several questions as to why the Seleucids would condone such involvement within their realm, or why Seleucid-controlled cities would accept these gifts and risk Seleucid ire?
Patterns of Property Ownership on Hellenistic Delos (314-167 BCE)
By Michael McGlin (Temple University)
This paper investigates practices and behaviors related to private property ownership on the island of Delos during the period of its political independence (314-167 BCE). Previous work on property and property ownership on Delos has explored several different arenas. It has established the existence of private property on the sacred island and the various forms of property offered as security for temple loans (Reger 1992).
Maritime Lenders Managing Risk in 4th Century Athens
By Andrew Foster (Fordham University)
Embedded within the 4th century Athenian maritime contract preserved in Demosthenes’ Against Lacritus is evidence that maritime lenders charged different rates of interest at different times and destinations based upon the relative risk of each prospective journey:
‘With all goodwill and eagerness’: Reciprocity in Seleucid Grants of Royal Land
By Talia Prussin (University of California, Berkeley)
Under the Seleucid kings, royal land grants created a reciprocal relationship parallel to Ma (2000)’s conception of the relationship between Antiochus III and the cities of Asia Minor based in euergetism. Traditionally, the grant is understood as repayment by the king for services rendered, such as military or diplomatic work, by the recipient. I argue that this relationship did not end with the grant but rather was constituted by it. After the grant was made, there were further expectations of good behavior from the recipient of land.