Popular Politics and Ancient Warfare

Historians are critical of views that make naval power a condition for democracy at Athens (Ceccarelli 1993, van Wees 1995; Gabrielsen 2002) and elsewhere in Greece (Robinson 2011: 230-37) as a mirage of ideology (e.g. Gabrielsen 2002: esp. 209-12). This paper seeks to pinpoint the moment of elite ideological formation and contestation in perceptions of a “bottom-up” organization in the Athenian navy and democratic culture.

Xenophon reduced the conflict between Lysander’s war aims and those of the Spartan King Pausanias after Sparta’s victory over Athens in 403 BC to personal issues, stating that King Pausanias envied Lysander’s growing, almost omnipotent power, and that he worried about Lysander’s desire to “make Athens his own.” (Xenophon, Hellenika 2.4.29).

This paper offers a new approach to the generation-old problem of “democracy” in the Roman Republic by looking at democratic features in the most prominent institution within the Republican state--the citizen army. In the past thirty years, much ink has been spilled on the extent that the Roman state can be classified as a democracy (the debate largely sparked by Miller 1984). Most scholars have focused exclusively on voting in assemblies in Rome to elect magistrates and pass laws, although Nicolet 1980 does explore some of the political implications of military service.

Scholars have traditionally considered the military one of the key factors underpinning the distinctively egalitarian political trajectory of ancient Greece. Whether it is the influence of hoplite tactics on Archaic government or the contribution of the navy to Athenian democracy, military participation has been thought to have a significant effect on the broadening of political participation (Hanson, Strauss, Raaflaub).